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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the basic concepts of the metaphysics of the pre-critical Kant is the early modern, Leibnizian 
concept of the world as a synthetic whole of simple substances. Space is the order according to 
which these simple substances coexist, in the presence of God.  Kant’s turn to critical philosophy 
contained a re-evaluation of Leibnizian metaphysics. Space is an ideal form of sensibility, not a real 
order of coexisting simple substances.  This dissertation argues that Kant’s critical turn inspired 
him to outline a new science of subjective space – the Transcendental Aesthetic.  
    Leibnizians argued that our knowledge of space is innate, but still abstracted from the common 
sense idea of extension. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant responded that this misrepresents our 
knowledge of the subjective space, which is the topic of the Transcendental Aesthetic.  An 
exposition of the marks of the concept of subjective space not only shows that space is a form of 
sensibility, but that it is a continuous, actually infinite whole, which precedes its potentially infinite 
parts. In Kant’s terminology space is an analytic whole, which gives a key to the ideality of space, 
according to this dissertation. 
    One important topic in the literature concerns Kant’s awareness of the Leibnizian alternative that 
space might be both a form of sensibility and an order of coexistence. This dissertation claims that 
Kant could not rule out this alternative completely. However, in one aspect, Kant was successful: 
Leibnizians had to admit that continuity belongs to space, not as an order of coexistence, but as a 
form of sensibility. We see all things in continuous space, not in God.  However, seeing things in 
space is analogous to seeing them in God.  
 
   Keywords: metaphysics, early modern philosophy, space, ideality   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Kantin niin sanotun esikriittisen metafysiikan yksi leibnizilaisista peruskäsityksistä on, että 
maailma on yksinkertaisten substanssien muodostama synteettinen kokonaisuus. Tässä 
näkemyksessä avaruus on järjestys, jonka mukaisesti yksinkertaiset substanssit ovat yhdessä 
olemassa Jumalan läsnäollessa. Kantin kriittiseen filosofiaan sisältyy leibnizilaisen metafysiikan 
uudelleen arviointi. Sen sijaan, että avaruus olisi yhdessä olemassa olevien yksinkertaisten 
substanssien reaalinen järjestys, avaruus on aistimellisuuden ideaali muoto. Tässä väitöskirjassa 
esitetään, kuinka Kantin kriittinen käänne sai hänet hahmottelemaan uuden subjektiivisen 
avaruuden tieteen – transsendentaalisen estetiikan. 
    Leibnizilaiset väittivät, että tietomme avaruudesta on sisäsyntyistä, joskin abstrahoitu 
arkiajatteluunkin kuuluvasta ulotteisuuden ideasta. Puhtaan järjen kritiikissä Kant puolestaan 
väittää, että leibnizilaiset vääristävät tietomme subjektiivisesta avaruudesta, joka on aiheena 
transsendentaalisessa estetiikassa. Subjektiivisen avaruuden käsitteen erittely osoittaa, että avaruus 
on paitsi aistimellisuuden muoto, myös jatkuva, aktuaalisesti ääretön kokonaisuus, joka edeltää sen 
potentiaalisesti äärettömiä osia. Kantin terminologiassa avaruus on analyyttinen kokonaisuus, joka 
tässä väitöskirjassa esitetyn perusteella toimii avaimena avaruuden ideaalisuuteen. 
    Tutkimuskirjallisuudessa tärkeä aihe on, miten tietoinen Kant oli leibnizilaisesta vaihtoehdosta, 
että avaruus saattaisi olla sekä aistimellisuuden muoto että yhdessä olemisen järjestys. Tässä 
väitöskirjassa esitetään, ettei Kant voinut kokonaan sulkea pois tätä vaihtoehtoa. Yhdessä mielessä 
Kant kuitenkin onnistui: leibnizilaiset olivat pakotettuja myöntämään, että jatkuvuus kuuluu 
avaruuteen aistimellisuuden muotona eikä yhdessä olemisen järjestyksenä. Näemme kaikki oliot 
jatkumollisessa avaruudessa, emme Jumalassa. Niiden näkeminen avaruudessa on kuitenkin 
analogista niiden näkemiselle Jumalassa. 
 
Asiasanat: metafysiikka, uuden ajan alun filosofia, avaruus, idealismi 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
 
One of the fundamental claims made in the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) is that space is not real.  Thus, according to Kant, space is the way that coexisting things are 
given to our sensibility, not the container or relation in which they coexist independently of our 
sensibility. In Kant’s terminology space is not a “determination” (Bestimmung) of things in 
themselves, but merely a form of sensibility.1 From now on, I will therefore refer to this 
metaphysical thesis about space as Kant’s “transcendental ideality claim”.  
    One way of addressing the transcendental ideality claim is to consider it in the context of Kant’s 
intellectual development. Roughly, and with much simplification, one can divide Kant’s intellectual 
development into three major periods: the pre-critical period from 1746 to 1770, the silent decade 
from 1771 to 1781 and the critical period from 1781 to his death 1804.  In addition to this, it is also 
common to divide the pre-critical period into two periods: the dogmatic period 1746-1760 and then 
the sceptical or empirical period from about 1761-1769.  
    Often the turn from the pre-critical period to the critical period is associated with the year 1769, 
the year when a “great light” fell upon Kant, according to his own recollections.2 What makes the 
critical turn important is that it records Kant’s first documented efforts to defend the transcendental 
ideality claim. The main points of the critical turn are, I think, nicely summarised by Benno 
Erdmann (1851-1921), in his introduction to Reflexionen Kants zur Kritischen Philosophie:  
 
Thus the epoch-making discovery of the year 1769, is (1) the specific distinction between the sensibility 
and the understanding, (2) the [transcendental] ideality of space and time, and thereby the preparation for 
(3) the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon, briefly the transcendental idealism, which first is 
developed for us in the dissertation from the year 1770 de mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et 
principiis, [and] which we, now enriched by this term itself, retrieve in the Cosmology of the Critique of 
the Pure Reason, as a result of the [Transcendental] Aesthetic.3   
 
 
    Erdmann not only suggested that the critical turn revolved around three very specific claims, but 
he also had a very definite hypothesis about why Kant made these claims and how they are 
interconnected. Thus, according to Erdmann, Kant’s claims were a highly elaborate response to a 
deep-seated conflict in 18th century Germany, between Newtonian oriented mathematicians and 
Leibnizian oriented metaphysicians. Whereas mathematicians dealt with mathematical bodies, like 
spheres, which were indeterminate with respect to the number of their parts and their size, 
metaphysicians dealt with real bodies, which were determinate in this respect. Though each party 
could have it their own way, as long as they kept to their special fields, problems ensued as soon as 
they entered their common arena – physics.  
                                                 
1 A26/B42. 
2 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 5037, Ak. 18, p. 69.  
3 My translation, J.J. Erdmann (1884, p. xlv). Numbering added by me, J.J.     
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    To the metaphysicians it was clear from the outset that a physical body, like a silver ball, must 
conform to the impeccable standards of their thinking. This means for instance that we can expect 
the silver ball to have a definite radius, from which we can calculate its volume, etc.  The very same 
standards also told the metaphysician that the silver ball must consist of a determinate number of 
parts, which is only possible if these parts, in their turn, consist of determinate parts, until we reach 
the ultimately simple parts, which are without parts. Physical bodies are, for short, nothing but finite 
wholes of ultimately simple elements, and what holds for the physical bodies holds for the world 
as well, for the world is nothing but a gigantic physical body or machine.         
    To this, the mathematicians answered that the metaphysicians failed to realise that the sphere is 
a spherical part of space, which is continuous and hence indefinite with respect to its parts. Even if 
the spherical part of space, which the silver ball fills, has a finite size, this is not true of space as a 
whole, which is of indeterminate size and hence mathematically infinite. So, unless the 
metaphysicians were ready to accept that the world is surrounded by an empty space, they would 
have to recognise that the world is also mathematically infinite.       
    Leibnizians had different strategies to cope with this challenge, as will be seen. On the one hand, 
they could insist that physical bodies and the world are finite, with respect to both their extension 
and the number of their parts.  On the other hand, they could recognise that their critics had a point, 
and accept the possibility that the number of parts of physical bodies is actually infinite, and that 
this holds for the world as well.  Metaphysics cannot answer one of the most fundamental question 
of cosmology, namely whether the world is finite or infinite.   From the point of view of pure reason, 
it is perfectly possible that both the thesis and the antithesis are true.   
    On Erdmann’s interpretation, the contradictions or antinomies inherent to Leibnizian cosmology 
are the key to Kant’s critical turn and, in fact, even his entire transcendental philosophy.4 The critical 
turn was a transcendental turn, a turn towards transcendental philosophy, which made it possible 
for Kant to recognise the body purely as an appearance, and to trace this transcendentally ideal 
representation back to its sources, in either the sensibility or the understanding. Moreover, Erdmann 
also argued that large parts of Kant’s transcendental philosophy were contained in the solution of 
the antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason, and that the Transcendental Aesthetic had a 
particular role in granting this solution.  
    This study tries to present a somewhat novel reading of Kant’s transcendental ideality claim and 
the arguments he gave for it.  My reading will evolve against the background of a discussion of the 
developments in Kant’s thinking, which led to the transcendental turn. In this discussion, I have 
tried to follow Kant’s own texts as carefully as possible. This means that I have considered not only 
Kant’s published works, but also his letters and handwritten notes on metaphysics.5  Occasionally 
I have also used Kant’s lectures on metaphysics, in the cases when they prove to be consistent with 
each other, and with the ideas expressed by Kant in his own handwritten notes.6      
    In my reading of Kant’s texts, I have tried to follow the principle of charity. I have put the main 
burden on myself as a reader, in those cases when I have stumbled upon passages and arguments in 
                                                 
4 Erdmann (1884, pp. xxv-xxvii). 
5 Kant’s published works are contained in volumes 1-9 of the Akademie edition of Kant’s collected works. 
The letters are contained in volumes 10-11, and the handwritten notes and fragments in volumes 14-19.  In 
this study I have mainly used Kant’s handwritten notes on Alexander Baumgarten’s (1714-1762) textbook 
on metaphysics, which are contained in volume 15 and volumes 17-18 of the Akademie edition.    
6 I have mainly used the lecture notes which are contained in volumes 28-29 in the Akademie edition.    
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Kant’s texts, which I have found difficult to interpret and understand.7  In these efforts, I have 
mainly supported myself with books, papers, and letters of thinkers which Kant was personally 
familiar with and reckoned as important. I have put less emphasis on secondary commentaries, 
unless I have deemed that they are helpful to emphasise or understand the points Kant tries to make.       
    The general picture, which emerges from my reading, is that ideas, which originated from early 
modern philosophy in general, and Leibnizian metaphysics in particular, were important factors 
behind the transcendental turn. More specifically, I will argue that Kant presented the fragments of 
a new science of space, a kind of proto-version of the Transcendental Aesthetic in the course of 
these developments. I will also argue that these fragments will help us to reconsider and understand 
Kant’s arguments for the transcendental ideality claim in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Thanks to 
this, we are also in a better position to understand Kant’s response to the Leibnizian critics of the 
transcendental ideality claim.        
    The disposition of the rest of this chapter is as follows. Sections two, three and four deal with 
previous discussions of Kant’s intellectual development and the transcendental turn.  Sections five 
and six contain a discussion of Kant’s new science of space, i.e. his proto-version of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. Section seven contains an outline of a new reading of Kant’s inaugural 
dissertation, where he first presented his new science of space. Section eight summarises the 
implications which the previous studies have for the interpretation of Kant’s arguments for the 
transcendental ideality claim, as he presents them in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Section nine, 
finally, contains an overview of the subsequent chapters.   
 
1.2. Previous Studies of the Dogmatic Period  
 
One recurrent theme in the literature on the dogmatic period concerns the question of Newton’s 
relative influence on Kant.  Schönfeld for instance interprets Kant’s pre-critical thinking as an 
attempt to integrate Newtonian physics in a universally comprehensive philosophy of nature.8 
However, Kant scholars like Erdmann, Eric Watkins and Anja Jauernig reject this reading.9 In their 
interpretation, influences from Newton were not as decisive for Kant’s philosophical development 
as his desire to solve the metaphysical problems he inherited from his rationalist predecessors, 
Leibniz and Wolff.  
    Leibniz had argued that extended bodies in space ultimately are aggregates of ontologically and 
causally independent monads or simple substances.10 However, this seems to generate an antinomy 
between the body as on one hand a continuous phenomenon in space and on the other hand a discrete 
whole of monads or simple substances. Here we cannot just declare that one of the incompatible 
predicates is false, but we must demonstrate how it is possible for something discrete to show itself 
                                                 
7 Markus Nikkarla’s recent study of Kant’s transcendental deductions gives a good example of how to apply 
the principle of charity, which is close to my own understanding of the principle; see Nikkarla (2017, pp. 
26-7). 
8 Schönfeld (2000, pp. 3-14). 
9 Jauernig (2008, pp. 41-2), Watkins (2005, pp. 1-180), Erdmann (1884, p. xiv); for similar views, see 
Paulsen (1875, pp. 29-30).  
10 Monadology §§ 1-3, G VI 607, AG 213. For a discussion of the concept of ontological independency in 
the philosophy of Kant, see Warren (2001, pp. 37-58).  For a broader discussion of the connection between 
the notions of ontological independency, causal independency simplicity, substance and conceptual 
independency, outside the context of Kantian philosophy, see Koistinen/Viljanen (2009, pp. 2-3).   
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as a continuous phenomenon in space. In other words, demonstrate how it is possible for actually 
infinitely divided wholes of simple, indivisible substances to be localised in space and become parts 
of extended bodies, which are potentially infinitely divisible.   
   Though the scope of the problem of the antinomy seems restricted to the metaphysics of bodies, 
it actually also reproduces itself in cosmology as well. Like the material bodies, the world is on one 
hand a continuous whole of outer phenomena in space, but on the other hand also a discrete whole 
of simple substances. Furthermore, if God has made the simple substances (monads) ontologically 
and causally independent of each other, how can one explain that these simple substances exist and 
are localised in the same outer world?  
    Leibniz had answered that monads could be connected with each other because they are 
harmonized with each other by God, from the outset of their creation.11 However, contemporaries 
of Leibniz, like Foucher, had pointed out that Leibniz’s theory of the pre-established harmony 
seemed to make the outer world superfluous; if the monads and their states exist independently of 
each other it was equally thinkable that each monad existed with God, in a world of its own.12  
    Watkins argues that Kant responded by outlining a new cosmology, based on the theory of 
physical influx he inherited from his teacher Knutzen.13 In Kant’s revised version of this theory, all 
simple substances depend on God as the common cause of their existence, which explains why they 
coexist and interact in spite of their ontological and causal independence.  Simple substances are 
not monads, but physical monads, endowed with repulsive and attractive forces, by virtue of which 
they occupy a definite space.  Discrete composites of physical monads are perfectly unextended, 
but by virtue of their repulsive forces they still occupy a continuous, extended space. 
    However, if it is true that Kant worked with Leibnizian themes in the pre-critical period and 
perhaps throughout his career, as Erdmann, Watkins, and Jauernig argue, how then should we 
explain the critical turn or transition from the pre-critical period to the critical period? Did the 
critical turn take place at all, or would it be better to speak about a smooth transition from pre-
critical to critical philosophy? 
    Watkins tends to lean to the latter conclusion.14 Thus, although Watkins recognises the 
discontinuities between the pre-critical and the critical period, he also underlines that there are some 
continuities between them. For instance, Kant never abandoned the cosmology of simple substances 
he outlined during the pre-critical period, although he made it a matter of belief, based on practical 
reason.15 Erdmann on the other hand emphasises that the critical turn was a decisive transformation 
of Kant’s thinking, and that the transcendental ideality claim was a decisive feature of this 
transformation.  Erdmann also argues that this claim can be seen as a solution to the antinomy 
inherent to Leibniz’s cosmology, for if space is a form of external phenomena only, and not the 
monads, then it follows that continuity and infinite divisibility only belongs to the phenomenon of 
the world, not to the world in itself.16  
    Though Erdmann’s explanation is very close to the truth, it does provoke an objection, recently 
made by Falkenstein, namely that Kant suggests a solution to the antinomy already in the pre-
critical period.17 To repeat, monads are physical monads, according to the pre-critical Kant, so even 
                                                 
11 New System, G IV 484-5, AG 144.  
12 Objections de M. Foucher, G IV 488-9.   
13 Watkins (2005, pp. 1-180).  
14 Watkins (2005, pp. 181-4). 
15 Watkins (2005, pp. 182). 
16 Erdmann (1882, p. 31) and Erdmann (1884, pp. xxiv-xxviii, xxx-xxxvii). 
17 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 300-1).   
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if the monads are indivisible, the spheres of activity of the repulsive forces of these monads are 
continuous and infinitely divisible.   
    In this work, I will argue that the studies of Schönfeld and Carpenter provide a better explanation 
of Kant’s rejection of the physical monadology, which also makes it possible to understand the 
developments which led to the transcendental turn.18  Kant had to revise the earliest version of his 
metaphysics and cosmology, but not because of the antinomies. Rather he revised his own thinking 
because he wanted to explain how it is possible for a thinking soul to interact with its body, without 
having to assume that the soul fills a place in the body like a physical monad. Let us now consider 
this interpretation in some closer detail.   
 
 
 1.3 Previous Studies of the Sceptical Period 
 
Kant’s first efforts to revise the metaphysics of physical monads are visible in his lectures and 
unpublished writings during the early 1760s. Many commentators have noticed that Kant’s 
questioning of the physical monadology seems to be rooted in deeper-seated doubts about the 
meaning, purpose and validity of metaphysics in general and Leibnizian and Wolffian metaphysics 
in particular. On the surface, it looks like the standard account of Kant’s intellectual development, 
according to which Kant turned away from the dogmatic, rationalist metaphysics he had defended 
in the earliest stage of the pre-critical period (1746-1760) is well supported.  
   In Kuno Fischer’s classic version of the events, Kant’s encounter with Hume was decisive for the 
break with the dogmatic period.19 Accordingly, it was Kant’s reading of Hume that made him realise 
that real grounds are different from logical grounds, i.e. that causes do not entail their effects in the 
same way as a logical ground entails a consequence. This rupture marked the beginning of Kant’s 
sceptical period, which Friedrich Paulsen and Erdmann also associated with the transition from 
rationalism to “empiricism” or “critical empiricism”.20  More recently, Beiser has described the 
early 1760s as the “period of disillusionment”21 marked by a break with “rationalist epistemology” 
and the rejection of all metaphysics that “transcends the limits of experience.”22 
    However, Beiser does not attribute any role to Hume in Kant’s transition from dogmatism to 
scepticism; according to Beiser it was Kant’s reading of Rousseau that made him convinced of the 
flaws of rationalist metaphysics, in particular with respect to its notion of the ends of all human 
intellectual activity.23 Beiser’s reading is in this sense opposed to the reading defended by Watkins, 
in which Hume’s influence was decisive for Kant’s distinction between logical and real grounds 
and which in turn made it possible for him to improve the ontological framework behind the theory 
of physical influx.24 Thus, according to Watkins Kant’s reading of Hume did not make him a 
                                                 
18 Schönfeld (2000), Carpenter (1998).  
19 Fischer (1897, pp. 138, 290-7); for an interpretation in the same tradition, see Vaihinger (1881, pp. 46-8).   
20 Paulsen (1875, p. 37); Erdmann (1884, p. xvii).  Note that both Paulsen and Erdmann deny that Hume 
had anything to do with Kant’s alleged transition to empiricism in the early 1760s, although Paulsen, 
surprisingly, seems to be prepared to recognise an influence on an indirect, almost subconscious level. For a 
discussion of Paulsen’s and Erdmann’s take on Kant’s Hume reception, see Lauener (1969, pp. 8-9).    
21 Beiser (1999, p. 26).   
22 Beiser (1999, p. 26). See also Beiser (1999, pp. 37, 42-3) for further details.  
23 Beiser (1999, pp. 43-4) 
24 Watkins (2005, pp. 160-70). 
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scepticist about metaphysics, although it propelled him to reconsider and improve the method of 
doing metaphysics.25  
    Schönfeld presents a promising alternative to both Beiser’s and Watkin’s interpretations. Though 
Schönfeld recognises an influence from both Rousseau and Hume, he puts more emphasis on the 
internal difficulties that haunted Kant’s pre-critical project. 26 Thus, according to Schönfeld, Kant’s 
intellectual crisis was associated with a growing insight into the weakness of his metaphysical 
foundations of Newtonian physics, particularly with respect to its arguments for the teleological 
purposiveness of nature, the freedom in man’s moral actions, and the existence of God.27  In 
particular, Kant came to realise that he was unable to explain how the soul is united with the body, 
without making the soul localised in space like a physical monad.28   
   Regardless of Newton’s relative influence on Kant’s metaphysics and cosmology of physical 
monads, Schönfeld identifies a problem which also seems relevant for interpretations of Kant’s pre-
critical project, such as the one defended by Erdmann, Watkins, or Jauernig.  As Andrew Carpenter 
argues, Kant’s metaphysics of physical monads seemed to entail that the soul can be a part of the 
world, only if it occupies a place in space.29 For if my body consists of physical monads, which 
interact with other physical monads, by virtue of being endowed with forces of repulsion and 
attraction, it follows that my soul can be united with and interact with the body, only if it occupies 
and fills a space within my body.   
    In this study, I will argue that the materialist implications of Kant’s metaphysics of physical 
monads were an important reason why he had to abandon it. In the 1760s Kant worked on the 
hypothesis that the soul can act on its body, namely insofar it is aware of the inner, perceptual states 
of the monadic parts of the body. This meant that Kant had to assume that the physical monads 
must be able to perceive and not just move.  However, as I will try to show, Kant failed to explain 
how it was possible for the monadic parts to in turn act on the soul. Thus, Kant once again 
recognised that the physical monads of the body could not act on and be present to something, 
except locally. 
    Instead, Kant began to search for other ways of preserving the immateriality of the soul and still 
explain how it is possible for it to interact with the forces of its body. In this study, I will argue that 
this explains why Kant put so much effort into the study of the faculty of sensibility in the late 
1760s, for it is by virtue of its sensibility that the soul is causally affected by its body. Part of this 
project was the effort to develop a novel notion of the sensibility of the thinking soul. From this 
point of view, Kant’s interests were shifting somewhat, from cosmology to rational psychology. 
    We should now be able to consider the rationales behind Kant’s distinction between the 
sensibility and understanding, which brings us to point (1) in Erdmann’s summary of the 
transcendental turn.  Given the interpretation of Kant’s intellectual crisis described above, we can 
trace the distinction between sensibility and understanding back to the need to more carefully 
identify and describe the passive and receptive faculty of the soul, as distinct from its active and 
spontaneous faculty. 
                                                 
25 Interestingly Erdmann (1884, p. xx) also takes the distinction between real and logical grounds to have 
contributed to Kant’s transition from dogmatism to “critical empiricism”. However, Hume did not play any 
role in this transition.  Instead, the decisive factor behind Kant’s transition from dogmatic metaphysics, 
according to Erdmann, was the insight that it leads to the antinomies between the finite and infinite division 
and extension of the world.            
26 Schönfeld (2000, p. 189).   
27 Schönfeld (2000, pp. 209-10).   
28 Schönfeld (2000, pp. 242-4).  
29 Carpenter (1998, pp. 130-43). 
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    Falkenstein interestingly notes that the distinction between sensibility and understanding is 
merely “postulated” in Kant’s critical works.30 Falkenstein explains this by reference to the fact that 
Kant simply took this distinction to be obvious for his readers.31 On Falkenstein’s interpretation, 
Kant reinvented the distinction from the Aristotelian tradition, but loaded it with connotations that 
it originally did not have. Thus, Kant conceived sensibility not just as a faculty of singular 
representations, but also as a passive faculty of intuitive representations.32  Conversely he conceived 
the understanding not only as the faculty of universal representations but also as a spontaneous 
faculty of conceptual representations.33 
    Much like Erdmann, Falkenstein takes the distinction between sensibility and understanding to 
be fundamental to the critical turn.34 Falkenstein suggests that it might have grown out of Kant’s 
rejection of the “one-faculty account” of human cognition, which he attributes to Leibniz and Locke 
respectively.35 However, this seems a little bit difficult to understand, for at least Leibniz certainly 
recognised more than one faculty of representation and this also holds for Wolff and Baumgarten.36 
Moreover, Falkenstein’s explanation of Kant’s two-faculty account makes it difficult to connect it 
with Schönfeld’s account of Kant’s troubles with the problem of the mind-body union. 
     In this study, I will argue that Kant already was familiar with the distinction between sensibility 
and understanding, from his reading of Leibniz, Wolff, and most notably Baumgarten. Kant had no 
need to make any detour through Aristotle, as Falkenstein argues. It is of course an oft repeated 
wisdom that Kant criticised Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten for having failed to recognise that the 
distinction between sensibility and understanding is a real distinction and not just a logical 
distinction. Sensibility is a profoundly passive faculty and not just a faculty of confused 
representations, as Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten had argued.    
    However, what is important to keep in mind is the reasons why Kant rejected the view of his 
predecessors, namely that it cannot explain how it is possible for sensibility to be causally affected 
by outer bodies. Because of their commitment to the theory of the pre-established harmony, Leibniz, 
Wolff, and Baumgarten failed to explain how sensations are causally linked to the outer world; the 
sensations could equally well be the outcome of God’s immediate actions on the soul, so that we 
see all things, not in space, but in God.   
    Kant’s main drive in the late 1760s was not to introduce a two-faculty model, but a causal two-
faculty model, consistent with the theory of physical influx yet free from any materialist 
implications. From this point of view, Falkenstein’s reading needs revision. Fortunately, 
Falkenstein has a deeper, more subtle explanation of the origins of the two-faculty account, which 
might turn out to be helpful in untangling this interpretative knot. In order to give justice to this 
explanation, it is better to consider it in the entire context of Kant’s transcendental turn, which is 
the next topic.   
 
                                                 
30 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 28-9).  
31 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 29-32). 
32 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 31-2, 44-7). 
33 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 31-2, 44-7). 
34 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 32-3).  
35 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 32-3). 
36 For a discussion of the distinction between sensibility and understanding in the psychologies of Wolff 
and Baumgarten, see École (1991, pp. 269-70).  
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1.4 Interpreting the Transcendental Turn    
 
Many interpreters have tried to explain Kant’s critical turn, by arguing, once again, that Kant fell 
under the spell of Hume. Paulsen for instance seems prepared to ascribe almost magical forces to 
the sceptical Scotsman: there was a kinship between the philosophical views of Kant and Hume 
already in the 1760s, but none of this occurred to Kant until the end of the 1760s and the beginning 
of the 1770s.37 According to Paulsen, this kinship mainly came to expression in their shared view 
that we cannot know the existence of things and facts solely by inferences from concepts.38   
    Disregarding the question of the merits of Paulsen’s account of Hume’s influence, his 
interpretation seems to be crowded with difficulties of its own. How can we explain the rationalist 
traits of Kant’s critical turn, and the period subsequent to his empiricist/sceptical phase? Hans 
Vaihinger, who suggests that Kant suddenly came under the “overwhelming” (übermächtigen) 
influence of Leibniz at the end of the 1760s, seems more convincing from that point of view.39  The 
trouble with Vaihinger’s version of the story on the other hand, is that it does not explain how 
Kant’s rejection of scepticism (or empiricism) was connected with the critical aspect of Kant’s 
transcendental turn; on Vaihinger’s interpretation Kant’s abandonment of Hume’s scepticism led 
him, initially, to accept a slightly revised version of the old, reactionary dogmatic metaphysics of 
Leibniz.40 The latter makes it necessary for Vaihinger to assume that Kant had to be woken up from 
his dogmatic slumbers, not only one time, but even two times – 1760 and 1771 – and that Hume 
was responsible for the wakeup calls in both cases.41     
     Erdmann proposes an interpretation of the critical turn, which tries to avoid the dilemmas of 
Paulsen and Vaihinger, which Beiser has taken up more recently.42 Thus, according to Erdmann the 
transcendental ideality claim was motivated by Kant’s attempt to find a solution to the antinomy 
that was inherent in the concept of the outer world as, on one hand, an actually finitely or infinitely 
divided composite of discrete monads, and, on the other hand, an infinitely divisible whole of 
continuous appearances. The awareness of the antinomies awoke Kant from his “dogmatic 
slumber”, already in the early 1760s, according to Erdmann; likewise, it was the solution of the 
antinomies, which made it possible for him to shake off the paralysing grip of scepticism.43  
     Erdmann argues that Kant found the key to the solution of the antinomies in the distinction 
between sensibility and intellect, which suggested that it is possible to solve the antinomies by 
making a distinction between the objects that sensibility encounters and the objects of the intellect.44 
This explains why Kant found it necessary to make a distinction between noumena and phenomena, 
between bodies as substantial composites of monads and bodies as appearances in space and time. 
Thus the solution of the antinomies is the common root of both point (1) and point (3) in Erdmann’s 
account of the critical turn. Ultimately, the solution of the antinomies is the key, not only to the 
understanding of the critical turn but also to Kant’s entire transcendental idealism, according to 
Erdmann. 
                                                 
37 Paulsen (1875, pp. 47-53, 96-100).  
38 Paulsen (1875, pp. 96-100).  
39 Vaihinger (1881, p. 48).  
40 Vaihinger (1881, p. 48).    
41 Vaihinger (1881, p. 48).    
42 Beiser (1999, p. 29).  
43 Erdmann (1882, p. 31) and Erdmann (1884, pp. xxiv-xxviii, xxx-xxxvii).  
44 Erdmann (1884, pp. xxiv-xxv).    
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     Erdmann also argues that the solution of the antinomies gives the key to point (2) in his account 
of the transcendental turn.45 On the assumption that space is transcendentally ideal it follows that 
we can solve the antinomies, and this provides us an indirect or experimental proof of the 
transcendental ideality claim. Thus, given that space is transcendentally ideal, it follows that bodies 
in space are mere representations or outer phenomena. There are no substantial composites of 
simple substances in space. Bodies in space are no more finitely divided than infinitely divided.  
The antinomy of the world as actually finitely and infinitely extended in space disappears for similar 
reasons.    
     To me it seems as if Erdmann is correct about the importance of the antinomies of cosmology 
for Kant’s critical turn. However, the problem is that Erdmann makes the antinomies a global theme 
of Kant’s intellectual development during the pre-critical period.  Even if the distinction between 
sensibility and understanding is an important condition of Kant’s solution of the antinomies and the 
critical turn, it seems difficult to make the antinomies the main or sole explanation of this 
distinction, in particular since they cannot be the root cause of Kant’s intellectual crisis in the 1760s, 
as we have seen.           
     In this study, I will try to argue that Kant’s distinction between matter and form of knowledge 
is the key to his distinction between sensibility and understanding, which made it possible for him 
to analyse the former faculty as a purely passive faculty. The distinction between matter and form 
belonged to Kant’s academic education, but his correspondence with the astronomer, 
mathematician and philosopher Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777) certainly brought it to his 
attention in the mid-1760s, if not earlier, as will be seen.  Sensation is the matter of all knowledge, 
but since there is no sensation of space, it follows that space belongs to the form of knowledge, not 
its matter, contrary to what Lambert argued in his letters to Kant.46   
    In this study, I will argue that these considerations make it possible to reconsider point (2) in 
Erdmann’s summary, i.e. the transcendental ideality claim.  For if space is only a form of sensible 
knowledge – a form of sensibility – it follows that the bodily substrate, with which the thinking soul 
interacts, is unextended. Hence, the bodily substrate is no more extended that the soul itself, which 
means that the problem of the heterogeneity of the body and the soul cancels, as Karl Ameriks has 
pointed out.47  The spatially situated body, which gives the thinking soul its point of view, is merely 
the appearance of the substrate of its body.  There is no need to conceive the mind as a physical 
monad localised in space, for its place is nothing but the point of view, from which its sensations 
are oriented outside it. Thus, it is exactly because space is a form of sensibility that the body of the 
mind appears in the midst of the world, so that we see all things in space from the determinate 
orientation of our bodily point of view and not in God.   
    Thanks to this, we can connect Kant’s dogmatic period and his intellectual crisis, with the 
transcendental turn. The same problem, which contributed to Kant’s intellectual crises – the 
problem of the materialist implications of the physical monadology – also finds its solution in the 
transcendental ideality of space.  There is no need to take recourse to Erdmann’s global explanation 
of the transition from the dogmatic period to the transcendental turn, according to which it was 
driven by the need to solve the antinomies growing out of Leibnizian cosmology.   
                                                 
45 Erdmann (1884, pp. xxvi-xxxii).     
46 Correspondence, pp. 77-8, Ak. 10, pp. 51-2. 
47 Ameriks (1999, pp. 270-1); see also Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29, pp. 907-8, which records Kant’s 
lectures on the problem of the heterogeneity of the soul and the body, as he conceived it during the critical 
period.    
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    True, Kant must have been aware of the true or apparent contradictions in the cosmologies of 
Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten – Kant’s physical monadology is in some sense nothing but an 
elaborated attempt to solve the antinomy between mathematical space as a continuous whole of 
indefinite parts and the cosmological space of simple substances as a discrete whole of 
mathematical points. However, it was the materialist implications of his physical monadology, 
which generated the problem that found its solution in the distinction between sensibility and 
understanding, and in the transcendental ideality claim. From that point of view, the solution of the 
antinomies of cosmology just came as an extra bonus on the top of the other important benefits, 
which were associated with the critical turn. 
    Falkenstein presents an alternative explanation of the transcendental turn and the distinction 
between phenomena and noumena. Like Erdmann, Falkenstein suggests that this distinction made 
it possible for Kant to solve or eliminate the antinomies (“paradoxes of composition and division”), 
but contrary to Erdmann, he takes the distinction to originate from the two-faculty account, 
mentioned above.48 In this context, Falkenstein plays with the hypothesis that the two-faculty 
account had a deeper-seated origin in Kant’s reflections on the concept which the intellect 
(“reason”) forms of space. In the late 1760s, Kant came to the insight that understanding cannot 
form a concept of space by reflection, for that only presents it to a species or genus, namely place 
or extension in general. Mathematical construction is of no help here, for it only offers the intellect 
the familiar spaces of Euclidean geometry, lines, angles, circles, etc.   
    In the end, the understanding distorts the original phenomenon of space and misconceives it, by 
taking recourse to traditional metaphysical concepts, such as substance, accidence etc., which leads 
to spurious concepts of space as a thing in its own right, or as an accident or relation between things. 
Kant’s great light of 1769 was nothing but the surprising insight that this concept is a pure concept, 
which is different from all other pure metaphysical concepts that the understanding or reason forms. 
The first step necessary in order to dissolve the spurious concepts is to trace the representation of 
space back to its origin, which presupposes the two-faculty distinction at the heart of the 
transcendental turn.  Let us now consider this issue in closer detail, in order to see how it might fit 
into the reading I will defend in this work.   
 
1.5 The Transcendental Turn and the Concept of Space 
 
The account presented above immediately provokes at least two questions: what is the original 
representation of space and how does it relate to the intellect’s concept of space?  In the late 1760s, 
Kant gives an answer to the first question, which is relatively frank, namely that it is a “pure singular 
concept”, i.e. an a priori pure intuition. What this seems to suggest is that we have an almost 
mystical vision of space, which is prior to the things we experience.  We see all things in a prior 
vision of an all-encompassing and all-present space, which is infinite in both extent and depth – a 
vision strikingly similar to the mystic, direct experience of God, who is present to everything and 
everyone, both heathen and believer.  
   Unfortunately, this interpretation just seems to raise more questions than it answers, for it suggests 
that the original representation of space is passively and immediately given to the sensibility prior 
to any sensation.49 If for no other reason, this seems absurd because it makes the original 
                                                 
48 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 34-41).   
49 For an overview and critique of this view, see Falkenstein (2004, pp. 83-9).  
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representation of space into something analogous to a sensation, without being a sensation. How 
can a transcendentally ideal structure of the mind or sensibility affect sensibility itself, giving us a 
representation of space or time prior to our experience of outer things?50  
    It comes as no surprise that Falkenstein rejects this interpretation, which he labels as the “forms-
as-representation reading”.51 In this context, Falkenstein suggests that there is no given 
representation of space, other than as a form of outer appearances, which is the order in which outer 
sensations and appearances are given. Hence, although this order is a priori and innate to the mind, 
it never appears to the sensibility in its pure form, apart from the sensed matters, colours sounds, 
etc.  The specific locations of the sensed matter in this order is not innate but grounded outside the 
mind.52  Sensibility does not assemble the sensa, like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, but rather 
follows the contours of a ready given picture.     
    Falkenstein also claims that Kant gets himself in great difficulties when he tries to answer the 
second question above, i.e. the question of how our understanding can ever acquire something such 
as a concept of space.  In his inaugural dissertation which was published 1770, just a year after the 
year of the great light, Kant even seems to deny that space and time are capable of an intellectual 
intuition (“intellectual representation”), as Falkenstein observes.53  This is of course just what we 
can expect, according to Falkenstein, given that representations of space and time are singular 
concepts or intuitions, and that understanding only abstracts and cannot have any intuitions, as the 
two-faculty account predicts.         
    Kant seems to end in a kind of philosophical limbo, trapped between an absurd non-receptive 
intuition of space and an abstract and empty intellectual concept of space.  In this study I will try to 
give an outline of Kant’s laborious struggle to find a way out of this trap.  For a start, it is important 
to see what it was that got him there in the first place.  Here I will argue that we will have to return 
to the issue of the form and matter of sensible knowledge. For Kant it was clear, already from the 
outset, that space is not just a form of sensible knowledge, but itself the matter of knowledge – a 
peculiar matter indeed, namely the matter of pure knowledge.    
    From the encouraging letters from Lambert, Kant was familiar with the idea that the 
representation of space derives from sensation or intuition, in the terminology of Lambert. For Kant, 
Lambert’s alternative was no option, since it made space a part of the matter of sensible knowledge.  
On the one hand space becomes a sensible reality, which brings back the problem of the 
heterogeneity of the body and the mind, mentioned above. On the other hand, and independently of 
the former argument, it makes the representation of space a singular concept of empirical intuition, 
a representation very similar to the sense ideas of Locke, a main source of inspiration for Lambert.    
   In this study, I will argue that Kant’s rejection of Lambert’s option is more intelligible against the 
background of Locke’s demonstration of the origin of the idea of space. Locke had made an attempt 
to trace the origin of the idea of space back to the simple sense idea of extension, which we get 
from touching and seeing extended bodies.54 Touching and seeing gives us an idea of extension as 
a finite whole of movable, impenetrable, discrete, and separable parts.  The trouble is that this idea 
is not identical with the idea of an absolute space, which is the pure idea of an infinite and 
                                                 
50 For a discussion of this aspect, see Specht (2014, p. 39). See also Falkenstein (2004, pp. 84-5).   
51 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 79-81).   
52 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 10-12).  
53 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 49-50). 
54 An Essay concerning Human Understanding II, xiii, 2. 
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continuous whole of immovable, penetrable, and inseparable parts.55 Locke was painfully aware 
that this fact is completely inconsistent with the principle of empiricism.  
    Kant was most likely aware of Locke’s difficulties. Locke wanted to trace all concepts back to 
experience, but made use of them beyond the limit of experience, as Kant observed in the 1770s.56 
Probably this contributed to his late 1760s assessment that the concept of space is a pure concept 
of understanding (notio intellectus puri).57 This was not Kant’s last word on the issue, as will be 
seen. In any case, it made Kant’s position very close to that of Leibniz, for Leibniz had also 
criticised Locke and suggested that space is an innate idea of understanding.  
    Taking this historical background into consideration makes it even more difficult to understand 
why Kant was usually so negative to Leibniz’s philosophy of space throughout his career. On the 
one hand he is famous for accusing Leibniz of having made the representation of space too sensible, 
by trying to reduce it to an empirical concept of reflection.58 On the other hand, Kant is also famous 
for accusing Leibniz of having intellectualised space and time – Leibniz was not familiar with the 
sensible component of our knowledge of space and time, as Kant explained in a note from the 
1770s.59   
    In this study, I will try to figure out what Leibniz actually thought about the intellectual origins 
of the idea of space. Though this is a noble task in itself, I will barely scratch the surface of this 
theme. My modest purpose is just to get a better understanding of Kant’s critique of Leibniz, which 
helps us to understand why he denied that the original representation of space is an empirical 
concept of reflection.   
    In order to see why Kant denied that it is possible to form a concept of space by virtue of 
reflection, it is helpful to consider Leibniz’s critique of Locke in closer detail. In this study, I will 
try to show how Leibniz tried to demonstrate that the idea of extension derives not from sight and 
touch, but from what is common to them. The idea of extension is therefore an abstract idea of 
common sense or imagination.60 Imagination perceives extension by abstracting from everything 
diverse, in the bodies – not only their colours and sounds, but also ultimately the entire richness of 
their actually infinite, ultimately simple parts. What remains is only the ghost-like, uniform, and 
unbound order of situations – an ideal whole, which only the intellect can grasp in its infinity, by 
forming the idea of an absolute space.   
    In an important study, Vincenzo De Risi has shown that Leibniz’s idea of absolute space is 
nothing but the idea of a complete order of situations or places, which he made an object of his 
analysis situs – a precursor of the 19th century geometries, which studied not figures, but the global 
structure of space.61 However, Leibniz never succeeded in showing that an order of situations or 
places is necessarily continuous and hence extended.62 Space is extended only as an order of 
confused outer perceptions or phenomena. From that point of view, one can perhaps say that Leibniz 
failed to show that space is a pure idea of the intellect.  
    However, as De Risi shows, Kant was hardly correct about Leibniz being innocently unfamiliar 
with the more sensuous aspects of space, for Leibniz made space a form of sensibility, a form of 
                                                 
55 An Essay concerning Human Understanding II, xiii, 11-21. 
56 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4866, Ak. 18, p. 14. For a detailed discussion of this note, see Guyer 
(2008, p. 81).     
57 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 3930, Ak. 17, p. 352. 
58 See Jauernig (2008, pp. 47-8), for an overview of the main components of this interpretation.    
59 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4851, Ak. 18, p. 9.   
60 New Essays, p. 128. 
61 De Risi (2007); see also De Risi (2015, pp. 1-11).   
62 De Risi (2007, pp. 415-22).  
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perception.63 Space figures as a form of the synthesis of situations, without which there are no 
perceptions and certainly no confused perceptions. It is the very same synthesis of imagination, 
which also makes space continuous. Hence, the continuity of space is neither an intellectual idea 
nor a sensible idea, but a transcendental determination of space, taken as a form of perception.  
    Keeping the transcendental aspects of Leibniz’s analysis situs in mind is of course helpful to 
evaluate Kant’s critique of Leibniz, but it still does not explain why Kant came to argue that the 
original representation is a singular, pure intuition and not a concept of reflection. In this study, I 
will argue that we cannot get the entire answer directly out of the inaugural dissertation, from 1770, 
but that we have to read it against the background of Kant’s notes on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. 
To this aspect of my reading, I turn now.  
 
1.6 Leibniz’s Analysis Situs and Kant’s Science of Space  
 
In this study, I will argue that Kant got much of his unfortunate ideas about Leibniz’s philosophy 
of space from the famous mathematician Leonard Euler (1707-1783), whom Kant probably came 
across already in the 1750s. Kant’s interest for Euler was not the result of a meeting of minds, but 
more like a rather sober professional interest in Euler, in his capacity as one of the main protagonist 
in the German 18th century debate between Leibnizian metaphysicians and Newtonian 
mathematicians. In his habilitation thesis from 1756, “Physical Monadology” (Monadologia 
Physica), Kant had estimated that it was easier to mate a griffin with a horse than marrying 
metaphysics with geometry.64 Whereas metaphysics denied that space was empty and infinitely 
divisible, geometry wholeheartedly affirmed it, etc.  
    Euler was of course an excellent example of Kant’s thesis. Euler had ridiculed the 
“metaphysicians” for having described the idea of space as an idea of place in general, by 
abstracting from every determination, which belongs to a material body.65  However, this does not 
give us an idea of the real space of the physical space of the universe, which is absolute and not 
relational and which all material bodies have to be related to in order to have a situation with respect 
to other material bodies.66    
    Though Kant only knew fragments of Leibniz’s analysis situs, he had raised some critical 
remarks against it, in the paper “Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of 
Directions in Space” (Von dem Ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume) from 
1768. In this study, I will argue that Euler might have influenced Kant’s critique. The original 
representation of space is not an empirical concept of reflection, no more than it is an empirical 
intuition, for it is not the concept of place in general.   
   The problem with Leibniz’s analysis situs, as Kant saw it, was that the author had failed to 
understand that space is more than an order of situations, namely an order of oriented situations.67 
Situations cannot be reduced to the situations of dead mathematical points, but are more like the 
situations of bodily points of view. Thus, situations are not just ordered with respect to other 
situations, but carry an orientation, a left, a right, etc.  These orientations refer beyond the mere 
                                                 
63 De Risi (2007, pp. 415-22).   
64 Physical Monadology, p. 51, Ak. 1, p. 475.   
65 Euler, Reflexions sur l’espace et le temps, §§ 14-15, pp. 329-30.  
66 Reflexions sur l’espace et le temps, §§ 11-15, pp. 328-30. 
67 Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Directions in Space, pp. 365-6, Ak. 2, pp. 365-6.   
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order of situations, towards an absolute space, from which the situations originate. Space is the 
absolute inner unity of all possible directions. 
   In this study, I will argue that Kant’s 1760s study of the form of sensibility led him to the sources 
of the science of space. This science is a science of a form of our knowledge, which can be revealed 
only by completely abstracting from the content or matter of our knowledge. The same method 
made it possible for Kant to reflect on the forms of knowledge, not from the logical point of view 
of what they have in common, but purely from the transcendental point of view of their origin, in 
either sensibility or understanding.  On the one hand it led Kant to space and time, as the original 
forms of sensibility, but on the other hand it also led him to the principle of contradiction, the 
principle of sufficient reason, and ultimately the logical forms of judgment, as the forms of the 
understanding.   
    The forms of understanding were important, because they pointed towards the pure concepts of 
understanding, met with in metaphysics, like the concept of possibility, substance, causality, etc. 
However, it was the forms of sensibility, which suggested the most promising results, namely a 
completely new philosophical science of space and time. Kant only presented glimpses of his new 
science in the inaugural dissertation from 1770 but taken together with those late 1760s remarks on 
space he had jotted down in his notes on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, a more complete picture 
arises. 
    On the one hand this new science was not metaphysics, for metaphysics is at its core ontology 
and hence a science of the most general predicates which belong to the possible existence of a thing. 
True, many of these predicates – pure concepts of understanding like the concept of the whole, the 
many, one, etc. – will migrate from ontology to the science of space. However, their use is entirely 
different, for they do not serve the purpose of knowing the most general predicates of a thing, but 
the most general predicates of space, which is an ideal structure.  On the other hand, it was not 
Euclidean geometry, for this rather outworn science “only” dealt with the general predicates of 
constructed geometric spaces, lines, circles, angles, etc.   
    In this study, I will argue that some of Kant’s results are surprisingly close to those of Leibniz’s 
analysis situs. For both Kant and Leibniz, space is absolute, in the sense that it is all-encompassing 
and therefore also infinite. Kant’s new science of space is not a Leibnizian geometry of space 
however. The space Kant had envisioned and measured out for his new science is out of reach for 
our understanding if it has to rely solely on its own idea of space as an all-encompassing and infinite 
order.   
   In his private notes from the 1760s Kant revealed that the science he had in mind was not the 
work of our understanding alone, for the concept of space is not a pure concept of understanding 
like the concept of an order of situations. Space is a specifically continuous order, an order which 
understanding has neither inclinations nor resources to deal with on its own.  Like the orders studied 
by the analysis situs, this order is a global order. However, the whole it forms is a continuous whole, 
a totum analyticum, which is given prior to its indeterminate parts. It is a space which is global in a 
much more radical sense namely because it tolerates no other spaces, no competitors, not even any 
friendly neighbours.   
   Our intellect may very well think of other global orders, with different fancy spherical or 
hyperbolical geometries, but in the end they are just figments of mind, locked up in our heads, like 
the phantasmata Hobbes once described.68  Moreover, the sole and unique space, which is the topic 
of Kant’s science of space, dominates not only the space structures that we may think about, but 
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also the Euclidean spaces we actually may construct and bring to life outside our heads, with a ruler 
or a compass. The same holds for the spaces of the far distant stars, the solar systems, and the 
galaxies, which are born only to become tiny parts of this truly gigantic, immeasurable space. Even 
the spaces of other universes are destined to bow their heads and become humble provinces in the 
kingdom of the one and only space.           
    The possibility of having first-hand knowledge of space, as a unique and continuous whole, left 
Kant with no other option but to conclude that the original representation of space is a pure intuition 
and hence neither an empirical nor a pure concept of reflection. This knowledge also shows that 
space must be transcendentally ideal.  For on the assumption that space is transcendentally real, as 
an order of situations or places of simple substances, we would not have a pure intuition of space. 
Instead, our knowledge of space would flow from an innate idea of space as an order of situations, 
or from the empirical concept of situation in general, which could never give us knowledge of space 
as a continuous whole.           
   There is no necessity given in the sensation at all, which means that space cannot be the source 
of any necessary truths, unless it is given to us a priori.  The transcendental ideality of space is 
hence inseparable from the very possibility of truths in Euclidean geometry. In this way, Kant found 
another arrow in his quiver of arguments, for the transcendental ideality claim. In the end, this 
argument turned out to be more important than the argument from the conditions of the mind-body 
union, described above.  
   In summary, Kant’s 1760s notes certainly suggest that he had discovered a way to show how it is 
possible for the understanding to have pure knowledge of space as it originally is given to 
sensibility. However, the notes do not give us any detail, which suggests that Kant’s way was real 
and open to anyone interested in a global investigation of space, not far distant from Leibniz’s 
geometry of space.  In order to zoom in on this question somewhat closer, we have to take a brief 
look into the inaugural dissertation from 1770. 
 
1.7 Rereading the Inaugural Dissertation  
  
Many commentators agree that Kant’s inaugural dissertation, from 1770, has a distinctive position 
in the transition from the pre-critical to the critical period. The “Inaugural Dissertation” (De mundi 
sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis) from 1770 has however caused much 
embarrassment among Kant’s commentators. In the inaugural dissertation Kant not only confirmed 
that space is the epistemic ground or condition under which sensibility can represent the 
phenomenal world, but also that it is transcendentally ideal, because it is different from the cause 
or real ground of the noumenal world, namely God.  
    For those scholars who defend the view that Kant abandoned metaphysics during the 1760s, it 
seems perplexing to see that Kant actually made room for things, which properly belong to 
dogmatic, Leibnizian metaphysics; as Beiser observes the inaugural dissertation seems to contain a 
revival of those ugly and musty rationalist ideas, which Kant allegedly had exposed and scorned in 
the 1760s.69 Moreover, given that the 1770s marks the threshold between the critical and pre-critical 
period, how are we to understand that Kant made concessions to ideas which seem inconsistent not 
only with scepticism, but with transcendental, critical philosophy as well?   
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   The Kant scholars have responded in different ways, by either trying to deemphasise or deny the 
rationalistic elements in the inaugural dissertation, or by accepting them but expedient of having to 
relegate the inaugural dissertation to the pre-critical period.70 The view that the inaugural 
dissertation belongs to the critical period has a long and prominent line of defenders, with names 
like Kuno Fischer, Benno Erdmann, Erich Adickes, Friedrich Paulsen, and Désiré Nolen.71 Typical 
of these scholars is that they put much emphasis on those passages where Kant discusses the 
transcendental ideality of space and time, which they take to be the decisive aspect of Kant’s critical 
turn. Other scholars, like Wilhelm Windelband and Vaihinger have down played the importance of 
these parts of the inaugural dissertation.72 More recently, Schönfeld has made a similar 
interpretation, by describing the inaugural dissertation as the “last major pre-critical work”, albeit 
one that served as a “starting point” for Kant’s critical philosophy. 73 
   The trouble for the first group of scholars is that they have to put the dogmatic metaphysical 
elements of the inaugural dissertation within brackets, particularly when they compare the inaugural 
dissertation with some of the works written during the critical period, most notably the Critique of 
Pure Reason. The second group on the other hand has to explain why Kant suddenly fell back into 
his “dogmatic slumber”, and why this sudden drowsiness occurred 1770, just shortly after the year 
of the great light, 1769. In addition to these dilemmas, there is the problem of explaining why 
Hume’s influence suddenly made itself felt in the inaugural dissertation (Fischer), and how Hume 
could have later inspired Kant to abandon the beliefs he expressed in the inaugural dissertation, 
given the strong impression that the reading of Leibniz’s New Essays (Noveaux Essais) had made 
upon him (Vaihinger).         
    The key needed in order to avoid these dilemmas is, I will argue, to consider the critical turn and 
in particular the transcendental ideality claim, not as a complete rupture with the early, dogmatic 
metaphysics of causally interacting monads but as a way of avoiding the unwarranted, materialistic 
implications of this metaphysics. In short, there is no conflict between the inaugural dissertation 
and the anti-metaphysical tendencies of the 1760s. Not because the inaugural dissertation is 
metaphysical exclusively in a sort of sophisticated and ironic way as Beiser argues – but because 
the 1760s never made Kant into a complete sceptic about the possibility of metaphysics in the first 
place.        
   In this study, I will make a modest attempt to re-read Kant’s inaugural dissertation, bearing these 
premises in mind, with the purpose of throwing more light on the vague contours of Kant new 
science of space, outlined in the 1760s notes. To this end I will pass over those passages in the 
inaugural dissertation which deal with ontology, not only because they are too vague and 
undeveloped to be of any importance for this study, but also because I want to keep Kant’s ontology 
apart from his science of space, which belongs to the presuppositions of ontology.       
   Kant’s remarks on cosmology are more promising in this respect.  Here Kant suggests that the 
understanding is in possession of a concept of an absolute whole, a whole which is not a part of 
another whole, and which understanding applies to the world, by thinking its ultimately simple parts 
                                                 
70 For a brief summary of the 19th century debate on the nature of the inaugural dissertation, see Hermann 
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under the concept of a composite substance.74 Though it is in the power of our understanding to 
grasp the absolute – a remarkable achievement – all its powers evaporate when it tries to exercise 
them on the world as a phenomenon. For when the understanding tries to conceive the world as it 
is in relation to sensibility, it has to operate on foreign territory in accordance with the laws of 
sensibility. This means that it can represent a whole, only by adding parts, which are given to it by 
the sensibility, a process that goes on indefinitely without ever resulting in anything but relative 
wholes, wholes that are parts of other wholes.75       
    In the face of this humiliating experience, understanding can insist on its entitlements to the 
absoluteness of the world, claiming that the sensibility distorts the actually finite world, by making 
it immeasurable for us. Alternatively, understanding can give up its entitlements to the absoluteness 
of the world, in exchange for the right of thinking that it is actually an infinite multitude. However, 
in both cases sensibility jealously preserves its secrets, making understanding degrade into a 
clueless speculative reason, which throws itself from one opposite to the other, in a perpetual and 
insolvable dialectical antinomy.   
    It is here that the results of Kant’s newly found science of space stretches out a helping hand, 
because it reconciles understanding with the fact that the phenomenon of the world has constituted 
itself as a whole in its own right, a whole grounded by space and time, and which bears the 
topological and mereological properties of space as its birth-marks. Thus, the newly born 
phenomenal world will constitute itself in the image of space as an infinite continuous whole, which 
is prior to its indeterminate parts.  Though the phenomenal world corresponds to and refers to the 
noumenal world of simple substances, on which it depends, it will be a whole in its own right.     
    I will argue that Kant’s fundamental message in the Inaugural Dissertation is that understanding 
must critically learn to check its inborn attraction to ontology, its tendency to think of everything 
in terms of things.  Though this tendency is both legitimate and useful in order to adumbrate the 
conditions under which it is possible to know and act on objects, which are substantially real and 
measurable, it is detrimental to the knowledge of ideal structures such as the space and time of the 
phenomenal world.  It makes us conceive space either as a mere figment of imagination, or as a 
substance, or as an accident, but it makes us blind to the ideality of space – an ideality which 
nonetheless is perfectly objective, and which dominates everything we experience.     
    It is exactly this forgetfulness, which explains why understanding misconceives the phenomenal 
world as a synthetic whole, which is posterior to its simple parts.  More generally, it is the source 
of the antinomies and the spurious Leibnizian ideas of spatially situated monads and souls, as well 
as the Newtonian idea that God’s omnipresence to the noumenal world is local, rather than virtual.  
As a result, space is misplaced, from the phenomenal world to the noumenal world, where it 
transforms itself into an order between discrete simple substances, or slips between God and his 
intimate presence to the world.     
   In this study I will argue that these considerations are decisive, in order to understand Kant’s 
arguments in the inaugural dissertation, against both the Newtonian idea of absolute space and the 
Leibnizian idea of space as an order between coexisting simple substances or monads.  In particular, 
I will argue that Kant’s arguments against the Leibnizian idea can be viewed more easily if we 
consider it against the background of the science of space he outlined in the late 1760s. In Kant’s 
interpretation, the Leibnizian idea of space strips space of its continuity and the necessity, which 
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belongs to it as a transcendental condition of outer phenomena. As an outcome, it becomes 
impossible for Leibniz to explain the necessity of the postulates of Euclidean geometry, which are 
reduced to mere inductive generalisations.  
    I will argue that none of these arguments really threaten Leibniz’s philosophy of space, when we 
consider them against the background of De Risi’s studies of Leibniz’s analysis situs. In short, they 
overlook that space is not an order of coexistence, according to Leibniz, but an order of situations, 
which serves as a form that conditions the way that situations are synthesised in sensibility.  
Euclidean geometry is embedded in the very formation of an outer perception by the imagination, 
according to Leibniz. We may think what we want about the validity of Leibniz’s philosophy of 
space, but Kant’s particular strategy of attacking it does not work.   
   With this said, a rereading of Kant’s inaugural dissertation, along the lines I suggest, leaves no 
answer to the question of the origin of the pure intuition of space and how a purely discursive 
understanding can form a concept of a singular space. On the bottom floor we have a truly mind-
boggling pure intuition of space, so powerful and yet so mysteriously unwilling to tell us anything 
about its origin. On the upper floor we have an abstractive intellect, which only feels at home with 
those abstract, reflective concepts it has been able to extract from itself or from the contents which 
the sense intuition has provided it with.   
   In the Inaugural Dissertation Kant does not dispel any of the mysteries of the machinery working 
behind our pure knowledge of space. In some sense, the inaugural dissertation just adds to the 
mysteries, for in the inaugural dissertation Kant tells his reader that space is the phenomenon of 
God’s all-presence.76 The pure intuition of space is perhaps not a rational intuition or direct mystic 
experience of God, but it certainly looks as an indirect mystic experience, one caused by God, as 
he makes us perceive his omnipresence as a phenomenon in its own right.77 We experience 
everything in God, not directly, but certainly indirectly.  
   Though this interpretation is tempting, and though I think that it comes close to what Kant 
believed, it played no practical role in his later, official explanations of the pure intuition, which 
understanding later makes itself familiar with in the science of space. Instead, it was going to be 
based on conclusions from the possibility of having pure, a priori knowledge of space, which would 
be impossible if space is a real structure of the world, rather than an ideal structure. In a rather 
famous letter to Lambert, from 1770, Kant suggested a plan for his new science. It would be a 
merely “negative science”, a phenomenology, which would determine the “validity” and 
“limitations” of the principles of sensibility, with the purpose of dissolving all spurious concepts of 
metaphysics.78  Later, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant would rebaptize his new science and 
present it under a new name: “Transcendental Aesthetic”. To my interpretation of Kant’s 
Transcendental Aesthetic, I turn now.  
 
1.8 Towards a Reading of the Transcendental Aesthetic as a Phenomenology   
 
The Critique of Pure Reason, from 1781, is commonly described as the final landmark in Kant’s 
transition to transcendental idealism and hence transcendental philosophy. Kant outlines his new 
transcendental philosophy in the following way:    
                                                 
76 Inaugural Dissertation, §22, Scholium, p. 405, Ak. 2, p. 410.  
77 For a discussion of the distinction between direct and indirect mystical experience in Kant’s philosophy, 
see Maharaj (2017).   
78 Correspondence, p. 96, Ak. 10, p. 98. 
                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                         Introduction 
 
19 
 
 
The philosophy of pure reason is either a propaedeutic (preparation), which investigates the faculty of 
reason in respect of all its pure a priori knowledge, and is entitled criticism, or secondly, it is the system 
of pure reason, that is, the science which exhibits in systematic connection the whole body (true as well as 
illusory) of philosophical knowledge arising out of pure reason, and which is entitled metaphysics. 
(A841/B869)  
 
Philosophy of pure reason is transcendental philosophy, which is either critique or metaphysics. 
First, it is critique, insofar as it investigates the origin, extent, and boundaries of the pure knowledge 
which we have from the faculty of reason.79 Secondly, it is metaphysics insofar as it exhibits the 
pure knowledge arising out of the faculty of reason. 
    In condensed form, transcendental philosophy must concentrate on the concepts and principles 
of all pure knowledge, and how this knowledge is possible. There is little doubt that the 
Transcendental Aesthetic can be seen largely as an attempt to put this plan into practice, with respect 
to the kind of pure knowledge which we have of space and time.  We should therefore expect that 
the Transcendental Aesthetic contains an investigation of the origin, validity, and limits of our pure 
knowledge of space. Such knowledge originates from space as a pure form of sensibility, namely 
an order or form of outer appearances.  
   The trick in order to isolate space as a form of pure sensible knowledge is first to isolate the 
empirical intuition of sensibility from the pure concepts of the understanding, and then separate off 
this empirical intuition from everything that belongs to outer sensation. This leaves us with nothing 
but a pure intuition of space and the spatial order of outer appearances:  
 
In the transcendental aesthetic we shall, therefore, first isolate sensibility, by taking away from it 
everything which the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing may be left save empirical 
intuition. Secondly, we shall also separate off from it everything which belongs to sensation, so that 
nothing may remain save pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is all that sensibility can 
supply a priori. (A22/B36) 
 
The problem is that understanding cannot have any knowledge of the original phenomenon of space, 
which shows itself in this pure intuition, unless it conceptualises it.  Intuitions without concepts are 
blind, as Falkenstein repeatedly observes.80 In order to conceptualise the pure intuition of space, 
understanding cannot rely on the active part of the sensibility, the imagination. Imagination only 
knows how to determine the manifold of the pure intuition under the concept of a Euclidean space, 
not the concept of the original metaphysical space, in which the understanding is interested.  Here 
imagination seems to have exhausted the utmost limits of its capacity, a failure that seems to 
illustrate the fundamental incorrectness of Kant’s method of isolation, which is exactly what 
Falkenstein concludes.81  
   Falkenstein therefore suggests that the proper method Kant actually followed was a method of 
conceptual exposition, not the method of isolation.82 Pure knowledge follows from an analysis or 
exposition of the metaphysical concept of the original space, as a singular, all-encompassing, 
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infinite, continuous magnitude which is the ground of all outer intuitions. From these marks, we 
can trace the concept of the original space back to its a priori origin in a pure form of sense intuition. 
It confirms that the concept of the original space is the concept of an a priori order, which is the 
outcome of an act of abstraction from everything given in the sensations.83  It is in this sense that 
space is a priori because it is an order, innate to sensibility (“the receptor system”).84 Though we 
might say that space is an intuition (or the object of an intuition), it is more correct to say that space 
is “originally presented in intuition”, namely as an order of an intuited manifold.85 
   Falkenstein’s version of the method of conceptual exposition has problems of its own however. 
Most importantly, the method does not itself explain the origin of the concept of the original space, 
which is the object of the exposition.  Here Falkenstein suggests that it results from an “intellectual 
abstraction” of the order “in which the matters of intuition are originally presented”.86 Basically, 
this is nothing but the method of isolation or abstraction, but with the important difference that it 
does not remove everything, which the understanding thinks through its concepts, such as when it 
thinks the representation of a body.87 Removed are only those determinations, which originate from 
the matters of intuition, like the impenetrability of the body, and those determinations, which 
originate from the “synthesis of just the pure form of the intuited manifold”,88 presumably the 
transcendental schemata, like the transcendental schema of the category of substance,89 which is 
the permanence that belongs to the impenetrability of the body.   
   The trouble is that Falkenstein’s version of the method of isolation leaves us with a concept of 
space, which is strikingly similar to the Leibnizian concept of space, as an order of situations, which 
Kant considered as a concept of reflection. However, on my reading, the primary purpose of the 
method of abstraction is not to isolate the concept of space and reduce it to an order. Rather it is to 
isolate what belongs to the pure intuition of space, which is exactly what Kant explains in a couple 
of paragraphs before the isolation passage quoted above, where he illustrates the method, by 
applying it to the example of the empirical intuition of a body.90 Taking the empirical intuition of a 
body in abstraction from the sensation of its impenetrability and colour, the thought of its 
substantiality, divisibility and force leaves us with nothing but extension and figure.91 Extension 
and figure thus belong to the intuition, purely as a form, apart from the contributions of the outer 
sense and the understanding.  
    Knowledge of figure belongs of course to Euclidean geometry, so this leaves us with knowledge 
of extension as the only pure sensible knowledge, which properly belongs to metaphysics, or 
phenomenology to be exact.  Extension, as a determination of pure intuition, is the key to knowledge 
of the pure space, sought for by Leibniz and Locke.  
    Unlike an abstract order of situations (Leibniz), the extension that belongs to pure intuition is 
continuous already from the outset and unlike the extension of bodies (Locke) it is prior to its 
indeterminate, inseparable, immovable and penetrable parts. The concept of space is hence found 
by abstraction, not from the body conceived as a thing in itself, which was the source of Euler’s 
mistake. It depends instead on abstractions from the body, conceived as an appearance or 
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representation, which means that we must conceive the body from a transcendental point of view.  
Only an analysis, undertaken from a critical point of view, can lead us away from arbitrary 
abstractions, to concepts, which belong to the science of space.              
    Knowledge of the pure, immediate or metaphysical space, takes the form of an analysis of the 
extension, which belongs to the pure intuition of the metaphysical space. It is immediately an 
exposition of the metaphysical concept of space – which Kant refers to as a “metaphysical 
exposition” because it is the exposition of an a priori given concept.92 The exposition of the 
metaphysical concept of space is therefore different from the kind of mathematical expositions 
(constructions) which occur in Euclidean geometry, which are formal intuitions.  Whereas 
metaphysical expositions produce descriptions of the original metaphysical space, mathematical 
expositions produce geometric spaces.        
    From the exposition of the metaphysical concept of space, Kant concludes that space does not 
represent any determination of things in themselves, in other words, that it is transcendentally ideal, 
for in that case we would not have a pure, a priori intuition of space.  Leibnizian critics of Kant, 
like Johan August Eberhard (1739-1809) and Hermann Andreas Pistorius (1730-1798), objected 
that Kant’s proof of the transcendental ideality of space was flawed. Kant failed to see that human 
intuitions are empirical and not a priori and pure; only concepts can be a priori.   This thread was 
then later taken up by Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-1872), who came to argue that there is 
a “lacuna” (Lücke) in the proof Kant presents in the Transcendental Aesthetic. On Trendelenburg’s 
interpretation Kant’s proof failed to exclude the “third alternative” that space might be both an a 
priori intuition and a transcendentally real property of things in themselves.93    
    In this study, I will argue that Kant did not overlook the third alternative, or at least not the 
Leibnizian versions of it. The main mistake of the Leibnizians, according to Kant, was that they 
tried to derive the phenomenon of space from the order of coexistence of simple substances, for it 
entails that space consists of simple substances. The latter is impossible, for although space is 
indivisible, it is still infinitely divisible and continuous in the sense that it contains no simple and 
invisible parts. Implicitly the Leibnizian alternative entails that monads are spatially localised 
physical monads.  
   Though it was easy for Leibnizians, like Eberhard, to point out that this conclusion is false, they 
had a hard time to refute the entire transcendental ideality claim.  Given the presumption that 
continuity is a structural property of wholes (indivisibility, connectedness, etc.), rather than orders, 
it becomes impossible to derive it from the concept of an order of coexistence. Making space an 
order of coordinated, confused perceptions, suggested in response to Kant, just goes to show that it 
is a form of sensibility.   
    Returning to the Transcendental Aesthetic we can say that it is a critique, not just because it 
isolates space as an element of the pure sensible knowledge but because it tries to determine how 
far this pure knowledge extends, namely to all outer appearances. To be exact, it extends only to 
the outer appearances, and not to things in themselves, like the simple substances, which figure in 
speculative metaphysics. The transcendental ideality of space therefore also limits the horizon of 
the pure knowledge, which can be derived from space. Kant’s new science of space, which he 
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discovered in the late 1760s, and presented in his letter to Lambert, is in this sense a forerunner of 
the Transcendental Aesthetic.    
    From this it seems to follow that the Transcendental Aesthetic leaves no room for speculative, 
transcendent metaphysics about the noumenal world, the thinking soul and God, which is what the 
majority of the Kant scholars discussed above have concluded.94  However, a number of scholars, 
among them Friedrich Paulsen, Peter Plaass, Léo Freuler, Karl Ameriks and Olli Koistinen, have 
been less willing to accept these conclusions.95 We can neither prove nor disprove the existence of 
noumena, like the noumenal world, the thinking soul-substance or God, but what we know is that 
they cannot exist qua phenomena, as Freuler correctly observes.96 From this point of view, all 
judgments, which affirm or negate the existence of the noumenal objects, are mere hypotheses, or 
problematic judgments.97    
   On Freuler’s interpretation knowledge of noumena is problematic, insofar as it exhibits analytical 
predicates already contained in the concept of the noumenon.98 Knowledge of noumena, insofar as 
it is not problematic, is restricted to predicates which are analogous to predicates that otherwise 
apply exclusively to phenomena.99 For instance, because space is related to the outer phenomenal 
substances, in a way which is analogous to how God is related to the noumenal substances, we are 
entitled to infer that God must be omnipresent to the noumenal substances, in a way which is 
analogous to how space is omnipresent to the phenomenal substances.  We see all things in space 
and not in God but in seeing all things in space, we see them in a way which is analogous to seeing 
them in God.   
   Ignoring this distinction make us apply spatial and temporal predicates beyond the limits of their 
use, which leads to the illusory metaphysics Kant refers to in A841/B869, above.  To this illusory 
metaphysics belong a number of spurious concepts, such as the concept of God’s omnipresence as 
spatial rather than virtual, the concept of extended noumenal substrates, the concept of spatially 
localised monads, and ultimately also the concept of the noumenal world as extended in space, 
which is the source of the mathematical antinomies.  In this study I will argue that these spurious 
metaphysical concepts depend on a so-called transcendental amphiboly, i.e. a conflation of 
phenomena and noumena.100 Dissolving the transcendental amphibolies and purifying speculative 
metaphysics from its illusions, depends on the recognition of the transcendental ideality of space, 
which provides another, indirect, argument for the transcendental ideality claim.  
 
1.9 Disposition  
 
The disposition of the study is as follows. The second chapter deals with the earliest stage of Kant’s 
thinking, i.e. the period 1747-1756, and his attempts to explain how seemingly indefinitely divisible 
bodies in space can originate from indivisible and partless substances. One important key to 
understanding this problem, and Kant’s solution to it, is to consider it against the background of 
                                                 
94 Kemp Smith (1999, p. 434), Erdmann (1884, p. lvii-lviii). Paulsen (1875 p. 147). Here it must not be 
concluded that Paulsen thought that the critical Kant rejected all metaphysics; on the contrary Paulsen 
claimed that the critical Kant only turned his critical weapons against the old speculative school 
metaphysics (Schulmetaphysik), not against metaphysics as such. See Paulsen (1900, p. 413).   
95 Paulsen (1900); Plaass (1994); Freuler (1992); Ameriks (1999); Koistinen (2012). 
96 Freuler (1992, p. 254).  
97 A781/B809.  
98 Freuler (1992, p. 354).   
99 Freuler (1992, pp. 340-5); cf. Prolegomena, § 58, Ak. 4, pp. 357-8.  
100 A270/B326.  
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Leibniz’s ontology of monads. Leibniz had suggested that monads are simple, unextended 
substances. Yet they are the basic building blocks of material bodies and other extended phenomena 
in space.   
   I will therefore start the second chapter with a discussion of how Leibniz figured it possible to 
bring non-spatial monads in touch with space. The most important lesson here is that monads have 
no situation or place in themselves.  However, like souls, they perceive the world from the point of 
view of an organic body which they control and which they confusedly perceive as extended and 
situated in an indistinguishable, continuous manifold of extensa, which are the organic bodies of 
other monads. The situatedness of the monads does not belong to the monads in themselves, but to 
their mode of coexisting with other monads on the ideal level of their bodily, phenomenal 
expressions. This explains how an infinitely divisible extended material body can arise from 
something as unexpected as an aggregate of an infinity of indivisible monads. 
   Leibniz’s contemporaries were not convinced, however, and suspected that his explanation was 
no better than a conjuring trick to make extended bodies disappear. In chapter two, I will try to 
show how this criticism led to a thoroughgoing revision and estrangement from Leibniz’s original 
metaphysics of monads. Wolff’s replacement of monads by atom-like, physical unities as the 
elementary parts of physical bodies was one important landmark of this revisionary movement. It 
was followed by Knutzen’s suggestion that bodies consist of monads, but monads that are endowed 
with primitive passive and active forces of motion, which make the monads capable of filling space 
and moving each other.      
   In chapter two, I will argue that Knutzen’s monads cannot act outwardly, in accordance with the 
theory of physical influx, unless they have a place and hence a mode of coexisting with other 
monads.  However, because of their ontological independency, monads do not coexist with others 
unless they already are connected and act outside themselves, which seems to make Knutzen’s 
defence of the theory of physical influx circular.  
    In chapter two, I will also argue that much of the young Kant’s endeavours were designed to 
correct this flaw in Knutzen’s argument. Simple substances exist in space because they act 
outwardly on one another by essential active forces which do not rely on the premise that the 
substances already move and are moved by these forces.  The only premise needed is that the simple 
substances coexist, something the young Kant took to be granted by the act whereby God 
perpetually creates and recreates them. To exist is for us to coexist in the same world, and 
coexistence compels us to interact in an orderly fashion.  In the course of Kant’s intellectual 
development during the dogmatic period, the simple substances finally evolve into physical 
monads, endowed with repulsive and attractive forces, by virtue of which they fill the places they 
occupy. Physical monads, not perceiving monads, are the building blocks of the material bodies.      
    The third chapter is focused on Kant’s development between the years 1760-1769. The basic 
background of this chapter is Kant’s growing insights into the materialist implications of his 
physical monadology. How is it possible to avoid the conclusion that the soul is a physical monad, 
which is present to its body because it occupies a place in it? In the third chapter, I will argue that 
Kant’s solution to this problem was based on the hypothesis that the soul can be present to its body, 
without touching it. The soul is virtually, not locally, present to its body, i.e. it is present to its body, 
because it acts upon it. Thus, the soul has no other place than the place of its body, which is its point 
of view.  Kant’s solution to the dilemma he had detected thus involved not only a reconsideration 
of the soul’s presence to its body, but also a different way of conceiving the bodily monads and 
their states and powers. 
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    In the 1760s Kant’s physical monads started to look more like Leibniz’s monads, in the sense 
that they had to have a power to perceive (feel) and not just move. However, Kant denied that the 
bodily elements could become aware of their own perceptions, no more than the perceptions of the 
human soul, which means that they have no power to act upon the soul.  The body is disassociated 
from the soul, for it cannot act upon something which does not occupy a space. In chapter three, I 
will argue that the dissociation of the body from the soul explains why Kant puts so much effort on 
his investigation of the human sensibility in the end of the 1760s. Thus, the study of sensibility 
seemed to provide the key to the problem of how it was possible for the body to act upon the human 
soul. 
    In chapter three, I will argue that Kant’s investigation of sensibility was inspired by his reading 
of Leibniz’s commentaries on Locke, and his correspondence with Lambert. Locke’s and Lambert’s 
influence is visible in Kant’s view that sensibility provides the soul with the matter of all 
knowledge. However, knowledge involves also form, as both Lambert and Leibniz pointed out. 
Kant’s main suggestion here is that knowledge has a sensible form, which is different from the 
logical form. The sensible form of knowledge originates from the form of our sensibility, which 
Kant now identifies with space and time.  More precisely space is the form of our outer sensibility, 
which lets the body appear as the point of view, from which sensations can be oriented in the 
determinate direction of an outer object.  In itself, the body is no more situated in space than a 
monad, which means that it is possible for it to act on the human soul, without having to assume 
that it occupies a place in space.          
    In the fourth chapter, I will describe how Kant’s study of sensibility, at the time of the critical 
turn 1769, compelled him to reconsider the origin and nature of the concept of absolute space. Given 
that space is a sensible form of knowledge it immediately follows that it is necessary to reconceive 
the origin of the concept of space. Outer sensations of sight or touch give us an idea of bodily 
extension.  However, none of this explains the origin of our idea of absolute space, which is non-
solid, continuous, immovable, and infinite, as Locke had observed.   To Leibniz this suggested that 
we have to search for the origin of the idea of space somewhere else. The idea of space originates, 
not from touch or sight, but rather from the common sense or imagination, which perceives what is 
common to them, namely extension. Extension, taken apart from the extended, leaves imagination 
with the idea of a uniform order of situations, without boundaries, which only the intellect can grasp 
in its infinity, by forming the idea of an absolute space.   
   In chapter four, I will argue that Kant unfortunately apprehended much of Leibniz and his analysis 
situs through the prism of Euler’s writings. This led Kant to the erroneous belief that the idea of 
space is the result of reflection, according to Leibniz.  Like the concepts of species and genera, the 
idea of space is an empirical concept of reflection, originally abstracted from bodies. Reflection 
reduces space to place, for place is the only thing bodies have in common when they are taken in 
isolation from all determinations which belong to their nature as bodies.  This ignores that space 
gives an orientation, and not just a place, to our sensations. In short, reflection cannot explain the 
idea of space as a subjective, but yet absolute ground of all dimensions and directions, typical of 
the pure form of outer sensibility, Kant had identified in the late 1760s.     
    In chapter four, I will also argue that it is possible to extract a somewhat stronger argument 
against Leibniz.  Leibniz’s difficulty is not so much that he cannot explain the directedness of an 
order of situations, but that he cannot explain what makes it continuous, rather than discrete.  
However, if this is true it becomes difficult for Leibniz to explain the possibility of the pure idea of 
an extended space, at least not without admitting that space is more than an order of situations, 
namely a form of sensibility. Space is extended, only if it is a continuous quantity, and therefore a 
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whole, which is prior to its indeterminate parts. From this observation, Kant concluded that spaces 
are possible only as parts of the all-encompassing subjective space, which led him to the conclusion 
that space is unique. The original representation of is not reflective, but intuitive, namely a pure 
concept of intuition, as Kant expressed it.  
   In the fifth chapter, I will discuss how the division between sensibility and understanding guided 
Kant in his attempts to come to terms with the twofold origin of the representation of the world, 
which he presented in the inaugural dissertation from 1770. The purpose of this chapter is to show 
how Kant’s new concept of space led him to make a distinction between the world as an absolute 
whole of simple substances, and the phenomenon of the world, i.e. the appearance of the world in 
relation to sensibility. The phenomenon of the world shares some of the fundamental mereological 
properties of the world, for instance that it is an absolute whole. On the other hand, the phenomenon 
of the world also shares some of the topological and mereological properties of space, namely that 
it is continuous prior to its indefinite parts, etc.     
   On the basis of this discussion, I try to follow Kant’s first attempt to demonstrate that the original 
representation of space is a pure intuition. The postulates of Euclidean geometry cannot be derived 
merely from concepts, such as the concept of an order of situations. Thus, there is nothing in the 
concept of an order of situations, which prescribes that it is Euclidean. The truths of the postulates 
of Euclidean geometry are derived from the constructions of lines, angles, circles, etc., which are 
apprehended in an all-encompassing, continuous space, which is a priori and singular.  
   From these observations, Kant concludes that space cannot be conceived in the same way as a 
determination of a thing.  For if it is conceived as an order of situations of coexisting noumenal 
substances (monads) as the Leibnizians argue, it follows that the original representation of space is 
an empirical concept. This makes it impossible to explain the possibility of Euclidean geometry as 
a science.  The postulates of Euclidean geometry, such as the first postulate, lose their necessity, 
and regress into mere inductive generalisations.   
    In chapter five, I will argue that Kant’s argument does not work against Leibniz. The postulates 
of Euclidean geometry are not inductive generalisations according to Leibniz, but principles of 
synthesis, in accordance with which imagination produces the extension of phenomena and the 
space of the phenomenal world. However, Kant’s arguments are still valuable, because they 
underline that his version of the transcendental ideality of space is much more radical than that of 
Leibniz.  For Kant the phenomena are not just confused expressions of things, which at the bottom 
are actually finite or infinite manifolds of discrete simple substances. Their potential, infinite 
divisibility inalienably belongs to their very being as phenomena. The consequence of this is that 
there is never any exact one-to-one correspondence between phenomena and noumena. For Kant 
space is transcendentally ideal, not only because noumena are not in space, but also because the 
spatial order between phenomena is not isomorphic with the order of coexistence between the 
noumena. 
   The sixth chapter enters the 1780s and Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic, against the background 
of Kant’s plan for a general phenomenology. The Transcendental Aesthetic was not executed 
exactly in accordance with Kant’s plan but shares many commonalities with it. The key issue for 
such a reading is to address Kant’s method of abstraction or isolation.  Contrary to what many 
scholars claim, the method of abstraction is not an unfortunate misstep on Kant’s part, but an 
essential element of his expositions of the metaphysical concept of space. Only by taking the 
empirical intuitions abstractly does it become possible to uncover extension, purely as a 
determination of the form of outer sensibility.  
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    The expositions of the metaphysical concept of space is an analysis of this extension. It shows 
that space is a continuous and infinite whole which belongs to the original phenomenon of space as 
a unique, formal ground of all outer appearances.  In chapter six, I will argue that this gives Kant 
an important advantage with respect to his Leibnizian critics, like Eberhard and Pistorius, because 
it points out that the original phenomenon of space cannot be reduced to an all-encompassing order 
or place of places. The original phenomenon of space is not grounded in an objective order of 
spatially situated simple substances (noumena), for such an order is never continuous and hence 
extended in itself.  On the other hand, Kant cannot exclude the possibility that there is a 
correspondence between the order of spatially localised phenomena and the order of coexistence of 
noumena.    
    Finally, in the seventh chapter I try to link Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic to his discussion of 
transcendental reflection. Transcendental reflection is a reflection on the origin of representations, 
in either sensibility or understanding. Without transcendental reflection, the original determinations 
of the pure form of sensibility cannot be isolated and analysed, in agreement with Kant’s original 
plan for a general phenomenology. Transcendental reflection is at the origin of Kant’s science of 
space, which uncovers the determinations of the original phenomenon of space which are 
fundamental to prove the transcendental ideality of space. Transcendental reflection lets us know 
space purely as a form and hence as a limit of all outer sensible knowledge.  
    Transcendental reflection fails when it mistakenly conceives space as a form of understanding, 
rather than as a form of sensibility. The result of this error is a transcendental amphiboly, a 
confusion of phenomena with noumena, which leads to a misapplication of the predicates of space 
and time to noumena. This is the source of the spurious concepts of spatiotemporal noumena, which 
belong to the illusory part of metaphysics.     
   In chapter seven, I will argue that Kant’s analysis of the origin of the spurious concepts of 
metaphysics gives an important insight into his critique of Leibnizian metaphysics. Though partly 
unjustified, it helps to uncover the rationales behind Kant’s discussion of the mathematical 
antinomies of rational cosmology, which are rooted in the spurious concept of a spatially extended 
noumenal world of simple substances.  Dissolving the spurious concept of an extended noumenal 
world and hence also the mathematical antinomies, is possible only from the standpoint of 
transcendental reflection, which is the same standpoint from which we know the limits of sensible 
knowledge and the transcendental ideality of space. This provides Kant with an indirect argument 
for the transcendental ideality claim, which he amplifies by showing how the recognition of the 
transcendental ideality of space makes it possible to reconceive the mind-body union, and the nature 
of the omnipresence of God. 
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2. Monads, Places, and Space in the Metaphysics of the Young Kant   
 
 
2.1 Background: Leibniz on Monads, Places and Points of View 
 
 
The best way of introducing the young Kant’s discussion of monads, places and space is to begin 
where it all starts, namely with the philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1648-1716) and his 
notion of monads.101 In the Monadology Leibniz gives the following explanation of the concept of 
a monad: 
 
The Monad, which we shall discuss here, is nothing but a simple substance that enters into composites – 
simple, that is, without parts (Theodicy, sec. 10). And there must be simple substances, since there are 
composites; for the composite is nothing more than a collection, or aggregate, of simples. But where there 
are no parts, neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is possible. (Monadology §§ 1-3, G VI 607, AG 
213) 
 
Leibniz starts in other words with the fact that there are phenomena, such as material bodies, which 
are composites, from which he concludes that material bodies ultimately must consist of parts, 
which are not composites in their turn. Composites, such as material bodies, are in other words 
aggregates of monads, according to Leibniz, i.e. aggregates of parts, which ultimately are perfectly 
simple. Leibniz thus rejects some of the major tenets of corpuscularian ontology and physics. 
Though monads are indivisible, like the atoms, they are without exception simple things.   
    From the simplicity of the monads Leibniz also concludes that they are substances, for that which 
exists without being a composite of another part can exist solely as a subject, i.e. can exist without 
existing as a predicate of something else.102 However, a monad is not just a subject because it is 
ontologically independent of the whole of which it is a part, but because it exists as a subject of 
actions. Thus, a monad has or even is a principle or primitive active force (entelechy), which 
involves a striving (conatus) to pass from one state to another.103  
    Leibniz describes these states as perceptions, for the state of a monad, in which all its inner 
properties are united, cannot exist without representing and being represented in things which are 
external to them, namely the composites.104 Insofar as a perception is less confused than the 
                                                 
101 Leibniz, Monadology, §§1-19, G VI 607-10, AG 213-15.      
102 Leibniz’s notion of substances as things which exist only as subjects was developed already in the 
midyears of his career (1680-1704), as Leibniz’s discussion of the concept of substance in the Discours de 
métaphysique §8, G IV 432-3, testifies. That a substance is a subject, which can exist, even if it is not the 
predicate of another thing, is only a “nominal definition” of the concept of a substance, according to 
Leibniz. Presumably, this definition is not sufficient in order to have a real definition of the concept of a 
substance, which expresses what belongs to the (real) possibility of a substance. For a more detailed 
discussion of the concept of substance as an ultimate subject, see Rutherford (2003, pp. 121-2). 
103 A New System of Nature, First Draft, G IV 472; A New System of Nature, G IV 479.  
104 Thus in Principles of Nature and Grace § 1, G VI 598, L 636, from 1714, Leibniz explains that 
perceptions are “representations of the composite, or what is external, in the simple.” C.f. Monadology, § 
14.  
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perception that precedes it the monad acts, according to Leibniz.105 However, if the monad passes 
to a perception, which is more confused, the monad suffers.106 The monad must therefore have a 
primitive passive force, complementary to its active force, which varies with the degree of its 
confused perceptions.       
    Leibniz concludes that the monads cannot originally have any of the external properties, which 
typically belong to composites, such as extension and shape.107 Instead, monads relate to other 
monads by virtue of their perceptions, i.e. actions and states, which are absolutely internal to the 
monad. Monads must therefore be distinguishable by properties, which cannot be reduced to 
relations, such as situation (situs), duration and interaction (commercio).108 In Leibniz’s 
terminology, the monads obey the so called principle of the identity of indiscernibles (or principle 
of individuation), according to which there can be no pair of individuals which share all their inner 
properties or qualities: 109 
 
However, monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be beings. And if simple 
substances did not differ at all in their qualities, there would be no way of perceiving (s’appercevoir) any 
change in things, since what there is in a composite can only come from its simple ingredients; and if the 
monads had no qualities, they would be indiscernible from one another, since they do not differ in quantity. 
As a result, assuming a plenum, in motion, each place would always receive only the equivalent of what it 
already had, and one state of things would be indistinguishable from another. It is also necessary that each 
monad be different from each other. For there are never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike, two 
beings in which it is not possible to discover an internal difference, that is, one founded on intrinsic 
denomination. (Monadology §§ 8-9, G VI 608, AG 214) 
 
    One of the main problems of Leibniz’s monadology is to explain how it is possible for simple 
monads to become parts of extended composites, given their nonmaterial and unextended nature.  
Here it is helpful to note that Leibniz, during the earliest stage of his career, in the first half of the 
1670s, started with a notion of substances, not as monads but as atoms or corporeal substances. 
Leibniz conceived these corporeal substances more or less similar to those of Aristotle, in the sense 
that he considered them as the outcome of a union between matter and form. The form Leibniz 
identified with the soul of the corporeal substance. In order to explain how this soul can enter into 
contact with, and act upon, the matter of the corporeal substance, Leibniz assumed that the soul 
must have a certain location. The soul is not an extended atom or physical point, like the body that 
results from its union with matter, but it has a place, a mathematical point, from which it views 
everything.   
                                                 
105 New Essays, p. 210. Perceptions are confused, to the degree they contain undistinguished perceptions, 
which cannot be brought to our attention.  When the number of undistinguished perceptions diminishes, the 
perception becomes more distinct.  
106 See for instance Lettre à Reymond, G III 636 and New Essays, p. 210.    
107 This is explicitly stated in Principles of Nature and Grace, G VI 598, AG 207. 
108 See “Notes for Leibniz to Des Bosses, 5 February 1712”, G IV 438, AG 199. In other words, the simple 
substances can exist independently of any relation that holds or may hold between them. The simple 
substances are ontologically independent, an independency that seems to go hand in hand with a certain 
causal independency, for if a substance is simple then it cannot be altered by any external causes, i.e. the 
kind of causes that are at play when the structure of the material bodies changes. As Watkins (2005, p. 33) 
correctly observes the ontological independence of Leibniz’s substances is grounded in their self-
sufficiency, even if they are the consequence of a common cause, namely God.  
109 Inner properties also involve quantities, but we cannot represent these quantities (distinctly) unless we 
relate them to each other.   
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    In a letter to Duke Johann Friedrich, dated 21 May 1671, Leibniz defends this contention based 
on an analysis of the conditions under which experience is possible: 
 
(…) thus when I want to ascertain myself, that a body handed over to me is of gold, I combine its glitter, 
sound, and weight, and conclude from this that it is of gold. The mind must therefore be in a place, since 
all the lines of the sight, hearing, [and] touch [visus, auditus, tactus] coincide, and that in one point. If we 
give the mind a larger place than a point, then it is already a body, and has partes extra partes; it is then 
not intimately present [intimae praesens], and cannot reflect upon all its parts and actions, which, however, 
is the essence of the mind. Posited that the mind consists in one point, it is indivisible and undestroyable.110 
(G I 53) 
 
Thus in this letter Leibniz seems to claim that the soul has or even is a place,111 a place that he 
identifies with a mathematical point.112 The soul is the form, which acts upon the extended matter, 
giving it structure and motion, without itself having extension.113  Ultimately, it is the latter actions, 
which makes the mind united with matter into a corporeal substance or atom. Moreover, Leibniz 
thinks that he can explain it in a way which preserves the indivisibility and immortality of the soul; 
far from depriving the soul of its spiritual properties, the analysis of the situatedness of the soul 
proves that these properties also are properties of the point from which it views the world of material 
bodies.  
    Just a couple of years after his letters to Duke Johann Friedrich, however, Leibniz seems to have 
realised that the different situations of souls and atoms are insufficient to explain the individuation 
of souls. As Christina Mercer and R. C. Sleigh have observed, in the mid-1670s Leibniz seems to 
have identified the principle of individuation of souls with the rule or principle in agreement with 
which their perceptual states develop.114 Souls are individualised by the different points of view 
from which they mirror the world, i.e. by the principles in accordance with which their perceptions 
are produced, principles which are internal to them.115 Thus, the point from which the soul views 
the world cannot be a mathematical point, for souls are not immediately located and individualised 
in space. Instead, the soul is a substantial unity, which is individualised by its rules of action, actions 
that result in sensations or thoughts, not in motions.116   
    Though it is easy to imagine that Leibniz wants to disassociate souls (and more generally all 
substances) from places and hence to avoid any associations between points of view and places, he 
frequently invites to the opposite. Thus, Leibniz often describes the points of view of the substances 
as analogous to the points of view of a person, who perceives one and the same town from different 
                                                 
110 My translation, J.J.   
111 Leibniz is less ambiguous in a  letter to Arnaud written in November the same year as his letter to Duke 
Johann Friedrich, where he explains that points are “loci” of the mind and hence not minds themselves; see 
G I 72.    
112 Russell (1964, p. 123) defends the view that Leibniz identified souls with mathematical points in the 
early 1670s. For a different interpretation see Mercer/Sleigh (1998, pp. 81-4).    
113 For a discussion of Leibniz’s earliest notion of corporeal substance, see Mercer/Sleigh (1998, pp. 76-84).  
114  Mercer/Sleigh (1998, pp. 91-2).  
115 In the terminology of Mercer/Sleigh, these principles can be described as “production rules”.    
116 Mercer/Sleigh (1998, p. 91).  The matter of the corporeal substance is not sufficient or even necessary in 
order for the soul to perceive; all that the soul needs to have a perception is that it acts in accordance with a 
certain rule. 
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perspectives, for instance from a high point or from a plain.117 Leibniz repeats the same town 
analogy in the 1680s, namely in the “Discourse on Metaphysics” (Discours de métaphysique), from 
1686: 
 
Moreover, every substance is like a complete world and like a mirror of God or of the whole universe, 
which each one expresses in its own way, somewhat as the same city is variously represented depending 
upon the different positions from which it is viewed. Thus, the universe is in some way multiplied as many 
times as there are substances, and the glory of God is likewise multiplied by as many entirely different 
representations of his work. (Discourse on Metaphysics § 9, G IV 434, AG 42) 
 
Furthermore, the Discourse on Metaphysics gives strong indications that Leibniz now connects the 
substantiality of the corporeal substance primarily with its form, rather than its matter. Leibniz does 
not completely sever the soul from the matter of the corporeal substance, but he gives it more 
metaphysical weight, so to speak, by taking the soul as that which “constitutes” the substance of 
the body.118 The soul is no longer a mere complement to the matter of the corporeal substance, but 
a substance in its own right.   
     Leibniz’s thinking about how substances can be linked to space is further developed in “A New 
System of Nature” (Systeme nouveau pour expliquer la nature et de la communication des 
substances, aussi bien que de l’union qu’il y a entre l’âme et le corps) from June 1695. In the New 
System Leibniz sometimes reserves the term “point of view” for the mathematical points. However, 
on a closer look, mathematical points are merely places, which abstractly express what belongs to 
the possibility of a thing insofar as it is being situated in the same way as another thing.119 The point 
of view of a monad is rather a physical point, namely an extended organic body, contracted into a 
tiny but extended particle or corpuscle.120 
    The point of view of the human soul, for instance, coincides with the human body, in spite of the 
fact that the body is an extended, physical point and not a mathematical point, as Leibniz explains 
in the first draft to the New System. Thus, in the draft Leibniz tries to explain that everything which 
occurs in the soul, occurs, 
 
(…) in the succession of time, through the sequence of thoughts and so to speak like in ordered dreams (or 
preferably internal phenomena) so true that they successfully predict the future, and all this independently 
of the external world, but in conformity with the rest of the universe, and in particular with the organs of 
the body which constitute its point of view [my italics, J.J.] in the world, and in which the union of the soul 
and the body consists.121 (G IV 477) 
                                                 
117 Leibniz’s use of the town analogy, in his writings in the 1670s, are discussed by Mercer/Sleigh (1998, 
pp. 96-8).    
118 Discourse on Metaphysics § 12, G IV 436, AG 44.  
119 Leibniz technically makes a distinction between situation (situs) and place (locus), during the mature 
phase of his thinking, e.g. in his correspondence with Clarke (1715-16), most notably Leibniz’s Fifth Paper, 
section 47. 
G VII, p. 400-1. Generally, Leibniz connects situations with a thing’s mode of coexisting with other things, 
whereas place abstractly expresses what belongs to the possibility of being in the same situation as another 
thing. For instance if A is in the same place as B, then this abstractly expresses that A’s mode of coexisting 
with C, D, etc. agrees with B’s mode of coexisting with C, D, etc.  For a magisterial discussion of Leibniz’s 
concepts of situation, sameness of situation (congruency), place, and modes of coexistence, see De Risi 
(2007, pp. 131-5, 477-86, 558-9).     
120 Thus, physical points are indivisible “only in appearance” as Leibniz expresses it in the New System. For 
a discussion of this passage, see Russell (1964, p. 105).   
121 My translation, J.J.   
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Hence, what the first draft seems to suggest is that monads cannot have a point of view unless they 
are embodied, and in this respect, they resemble the soul of an animal or human being.    
    For a monad to be a soul, which is united with a body, is for the soul and the body to express 
themselves immediately in each other. The immediateness of this mutual relation makes the monads 
of the body subordinated to the body and ultimately the soul. As Adams observes, this is not only 
to be understood in terms of the dominating monad expressing more distinctly what happens in its 
own body than the rest of the world, but in terms of explanatory directness by which their 
expressions agree: 
 
An organic body stands in this relation to its dominant monad alone, not to the subordinate monads in it – 
though they do of course contain expressions of it. This is an important part of the structural relationship 
between a monad and its organic body by which monadic domination is constituted. An organic body is 
an expression of its soul or dominant monad. Leibniz has less to say about this than about the soul’s 
expressing its body, but expression as he understands it is a relation of one-to-one mapping, which will 
normally be symmetrical. So if each monad is an especially good expression of its body, the organic body 
will be, reciprocally, an especially good expression of its dominant monad.122 
 
Monads and bodies express themselves in each other, but it is only the expression of the dominant 
monad (soul) which is a perception.123 Insofar as the dominant monad perceives the impressions on 
its body distinctly it acts, for instance when my hand moves at my will to lift it. On the other hand, 
if the dominant monad suffers, it perceives the impressions confusedly, which explains why it has 
a confused perception of its own body as extended and situated in a world of other extended bodies. 
There is hence a kind of mutual mapping relation between the states of the dominant monad, the 
states of its phenomenal organic body, and the states of the organic bodies of all other monads, in 
the sense that they and their states are mutually mirrored or expressed in each other. However, 
because of the confusion in the perceptions, the mapping is distorted, so that for instance a 
phenomenon can be an expression of more than just one monad, or just originate from a confused 
perception, rather being an expression of a monad.124 Leibniz scholars have therefore concluded 
that the mapping from monads to phenomena cannot be perfectly isomorphic, but only 
homomorphic.125         
                                                 
122 Adams (1994, p. 286).      
123 Thus, it is only an expression, which represents a multitude of bodily impressions within the unity of one 
monad, which is a perception. Monads with animal or human bodies have the capacity of receiving bodily 
impressions (on their outer sense organs) which are sufficiently distinctive or heightened to become 
sensations of outer objects; see The Principles of Nature and Grace, § 4, G VI 599, L 637. Sensations or 
sense perceptions of objects, which are sufficiently distinctive to be distinguished from other perceptions of 
objects, are clear, and when their contents are distinguished as well they are distinct. For a careful 
discussion of the difference between distinctive, clear and distinct perceptions, see Puryear (2006), in 
particular Chapter 3 and 4.       
124 This is for instance argued by De Risi (2007, pp. 431-2).   
125 The mapping is isomorphic if and only if four conditions are fulfilled: (i) at least one phenomenon 
corresponds to each monad, (ii) to each monad corresponds at most one phenomenon, (iii) each monad 
corresponds to exactly one phenomenon (i.e. the mapping is injective) and (iv) each phenomenon is an 
expression of exactly one monad (i.e. the mapping is a surjective). However, since the two last conditions 
are not fulfilled, De Risi (2007, pp. 429-33) concludes that the correspondence between monads and 
phenomena cannot be an isomorphism, but only a homomorphism, i.e. a partial isomorphism. An 
isomorphism is hence only possible as an ideal limit to the expressive relation between the phenomena and 
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     From this it follows that monads can become situated or placed in space, not directly of course, 
but indirectly by virtue of their presence to an organic body, which they confusedly perceive as 
extended. This answers the question of how extended bodies and other composites can have monads 
as their simple parts in spite of their simplicity. Ultimately, bodies are nothing but aggregates of 
monads, i.e. discrete units, which appear as continuously diffused from the contracted point of view 
of the finite monads.   
     We find additional information about these issues in Leibniz’s letters to Des Bosses. In one these 
letters (June 1707) Des Bosses questions how it is possible for extension to be a mode of non-
extended things (monads).126 In his answer to Des Bosses, one month later, Leibniz underlines that 
although monads lack extension in themselves we can link them to extension, by virtue of their 
position (positio), for extension is the “simultaneous continuous repetition of position 
(positionis)”.127 A letter to De Volder, written a couple of years earlier (20 June 1704), nicely 
parallels Leibniz’s answer to Des Bosses:  
 
For although monads are not extended, they nevertheless have a certain kind of situation [situs] in 
extension, that is, they have a certain ordered relation of coexistence with others, namely, through the 
machine which they control. I do not think that any finite substances exist apart from a body, or, therefore, 
that they lack a position or an order relative to the other things coexisting in the universe.  (G II 253, L 
531) 
 
Thus, monads still have a situation in space indirectly, by virtue of their presence to an extended 
organic body, which they control.   
    Many commentators have questioned if Leibniz adequately explains how it is possible for the 
monad to have a physical point of view and hence also a place. For instance, even if one accepts 
Adams’s version of the domination theory, the aggregation of monads into organic bodies seems to 
presuppose that these monads in their turn have an organic body and so on. Adams’s version of the 
domination theory leads, in other words, to an infinite regress that threatens the explanation of how 
the subordination of monads, can make them into parts of the organic body of a dominant monad. 
Here Bertrand Russell’s version of Leibniz’s theory has the advantage that it only demands that 
every monad must belong to an organic body, not that it must have an organic body, as for instance 
Adams claims.128 On Russell’s interpretation of Leibniz, the order of the monad’s coexistence with 
the other monads does not depend on how it perceives its own body, but on the different degrees of 
distinctness with which it perceives.  The monad will dominate those monads, which have a lesser 
degree of distinctness in their perceptions. The monad can be attributed a point of view, without 
losing its existential and causal independency.  
     Furthermore Leibniz’s contemporaries argued that the physical point of view of the monad is 
unnecessary in order for it to perceive the world from the point of view of its inner constitution. 
Thus, the expressive relation between the monad and its body is admittedly not causal, for 
according to Leibniz it is impossible for the monads and their bodies to influence each other. 
Monads can influence each other, only if their states “migrate” (passer) between each other, which 
is impossible since the states are accidents, which cannot exist without the support of some 
                                                 
noumena, according to De Risi (2007, pp. 338-41). Puryear (2006, pp. 13-15) speaks about the 
correspondence relation between monads and phenomena as an isomorphism, but as far as I can see he has 
a homomorphism in mind.   
126 G II 332. 
127 G II 339.  
128 Russell (1964, pp. 147-9).    
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substance, that is, a monad.129 Every monad therefore expresses the universe in accordance with its 
own laws, without causally interacting with the other monads, in accordance with the hypothesis of 
the pre-established harmony (Hypothese des accords).130     
    Given that there is no causal interaction between the soul and its organic body, but merely a 
harmonious correspondence, sensations might equally well occur independently of the alterations 
in our sense organs, as if we existed without a body.  This was also something the sharp-witted 
canon of Dijon, Simon Foucher (1644-1696), had pointed out to Leibniz, in a critical remark to his 
New System, which was published in Journal des Savants, in September 1695.131 Thus, according 
to Foucher, Leibniz could not rule out the possibility that our perceptions occur even apart from our 
bodies and the outer world, within which they seem to be located. But then, why has God given us 
grounds to believe that our perceptions correspond to and are causally produced by alterations in 
the body, when that is not the case?  Not only does it make God look like a rather unskilful artisan, 
but as a deceitful one too. 
    Foucher also suspected that the causal independency of the states of the monads would make the 
monads independent, not only of their bodies but of each other as well.132 Monads would in other 
words become detached from each other and hence lose their places in the world and in the material 
bodies in particular.  Even as aggregates of monads bodies are, still, nothing but phenomena, 
according to Foucher, “chimerical composites” which lack the intrinsic unity that is characteristic 
of the simple substances. The harmony between the states of the monads was an “artifice”, which 
really served no purpose; the states of the monad did not depend on the states of other monads and 
was solely the outcome of the actions of God or powers internal to the monad itself.               
    The theory of the pre-established harmony seems to put our entire belief in the outer world in 
question; if there is no causal connection between our thoughts and the material bodies, how can 
we ascertain ourselves of their existence? In the absence of a causal connection between material 
bodies and thoughts, our natural inclination to believe in the existence of the outer world will have 
no justification, other than the teachings of the Scriptures. This was also the conclusion of Nicolas 
Malebranche (1638-1715), a priest and philosopher whose work Foucher had made into an object 
of fierce criticism. Thus, according to Malebranche the immediate objects of our awareness are not 
material bodies, but ideas which exist in God’s mind.133 We see all things in God, not in space.       
    Foucher’s critique certainly exaggerates the kind of causal independency Leibniz was prepared 
to attribute to the soul and its perceptions, as can be seen from his reply to Foucher.134     On the 
other hand, Leibniz never denied that the mind’s union with God is stronger than its union with its 
body, as the exaltation of mystics, like St. Theresa of Avicenna, demonstrated. Seeing a town 
without eyes is of course absurd from the point of view of common sense, but perfectly conceivable 
given that the theory of the pre-established harmony and the theory of perception it supports are 
correct.135 
                                                 
129 Postscriptum eines Briefes an Basnage de Beauval, G IV 498-99; for a discussion of Leibniz’s 
arguments against a real influence between the monads, see Watkins (2005, pp. 27-8).     
130 New System, G IV 484-5, AG 144.  
131 Objections de M. Foucher, G IV 488-9.   
132 Objections de M. Foucher, G IV 488-9.   
133 See for instance, The Search after Truth III, ii, 6, p. 234. 
134 Remarques sur les Objections de M. Foucher, G IV 492.      
135 New System, G IV 484, AG 143. 
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    As Leibniz admitted, there is only one outer object of which I am immediately certain: God. In 
that particular sense, there is an affinity between Leibniz and Malebranche, which Leibniz also 
openly recognises, in the dialogue Conversation of Philarète and Ariste: 
 
I am convinced that God is the only immediate external object of souls, since he alone acts immediately 
on the soul. And our thoughts, with all that is in us insofar as it includes some perfection, are produced 
without any interruption by his continued operation. Thus, insofar as we receive our finite perfections from 
his infinite perfections, we are immediately affected by them; and that is how our mind is immediately 
affected by the eternal ideas in God, when our mind has thoughts that relate to them and participate in 
them. It is in this sense that we can say that our mind sees all things in God.   (G VI 594, AG 268) 
 
Passages like this explains, I think, why Wolff, and ultimately also Kant, tried to defend a more 
realistic notion of monads and material bodies. Because of this critique, Leibniz’s monadology 
evolved into a more realistic, physical monadology. To these developments, I turn now. 
 
 
2.2 Physical Unities, Places, and Space: Wolff’s Response   
 
It is well known that relatively little of Leibniz’s philosophical writings were published during his 
lifetime, and that the attitude towards Leibniz’s philosophy was growing less favourable in the 
immediate years after his death, not only in England and France, but also in Germany. The 
objection, which Leibniz’s contemporaries raised against his ontology of monads, concerned its 
ability to present a viable and consistent realist notion of material bodies.  The attacks on the theory 
of the pre-established harmony did not contribute to Leibniz’s reputation in Europe.  
    The situation in Germany was however a little bit different from the rest of Europe. In the early 
18th century Germany was becoming increasingly independent, from the influences of its 
neighbours – France, Austria, Sweden, etc. – not only politically, but also culturally. The 
enlightenment in Germany made its way under national banners. The leader of the philosophical 
formation of this movement, Christian Wolff (1679–1754), was staunchly defending Germany’s 
colours and hence also the reputation of its greatest mind – Leibniz. Wolff’s defence of the 
reputation of his hero and mentor included a reply to the objections of Foucher, among them the 
allegation that material bodies had evaporated in to chimerical composites, within the system of 
Leibniz. Wolff’s response is interesting because it relates to the issue of the ontological status of 
the material bodies, the simple things and the order in accordance with which they coexist.  
    Like Leibniz, Wolff defines simple things as things which have no parts.136 The collorary of this 
definition is that simple things cannot have an extension or shape. Thus, according to Wolff, the 
extended is impossible without a plurality of parts, and shape is a property of the extended, insofar 
as its extension is limited. The simple parts of the material bodies are limited only because they 
exist in a determinate inner state, which makes them different from each other, in accordance with 
the principle of individuation.137 These inner states are furthermore alterable, for they involve not 
only necessary, immutable properties of the simple thing (essences and attributes), but also their 
contingent, mutable properties (modes).138 Since the alterations of the inner states cannot be 
groundless, it follows that the simple things are endowed with certain primitive active forces. The 
                                                 
136 Wolff, Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 75.   
137 Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 586. 
138 The last point is elaborated by Wolff in Prima Philosophia sive Ontologia, §§ 705-6.    
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simple things are in other words substances, namely “monads” or “physical unities” (Einheiten der 
Natur).139  
    However, the real touchstone of Wolff’s more realistic notion of simple substances is its ability 
to explain how it comes that simple substances can be in an outer state. Wolff’s answer to this 
question is based on the assertion that the simple substances coexist with each other, and that each 
substance therefore has a mode of coexisting with the other substances, which makes it localised 
outside them. The position of a thing in the order of coexistence, i.e., its mode of coexisting with 
other things, is literally a place in space. Even if the simple substances have no shape and do not 
fill any space, Wolff can still argue that it must be possible for the physical unities to be located in 
space.  
   Wolff’s argument for this ontological and cosmological thesis is, however, based on 
phenomenological considerations, which we will later recognise in Kant’s Transcendental 
Aesthetic.140 Thus, according to Wolff we cannot be conscious of things distinct from ourselves, 
except by being conscious of them outside ourselves.141 Likewise, insofar as we also are conscious 
of these things as simultaneously distinct and different from other things, we represent them as 
coexisting outside one another.142  Typical of the latter representation is that it involves and comes 
with a certain order. In other words, we cannot represent one thing as the first, without representing 
the other thing immediately next to it as the second, and the one next to the second one as the third, 
etc.143 We therefore represent outer things in space, for space is nothing but the order of things, 
which coexist.144   
   Like all other determinations, the place of a thing cannot be groundless; there is a reason why this 
pencil exists immediately next to that mug and not another thing, etc.: 
 
If among the simultaneous things, one contains in itself the reason why the other is simultaneously next to 
it, then each one has its particular mode, how it is simultaneous with the others. Each one has therefore its 
particular place, and is connected with all the others in space.145 (Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt 
und der Seele des Menschen, § 546) 
 
Much like Leibniz, Wolff argues that we can find the ground or reason for the particular location 
of a thing in the inner states of its parts, i.e. in the inner states of the physical unities and not in the 
empty mathematical space: 
 
Because everything has its sufficient reason, why it is rather than not, it follows that there must be a 
sufficient reason why each one of them is to be found at the side of this one and not another one. But now 
since also here the ground is to be searched for neither in space, nor in time – namely insofar as they must 
be taken as empty of the things that are situated in them – it follows that the ground must be found in those 
things that exist next to each other, and hence also in the inner states of the simple things.146 (Vernünftige 
Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 594) 
                                                 
139 Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 599. 
140 See Chapter 6.     
141 Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 45. 
142 Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 45. 
143 Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 46.   
144 Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 46. 
145 My translation, J.J.   
146 My translation, J.J.   
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The physical unities are not engulfed in themselves; on the contrary, they are “connected” 
(verknüpft) with each other, because of the conformity or agreement, which holds between their 
inner states. That the inner state of a physical unity immediately agrees with the inner state of 
another physical unity thus explains why they are represented next to each other.  But since the 
inner state of a physical unity depends on the degree of its force, it follows that the forces of the 
physical unities have to agree and be connected with each other, in order to explain the places of 
the physical unities. Likewise, the alterations in the states of the simple substances are also 
grounded outside them, but not without the mediation of the forces within the substances.147  
   This explains why Wolff attributes not only primitive active forces, but also primitive passive 
forces to the simple substances.148 The active force brings about an alteration of the inner state of a 
simple substance, which answers to a passive force in the other simple substances, coming to 
expression as a corresponding alteration in their inner states. The forces that connect the simple 
things are, however, not necessarily identical with those forces of representation that must be 
ascribed to all monads, according to Leibniz.149 Leibniz never proved that there is a single, universal 
force common to all simple things, so the inner states of the simple substances are not necessarily 
identical with perceptions.150  
   Wolff is far from easy to follow, but as will be seen he seems to think that the impossibility of 
ascribing one universal force to all simple substances makes it difficult to explain and determine 
exactly how the forces and states of the simple substances are connected and brought into harmony 
with each other.151  In other words, Wolff does not declare if he thinks that the harmony between 
the forces and states of the simple substances depends on a causal interaction, or if it is pre-
established, in accordance with Leibniz’s theory. In either case, the result is that the simple 
substances connect with all substances that coexist “outside”152 (ausser) them in the world. Thus, 
the alterations in the states of the simple substances depend on what happens outside the simple 
substances themselves.153  
    Wolff thus never demonstrates that the coexistence of the physical unities is an outcome of a 
causal interaction, rather than a mere agreement between their states. Even if a causal interaction 
between their forces and states of physical unities connects them, it is far from evident that this 
necessarily makes them coexist outside one another and the mind that represents them. There is 
nothing which seems to prevent physical unities from coexisting with other qualitatively different 
physical unities, without existing outside each other, as long as their states agree with each other, 
be it as a result of causal interaction or not. It is true that we cannot reduce the outsideness of the 
physical unities to a relation between points of view, like the monads of Leibniz, but this does not 
grant that they coexist outside each other. For the relation of outsideness belongs to things, 
including the simple things, as a result of how they are perceived by us, insofar as we perceive them 
as being different from each other.  
                                                 
147 Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen § 105.   
148 Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 697.  
149 Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen § 600.   
150 Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen § 600 and Vernünftige Gedanken 
von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, Anmerckungen, § 215. 
151 Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 600 and Vernünftige Gedanken 
von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, Anmerckungen, § 216. 
152 Wolff uses the word “outside” in an ambiguous way: originally it signifies that a thing is different from 
us and other things, but more narrowly it applies to things that are different from each other in space; c.f.  
Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 45. 
153 Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 602.  
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    Finally, the physical unities cannot add up to something extended just because they occupy a 
place. The physical unities might very well occupy a space, but because of their simplicity, it is 
impossible for them to fill a space. As will be seen, this will be important for the understanding of 
the further developments of Wolff’s realist program for simple substances. It was these 
developments, which finally led to Kant’s notion of simple substances as physical monads, which 
not just occupy, but fill a space, and which hence can become parts of extended material bodies.  
 
 
2.3 Monads, Places and Physical Influx: Knutzen’s Arguments  
 
Historians of philosophy seldom mention Martin Knutzen (1713-1751), except as the Kant’s teacher 
in philosophy, and in particular as the teacher who introduced Kant to the physics of Newton. In 
his Commentary to Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”, Norman Kemp Smith gives the following 
assessment of Knutzen: 
 
It was to his teacher Martin Knutzen that Kant owed his first introduction to Newtonian cosmology; and 
from Knutzen he inherited the problem of reconciling Newton’s mechanical view of nature and absolute 
view of space with orthodox Leibnizian tenets.154 
 
 One does not have to share Kemp Smith’s assessment in all its details in order to convince oneself 
of the affinities between Knutzen and the young Kant. The biographies of Kant and Knutzen 
overlap, not only because Knutzen taught Kant, but also because they shared the same pietistic 
predilections and backgrounds.  Though Kant was a son of a saddler, and Knutzen the son of a 
Danish merchant, they both lived in the vicinities of Königsberg during their entire lives. 155    
    The influence of the Pietists of Königsberg is reflected in Knutzen’s philosophical education and 
project. In agreement with the teachings of the Pietist Friedrich Albert Schultz, Knutzen tries to 
show that the metaphysics of Wolff is perfectly consistent with Pietistic faith and theology. One 
side aspect of this project includes a more elaborated defence of Wolff’s realistic notion of material 
bodies, according to which material bodies are aggregates of simple substances. However, contrary 
to what can be expected, Knutzen does not start with the assumption that the bodies consist of 
physical unities, as Wolff did; instead Knutzen describes the simple substances as perceivers, like 
the monads of Leibniz.156  
    Knutzen’s attempt to provide a defence of Wolff’s more realist notion of material bodies does 
not stand firmer than its ability to explain how it is possible for monads to be localised in space. 
Knutzen’s answer to this question follows mainly along the same line as Wolff; the monad is in a 
place merely because it coexists with other monads in an orderly fashion: 
 
Space is the order of coexisting things, insofar as they coexist. A thing in which such an order of coexisting 
is given is said to fill space.  Place [Locus] is  the determinate and finite mode of coexisting with the rest 
                                                 
154 Kemp Smith (1999, p. 161). 
155 In his study of Knutzen, Benno Erdman (1875, p. 48) describes Knutzen as a “son of Königsberg”, who 
never left his hometown.   
156 Knutzen, Systema causarum efficientium, § 18.   
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of the coexisting things, or the order of continuous coexistence. Position is the order of non-continuous 
coexistence.157 (Knutzen, Systema causarum efficientium, § 23) 
 
Knutzen’s explanation of the situatedness of the monads is, however, different from Wolff’s 
explanation, namely because it presupposes that the coexistence of the monads is an outcome of 
their causal interactions with each other.  Unlike the monads of Leibniz, causal interactions between 
the primitive forces of Knutzen’s monads determine their perceptual states, in accordance with the 
theory of physical influx.158  The hidden premise behind this contention is the claim that monads 
are endowed with certain primitive forces of perception and motion, which derive from each other, 
or have an identical source (fons).159 Knutzen thus resuscitates Leibniz’s notion of universal forces, 
but in a way that lets him prove that the effects of these forces are intersubstantial and not just 
intrasubstantial. Regardless of whether Knutzen’s strategy is successful or not, the end-result is a 
drastic radicalisation of Wolff’s critique of the theory of pre-established harmony.  
    Watkins discusses Knutzen’s arguments for the theory of physical influx in detail, so I will 
restrict my discussion to the points that are relevant for our purposes.160 Knutzen’s arguments divide 
into four or perhaps five groups, of which the two first are the most interesting in the present context. 
In his first argument, Knutzen builds on Leibniz’s familiar contention that a thing can move itself 
by its forces of motion, but unlike Leibniz and like Wolff, he argues that these forces can move 
other things as well.161 Knutzen supports this claim on the premise that motion is a modification in 
the location of the thing grounded in some action, caused by the forces of motion of the thing.  For 
a thing cannot move itself by its derivative force, unless it takes the place of another thing, as is 
illustrated by the example of colliding bodies: 
 
Therefore, a being endowed with the force of moving itself strives to push other things away, if they resist. 
But if they are truly also supposed to yield spontaneously, still what is already participating in progressive 
motion exerts itself in the way that is required to complete the motion beyond itself or to push other things 
away, since resistance is only the occasional cause of motion and does not add anything to the intrinsic 
force. Therefore, a being that moves itself enjoys the effort of changing the place of coexistents or the 
force of moving other things (§24). Therefore, the force of moving itself cannot be conceived without the 
force of moving other things, but after the one has been posited, the other is posited at the same time.162 
(Knutzen, Systema causarum efficientium, § 28) 
 
However, since the forces of motion ultimately derive from the simple substances out of which the 
bodies are composed, it follows that the simple substances must have primary, active forces of 
motion, by which they move each other. Implicitly this means that Knutzen rejects Leibniz’s 
famous dictum that “every passion of a body is spontaneous or arises from an internal force, though 
on the occasion of something external”.163 The derivative forces of motion of the body are, in other 
words, not only occasions for, but also causes of the motions of the other bodies, according to 
Knutzen.  
                                                 
157 My translation, J.J.   
158 Knutzen, Systema causarum efficientium, §§ 10, 21, 23, 29.   
159 Systema causarum efficientium, § 45.   
160 Watkins (2005, pp. 50-73).  
161 Knutzen, Systema causarum efficientium, § 28; cf. Wolff, Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und 
der Seele des Menschen § 620.     
162 Translation in Watkins (2005, p. 54).   
163 Leibniz, Specimen Dynamicum, L 448.  
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    Watkins identifies a number of weak spots in Knutzen’s first argument, namely that the same 
result could be obtained if the derivative force of the moving body acts jointly with the derivative 
force of the body that is moved.164 In that case, it is possible to argue that the first body moves itself 
by its force of motion, without causing the motion of the second body, since the cause of the latter 
motion is the force of motion of the second body. The motion of the latter, which appears to be the 
outcome of a passion, is truly nothing but the result of an action, caused by its moving force.  This 
seems to be consistent with the fact that Knutzen’s notion of physical influx is different from 
Baumgarten’s notion of real influence. Thus, according to Knutzen, no transmission of forces 
occurs between the monads that act upon each other; the monad, which acts upon another monad, 
only modifies the force of the latter.165  
    On the other hand, it would still follow that the moving force of the first body would be part of 
the ground or condition of the motion of the second body.166 The reason for this is that the action 
of the moving force of the first body conditions the outcome of the action of the moving force of 
the second body. As Watkins observes, this conclusion seems warranted by Knutzen’s way of 
defining the acting of a thing as something, which occurs when it contains the reason for the 
existence, or modification of a certain (cuiusdem) thing.167   
    In the second argument, Knutzen tries to show that it is necessary to ascribe not only active, but 
also passive forces of motion to the simple substances.168 The premise of Knutzen’s argument is 
that no monad can exist in exactly the same place as another monad, which means that all monads 
have to be impenetrable, in spite of the fact that the monads cannot fill a space. Knutzen furthermore 
argues that the impenetrability cannot be an original primitive property of the monads. Instead, 
Knutzen argues that the impenetrability of the monads is the outcome of the force that a monad 
exerts when it collides with and resists the moving force of another monad. The impenetrability of 
a monad is hence the outcome of a passive force, which makes it impossible for the monads to 
penetrate each other mutually. The same force explains why colliding bodies only change their 
shape, and the velocity and direction of their motion: 
 
Since it is most certain that simples are moved and that distinct simples are not moved according to an 
opposite line of direction, it is consequently impossible that they penetrate each other mutually, or rather 
what we may gather from the conflict of bodies and their collision is that in fact they are carried in a 
contrary direction mutually from each other.  It follows in this case that one must hold that either simples 
                                                 
164 Watkins (2005, p. 55).   
165 On Baumgarten’s concept of real influence it must, however, be possible for the state of a substance to 
alter, purely because of alien forces belonging substances “outside it” (extra se), without the help of any 
forces and actions within the substance.  The forces of substances outside the substance are not only part of 
the explanation of the alterations in it and in this sense, their influence is real, not merely ideal. See 
Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §§ 210-12.   
166 Watkins (2005, p. 55) speaks about forces being causes of the exercising of the forces of other bodies. 
However, to me it seems as if this is a somewhat illicit use of the term “cause”, for in Wolffian ontology the 
term “cause” is reserved for things, e.g. forces, that are sufficient reasons for the existence of other things, 
states, actions etc. The force or action of the first body would then not be a cause, but part of the 
explanation of the acting of the force of the second body.         
167 For a closer discussion of Knutzen’s concept of action, see Watkins (2005, p. 57). Watkin’s discussion 
refers to Knutzen, Systema causarum efficientium, § 21. As far as I can see, Wolff is more restrictive in his 
way of defining an action, namely as a modification in a state of a thing grounded within that thing itself, or 
more simply an alteration grounded in nothing else but the thing which alters; see Wolff, Philosophia 
Prima sive Ontologia, § 713.     
168  Knutzen, Systema causarum efficientium, § 29. 
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penetrate each other mutually, which goes against Leibniz’s assertions, or if they resist each other 
mutually, they must act on each other mutually.169 (Knutzen, Systema causarum efficientium, § 29) 
 
On these premises, Knutzen argues that a monad is penetrable, unless it acts upon other monads, in 
accordance with the theory of physical influx. Together with the active forces, the passive forces 
explain why the simple substances and the bodies act upon each other, which is exactly what follows 
if the theory of physical influx is correct.  
    Interestingly there is a counterargument against Knutzen’s second argument, which has bearing 
on the first argument as well. For as Watkins points out, the Leibnizians can always argue that the 
passive forces in the second argument are ontologically equivalent to the active forces in the first 
argument, in the sense that both are derivative forces, which apply to material bodies only.170 The 
only difference between the passive and active forces of motion is that the first deals with motions 
that are the outcome of reactions, whereas the second deals with motions that result from actions. 
In both cases, they are forces that strictly apply only to bodies. 
    Knutzen will of course answer that the forces of the monads would have to ground or cause the 
derivative forces and the motion they cause. But, as Watkins correctly observes, it is far from clear 
how the primitive forces are supposed to be translated into derivative forces, a question which 
brings attention to another, more general difficulty attached to Knutzen’s defence of the theory of 
physical influence, a difficulty which is intimately connected with our discussion of the ontology 
of monads and space.  
    For as we have seen so far, Knutzen’s argument for the theory of physical influx hangs on the 
premise that it is possible for monads to be localised in space. It simply does not make sense to 
ascribe primitive forces of motion to monads, let alone deriving the forces of bodies from these 
primitive forces, unless it is possible for the monads to move, which of course presupposes that 
they have a location in space. What makes the case so difficult for Knutzen here is that the latter is 
a mode of coexisting, supposedly determined by the physical influx between the monads, which 
seems to make his first two arguments circular.  
   Knutzen could of course break this circle, by assuming that the monads are localised in space 
already from the outset of their interaction, but then he would have to abandon his relationalist 
theory of space and consider the monads more like the corpuscles of the atomists. As Watkins 
correctly notes, Knutzen seems to require a notion of monads that is closer to that of physical atoms 
than that of souls: 
 
Knutzen claims that the simple elements that compose bodies (which he thinks of as corresponding to 
Leibnizian monads) are spatial to the extent that they are in a place even if they are not extended (and thus 
indivisible). That is, Knutzen’s simple elements would seem to be not just metaphysical, but also physical 
points. (…) What exactly is a metaphysical point and does Leibniz have any reason for thinking that it 
could not be physical as well? It is striking in this context that Leibniz (at least in his texts publicly available 
in early eighteenth-century Germany) never seems to consider the possibility that monads might be 
physical points in this sense. In the “New System of Nature,” he says that the substantial unities required 
for being (i.e., monads) can be neither mathematical points (since mathematical points are “merely 
modalities,” i.e., abstractions from reality rather than realities themselves) nor physical points, but are 
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170 Watkins (2005, p. 62). Watkins also points out that it is possible for the Leibnizian to argue that the 
impenetrability reduces to the “metaphysical fact” that a substance cannot be at the same place as another 
substance. For the details and problems with this argument, see Watkins (2005, p. 61).  
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rather metaphysical points.  But his “justification” of the claim in this passage seems to presuppose that 
physical points are extended organic beings, rather than truly indivisible, physical points. (…) In other 
words, he seems to think that physical points are organic beings and, “if contracted,” can appear to be 
indivisible, but are in fact divisible (as organic beings would be, since they are extended). 171 
 
    Though Watkins’ reconstruction of Knutzen’s notion of monads is basically correct, it seems as 
if he somewhat underestimates the difficulties involved in Knutzen’s attempt to show that monads 
can be endowed with a place, and not just a point of view. There is no shortcut from metaphysical 
points to physical points. Here one can object that the physical points Watkins has in mind are more 
like simple substances than atoms or corpuscles. However, even if one carefully keeps this 
distinction in mind, as Watkins does, Leibniz would still insist that monads, not physical points, are 
the only acceptable candidates for simple substances. For according to Leibniz, only soul-like things 
can match the demands of ontological, causal, and conceptual independence connected with 
substances.  
    Furthermore, souls are not immediately localised in space. Thus, if all simple substances are like 
souls, then it makes no sense to speak of them as localised, except in the sense that they view things 
from the point of the bodies they dominate. In other words, Leibniz would insist that he is entitled 
to keep the distinction between monads (metaphysical points) and bodies (physical points).  
    Finally, even if Knutzen’s explanation of the localisation of monads is acceptable, there is still a 
great, perhaps insurmountable leap from the point-like places of his monads, to the three-
dimensional volumes occupied by material bodies. Knutzen just presupposes from the outset that 
monads are in places, and that place is a mode of continuous coexistence, rather than a mode of 
discrete coexistence (position), without providing an argument for either of these claims.  To the 
embarrassment of Knutzen, his explanation of how it is possible for a monad to enter and become 
a part of a material body does not make his ontology of monads look better than that of Leibniz.  
The old annoying problem of how a simple, discrete, and unextended monad could ever add up to 
a composite, continuous and extended body remained unresolved.  The final steps needed to solve 
this problem were taken by the young Kant, and they would lead him to the drastic conclusion that 
bodies had to consist of monads, no less physical than the bodies themselves.  
 
2.4 Monads and Places: Kant’s Views  
 
Kant had begun his studies at the University of Königsberg in the autumn of 1740, at the age of 16. 
Though it cannot be established when Kant first attended Knutzen’s lectures, his influence on Kant 
is revealed already in his choice of university subjects, namely philosophy and physics. From the 
very beginning of these studies Kant revealed a deep understanding of the importance of figuring 
out how and in what sense it can be said that the substances can be related in space. For the young 
Kant the location of the simple substances became a foundation stone for his explanation of how it 
is possible for there to be a world in which all simple substances are connected, in spite of their 
ontological independence.  
   Scholars have tended to disagree about the relative importance of Leibniz, Wolff, and Knutzen in 
shaping these views. Nikola Poppovich for instance argues that Kant’s pre-critical philosophy of 
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space basically was identical with that of Wolff, at least until 1768.172 Poppovich’s reading ignores, 
however, that Kant was not as agnostic as Wolff was about the nature of the harmony, which makes 
the simple substances connected in space. The reading defended by Benno Erdmann, according to 
which Kant’s pre-critical works reflect Knutzen’s less orthodox version of Wolffian philosophy, is 
more convincing.173  On this reading, Kant grounded the places of the monads on his defence of the 
hypothesis of a physical influence, which Knutzen introduced to him.  
     Kant’s preoccupation with the problem of the spatial relations of simple substances is revealed 
already in his first published work “Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces”174 
(Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte) from 1746-7. Kant’s discussion of 
this problem is presented against the background of an account of the forces of substances. Kant 
thus argues that the power of the substances involves an essential force, i.e. a primitive active force. 
In Living Forces Kant identifies Leibniz as the progenitor of this important insight and praises him 
for having been the first to understand that bodies have essential forces that are internal to them 
and prior to their extension.175 The young Kant’s endorsement of Leibniz’s view that we can 
attribute primitive active forces to the substances is heterodox however. According to Kant, the 
essential force of a substance is, somehow, able to alter the inner states of another substance. Kant’s 
notion of substances endowed with active forces is, in other words, worked out in such a way that 
it is possible for him to subscribe to certain elements of Leibniz’s notion of active force, while still 
defending Knutzen’s notion of intersubstantial causation. 
    Kant’s defence of Knutzen does not come without reservations however: as Martin Schönfeld 
points out, Kant rebukes Knutzen for having tried to ascribe forces of motion to all things, including 
both souls and bodies.176 Schönfeld argues that these reservations are motivated by Knutzen’s 
alleged reduction of the forces of the monads to forces of motion, but that cannot be true, for 
Knutzen explicitly states that the forces of monads are forces of perception and motion, even though 
they originate from one and the same source.177  
    Unless we assume that Kant’s reservations are based on an outright misunderstanding of the 
teachings of Knutzen, it seems more reasonable to say that Kant tries to make Knutzen’s argument 
more convincing. When Knutzen speaks about the forces of motion and perception as 
indistinguishable forces, he just wants to say that monads have one force, though one which 
produces ontologically different effects. In part, this involves something as simple, if not even 
naïve, as the suggestion that Knutzen could have avoided his troubles if he just had started speaking 
about “essential forces”, rather than “forces of motion and perception”.   
    Kant’s concerns about Knutzen’s choice of terminology reveal, however, that he might have had 
deeper-seated worries about Knutzen’s notion of force. As Andrew Carpenter has pointed out, there 
are at least two important objections against the notion of force as a force of motion (vis motrix) 
                                                 
172 Poppovich (1924, p. 24).   
173 Erdmann (1876, p. 143).   
174 Henceforth Living Forces.   
175 Living Forces, §§ 2-3, Ak. 1, p. 18.   
176 Schönfeld (2000, p. 40).   
177 Knutzen, Systema causarum efficientium, §§ 30-1. Perceptions are, Knutzen explains, representations of 
external things in simple beings, i.e. perceptions are states of monads, which make it possible to understand 
the properties of external things. Combining this uncontroversial commonplace, from Leibnizian 
philosophy, with Wolff’s somewhat naïve contention that the properties and states of external things can be 
inferred from the causal effects they have on other things, leads Knutzen to the less obvious conclusion that 
all monads are perceivers. For if all monads are causally interacting with each other, it follows that the 
alterations in their states are causal effects, which tell us something about the states of the monads that 
cause them. Hence, the alterations in the states of monads, including the corporeal monads, are perceptions.    
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which Kant raises in Living Forces.178 First, Kant argues that the notion of forces is vacuous, for if 
a force of motion is nothing but a cause of motion, any explanation of motion in terms of forces of 
motion will in the end be circular.179 Secondly, Kant argues that the notion of forces as forces of 
motion is “metaphysically incoherent”, for a body might be in a state of rest and still possess a 
force, as exemplified by a ball that presses its weight upon a table.180 Likewise, a body might move 
and still not act, as is illustrated by inert bodies, which move uniformly though space without acting. 
This explains why Kant reserves the term active forces for the kind of forces, which are present 
insofar as a substance is the efficient cause of an alteration, and which come to expression for 
instance when the velocity of a body increases or decreases, as a result of a collision with another 
body.181    
     However, in my opinion, there is an objection to the notion of forces of motion, other than the 
two discussed by Carpenter. We can link this objection to Kant’s attempt to base his argument for 
the theory of physical influx on something different from Knutzen’s forces of motion. For such a 
demonstration holds only for localised substances, i.e. interacting and connected substances, which 
means that Knutzen’s demonstration presupposes what it is supposed to prove. Kant’s conundrum 
is therefore to replace the forces of motion by essential forces and prove that the essential forces 
are able to do exactly the same job as Knutzen’s forces of perception and motion.  
     The trouble here is that the essential forces seem to lack any ability to act outside themselves, 
which is necessary if they are to make it possible for substances to interact and become localised in 
space. Like their twin counterpart in Leibniz’s metaphysics – the primitive active forces – the 
essential forces are originally not intersubstantial, but intrasubstantial: 
 
Because all connections and relations between substances, which exist outside one another, originate from 
the exchanged effects which their forces exercise on each other, let us see what the truths are that can be 
derived from this concept of force. Either is a substance in connection and relation with the substances 
outside it, or it is not. Because each independent being contains the complete ground of all its 
determinations, it is not necessary for its existence that it is connected with other things. Substances can 
therefore exist and still have no external relation to any other substances whatsoever, or stand in no actual 
connection with them.  Since no place can occur without external connections, positions and relations, it 
is no doubt possible for a thing to actually exist, without being anywhere [nirgends] in the entire world. 
This paradoxical statement, although it is an immediate consequence, and moreover a very simple 
consequence, of the most familiar truths has, so far I know, been observed by nobody before.182  (Living 
Forces §7, Ak. 1, pp. 21-2) 
 
    In themselves the substances can exist, yet exist “nowhere” in the world. Kant bases this 
“paradoxical” conclusion on the premise that the substances are “independent” beings, which 
contain the “complete ground” of all their properties. If we recall the discussion of simple 
substances and atoms in the previous sections, it seems as if Kant tries to say that the substances he 
has in mind are ontologically and causally independent things, which exist independently of each 
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181 Living Forces, §3, Ak. 1, p. 18.  
182 My translation, J.J.   
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other and the world, and which contain the sufficient reason of all their properties within 
themselves.  
    However, though it is perfectly conceivable that the substances exist without interacting, it is 
impossible for them to exist in the same world without existing in the same space. The latter means 
that an interaction has to occur between their essential forces, for only thus can an order occur 
between them, which makes the substances located in a space.  We can then explain the localisation 
of the substances as an outcome of the interaction, which occurs between their essential forces 
rather than their forces of motion: 
 
It is easy to point out, that there would be no space and no extension, if the substances had no force to act 
outside themselves. For without this force there is no connection, without connection no order, and without 
order finally no space.183  (Living Forces § 9, Ak. 1, p. 23) 
 
In the absence of an interaction between the essential forces of the substances, the substances would 
fall apart from the world.184 Those who claim that there can be only one actual world, namely our 
world, forget the possibility that our world only contains a subset of all substances.185  
   The problem with Kant’s argument for interacting essential forces is of course that he gives no 
solid argument for thinking that the substances belong to one and the same world and hence are 
interacting in space. Though Kant dissolves the fundament of Knutzen’s demonstration of physical 
influx and replaces it with what he thought to be a more coherent notion of force, he provides no 
argument for thinking that the actions of these forces are interconnected.  In this sense Watkins is 
perfectly right when he observes that Kant “simply presupposes” the truth of the theory of physical 
influx in Living Forces.186   
   To be exact Kant presupposes that the substances belong to the same world. This has 
consequences for his attempts to show that essential forces are able to produce alterations, not only 
in the inner states of the substances, but also in their states of motion.  For although Kant claims 
that “nothing is easier” than to demonstrate the motion of substances from the essential forces, one 
does not have to follow all the intricate details of Kant’s laborious argument to see that it 
presupposes that the forces of the substances are “determined to act externally”.187        
   The lacuna, which is present in Kant’s argument for physical influx in Living Forces, might 
explain why he attempts to present an explicit proof of the theory, eight years later in “New 
Elucidation” (Nova Dilucidatio) from 1755.188 In New Elucidation Kant describes the simple 
substances (substantiae singulae) in the following way: 
 
Individual substances, of which none is the cause of the existence of another, have a separate existence, 
that is to say, an existence which can be completely understood independently of all other substances. If, 
therefore, the existence of some substance or other is posited simply, there is nothing inhering in it which 
proves the existence of other substances distinct from itself. But since a relation is a relative determination, 
that is to say, a determination which cannot be understood in a being considered absolutely, it follows that 
a relation and its determining ground can neither of them be understood in terms of the existence of a 
substance, when that existence is posted in itself. (New Elucidation, p. 40, Ak. 1, p. 413) 
                                                 
183 My translation, J.J.   
184 Living Forces, § 8, Ak. 1, p. 22.    
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As Daniel Warren observes there are two important points worth noticing in this passage.189 The 
first point is that Kant takes the simple substances to exist independently of each other. This means, 
more exactly, that he considers the simple substances to have a separate existence, i.e. they do not 
cause the existence of each other.190 The existence of a simple substance is, in other words, possible 
independently of any relation that holds or may hold between them, even if it may be true that they 
are the consequence of a common cause, namely God. The simple substances are, in other words, 
both ontologically and causally independent.   
    The second point is that Kant considers the possible existence of simple substances to be 
intelligible, even if one conceives them in isolation from each other.191 The properties of simple 
substances are perhaps beyond the reach of our intellect, but if we can know them, then it must be 
possible to know them from the essences of the simple substances, i.e. from the inner, essential 
properties that they have independently of their relations to each other.192 In the terminology 
prevalent in Kant’s time, one would say that that the simple substances are not only possible, but 
also knowable in themselves. The simple substances are therefore conceptually independent, in the 
sense that if we can know something about them, we can know it independently of their relations 
to other things.193 
    In his attempt to prove that simple substances interact, in spite of their causal and ontological 
independence, Kant develops two arguments.194 The first argument builds on an attempt to 
demonstrate that no alteration can occur within the simple substances if they are causally isolated 
from each other. Kant thus argues that the inner states of the simple substances are immutable unless 
they are endowed with forces, which make it possible for them to act upon each other. For the forces 
of the simple substances can only alter their inner states if they alter their modes, i.e. those 
contingent properties which do not have the complete grounds or sufficient reason for their 
existence in the essence of the simple substances. The latter means that the modes cannot appear or 
disappear in the substance unless it exists in an external state, i.e. unless it relates to and interacts 
with another substance.  
    In the second argument, Kant tries to show that the world, taken as a whole of simple substances, 
would be impossible if the substances were causally isolated from each other. Here Kant emphasises 
God’s active part in bringing about the real connection, which is necessary in order for the 
substances to exist in a world. God can, if he wills, bring the simple substances into existence, and 
continuously preserve them, without conceiving or conceptualising them as connected and as 
endowed with interacting forces. However, given that the simple substances interact, as they do 
assuming that the first stage of Kant’s proof is correct, it follows that God must conceive them as 
related, in the same act by which he preserves their existence: 
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192 Later, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant will argue that such properties, which are absolutely internal 
to a simple substance, cannot occur in the explanation of the inner properties of phenomena, such as the 
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 The schema of the divine understanding, the origin of the existences, is an enduring act [actus 
perdurabilis] (it is called preservation); and in that act, if any substances conceived [conceptae] by God as 
existing in isolation and without any relational determinations, no connection between them and no 
reciprocal relation would come into being. If, however, they are conceived as related in God’s intelligence, 
their determinations would subsequently, in conformity with this idea, always relate to each other for as 
long as they continued to exist. That is to say, they would act and react; and the individual substances 
would have a certain external state. But if you abandoned this principle, no such state would exist in virtue 
of their existence alone. (New Elucidation, p. 42, Ak. 1, p. 414) 
 
Hence, only God can conceive the simple substances as related, in spite of their ontological and 
causal independence, and so bring them in interaction.195 In the opposite case, the agreement or 
harmony between the states of the simple substances would have to be pre-established by God, like 
the inner, perceptual states of Leibniz’s monads.196   
   The same arguments Kant presents to show that it is perfectly possible for simple substances to 
exist without interacting are then applied to show that there is nothing in the simple substances 
themselves, which determines their place in space: 
 
Since place, position, and space are relations of substances, in virtue of which substances, by means of 
their reciprocal determinations, relate to other substances which are really distinct from themselves and 
are in this way connected together in an external connection, and since, furthermore, our demonstration 
has shown that the mere existence of substances does not in itself involve connection with other substances, 
it is obvious that, if you posit a number of substances, you do not at the same time and as a result determine 
place, position, and space, this last being compounded of all these relations.  (New Elucidation, p. 42, Ak. 
1, p. 414) 
 
 
Kant thus seems to claim that the place of the substance cannot be determined unless it interacts 
with other substances, which makes the determination of the place of a simple substance 
conditioned by the very same enduring act or scheme, by which God brings the substances to 
existence and conceives them as related. For as we already have seen, Kant denies that there is 
anything in the substances themselves, which makes them connected with each other. It is therefore 
perfectly possible that God could have created a plurality of isolated substances, each one of them 
situated in a world of their own apart from the worlds of the other substances, exactly as Leibniz 
had suggested in the New System:   
 
But, since the reciprocal connection of substances requires that there should be, in the effective 
representation of the divine intellect, a scheme conceived in terms of relations, and since this representation 
is entirely a matter of choice for God, and can therefore be admitted or omitted according to His pleasure, 
it follows that substances can exist in accordance with the law which specifies that they are in no place 
and that they stand in no relation at all in respect of the things in our universe. There could be, if God so 
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willed, a number of such substances, free from any connection with our universe, but, nonetheless, linked 
with each other by means of a certain connection of their determinations so as to produce place, position, 
and space: they would constitute a world banished from the limits of the world, of which we are parts, that 
is to say, they would constitute a solitary world. For this reason, the possibility that there might be, had it 
so pleased God, a number of worlds, even in the metaphysical sense, is not absurd.  (New Elucidation p. 
42, Ak. 1, p. 414) 
 
    In a subsequent passage, Kant adds some details to his discussion of how simple substances 
become connected and localised in space. Though Kant is far from easy to follow, he seems to 
suggest that the interaction between simple substances is a necessary condition for their connection 
and localisation in space. Thus, if the substances are localised in the same space, then they are also 
interacting: 
 
All substances, in so far as they are connected with each other in the same space, reciprocally interact with 
each other, and thus they are dependent on each other in respect of their determinations. It is, hence, 
possible to understand the universal action of spirits on bodies and of bodies on spirits. (New Elucidation, 
pp. 43-4, Ak. 1, p. 415) 
 
    Later, in the “Physical Monadology”197 (Monadologia Physica) from 1756, Kant continues his 
investigation into the connection between the spatial properties and relations of simple substances 
and the interaction of their forces, outlined earlier in New Elucidation. Physical Monadology 
contains, in fact, a plea for a physics supporting itself on geometry, but still open to the arguments 
of the metaphysicians.  Kant seems convinced that such a move would prove itself more useful to 
the dynamist programme, than Descartes’ mechanical, corpuscularian physics and metaphysics. 
Kant’s starting point is a theme that he left without detailed consideration in Living Forces, namely 
the question of the ultimate “parts” of the material bodies; how are they are related and able to not 
just occupy a space but also fill it: 
 
Metaphysics, therefore, which many say may be properly absent from physics is, in fact, its only support; 
it alone provides illumination. For bodies consist of parts; it is certainly of no little importance that it be 
clearly established of which parts, and in what way they are combined together, and whether they fill space 
merely by the co-presence of their primitive parts or by the reciprocal conflict of their forces. (Physical 
Monadology, p. 51, Ak. 1, p. 475)       
  
In the absence of an answer to these questions, one could still argue that the dynamist programme 
is unable to explain the extension of material bodies. The latter is of course unsatisfactory, given 
its claim that forces are “prior” to extension. The corpuscularian philosopher could then rightly ask 
whether not it seems easier and more reasonable to explain the extension of bodies, by assuming 
that they consist of extended corpuscles. 
    In Physical Monadology, Kant starts by arguing that we have to conceive the parts of material 
bodies, not as corpuscles, but as simple substances. Taking away the peculiar mode of composition 
of a body that gives it its structure (essence) abolishes everything, except the parts. The remaining 
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parts must therefore be free from everything that is composite in the body, i.e. they must be 
ultimately simple substances, so called monads: 
 
Bodies consist of parts, each of which separately has an enduring existence. Since, however, the 
composition of such parts is nothing but a relation, and hence a determination which in itself contingent, 
and which can be denied without abrogating the existence of the things having this relation, it is plain that 
all composition of a body can be abolished, though all the parts which were formerly combined together 
nonetheless continue to exist. When all composition is abolished, moreover, the parts which are left are 
not compound at all; and thus they are completely free from plurality of substances, and, consequently, 
they are simple. All bodies, whatever, therefore, consist of absolutely simple fundamental parts, that is to 
say, monads. (Physical Monadology, p. 53, Ak. 1, p. 477)     
 
Superficially, Kant thus aligns himself with the Leibnizian camp and its warhorse – the monad.  In 
reality there are important differences between Leibniz’s concept of the monad and Kant’s concept 
of the physical monad, for according to Kant a monad is located in space, not because it has a point 
of view, but because it is connected with a mathematical point, i.e. because it has a place, in a more 
literal sense.   
    The young Kant’s theory of physical influx is clearly novel, in the sense that it presents a new, 
stronger defence of the Knutzen’s thesis that the reciprocal determination of forces of the monads 
is a necessary condition of the places of monads. However, Kant is not easy to follow, for it must 
be underlined that he carefully emphasises the phenomenal nature of space, and presumably the 
locations within it, even if they are produced by the relations that hold between reciprocally 
determined monads. In space, there are no simple parts, like the ones we find in the material bodies: 
 
For it is abundantly plain that space, which is entirely free from substantiality and which is the appearance 
of the external relations of unitary monads, will not at all be exhausted by division continued to infinity. 
(Physical Monadology, pp. 55-6, Ak. 1, 479)   
 
Kant’s view here is certainly consistent with Leibniz’s famous claim that space or extension is a 
well-founded phenomenon. The ontological groundwork for this phenomenon is nonetheless 
different according to Kant’s theory: the physical monads relate externally because they influence 
each other, not because their states harmoniously agree with each other.      
    The theory is, however, novel in another more profound and heterodox way, namely because it 
claims to present a new solution to Wolff’s and Knutzen’s problem of how it possible for simple 
substances to be parts of extended material bodies in spite of their unextended nature.  The monad 
thus “fills space” by its repulsive force, or force of impenetrability.198 The latter depends on its 
“external relation” to other monads:  
 
Since there is no plurality of substances to be found in the monad, though any monad, when posited on its 
own, fills a space, it follows from what has been said that the ground for the filled space is not to be sought 
in the mere positing of a substance but in its relation with respect to the substances external to it.  (Physical 
Monadology, p. 57, Ak. 1, p. 481)   
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The activity of these repulsive forces makes it possible for a physical monad to resist the penetrating 
motion of other physical monads into the field within which they act. Since the repulsive force 
diminishes by the cube of the radius along which it acts, it follows that the force field of a physical 
monad is spherical. The physical monads are in other words, endowed with an impenetrable, orbital 
force field.199 The expansion of this force field is not unlimited, but curbed by a Newtonian 
attractive force, which acts in the opposite direction of the repulsive force: 
 
It is, therefore, necessary that there be opposed to this striving another striving which is opposed to it and 
which is equal to it at a given distance, and which, by occupying a space, determines its limit. But that 
which acts in the opposite direction to repulsion is attraction. Accordingly, in addition to the force of 
impenetrability, every element needs another force, that of attraction. If the force of attraction did not exist, 
then the bodies of nature would have no determinate nature. (Physical Monadology, pp. 61-2, Ak. 1, p. 
484)   
 
Since the attractive force diminishes by a slower rate than the repulsive force, namely by the square 
of its radius of action, there is ultimately an equilibrium between repulsive forces and another, 
attractive force, which determines the limits of the force field of the physical monad. Otherwise, it 
would be impossible for the physical monads to gather into finitely extended bodies with a definite 
inner structure.  
    The interaction between the forces of the simple substances therefore not only determines the 
order of their coexistence, i.e. their places, but also the extension of their force fields. The monad 
fills space merely by virtue of its forces of motion, which means that Kant can explain how the 
monad can fill a space, without taking recourse to any inner, primitive passive forces (confused 
perceptions). The latter explains how the monad can be present to and so occupy a determinate, 
infinitely divisible space, and not just a point-like place, in spite of its simplicity and lack of 
extension.   
    The main point of this conclusion, I think, is that Kant now had an explanation of how it is 
possible for bodies to occupy an extended place, and yet consist of ultimately simple monads. It 
was exactly this problem from Leibniz, which Wolff and Knutzen had tried to solve, and which 
Kant now thought he has solved. Thanks to the repulsive forces of the physical monads, it is possible 
for them to have a position in an extended body, which was one of the main objections that Des 
Bosses and De Volder had raised against Leibniz’s idea that bodies consist of ultimately simple 
substances. Material bodies are no chimerical composites, as Foucher had objected, but consist of 
physical monads which interact, in a fashion perfectly consistent with the theory of physical influx.  
Human experience is impossible, unless the mind is attached to a body of causally interacting, 
physical monads.   
 
 
2.5 Problems with Kant’s Views 
 
In order to understand what made Kant abandon his dogmatic solution to the problem of the causal 
interaction and spatial location of simple substances, it is necessary to consider some of the more 
peripheral implications of this solution.  This means that we have to consider its implications for 
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Kant’s dogmatic solution of the problem of how it is possible for the soul to interact with its body. 
The key to the solution of this problem is, Kant argues, to consider the interaction between the soul 
and the body in terms of an interaction between primitive forces, not forces of motion:  
    
For that reason it becomes so difficult in the metaphysics, to understand, how matter is in a position, to 
produce representation in the soul of the man in a truly active way (that is, through physical influx).  What 
does the matter, one says, other than causing motions? That is why all its force comes down to that it, at 
most, moves the soul out of its place. Simply how is it possible that the force, which just produces motion, 
should generate representations and ideas? (…) A similar difficulty shows itself, in the question of whether 
the soul is in a position to set matter in motion. But both difficulties disappear and more than a little light 
is shed on the physical influx, if the force of matter is ascribed not to motion, but rather to its actions upon 
other substances that need not be defined further. For the question of whether the soul can cause motions 
– that is, whether it has motive force – is transformed into the question of whether its essential force is 
directed to act externally, that is, whether it is capable of acting outside itself on other entities and of 
producing changes. One can answer this question quite decisively by saying that the soul must be able to 
act externally by reason of the fact that it is in a specific location. For when we analyse the concept of what 
we call location, we find that it suggests the actions of substances upon each other. All that kept a certain 
acute author from making the triumph of physical influx over pre-established harmony complete was 
nothing more than this little confusion of concepts, a confusion that is easily overcome as soon as one’s 
attention is brought to it.200  (Living Forces §§ 5-6, Ak. 1, pp. 20-1) 
 
The “acute author” (scharfsinnigen Schriftsteller) of which Kant speaks in this passage is of course 
Knutzen.  
    Kant’s arguments for the theory of physical influx are, however, partly original. Thus, in Living 
Forces Kant argues that the interaction between the soul and the body is granted by the fact that the 
simple substances are endowed with essential forces, i.e. primitive active forces, and not just active 
forces of motion. For the soul’s place in the world is an outcome of its interaction with the other 
simple substances in the world. Thanks to the spatial situatedness of the soul, it becomes possible 
for the soul to act outside itself, i.e. to move the parts of its body. Reversely it also makes it possible 
for the forces of motions of the body to produce representations and ideas in the soul, and not just 
motions in other bodies:   
 
Likewise, it is easy to understand the sort of paradoxical statement, namely how it is possible that matter 
– which one imagines cannot cause anything but motions – can impress certain representations and images 
on the soul. For the matter, which is set in motion, acts on everything, which is connected with it in space, 
thus also the soul, that is, it alters the inner state of the soul, insofar as it is externally related. Now, the 
inner state of the soul is nothing else, but the combination of all its representations and concepts, and 
insofar as this inner state is externally related is called status representativi universi. That is why the matter 
alters the state of the soul, by which it represents the world, through its moving force.201 (Living Forces 
§6, Ak. 1, pp. 20-1)  
    
The interesting and important insight Kant expresses in the passage from Living Forces quoted 
above is therefore based on the observation that the localisation of the soul is the key to the problem 
of the two-sided effects of the primitive essential force of the soul and a monad in general.  Thus, a 
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force of the soul cannot translate into a force of motion except as a force of a localised thing.  Only 
if the mind is localised does it become possible for the body to interact with the mind, and so bring 
about an alteration in its perceptual states. 
   The issue of the localisation of the human soul and its interaction with the body is given a more 
detailed treatment in New Elucidation. As we have seen, Kant argues that no alteration can occur 
within a monad unless its forces causally interact with the forces all other monads, and that God, 
who is perpetually present to all monads, conditions their interaction. Taken in isolation the inner 
forces of the monads cannot act and give existence to anything except those immutable, necessary 
determinations, which follow from their essence. The world then becomes an aggregate of dead, 
immutable monads, which is hardly a world at all, because of the absence of any real connection 
between the monads.   
    In New Elucidation, Kant argues that this principle applies in particular to the inner states of the 
human soul and that this shows that the soul must interact with things outside it, in particular its 
own body.  Thus, in New Elucidation Kant not only notes that the mind has an active force and an 
appetite for new perceptions implanted in it, but also that this desire alone cannot bring about any 
alterations in its perceptions.202 Hence, the alterations in the perceptual states, which we observe 
within ourselves, show that our soul must interact and connect itself with other things: 
 
For the soul is subject (in virtue of the inner sense) to inner changes. Since, as we have proved, these 
changes cannot arise from its nature considered in isolation and as disconnected from other things, it 
follows that there must be a number of things present outside the soul with which it stands in reciprocal 
connection. It is likewise apparent from the same considerations that the change in perceptions also takes 
place in conformity with external motion. It follows from this that we could not have a representation, 
which was a representation of a body and which was capable of being determined in a variety of ways, 
unless there was a real thing present to hand, and unless its interaction with the soul induced in it a 
representation corresponding to that thing.  For this reason, it can easily be inferred that the compound, 
which we call our body, exists.   (New Elucidation, p. 39, Ak. 1, pp. 411-2)  
 
    The ultimate flaw of Leibniz’s theory of the pre-established harmony is therefore its inability to 
explain the localisation and embodiment of the minds, in a way that meets the challenges of 
idealism. However, thanks to the proof of the principle that all succession within the monads occurs 
because they interact with each other Kant thinks that it is possible to reject the doctrine of the pre-
established harmony:  
 
Our proof utterly overthrows the Leibnizian pre-established harmony, not, as is generally the case, by 
means of final causes, which are thought to be unworthy of God and which not infrequently supply only 
an unreliable support, but by means of the internal impossibility of the thing itself. For it follows 
immediately from what we have demonstrated that, if the human soul were free from real connection with 
external things, the internal state of the soul would be completely devoid of changes.  Our demonstration 
furnishes the opinion that some kind of organic body must be attributed to all spirits whatever with 
powerful evidence of its certainty. (New Elucidation, p. 39, Ak.1, p. 412) 
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Like all other spiritual substances, the human soul must have an organic body, in order to perceive 
the world, for otherwise the perceptual states of the soul could undergo no alterations. Though Kant 
is reluctant to present any details it is quite clear that the “real connection” Kant speaks about 
involves external relations, i.e. relations in space or places, for the latter are, as we have seen, the 
outcome of the causal interaction between the forces of simple substances.  Applying the argument 
Kant presents in New Elucidation, it would then follow that the place or point from which the soul 
perceives the world, would become a condition under which its perceptions alter, thus making it 
situated not only in space, but also in time.      
   In addition to the fact that Kant’s arguments fail to demonstrate the principle of succession, it 
seems as if the arguments have other serious flaws.  These flaws are not so much concerned with 
their inability to refute idealism, as their implications for Kant’s conception of the mind-body union. 
For if the teachings Kant presents in Physical Monadology apply to the soul, it follows that the soul 
must have repulsive and attractive forces, like all other monads. The soul can then perceive the 
world from the point of view of the place it occupies, by filling it by its repulsive force. Souls 
become opaque, impenetrable physical monads, which not only occupy but also fill a space in their 
bodies, within the sphere of activity of its repulsive force. As Schönfeld correctly observes Kant’s 
pre-critical notion of the physical monads makes it difficult for him to draw an exact line between 
“material and immaterial things”:  
 
Nevertheless, Kant needed to draw such a line while insisting that the soul is somehow material. In the 
context of the pre-critical project, a soul that is not of material nature is a soul that does not belong to the 
world, cannot be embodied, and cannot causally interact there. (…) Thus, the inevitable consequence of 
the pre-critical project was that bodies and souls, or material and immaterial substances, are subject to the 
same laws. At the same time, the pre-critical project must not rule out the possibility of an afterlife – that 
is, the possibility that material substances remove themselves from their physical embodiment and interact 
purely among themselves. If Kant had wanted to rule this out, he would have had to embrace atheism or 
materialism.203    
 
Kant’s attempt to combine physical monads with physical influxionism thus seems to make the 
mind into a part of material bodies and not something merely present to them. Though Kant thought 
that his physical monadology could answer all those questions, which had already been raised 
against both monads and the theory of physical influx, it had an unwelcome side-effect, namely that 
the mind no longer has the same place as its body, but rather a place in its body.  
   Human experience was not a mystic vision of all things in God, as Malebranche had intimated, 
but an experience from a point of view.  However, this point of view was not the place of the body, 
but a peculiar and absurd point of view in the body, similar to the point of view of a little 
homunculus in the brain. It was these absurd and partly materialistic implications, which were 
brought to Kant’s attention in the early 1760s, and which he had to address in a series of revisions 
of his physical monadology, revisions, which finally led him to the transcendental turn. These issues 
are the topic of the next chapter.  
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3. Crisis and Reorientation: Kant and the Sensibility of the Soul 
 
 
The previous chapter dealt with Kant’s attempt to show how it is possible for the mind to be a 
simple immaterial substance and yet have a place, which gives it a point of view in the outer, 
material world. The trouble with the ontology of physical monads is that it seems to make all simple 
substances, including human souls, into material things endowed with forces, which make it 
possible for them to occupy and fill a place in space.  In other words, the ontology of physical 
monads cannot grant the immateriality of the human souls.  To avoid this conclusion Kant attempted 
to show that the human soul is present to the physical monads of its body, in spite of its inability to 
act upon them by any forces of attraction or impenetrability. Like Leibniz before him, Kant started 
to play with the idea that the immaterial soul is present to its body not locally, but virtually.  
    The first section of this chapter introduces the shift in the focus of Kant’s metaphysical 
investigations in the 1760s, from the metaphysics of monads and bodies to the metaphysics of the 
human, thinking soul. What Kant came to realise is that the scope of the conceptual analysis of 
metaphysics is limited. The properties of the physical monads, like their impenetrability for 
instance, cannot be demonstrated as an outcome of an analysis of the concept of physical monads. 
In the absence of such a method, it could not really be said that it had been demonstrated that 
physical monads are endowed with forces of repulsion. Even more importantly, it was brought to 
Kant’s attention that the same was true also of the immateriality of the human, thinking soul; Kant’s 
predecessors had not successfully demonstrated that the mind is a spiritual substance.       
    The second section enters the main theme, which was introduced in the previous chapter, namely 
Kant’s attempt to conceive the mind-body union in a way which is consistent with the theory of 
physical influx. Kant’s revision of his earlier ontology of physical monads in the early 1760s marks 
an important step towards such a conception. The soul is an immaterial, spiritual monad, not a 
physical monad, and has no other place than the place of its body, which is the point from which it 
views the world. The soul acts upon its body, and it acts upon the body because it perceives it, not 
because it fills some place within the body, for instance in the brain tissue. The soul is present to its 
body, virtually, not locally, which entails that the monadic elements of the body cannot influence 
the soul by its forces of repulsion and attraction, much in agreement with what Swedenborg had 
argued. 
    The third section therefore deals with Kant’s discussion of Swedenborg and his theory of spiritual 
influx, in the mid-1760s.  Typical of this theory is that it describes the relation between the soul and 
its body as asymmetric:  the human soul can act upon the body, but not the other way around.  One 
of the spectacular implications of Swedenborg’s theory is that it might be possible for the sensibility 
of the soul to have sensations, without being affected by the body. Kant’s attempts to restore the 
immateriality of the soul seem to thus have implications, which are inconsistent with the theory of 
physical influx and the realistic notion of material world as a composite of physical monads.   
    The fourth and fifth sections outline how Kant tries to come to terms with these difficulties, in 
the end of the 1760s. The focus of these sections lies on Kant’s investigation into the soul’s passive 
faculty of representation, i.e. the sensibility of the soul and his attempt to delimit it from 
understanding. In the end of the 1760s Kant’s attention shifts from the problem of the soul-body 
union to the problem of how sensibility is capable of being acted upon by the forces of its body, so 
as to produce sensations. The sensations do not immediately refer to an outer object, however, 
which means that sensations must be directed and coordinated to an object. From this, Kant 
concludes that sensibility is more than just a faculty of sense, namely a faculty of intuition. Possibly 
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inspired by Lambert’s distinction between the matter and the form of knowledge Kant singles out 
space as the form of sensibility, which makes it possible for the sensations to become 
representations, for it is only in space that sensations can be directed to an object.  
 
 
3.1 Kant and the Immateriality of the Human Soul  
 
Kant’s presentation of his habilitation thesis 1756 was followed by a period of relative calm, mainly 
characterised by practical concerns related to his activity first as a private university lecturer (1755-
1765), and then later as a librarian (1765-1770). The beginning of the 1760s signalled, however, a 
dramatic upheaval in Kant’s way of thinking, as Schönfeld shows in his colourful account of this 
stage in Kant’s life.204 Paradoxically the reason for this upheaval may be found in the rather dull 
and eventless circumstances that framed Kant’s outer life. For in working out his lectures Kant 
certainly had to think over the vast array of topics that were presented in the works he lectured on. 
For instance, in the systematic textbook on metaphysics by Baumgarten, he had to consider not only 
ontology and cosmology, but also the metaphysics of the mind and God, and in the “Introduction 
to the Doctrine of Reason” (Einleitung in die Vernunftlehre), by the Wolffian Georg Friedrich 
Meier, he was confronted with the problems of logic and the theory of knowledge.  The results of 
these labours were recorded in a number of original and thought provoking books on the 
metaphysics of the mind and God, in which Kant challenged not only the views of Wolff and 
Leibniz, but also his own earlier beliefs.   
    More specifically Kant’s works were concerned with the problem of showing how it is possible 
for the mind to be at once a spiritual substance and still interact with things which are material, 
most importantly its own body. To see how Kant’s dilemma might help us to understand the setting 
of his investigation into the nature of the human soul, during the 1760s, we have to consider his 
writings in some closer detail.  The writing which stands out as most important here is Kant’s 
“Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality” 
(Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral), a 
prize essay written in the autumn of 1762 and published 1764.  
     The fascinating about this essay is that it illustrates how Kant starts to deal with themes such as 
the question of the origin, validity, and boundaries of the concepts and principles of metaphysics, 
themes which later return during the critical period.  Metaphysics must proceed in accordance with 
a method of its own, which cannot be reduced to, or mimic, the synthetic method adopted in 
geometry, which we are familiar with from the Physical Monadology.205 Typical of geometry is that 
its concepts arise out of the constructions which define them. For instance, the concept of a triangle 
is not given to geometry but defined by the construction of a three-sided figure. The essential 
elements of the triangle construction, namely the three sides, also serve as a ground or argument 
(Beweisgrund) for everything that can be demonstrated about a triangle, like the sum of its angles, 
etc.   
    Geometrical constructions serve as arguments, not only for theorems about curves, figures etc., 
but also for general propositions about the properties of space. Thus, though geometry does not 
bother about the concept of space, it can still say something about it, thanks to the possibility of 
potentially infinite, iterative constructions.206 For instance, in order to demonstrate the infinite 
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divisibility of space one has to construct two indefinitely extended parallel lines and then cut them 
by a line at right angles.207 From a given point, on one of the parallel lines, it is then possible to 
draw indefinitely many intersecting lines through the other two lines. Hence, it follows that space 
is infinitely divisible, etc.  
    Metaphysics, on the other hand, proceeds from “confused” (verworren) concepts, which are 
given to our understanding prior to any definitions.208  Definitions are rare and must be prepared by 
giving careful attention to the primary marks (Merkmale) of the concept, in abstraction 
(abgesondert) from other concepts.209 These primary marks present our understanding with “data” 
(Data) to indemonstrable propositions or principles, which serve as arguments for subsequent 
demonstrations, which may lead to definitions.210 However, the analysis is often partial and 
therefore incomplete, which means that it cannot lead to a definition. The concept of space for 
instance is only open to a partial analysis (Auflösung).211  
    However, the true problem of definitions in metaphysics is not so much the incompleteness of 
its analyses as the data on which they are based. In geometry, the same construction which defines 
a concept also shows that it expresses a real possibility “outside” thought, but in metaphysics there 
are no such guarantees. The mere analysis of a concept may present us to the marks, which are 
essential to a concept, but from this it does not follow that they are also essential marks of a real 
possibility. That a mark is formally possible just goes to show that it is logically possible, in the 
sense that it is consistent with the principle of contradiction, but from this it does not follow that it 
is inseparable from the possible existence of a property, or a thing.  In Inquiry Kant underlines this, 
by making a distinction between “formal principles” and “material principles”.212 Roughly, this 
corresponds to the distinction between “logical grounds” and “material grounds”, which appears in 
“The only possible argument in support of a demonstration of the existence of God” (Der einzig 
mögliche Bewisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes), written the same autumn as the 
Inquiry.213 
    In The Only possible argument, Kant underlines that the marks of real possibilities (“material 
elements”) are originally given, only as the marks of something which exists or as the consequence 
of something which exists.214 Contrary to Wolff or Baumgarten, Kant thinks that the inner 
possibility of a thing (ens) is material and not just formal. The triangle for instance is formally 
possible as long as the three sides agree and hence do not violate the principle of contradiction.215 
However, the triangle will of course not be possible apart from its three sides, which are the material 
                                                 
207 Inquiry, p. 251, Ak. 2, p. 279; cf. Physical Monadology, pp. 54-5, Ak. 2, pp. 478-9. In the Physical 
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principles of its possibility.216 They are given as data, presumably as a presupposition of the very 
same construction that defines the triangle.  
    Unfortunately, this observation does not sit perfectly well with Kant’s rigid distinction between 
the synthetic and analytic methods, defended in the Inquiry. For instance, in the Inquiry Kant argues 
that the three-dimensionality of space follows from a mere analysis of the concept of space. 
However, it is evident that the datum Kant refers to must be taken from “space itself” (den Raum 
selber), which is hardly possible without an additional appeal to a geometric construction.217  
    The same unfortunate problem also slips into the analysis of the concept of body. Kant ensures 
his readers that an analysis of this concept makes it evident that bodies are impenetrable, substantial 
composites of simple things (physical monads), etc.218 However, whereas the impenetrability is 
given as a datum to the sense of touch, there is no datum, which goes to prove that bodies are 
substantial composites. From this point of view, Kant is in no better position than he was in the 
Physical Monadology, where he seems to have just assumed that it belongs to the real possibility 
of a body that it has to be a composite of simple elements.   
    Here rational psychology has an advantage, according to Kant, for the concept of the rational 
soul or spirit is not given, but stipulated, like the concepts of geometry.219 However, from this we 
do not know that rational souls (spirits) are possible. Even if souls are simple substances and hence 
different from matter, which is composite, there is nothing, which seems to exclude that they 
nonetheless are material.  Thus, given the notion of simple substances as physical monads, it is not 
impossible (contradictory) to conceive the soul as an “element of matter”, endowed with a passive 
force of impenetrability: 
 
I admit that the proof we have in our possession for establishing that the soul is not matter is a good one. 
But take care that you do not infer from this that the soul is not of a material nature [materialer Natur]. 
For this latter claim is universally taken to mean not merely that the soul is not matter, but also that it is 
not a simple substance of the kind which could be an element of matter. But this requires a separate proof 
– the proof namely, that this thinking being does not exist in space in the way in which [nicht so wie] a 
corporeal element exists in space, that is to say, in virtue of impenetrability; it also requires proof that this 
thinking being could not, when combined with other thinking beings, constitute something extended a 
conglomerate. But no proof has actually been given yet of these things. Such a proof, were it to be 
discovered, would indicate the incomprehensibility of the way in which a spirit is present in space.  
(Inquiry, pp. 266-7, Ak. 2, p. 293)   
 
Here it seems as if Kant finally adumbrated the problem of how it is possible to ascribe a point of 
view to an immaterial mind. To prove that the mind is immaterial it is insufficient to show that the 
mind is simple and not composite, as its body. Rather, it has to be demonstrated that the mind has 
                                                 
216 Kant illustrates the same point by taking the example of a rectangular triangle. The triangle and the right 
angle are the material elements of the rectangular triangle and their agreement, in accordance with the 
principle of contradiction the formal element of the triangle. See, The only possible argument, pp. 122-3, 
Ak. 2, pp. 77-8. 
217 Inquiry, p. 254, Ak. 2, p. 281. Later in the Critique of Pure Reason (B 41) and in Prolegomena, Ak. 4, p. 
284,  Kant repeats Ptolemy’s famous “proof” of the three-dimensionality of space, which is based on the 
observation that for any given point it is impossible to construct more than three lines which cut it at right 
angles.     
218 Inquiry, pp. 259-60, Ak. 2, pp. 286-7. 
219 Inquiry, p. 249, Ak. 2, p. 277. 
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a point of view and therefore a place, which it does not fill by virtue of any force of impenetrability, 
something Kant assumed was impossible. 
  
3.2 The Rational Soul and its Place: Kant’s Views in “Metaphysik Herder” 
 
Kant’s efforts to come to terms with the immateriality of the thinking soul are visible also in 
Metaphysik Herder, i.e. in the lecture notes taken by his favourite student Johann Gottfried von 
Herder (1744-1803), from the summer semester 1762, to the summer semester 1764.  In Metaphysik 
Herder Kant repeats many of the basic teachings of the physical monadology: physical monads are 
not extended, but occupy space, by virtue of the interplay between their repulsive and attractive 
forces.220  Repulsive forces are expansive, attractive forces cohesive.221 Repulsion is always 
repulsion of another physical monad, so the filling of space of physical monads presupposes that 
they are mutually compresent.  Relations within space are therefore mutual.222  From this it follows 
that God cannot be in space; there is no space between God and that which he has created, for in 
that case it would have to be possible for that which is in space to act on God, i.e. God would have 
to be passive and dependent, which he is not.223  
   Taken apart from the simple substances, which make space possible, space just consists of 
accidents. In Kant’s terminology, space is a totum ideale, a whole, which consists of accidents.224 
Hence, there is nothing in space in and for itself, which supports it: 
   
Space does not consist of simple parts. (That does not mean that it is infinitely divisible.) In every space 
is a straight line possible – next to any one is a perpendicular line possible. Parallels which do not consist 
of simple parts, in that is not a subject of composition, because that which, etc., of that remains nothing 
when all composition is taken away; because that which remains would have to be simple. That which 
does not have an inner subject of composition must be something whose essence is pure composition. 
Space has no first subject of composition = no space is in and for itself possible if no simple substances 
were given, because composition as an accident without substance [is] not possible.225 (Nachträge Herder, 
Ak. 28, pp. 848-9) 
 
    More novel is Kant’s distinction between physical monads and souls, which he had left without 
consideration in the Physical Monadology. One of Kant’s guiding ideas here is Wolff’s familiar 
doctrine that the forces of the material and immaterial substances cannot be of the same kind. Thus, 
Wolff typically describes the human, rational soul as a self-conscious being, which has a thought, 
inasmuch as it apperceives its perception of the thing.226 That the rational soul is a thinking thing 
also grants that it is an immaterial simple thing, for a composite material thing cannot think.227 
However, the force of the soul is different from the inner forces of the physical unities, according 
                                                 
220 Metaphysik Herder, Ak. 28, pp. 30-1, 46.    
221 Metaphysik Herder, Ak. 28, p. 46.    
222 Nachträge Herder, Ak. 28, p. 848.  
223 Nachträge Herder, Ak. 28, p. 848.  
224 Nachträge Herder, Ak. 28, p. 847. 
225 My translation, J.J.  
226 Wolff, Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 194.  
227 Wolff, Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 742.  
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to Wolff, for none of these forces make it possible for the physical unities to perceive anything 
outside them, not even indistinctly as Leibniz thought.228  
    Kant outlines the difference between the human soul and the physical monads in a similar 
fashion. According to Kant, only souls have a faculty and power of representation.229 Whereas the 
faculty of representation is the possibility of the soul to represent something different from itself, 
the force is that which is sufficient for it to actualise this possibility.230 The force that is sufficient 
to actualise a representation is furthermore either entirely within the soul or partly outside the soul. 
In the latter case, the force corresponds to a passive faculty of the soul; in the former case, the force 
corresponds to an active faculty. The faculty of representation is consequently both passive and 
active. Kant hence distinguishes between two faculties of representation: sensibility and 
understanding.231 
    The sensibility of the soul includes the sense, which can be divided into two faculties: outer sense 
and an inner sense.232 Outer sense gives sensations, i.e. representations, which have their ground in 
the presence of an object (Sache).233 However, not everything in the sensations can be referred 
outside ourselves, namely the feeling of pleasure or pain, which accompanies them.234  Later, in the 
1770s, Kant marks this by making a distinction between outer sense, and the feeling of pleasure 
and pain, the internal sense (sensu interior).235 Internal sense should also not be confused with the 
inner sense, for the inner sense does not make us sense and feel, but it make us aware of our feelings 
and sensations. 236  
                                                 
228 Wolff’s  realism with respect to material bodies thus goes hand in hand with a more dualistic model of 
the mind-body union; cf. Erdmann (1877, p. 63).   
229 Kant is not entirely unambiguous on this issue, however, as will be seen below.   
230 Metaphysik Herder, Ak. 28, pp. 24-8; Nachträge Herder, Ak. 28, pp. 844-7.  
231 Nachträge Herder, Ak. 28, pp.  850-7; 869-74. Herder’s lecture notes do not, to my knowledge, 
explicitly say anything about the understanding as an active faculty and power. Kant underlines, however, 
that the understanding is an original faculty (Grundvermögen) in its own right, which is different from the 
receptive, sensible faculty.  Moreover, Kant describes repeatedly the understanding or intellect as the active 
faculty, both in the Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Ak. 15 pp. 77-91, as well as in the later lecture notes, 
e.g. Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29, p. 888.        
232 Nachträge Herder, Ak. 28, p. 850. This can be compared with Baumgarten’s distinction between inner 
sense and outer sense, discussed in Metaphysica, §§ 534-5, which is based on the difference between the 
two kinds of objects represented by these senses, namely states of my mind (animae mea) and states of my 
body (corporis mei). 
233 Nachträge Herder Ak. 28, pp. 850.  What Kant means by “object“ or “presence“ is not altogether clear, 
but the lecture notes suggest that Kant takes sensations to be the result of the soul’s presence to itself, as 
well as the effect of actions on the soul by material bodies; see Ak. 28, pp. 850, 890.  The notion of 
sensation presented by Kant in Metaphysik Herder is more consonant with some sort of direct realism, than 
the notion presented in the Critique of Pure Reason (A19-22/B33-4), where Kant speaks of  “objects” 
(Gegenstände), rather than things, and where he takes the objects of sensations (empirische Anschaungen) 
to be appearances.      
234 Pleasures and pains rather refer to ourselves, namely to the agreement or disagreement which a sensation 
produces with respect to our consciousness of ourselves and sensibility (Empfindsamkeit), as Kant explains 
in one of his 1760s notes on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica; see Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Nr. 651, Ak. 
15, p. 288. 
235 See for instance Reflexionen zur Anthropologie Nr. 605, Ak. 15, p. 260. 
236 See Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Ak. 15, Nr. 208, p. 80. This leaves it open if inner sense is identical 
with self-awareness or apperception, and it is not until the late 1760s, that we find a more clear cut 
distinction between the inner sense and the apperception; see Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Ak. 15, Nr. 
208, p. 80.  Thus, whereas the inner sensation is an awareness of myself insofar as I am affected, the 
apperception involves an awareness of myself as spontaneously active. Inner sense understood as 
apperception makes it possible for us to apprehend objects as distinct from ourselves, and hence reflect on 
their characteristic marks. Inner sense is therefore connected with understanding. Already in Nachträge 
                                                      Crisis and Reorientation: Kant and the Sensibility of the Soul    
 
 
 
59 
 
    The important lesson from Herder’s lecture notes, which is relevant for our purposes, is that Kant 
describes sensibility (sense) as passive, because it is unable to represent an object spontaneously by 
its own force alone. Sensibility is in other words passive, not because it resists the tendency of the 
intellect to make perceptions more clear and distinct, as Leibniz thought, but because it cannot 
represent without being causally affected by its body. In this context, Kant recognises that not only 
sense and reproductive imagination, but also thinking, depend on the causal actions of the body:   
 
- Quaestio: does the soul need a body for rational thinking? Responsio: 1) it needs the body [ihn], since 
sensations are effects of the body on the soul, which are grounds of the thoughts. Thus the same motions 
of the body appear to be necessary as causes in order to reproduce the same effect – the thoughts – at least 
partially. Likewise the body must act in the soul as previously [damals] for instance [in order to] to 
reproduce tones (of which one has no concept without the body), and the soul must excite the same motions 
in the brain as formerly.237  (Metaphysik Herder, Ak. 28, p. 106)   
 
    The sensibility of the soul shows that the soul has a passive force, which is entirely different from 
the passive forces of the physical monads.238  It must therefore be assumed that the soul’s presence 
to the body does not depend on having a force of impenetrability, like the physical monads or 
material elements. The absence of forces of impenetrability in the soul leads, however, to two 
dilemmas, which Kant presents in the following way to his students: 
  
– If it [the soul] is not present in space through its force of impenetrability, then the bodily elements can 
also be where the soul is.  – If the bodily elements can be immediately present everywhere in space, then 
why cannot the soul also be everywhere in space and in fact immediately in the entire body?239  
(Metaphysik Herder, Ak. 28, p. 146)   
 
    In the solution to these dilemmas, Kant suggests that the bodily elements are present to each 
other, only insofar as the spheres of activity of their passive forces touch and exert pressure on each 
other. Material elements are, therefore, only externally present to other material elements, for a 
material element can only be touched by an element which itself has a force of repulsion. The soul’s 
presence to the bodily elements is therefore only internal, i.e. it is present to them only in the sense 
that it is immediately aware of them. The soul cannot be localised in the body, but thanks to its 
presence to the material elements the soul becomes localised in the same place as the place where 
the body is: 
 
The place of the soul in the universe is the place of the body, and in the body the soul has no place. The 
soul is most intimately [innigst] present to the bodily elements, for the bodies are only externally present 
to each other. The soul is thus not acting upon the surface [of the body] but upon the inner forces [of its 
elements]. The soul can hence act upon the inside of the body, but the body cannot act upon the soul. The 
soul cognises the inner state of each element and acts upon every inner state, and in this way it is present 
                                                 
Herder, Ak. 28, p. 869 Kant seem to have suggested that there would be no understanding, no concepts and 
no judgments, without inner sense and therefore also consciousness.    
237 My translation, J.J. 
238 Metaphysik Herder, Ak. 28, p. 144. 
239 My translation, J.J.  
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to the body. The bodily elements act externally upon each other, by powers of repulsion etc. etc., that is, 
outer relations.240  (Metaphysik Herder, Ak. 28, p. 146)   
 
    Kant’s solution to the dilemmas, presented in the lectures, thus involves the claim that the soul 
is virtually and not locally present to the bodily elements. If this is true, it follows that the presence 
of the thinking soul to its body is not physical (by contact).  This presupposes that the bodily 
elements, i.e. the physical monads, must have an inner, essential force, in addition to the forces of 
repulsion and forces of attraction. Thus, the elementary parts of the living body, which is joined to 
the thinking soul, start to look less like physical monads and more like the monads of Leibniz, in 
the sense that they must have some force which makes it possible for them to perceive or feel both 
pains and pleasures. The soul’s inner sensations, which include an awareness of the inner states of 
the elements of the living body, i.e., their states of pain or pleasure, also explain how it is possible 
for the soul to be present to its body. The pains and pleasures of the elementary parts of the body 
are hence not suffered and enjoyed by the soul, until it feels them.  
    Kant also argues that these inner states are influenced or acted upon by the soul’s awareness of 
them, but leaves very few details of the exact workings of this influence; the nature and laws 
according to which the forces of the soul act is a puzzle, according to Kant.241 Even if sensations 
are caused by the body, the soul cannot be influenced by the forces of repulsion and attraction of 
the body. For the elements of the body cannot act upon something, except locally, i.e. insofar they 
touch it or attract it at a distance. The only way the physical monads could influence the soul by 
their forces of repulsion and attraction, would be if the soul is material and thus seated in the body.    
    The immateriality of the soul cannot be demonstrated but proves to be consistent with the fact 
that our sensations involve something more than just inner sensations, namely sensations of the 
outer states of the bodily elements.  Typical of these outer sensations is that they can refer to some 
place outside the brain, to the states of the bodily organs or to the places of objects, which are 
located outside us.  The latter insight disproves the attempts of certain materialists to show that the 
soul is seated in the body, for in that case the places of our sensations would be inside our heads 
and not outside them:    
 
Posited that the soul [sie] had its place, for instance in the brain, all other [places] would be mediated, for 
instance through nerve fibres. The place of the sensation must then be the place where straight lines, e.g. 
the nerves, encounter. If I would sense along an oblique line, for instance a pain in the hand, or sounds 
coming from behind, then the soul would have to refer them along a straight line, hence to the wrong place, 
or it would have to refer everything to the brain, in the place where the soul is present. 242  As it is we refer 
the pain to the organ; for instance that the finger pains is hardly something I refer to the brain, etc. These 
illustrations probably tell that the soul has no place in the body. Its presence is just a sphaera activitatis, 
                                                 
240 My translation, J.J. 
241 Metaphysik Herder, Ak. 28, pp. 146-7.   
242 Though Herder gives few details, it seems as if Kant thinks of this situation as analogous with the case 
described by Newton in his optics, in which an object sends rays of light, which are reflected through a 
looking-glass. In the looking-glass the rays will change direction and move into the spectator’s eye, from 
the point of view of which the object will appear in a place, before the eye, where the rays of light 
converge. Kant’s curious reference to the oblique line would then be the counter part to the 
reflected/refracted ray of light in Newton’s example. For a more detailed discussion of Newton’s example, 
with references, see Grier (2001, pp. 37-8).         
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like the gravitation of the bodily elements. It is in all places of the body, without being extended.243  
(Metaphysik Herder, Ak. 28, p. 147) 
    
     Kant’s idea here seems to be that a material soul will be located in a place in the brain, where 
the nerve fibres encounter. Instead of feeling a pain in the finger, or hearing a sound from behind, 
the pain/sound will be felt/heard in the point of convergence of the nerve fibres, in the brain, where 
the soul is located. This absurd implication makes it improbable that the mind fills a space, for 
instance in the brain, with a repulsive force. That the pain is referred to the finger does not prove 
that the mind is immaterial, but it is certainly evidence in favour of this thesis. The mind has no 
other point of view than the place of its body, which is perfectly consistent with what we can expect 
if the mind is immaterial.  
    This insight does not dispel the difficulty of explaining what it is that makes these bodily organs 
and the brain connected with the sensations in the first place. The revised notion of physical monads, 
which match the immaterial soul, and allow it to act upon its body, does not allow the body to act 
and make an impression on the rational, immaterial soul. Kant does not allow the forces of the 
rational soul to be determined or modified by the forces of the body, as his version of Knutzen’s 
theory of physical influx would predict. The monadic elements of the body cannot act upon the 
soul, since they cannot cognise the states of the soul in the same way as the soul cognises the states 
of the monadic elements of the body.   
    To summarise, the insight that the soul has no other point of view than the body, made it highly 
probable that the soul is immaterial, something Kant did not consider or mention in the Inquiry. 
However, from this insight, it was a huge step to explain how the soul causally interacts with its 
body.  Curiously, Kant’s revision of his earlier notion of physical monads seems to open up the 
possibility that the soul might have extrasensory experiences, independently of the body, not 
completely unlike the experiences of mystics, or even spirit-seers. To see how Kant handled this 
problem, and how it moved him forward to a study of the human sensibility, we have to turn to his 
encounter with Swedenborg.  
 
3.3 The Spirituality of the Rational Soul: Kant’s Encounter with Swedenborg 
 
Kant’s efforts to come to terms with the forces of the human rational soul and its connection with 
the body are further developed in “Dreams of a spirit-seer”244 (Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert 
durch Träume der Metaphysik), from 1766.  In Dreams Kant reiterates the definition of certain 
“modern philosophers”, presumably Leibniz and others, according to which a spiritual being is a 
simple being endowed with reason, like the human soul.245 The simplicity of the spiritual being 
grants that it is not extended, but from this it does not follow that it is immaterial, as the Leibnizians 
had argued. For neither reason nor simplicity excludes that such beings are capable of filling entire 
volumes of space, which in turn would make it impossible to distinguish them from material bodies. 
To show this Kant invites the reader to make the following thought experiment:    
 
                                                 
243 My translation, J.J.   
244 Henceforth Dreams.   
245 Dreams, p. 308, Ak. 2, p. 320; on the Leibnizian connotations of Kant’s definition, see Carpenter (1998, 
p. 164).   
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I now proceed to raise the following question: suppose that I wished to place this simple substance in a 
cubic foot of space which is full of matter: would it be necessary for a simple element of that matter to 
vacate its place so that the spirit could occupy it? Do you think that the question must be answered 
affirmatively? Very well! In that case, the space in question, if it were to admit a second spirit, would have 
to lose a second elementary particle. And if one were to continue this process, the cubic foot of space 
would eventually be filled with spirits. And this cluster of spirits would offer resistance by means of 
impenetrability in exactly the same fashion as if the cubic foot of space were full of matter.  (Dreams, p. 
309, Ak. 2, p. 321)   
  
Kant’s conclusion from his thought experiment is thus that spirits would become parts of entire 
clusters of spirits, offering resistance to whatever might intrude into its space. Hence, in spite of 
their power of thinking, spirits would be “indistinguishable from the elements of matter”, i.e. they 
would become material, to use the terminology from the Inquiry. 246  
    Though Kant acknowledges his inclination towards the notion of human souls as spiritual 
substances, he also confesses that this view makes it difficult to understand how a spiritual 
substance can be united with a body.247 Thus, how is it possible for a spiritual being to be present 
in the same place as the body and be acted upon by the body, in spite of the fact that it is penetrable 
and exerts no passive forces of repulsion? That the soul is a simple thinking substance is not an 
issue here, according to Kant; the issue is rather to demonstrate that it is possible for such a 
substance to be present to a space without filling it.  Negatively stated, spiritual substances must 
lack all passive forces of repulsion, but positively stated, they must have a force which makes them 
present in space, but without filling it:  
 
Now, suppose that I posited the existence of substances which were of a different kind: they are present in 
space but they possess forces which differ from the motive force of which the effect is impenetrability.  If 
I supposed that such substances existed, it would be altogether impossible for me to think of them in 
concreto as displaying activity, unless it bore analogy with my empirical representations.  And, in so far 
as I have denied them the property of filling the space in which they operate, I would have deprived myself 
of a concept by means of which the things which present themselves to my senses are otherwise thinkable 
for me; and the inevitable result must, therefore, be a kind of unthinkability. But this cannot be regarded 
as a known impossibility for the simple reason that the opposite will, in respect of its possibility, likewise 
remain incomprehensible, even though its actuality presents itself to the senses.    (Dreams, pp. 310-1, Ak. 
2, p. 323)  
   
     Once again, Kant repeats his conclusion from Inquiry, namely, that it is impossible to 
demonstrate the possibility of an immaterial soul which does not fill a space. On the other hand, we 
cannot disprove the possibility of an immaterial soul either; it is even probable that there are 
immaterial souls, as Kant seemed to have argued, according to Herder’s lecture notes.  To make it 
conceivable how such spiritual substances, which do not fill a space, still might be connected with 
material bodies, we have to rely on shaky analogies. For instance, we can think of human souls as 
being endowed with a sphere of activity, analogous with the sphere of activity of the repulsive force 
of a physical monad (“simple element of bodies”).  However, unlike the sphere of activity of a 
physical monad it would have to be possible for material bodies to penetrate into it.248  Paradoxically 
                                                 
246 Dreams, p. 309, Ak. 2, p. 322.   
247 Dreams, pp. 314-5, Ak. 2, p. 327.  
248 Dreams, p. 311, Ak. 2, p. 323.   
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a spiritual substance cannot fill a place, but we must still think of it as occupying or “taking up” 
(Einnehmen) a place, by virtue of the sphere of its activity.249  
    But where in the body is the soul localised?250  The answer given by Kant is simply: nowhere. I 
just am where my body is. For short, my place is the place of my feelings:  
 
Where is your place (that of the soul) in the body? then I should expect there was a catch in the question. 
For it is easy to see that the question already presupposes something with which we are not acquainted 
through experience, though it may perhaps be based on imaginary inferences. The question presupposes, 
namely, that my thinking ‘I’ is in a place which is distinct from the places of the other parts of that body 
which belongs to my self. But no one is immediately conscious of a particular place in his body; one is 
only immediately conscious of the space which one occupies relatively to the world around. I would 
therefore rely on ordinary experience and say, for the time being: Where I feel, it is there that I am. 
(Dreams, p. 312, Ak. 2, p. 324)    
 
The human soul is thus in the “whole body”251 and “wholly in each of its parts.”252   There is no 
particular place in the body, reserved for the spiritual substance, as distinct from the place of the 
heart, kidney, lung, etc. 
    Though Kant openly confesses that his reason for accepting the existence of immaterial natures 
remains “obscure”, he does not think that it is completely unsound.253 In the simple elements of 
living bodies, there are not just material natures, i.e. forces of repulsion and attraction, but an inner 
principle of activity, which animates them and makes them joined to a soul. Kant confesses that he 
cannot specify in what these inner life activities consists.254  However, in a footnote (quoted below), 
he suggests that even material parts are capable of perception, most likely feelings of pains and 
pleasure. This suggests that even the material elements are endowed with forces of perception. 
Kant’s position here seems to be that animal behaviour is easier to explain, if we think of animals 
as beings with a soul.255  
    The outcome of this metaphysical line of argument, familiar from Metaphysik Herder, is that the 
human soul can move and generally influence its body, but only if its awareness of the inner states 
of the elementary parts of the body affects their inner forces of perception.  Leibniz’s thesis that the 
elements of the bodies (monads) are capable of perception is not as easy to refute as one might 
think, for even if the elementary parts of the bodies have faculty of representation, it does not follow 
that the bodies themselves are capable of representations:           
 
Leibniz said that this inner ground of all its external relations and their changes was a power of 
representation. This thought, which was not developed by Leibniz, was greeted with laughter by later 
philosophers. They would, however, have been better advised to have first considered the question of 
                                                 
249 Dreams, p. 311, Ak. 2, p. 323.   
250 Dreams, p. 312, Ak. 2, p. 324.   
251 Dreams, p. 313, Ak. 2, p. 325.   
252 Dreams, p. 313, Ak. 2, p. 325.   
253 Dreams, p. 315, Ak. 2, p. 327, footnote.  
254 Dreams, p. 315, Ak. 2, pp. 327-8.   
255 Kant also reckons that these spiritual substances could influence each other. The spiritual substances 
could then coexist in an ordered fashion, without necessarily having to coexist outside one another, that is, 
independently of the order under which the coexistence of the material bodies in the outer world is possible.  
The human mind might thus be influenced, in a way, which gives it a place in the world of spirits. 
Seeing All Things in Space 
64 
 
whether a substance, such as a simple part of matter, would be possible in the complete absence of any 
inner state.  And, if they had, perhaps, been unwilling to rule out such an inner state, then it would have 
been incumbent on them to invent some other possible inner state as an alternative to that of representations 
and the activity dependent on representations. Anybody can see for himself that if a faculty of obscure 
representations is attributed even to the simple, elementary particles of matter, it does not follow that matter 
itself has a faculty of representation, for many substances of this kind, connected together into a whole, 
can after all never constitute a unified thinking entity.  (Dreams, p. 315, footnote, Ak. 2, p. 328)     
    
    The soul feels the pains and pleasures of the bodily elements of the living body, but they do not 
become painful or pleasant representations until the soul refers them somewhere, inside or outside 
the bodily organs, as we have seen in Herder’s lecture notes. In Dreams Kant explains the 
directedness of the sensations, in terms of the directions of the impressions, which the objects make 
on our sense organs; objects are seen or heard, not just because their impressions on the senses are 
“heightened”, but because they are directed.256   
    However, Kant’s discussion of the orientation of the impressions does not explain how it is  
possible for a material body or a physical monad to act on the senses in such way that a sensation 
is given to the soul in the first place. Kant intimates that, for instance, sounds can make impressions, 
which he somewhat vaguely associates with the so called material ideas (brain patterns) which 
accompany and copy them.257 However, like Leibniz and Wolff, Kant denies that the sensations of 
the soul can be caused by these material ideas.258   
    Furthermore, in his discussion of impressions (Eindrücke) in his 1760s notes on Baumgarten’s 
Metaphysica, Kant suggests that the impressions are identical with bodily feelings of pleasure and 
pain, rather than impressions on sense organs (brain patterns).259  Bodily feelings of pleasure and 
pain are, however, acted upon by the soul, not given to it, according to the views presented in 
Herder’s lecture notes. Kant’s explanation of sensation is therefore incomplete in the sense that it 
fails to give an account of the bodily causes of the impressions/sensations and their directions.  
    Kant’s predicament here seems to be that he is caught up in a conflict between opposing 
tendencies and requirements. On one hand, philosophy has to live up to the standards of 
mathematics and physics, which require that the unity between the thinking soul and the body is 
explained, purely in terms of an interaction between forces, capable of producing measureable and 
visible motions. On the other hand, an explanation of such kind seems to undermine and contradict 
the proudest findings of rationalist psychology, namely that man has a thinking soul which is 
immaterial and endowed with a power (or powers) capable of nothing but perceptions and desires, 
although in such fashion as to make it connected with a body.     
    Though Kant is very cautious about not jumping into conclusions, he seems convinced that the 
life sciences provide a solution to the contradiction between physics and rational psychology.  
Though Kant pays respect to biologists like Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738) and his mechanist 
explanations of life, he seems convinced that there must be some immaterial principle or force in 
                                                 
256 Dreams, p. 331, Ak. 2, p. 344.  
257 Dreams, p. 332, Ak. 2, p. 345.  
258 More specifically the places of the material ideas in the brain cannot explain how it comes that the object 
of sensation is viewed at a point or place outside me. The cerebral pattern that accompanies my sensation of 
a pencil for instance is located within my brain, no less than the cerebral pattern that accompanies the pencil 
I am inventing in my imagination. Nonetheless my soul discriminates between the brain patterns, by 
localising the seen pencil in a “focus imaginarius” outside me and the imagined pencil in a “focus 
imaginarius” within me.      
259 See for instance Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Nr. 268, Ak. 15, p. 102.  
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living bodies as well.  In support of this thesis, Kant makes references to the vitalist biologist Georg 
Ernst Stahl (1660-1734) and his idea that the soul adds a certain “vital force” (vis vitalis) to the 
organic body.260 The trouble with this position is not only that the biology of the 1800th century 
was in its bud, but also that it upsets the elegant symmetries typical of the mechanist explanations 
of the interaction between the soul and the body.  
    Kant’s conclusions here can be viewed against the background of his discussion of Emanuel 
Swedenborg (1688-1772) and his notion of spiritual substance. On my reading, the purpose of 
Kant’s book on Swedenborg is not simply to warn the readers of the mystic and spiritualistic 
implications of the airy-fairy speculations of dogmatic, rationalist metaphysics. Contrary to the 
opinions of commentators like Désiré Nolen, Ernst Cassirer, Kuno Fischer, and Martin Schönfeld 
for instance, Kant’s discussion of the mystic experiences of Swedenborg does not testify to his 
rupture with the metaphysics of Leibniz and his transition to Humean scepticism.261  
    Like Kant, Swedenborg typically argues that the soul is a spiritual substance, which cannot be 
affected by anything material. For instance, in “On the Intercourse between the Soul and the Body” 
(De Commercio Animae et Corporis), from 1765, Swedenborg explains that it is easier for souls to 
“flow” into the senses and bodies, than for bodies to flow into the soul, 
 
for the soul is a spiritual substance, and is consequently purer, prior, and interior, but the body is material, 
and is consequently grosser, posterior, and exterior; and it is according to order for the purer to flow-in 
into the grosser the prior into the posterior, and the interior into the exterior, thus the spiritual into the 
material, and not vice versa: consequently it is according to order for the thinking mind to flow-in into the 
sight according to the state induced on the eyes from objects presented, which state that mind also disposes 
at its pleasure; and like-wise for the perceptive mind to flow-in into the hearing according to the state 
induced on the ears by speech.   (Swedenborg, On the Intercourse between the Soul and the Body, p. 5)    
 
The purity, priority and internality of the spiritual substance therefore makes the relation between 
the body and the mind asymmetric, in the sense that it is possible for the mind to influence the body, 
but impossible for the body to influence the mind.  
    What is embarrassing here is that Kant’s own account of the unity of the soul and the body seems 
to end up in something quite similar to Swedenborg’s imaginary account of the human soul being 
engaged in an intercourse with the body. Like Swedenborg Kant denies that the soul can be 
influenced by the body; the body has a life together with the soul, but this life is asymmetric, in the 
sense that it is possible for the soul to influence the body, but not the other way around. Not only 
does this open up the possibility of extra-sensorial perceptions and previsions, but also inter-
spiritual communication (speaking with the souls of the dead, etc.).  Was it not true that Swedenborg 
had perceived a fire in Stockholm, while his body and his eyes were situated far away, in 
Gothenburg? Kant’s investigations into Swedenborg’s clairvoyant experiences are therefore a part 
of his investigations into the question of how the human soul is connected with the body.      
                                                 
260 Dreams, pp. 318-9, Ak. 2, p. 331. 
261 Nolen (1875, p. 150), Schönfeld (2000, pp. 234-44).  Kuno Fischer’s and Ernst Cassirer’s interpretations 
are discussed by Carpenter (1998, pp. 150-1). Paulsen (1875, p. 100) makes, unsurprisingly, a more 
cautious evaluation of Kant’s philosophical position in Dreams: “Kant is an empiricist, he just doesn’t 
properly know it himself.” 
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    The true target of Kant’s irony is not Swedenborg, but rather himself in his potential role as a 
spiritualist.262 For if the mind is a spiritual substance, as Kant envisages in Metaphysik Herder, it 
follows that the human mind is beyond the causal influence of any bodily forces, exactly as 
Swedenborg claims. The needle, which punctures my finger, is not the cause of my pain, but an 
occasion for my feeling of pain. Given that this is true, one encounters the possibility that the mind 
can have sensations independently of its body and the bodily sense organs.  The possible existence 
rational soul seems, in other words, to undermine Kant’s realistic notion of the world as a world of 
physical monads and material bodies.  
   The possibility that the human soul exists and acts independently of the body and the outer world, 
in accordance with the occasionalist doctrine of Malebranche, cannot be dismissed outright. 263 In 
this respect, Kant is in no better position than Swedenborg is.  The latter explains also, I think, why 
Kant’s interest in Swedenborg’s spiritism should be taken as a part of a serious investigation into 
the nature of the human soul and the workings of its sensibility.  Let us consider these investigations 
in closer detail and follow their implications for Kant’s notion of space and the reality of space.  
 
3.4 Kant’s Encounter with Lambert   
 
To see how Kant’s investigation evolved in the last half of the 1760s, i.e. after the publication of 
Dreams, it is helpful to concentrate on his notes on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica and Meier’s Auszug 
aus der Vernunftlehre, a text-book which faithfully summarised the basic ideas of Wolff’s logic.264 
In his notes, Kant once again returns to the question of the sensibility of the soul.  Removed are all 
previous doubts about sensibility as a passive and receptive faculty. Sensibility produces no 
sensations unless it is affected by the states of its body.  Only the understanding makes it possible 
for the soul to represent an object spontaneously without having to be affected by it.265 The rational 
soul is united with the body, not because the soul influences the body, in agreement with the theory 
of spiritual influx, but because they causally interact with each other. 
    One important factor, which might have enforced and shaped this attitude, was not only Kant’s 
heritage from Knutzen, but also his rising interest for Locke, whom he later would describe as a 
physical influxionist.266 I will not discuss Locke in any closer detail in this section, but Locke needs 
to be mentioned in order to understand Kant’s approach to the sensible faculty of the soul.267 Locke 
had suggested that all sensations or “simple ideas of sensation”, which were present to the mind, 
had to be produced by an object external to the mind and its power of perception, i.e. the 
understanding.  
   Though Locke hardly offered any alternatives that could settle the German debate over the theory 
of physical influx and the spirituality of the human mind, he suggested something which  proved 
very important for German philosophy in general and Kant’s philosophy in particular, namely that 
                                                 
262 For a discussion of Kant’s critique of Swedenborg as a self-critique, see Schönfeld (2000, pp. 241-4).   
263 Though Malebranche would reject the part of Swedenborg’s theory of spiritual influx, which says that it 
is possible for the soul to influence the body, he would certainly agree that it is impossible for the body to 
influence the soul. 
264 Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Ak. 15; Reflexionen zur Logik Ak. 16; Reflexionen zur Metaphysik Ak. 
17-18.  
265  Kant’s marginal notes to Baumgarten’s Metaphysica at the beginning of the 1760s and later makes it 
clear that this was Kant’s view; see for instance Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Nr. 202, Ak. 15, p. 78. 
266 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4275, Ak. 17, p. 492.    
267 Locke’s theory of ideas, perceptions and space will be discussed at some length in Chapter 4, section 2.   
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the matter (“material”) of all knowledge originated from the senses.268  This does not mean that the 
Germans suddenly turned into empiricists and forgot everything that Leibniz and Wolff had taught 
them, but it put the finger on a previously neglected philosophical question, namely the question of 
the distinction between the matter and form of our knowledge. Already Leibniz had hinted at this 
distinction in the manuscript to his “New Essays” (Noveaux Essais), an extensive commentary on 
Locke which, however, was unknown to the German audience until 1765 when it was published for 
the first time, thanks to an astute librarian, Rudolf Erich Raspe.  
    In a passage of New Essays Leibniz had seemingly confirmed that Locke was right. Ideas were 
the matter of our knowledge and could not be reduced to immediate objects of thought (“forms of 
thought”), for they were objects, which also expressed the forms of things:           
  
I agree about that, provided that you add that an idea is an immediate inner object, and that this object 
expresses the nature or qualities of things. If the idea were the form of thought, it would come into and go 
out of existence with the actual thoughts which correspond to it, but since it is the object of thought it can 
exist before and after the thoughts. (New Essays, p. 109)     
 
However, on other occasions, such as for instance in the Discours de métaphysique, Leibniz had 
insisted that an idea could express the form of a thing only as a permanent quality or form of 
thought.269 The question of the relation between the form and matter of knowledge remained 
unsettled.   Most likely, Kant’s own attitude to this anciently rooted dilemma was stimulated by his 
correspondence with the famous philosopher, mathematician and astronomer Karl Heinrich 
Lambert.  
    Lambert, who was a member of the Berlin Academy of the Sciences, had criticised Wolff for his 
attempt to treat all concepts as complex concepts, i.e. concepts which could be defined.270  Instead, 
Lambert revived Locke’s notion of simple ideas (“concepts”), by arguing that all human knowledge 
originated from the combination of certain simple concepts, which could not be defined.271  In a 
letter to Kant, dated 13 November 1765, Lambert had emphasised the “similarity” in their “ways 
of thinking” and pointed out that there was a strong parallelism in their philosophical and scientific 
interests and projects. The letter was partly inspired by a misunderstanding: Lambert had 
mistakenly got the belief that Kant was going to publish a seminal work on the “proper method of 
metaphysics”,272 and now he was curious about whether his own forthcoming book on metaphysics 
would turn out to be consistent with the method Kant advised.273   
   Lambert generously declared that he had no doubts about the correctness of Kant’s method, except 
that his own “architectonics” would be a little bit more contentious than the standard text-book on 
metaphysics:     
 
(…) I maintain that a complete system of metaphysics must include more than has previously been thought. 
I take “architectonic” to include all that is simple and primary and in every part of human cognition, not 
only the principia which are grounds derived from the form, but also the axiomata, which must be derived 
                                                 
268 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, i, 1.   
269 Leibniz’s notion of ideas will be more closely considered in Chapter 4, Section 3.    
270 Lambert, Anlage zur Architectonic (1), § 14, p. 12.  
271 Anlage zur Architectonic (1), § 9, pp. 7-8.  
272 Kant, Correspondence, p. 77, Ak. 10. p. 51.  
273 Lambert’s Anlage zur Architectonic, was not going to be published until 1771, although Lambert had 
completed the manuscript already in 1764.   
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from the matter of knowledge and actually only appear in simple concepts, thinkable in themselves and 
without self-contradiction, and also the postulata which state the universal and necessary possibilities of 
composition and connection of simple concepts. (Correspondence, pp. 77-8, Ak. 10, pp. 51-2)     
                                                                   
In a brief and rather empty reply to Lambert, written New Year’s Eve 1765, Kant confirmed that 
he indeed was working on a book on the “proper method of metaphysics”, but that the publication 
of the book was postponed.274   
     Kant’s short answer did not discourage Lambert however and in a letter, dated 3 February 1766, 
he added some further details to his first letter.275 The simple concepts, which provided the 
understanding with the matter of all its operations, had to be distinguished from the logical form, 
which presumably included or entailed certain logical principles, such as the principle of 
contradiction.276  Based on this distinction, Lambert also suggested that the knowledge of things 
could be separated from the knowledge of what was possible, i.e. thinkable or conceivable merely 
from the matter of the knowledge, i.e. alone from the simple concepts, which were singular concepts 
that could be found only by “direct intuition” (directen Anschauen).277  The knowledge of the latter 
possibilities could be stated in indemonstrable propositions, propositions that included axioms such 
as the proposition “space has only three dimensions”, etc., as well as postulates, which together 
with the principles showed how the simple concepts could be combined into complex concepts.     
    To understand the novelty of Lambert’s seemingly innocuous suggestions, it must be noted that 
Wolff had drawn a sharp line between intuitive, historical knowledge of facts and philosophical 
knowledge of the reasons under which these facts were possible. Wolff had not denied that facts 
could be derived from other facts, and that the knowledge of these facts was immediate, intuitive, 
and indemonstrable. However, Wolff had reserved the term “axiom” for immediate, indemonstrable 
theoretical propositions, in which the agreement or disagreement between the subjects and the 
predicates was evident merely from the definitions of the subject concepts.278 For instance, the 
three-dimensionality of space was an axiom only if the three-dimensionality of space was included 
in the definition of the concept of space, which ruled out that the concept of space could be described 
as a simple concept, in the way Lambert suggested.   
    Lambert’s heterodox way of redrawing the demarcation line between intuitive historical 
knowledge and philosophical knowledge was not merely a matter of terminology but pointed to a 
deeper seated disagreement between Lambert and Wolff on the concept of space, the nature of 
axioms and the metaphysical and ontological concepts in general. Space is absolute and not 
relational as Wolff thought, for the concept of space is not a relational concept but a simple, singular 
concept derived from intuition.279 Euclidean geometry therefore starts with the line, the angle etc., 
which contrary to the impression, are simple concepts.280  Instead of dissolving complex concepts 
                                                 
274 To Johann Heinrich Lambert. December 31, 1765, Correspondence, pp. 81- 83, Ak. 10, pp. 54-57. 
275 From Johann Heinrich Lambert, February 3, 1766, Correspondence, p. 85, Ak. 10, pp. 64-5.   
276 Correspondence, p. 85, Ak. 10, pp. 64-5; cf. Lambert, Anlage zur Architectonic (1), Vorrede, pp. xvi- 
xxiii.    
277 Correspondence, p. 86, Ak. 10, p. 65. 
278 See Wolff, Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica, § 267 and § 262 respectively. De Risi (2015, pp. 11-12) 
correctly points out that Lambert was one of few mathematicians who questioned the general belief that 
axioms should be derived from definitions, rather than the other way around. 
279 Anlage zur Architectonic (1), § 11, pp. 10-12.  
280 Correspondence, pp. 87, Ak. 10, p. 66. Lambert’s position seems to be that Euclid’s definitions, such as 
definition 1 (the point), 2 (the line) and 8 (the plane angle) are axioms, rather than definitions in the proper 
sense of the term.  
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into simpler ones, the “Leibnizian analysis” of relational concepts only leads to concepts that are 
successively more and more complex. 281   
    In order to set things straight metaphysics has to take guidance from Euclidean geometry. Thus, 
what Lambert suggests is that ontology should start with the simple concept of solidity, which is a 
singular concept derived from intuition.282 This went against Wolff’s claim that the basic 
ontological concept is the concept of a thing in general. It is a concept which is more complex than 
all other concepts of things, according to Lambert, for it is a universal and generic concept which 
contains the basis of the division and subdivision of all things. 283  Relational concepts are not the 
starting-point, but the end-product of both metaphysics and geometry. 
    Though Lambert received no answer from Kant until 1770 it was soon to become evident that he 
would develop Lambert’s suggestions in a different direction, by arguing that the concept of space 
is the concept of a form of sensibility, which cannot be derived from sensible intuitions.284 In a 
letter to his friend Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), written a couple of months after the letter from 
Lambert, Kant connects his investigation of sensibility with his earlier efforts to understand the 
mind-body union:   
 
In my opinion, everything depends on our seeking out data for the problem, how is the soul present in the 
world, both in material and in non-material things. In other words, we need to investigate the nature of 
that power of external agency in a substance of this kind, and the nature of that receptivity or capacity of 
being affected, of which the union of a soul with a human body is only a special case. (Correspondence, 
p.  91, Ak. 10, p. 71)  
 
In the letter Kant, resignedly, concludes that we cannot solve this problem except in terms of 
hypotheses which in the worst scenario are indistinguishable from mere daydreams, like those of 
Swedenborg. There are no data, neither in thought nor in sensation, which are sufficient to solve 
the problem. However, this conclusion is hardly Kant’s last word on the issue, for if we have data 
to know something about the form of sensible knowledge, then we also have data sufficient to 
investigate at least the form of sensibility.285  
 
 
 
                                                 
281 Correspondence, pp. 85-6, Ak. 10, p. 65. In Anlage zur Architectonic (1), §§ 7-8, pp. 4-7, Lambert 
underlines that Leibnizian analysis can produce different results if applied to non-relational concepts, 
although it remains highly unclear how.    
282  Lambert, Anlage zur Architectonic (1), § 57, pp. 48-9. 
283 “For genera and species contain the fundamenta divisionum et subdivisionum within them and, just for 
that reason, are more highly complex the more abstract and universal they are. The concept of ’thing’, ens, 
is of all concepts the most complex.” See, Correspondence, pp. 85-6, Ak. 10, p. 65. 
284 To my knowledge Lambert does not use the term “sensible intuition”; to intuit is to apprehend. However, 
in order to apprehend a simple idea, for instance the simple idea of solidity or extension, sensation is 
needed, which makes the sensation sensible. In Neues Organon, § 578, Lambert even seems to identify 
intuitions with sensations, at least when it comes to intuitions of things in nature.   
285 In Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Nr. 639, Ak. 15, p. 276, which Adickes dates to 1769, Kant explains 
that he takes the sensible form of our knowledge (sinnliche Form einer Erkentnis) as synonymous with the 
form of sensibility (Form der Sinnlichkeit).    
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3.5 Absolute Space and the Matter and Form of Sensibility 
 
Kant’s first published report from his investigation of sensibility, after the publication of Dreams, 
is presented in “Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space”286 
(Von dem Ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume) from 1768. In this essay, 
Kant adds further details to his previous discussions of the directedness of our sensations. In Dreams 
Kant had argued that the impressions on our bodily sense organs (eyes, ears, etc.) are oriented to 
the objects that cause them.  The direction of the impressions, which the visible objects make upon 
our sight for instance, is indicated by the direction of the rays of light (“lines”) sent out from them. 
Like the spectator in Newton’s optics, the soul will orient these rays of light in their backward 
direction to the point where they converge – the “optical point” (Sehepunkt) or focus imaginarius. 
Thus, the point of convergence indicates the place where the object is located, without which we 
would be unable to see it at all.287  
    In Directions Kant shifts his focus from the physiology and psychology of sensation, to the 
deeper-seated question of what makes the impressions oriented in the first place. The easiest answer 
seems to be that impressions are oriented because they originate from an object, which must be 
located on one side or the other of my body. The objects of my sensations are therefore situated 
either below or above me, to the left or to the right, before or behind me.  I hear the sound of the 
bee behind my head; I see the computer screen in front of my eyes, etc. However, this answer is not 
perfectly satisfactory to Kant, for it does not indicate the first ground (ersten Grund) of the 
distinction between different directions (Gegenden), between below and above, between left and 
right, etc.  
   In whatever the first ground consists, it must be the ground of a qualitative difference, for the 
left/right, up/down, etc., are different not just because they are outside one another. The right hand 
for instance is different from my left hand, not just because it can be seen outside the left hand, but 
because its rightness feels different from the leftness of the left hand. The right hand is felt as 
stronger, more useful and convenient, etc.  
   More recently, David Walford has argued that the “subjectivist” distinction between right and left 
can be extended to the other directions as well. For instance, the distinction before/behind is 
associated with the polarity between a feeling of security and a feeling of vulnerability and 
insecurity, etc.288 However, Walford also points out that although the distinction between the 
opposite directions is subjectively grounded in polarly opposed feelings, it does not also follow that 
oppositely directed sides of my body are (entirely) subjectively grounded, according to Kant.289    
    For instance, I can distinguish the front of my body from the back because of differences and 
asymmetries in their anatomy. The front side is the side with the face and the back side is literally 
the side of the back, etc.  However, though these distinctions are practically important, they do not 
identify the first ground of the distinction between the opposite directions of the sides of the body, 
which is the real topic of Directions.   
    To find the first ground of the distinction between the opposite directions we have to conceive 
direction abstractly, apart from the polarly opposed determinations (left/right, up/down, etc.). This 
will leave us with direction (Gegend) in “the most abstract sense of the term”, as Walford 
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287 Dreams, pp. 331-2, Ak. 2, p. 344. 
288 Walford (2001, pp. 429-31).  
289 Thus Walford (2001, pp. 430-1) suggests that directions (Gegenden) are grounded in the polarly opposed 
feelings, but that an object cannot have either of these directions unless it is has a direction (Gegend), which 
makes it related to absolute space.   
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observes.290  However, contrary to what one can expect this does not present us to an abstract 
situational relation (“directedness”), but with a relation between a particular object and three-
dimensional absolute space.291  The direction (Gegend) of the human body is therefore a relation to 
three-dimensional absolute space:   
 
I do not know exactly to what extent the object which I propose examining here is related to what the great 
Leibniz had in mind. But to judge by the meaning of the term, what I am seeking to determine 
philosophically here is the ultimate ground of the possibility of that of which Leibniz was intending to 
determine the magnitudes mathematically. For the positions [Lagen] of the parts of space in reference to 
each other presuppose the direction [Gegend] in which they are ordered in such a relation.  In the most 
abstract sense of the term [im abgezogensten Verstande], direction [Gegend] does not consist in the 
reference of one thing in space to another – that is really the concept of position – but in the relation of the 
system of these positions to the absolute space of the universe. (Directions, p. 365, Ak. 2, p. 377) 
 
     The relation to three-dimensional absolute space makes it possible to conceive the body as 
intersected by three planes at right angles. Thanks to this, we can conceive our body as standing on 
a horizontal plane, which first grounds the possibility of making a distinction between the upside 
and the downside of the body.292 Letting the remaining vertical planes divide the body into two 
symmetric halves and two asymmetric halves, grounds the possibility of making a distinction 
between left/right and fore/hind respectively.293 Without the distinction between the three planes 
and their two sides, which originate from the three dimensions of absolute space, no distinction 
between up/down, left/right, before/behind could be made, according to Kant, even if my faculty of 
feeling such differences is otherwise intact.    
     Kant notes that there is no sensation (or direct intuition as Lambert would put it) of absolute 
space, which proves its existence.294  However, he suggests that we can demonstrate the existence 
of absolute space by showing that we need to refer to absolute space in order to explain the 
phenomenon of incongruent counterparts.295 To this end, he invites the readers to imagine two 
hands, one left hand and one right hand.  Both hands are equal in size and similar with respect to 
their shape and the inner situational order between their parts, from which it should follow that they 
are congruent, according to Leibniz’s concept of congruency.296 However, contrary to what 
Leibniz’s concept of congruency predicts, they are still different with respect to their orientation, 
which goes to show that an inner difference remains between them, which cannot be explained in 
terms of their relations to each other, but only by reference to their different relations to absolute 
space.297 Hence, absolute space exists.298  
     On the surface it seems as if Kant presents a defence of Newton’s and Clarke’s theory of absolute 
space, according to which space is the “sensorium of God”, and originates from his presence to all 
                                                 
290 Walford (2001, pp. 423-4).   
291 Walford (2001, p. 424).   
292 Directions, pp. 366-7, Ak. 2, p. 379.    
293 Directions, pp. 366-7, Ak. 2, p. 379.   
294 Directions, p. 371, Ak. 2, p. 383.   
295 Directions, p. 370, Ak. 2, p. 382.   
296 Leibniz’s concept of congruency, and Kant’s critique of it will be discussed in some closer detail, in 
Chapter 4.   
297 Directions, pp. 370-1, Ak. 2, p. 382.    
298 For a critical discussion of this conclusion, the reader is referred to van Cleve/Frederick (1991).    
Seeing All Things in Space 
72 
 
created things, most notably the corpuscles in the material universe.   However, as will be seen, this 
reading of Directions seems inconsistent with Kant’s claim that God cannot have any spatial 
properties and that space cannot be a substance endowed with forces, like God. Space is absolute, 
not because it is a property of God, but because it cannot be reduced to an order between coexisting 
things, since it is the condition under which an ordering of them is possible.  
    Kant had started to question his earlier view that the coexistence and interaction of the simple 
substances is a condition for their localisation already in the 1760s, as is apparent in his notes on 
Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. In one note, which Adickes dates between 1764 and 1768, Kant for 
instance plays with the idea that space might be a condition of the possibility of their interaction: 
 
Either space contains the ground of the possibility of the coexistence [compraesentz] and relatedness of 
many substances, or these contain the ground of the possibility of space.299 (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, 
Nr. 3790, Ak. 17, p. 293) 
 
This intimates a revision of the earlier view that simple substances are related to each other prior 
to their localisation in space. Even more importantly, Kant’s revision of the order of dependence 
between the possibility of space and the possibility of coexisting substances signals the upcoming 
re-evaluation of his earlier view that simple substances are physical monads located in space.  In a 
note, which Adickes dates to almost the same time as the previous note (1764-1768), Kant explains 
that space and time should be considered as the primary relations (die ersten Beziehungen), under 
which all things are connected in the world.300    
    Kant’s claim that directions are felt dimensions gives an important key to his thinking about 
space as a form of sensibility in the late 1760s. Feelings of strength/weakness (right/left) do not just 
belong to the internal sense, but help us to judge the directions of our sensations, directions that 
make them into sensible representations (intuitions) oriented outside ourselves. In Kant’s 
terminology, the sensations are only the matter of our knowledge. The knowledge of the body is 
conditioned by a ground or form, which is peculiar to the sensible knowledge, but which cannot be 
reduced to the formal elements that Kant had discussed in The only possible argument and in the 
Inquiry.301 Somewhat cryptically, Kant explains that the form is “given” to sensibility through an 
“activity of the soul”:     
 
Sensation is the first element of our knowledge. So are the representations called, in cases when the mind 
is considered as solely passive, while it is affected by the presence of an object [Sache]. They [i.e. the 
sensations J.J.] are, as it were, the matter [Materie] of all our knowledge. For the form is given [gegeben] 
afterwards, through the activity of the soul. This sensation, insofar as it only intimates [andeutet] the state 
of the subject, is called feeling, but does it refer (is it in relation [Verheltnis]) to an outer object, it is called 
appearance [Erscheinung].302  (Reflexionen zur Anthropologie Nr. 619, Ak. 15, p. 268)   
  
    In this context, Kant criticises Leibniz for having failed to distinguish properly between 
sensations and thoughts and for having suggested that all sensations are immediate representations 
of objects: 
                                                 
299 My translation, J.J.   
300 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 3806, Ak. 17, p. 298.   
301 Kant uses the term “knowledge” without specifying whether it refers to sensible knowledge alone, or 
whether it applies to all kinds of knowledge; if the latter is true it gives support to the thesis that Kant 
turned into a “critical empiricist” during the 1760s.     
302 My translation, J.J. Adickes dates this note to 1769.   
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Leibniz takes all sensations of certain objects to be representations of them. The sensation has indeed to 
be the condition of the external representation, alone because those beings, which by their representations 
cannot be the cause of the object [of the representation], have first to be affected in a certain way by it, in 
order that its presence can be known, but sensation is not the external representation itself.303 (Reflexionen 
zur Anthropologie Nr.  695, Ak. 15, pp. 308-9) 
 
Kant’s remark is hardly interesting because of its accuracy, since it completely ignores that for 
Leibniz the perceptions of the impressions made on our organic bodies by external bodies, become 
“sensations” (sentiments) of these latter objects only if they are sufficiently distinguished, which is 
possible only if the perceiving monad is an animal or human soul.304 The interesting aspect of Kant’s 
note is that it illustrates his attempt to draw a line between sensations and representations. The 
sensations are thus not immediately ready-made representations of outer objects, as Lambert had 
argued, but are more or less identical with our feelings of pain and pleasure. Hence, the sensations 
become outer sensations/representations or appearances, only insofar as they relate to an object: 
 
The first faculty of the human soul and the condition for all the other is the sense [Sinn], through which 
the soul receives [empfängt] representations not from itself, but as effects of the presence of the thing.  The 
representation of sensibility [Sinnes] as something which belongs to the state of the subject is called 
sensation, but as something which is related to an object [Gegenstand], appearance.305 (Reflexionen zur 
Anthropologie, Nr.  620, Ak. 15, p. 268) 
 
    Though Kant speaks about the sense as a faculty, which receives representations, it must be kept 
in mind that even if sensations and appearances are given to sensibility, sensibility cannot be 
entirely inactive.  Sensibility is a passive power, not because it does not act (there is no thing such 
as a completely passive power), but because it cannot produce sensations and representations out 
of itself, unless it is modified by some power outside it which presumably belongs to its body.  On 
the basis of the path-breaking distinction between sensations and appearances, Kant suggests that 
sensibility must involve something more than just sense, namely a faculty of intuition:  
 
Sensible representations are either sensations and require sense, or appearances and are founded on the 
faculty of intuition. The former are alterations in the state of the subject, through the presence of the object 
[Gegenstande]; the latter: representations of the object [Gegenstandes] itself, so far the senses are subjected 
[ausgesetzt] to it.306 (Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Nr. 650, Ak. 15, p. 287) 
 
    In the end of the 1760s Kant also adds further details to his account of the form of sensible 
knowledge, and in what it sense it depends on an “activity of the soul”, i.e. an activity of the faculty 
of intuition, which Kant later would ascribe to the imagination.307 This activity involves the ordering 
or coordination of the sensations and their directions. Directions are, however, determinations of 
                                                 
303 My translation, J.J.   
304 Leibniz, The Monadology, §19, G VI 610, AG 215.    
305 My translation, J.J.  
306 My translation, J.J.  
307 It is this way that Kant tries to capture by describing the faculty of intuition as a formative power, which 
he then successively came to identify with the faculty of imagination.  See Mathias Wunsch (2011, pp. 76-
90) for an excellent overview of the role played by the faculty of intuition in Kant’s thinking in the 1760s. 
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space, which suggests that space prefigures as a ground or form of the coordination necessary in 
order to have an image of a determinate geometric space, like a triangle. Kant marks this out by 
pointing out that space is a form of sensibility, which conditions the images of figures and other 
definite spaces:  
 
Because sensibility has a determinate form in our representation, a synthesis is required for it, not just a 
collection. This synthesis is a connection [Verknüpfung] of coordination and not subsumption or 
subordination, such that the reason carries out. The ground of all coordination, hence the form of sensibility 
[Form der Sinnlichkeit], is space and time. The representation of an object according to relations in space 
is the figure [Gestalt] and its reproduction the image.308 (Reflexionen zur Anthropologie Nr. 683, Ak. 15, 
p. 304) 
 
To me it seems as if the passage quoted above is helpful to understand what Kant means when he 
says that the form of sensations is “given afterwards”,309 by an activity of the soul. Kant does not 
mean that space is imposed on the sensations; the sensations are on the contrary given in space and 
endowed with a direction. The impression made on our bodily sense organs is thus not only felt as 
hurtful or pleasant, but also felt with an orientation. It is this orientation, which makes it possible 
for sensibility, in its capacity as a faculty of intuition, to direct the feeling to a determinate object 
outside the body, or direct it to the body and the “state” (Zustand) of the bodily organs, in which 
the pain or pleasure is felt.310   
    For instance, painful coldness is not just felt with an orientation, but as oriented in the direction 
of my hand and the air surrounding my hand, etc., and this makes the feeling of coldness into an 
intuition of the hand or the air, which is a representation of the faculty of intuition.  Space is not 
itself a product of coordination, but it is the ground or condition, which makes any coordination 
possible. In Kant’s terminology, the form of the appearances “depends” on space and time.311   The 
only form, which is a product of coordination (“given afterwards”), is the shape (Gestalt), without 
which it would be impossible to have a conscious empirical intuition of a determinate object, in 
other words an image of an object.       
    Without consciousness, it will be impossible for the faculty of intuition to produce empirical 
intuitions, which are clear and distinct. The clearness of the intuitions depends of course on the 
intensity or “strength” (Stärke) of the sensations, but this is not sufficient in order to make them 
distinct as well.312 The intuition of a tree for instance is clear if I can distinguish the tree from other 
trees, but it is still indistinct, if it does not make me conscious of its parts, its stem, its branches etc., 
and how they belong together.  In a note, which Adickes dates to the years between 1769 and 1770, 
Kant explains that the indistinctness originates from a disordered representation, which makes it 
confused: 
 
                                                 
308 My translation, J.J. Adickes dates this note to either 1769 or 1769-1770.  
309 Reflexionen zur Anthropologie Nr. 619, Ak. 15, p. 268. 
310 See for instance Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Nr. 267 Ak. 15, p. 101.  
311 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 3957, Ak. 17, p. 365. 
312 See Reflexionen zur Logik, Nr. 2377, 2383 in Ak. 16, pp. 337-8. The attention which depends on strong 
impressions is involuntary according to Kant, and should not be confused with the voluntary attention 
involved in the act by which an appearance is brought under concepts.  This view is in line with 
Baumgarten’s psychology of attention, which Kant seems to have defended at least in some of the earlier 
lecture notes, Metaphysik Herder, Ak. 28, pp. 850, 869.  According to Baumgarten, the sensation is clearer 
the stronger the impression is. Moreover, we involuntarily attend to that which is clearly sensed; see 
Metaphysica, § 537 and § 529. 
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The confusion is actually opposed to the order, and the indistinctness [is opposed] to the distinctness. But 
through the confusion arises indistinctness in the representation. That is the cause, why the order pleases.313 
(Reflexionen zur Anthropologie Nr. 178, Ak. 15, p. 67)   
 
Failing to coordinate the stem, branches, etc., makes the intuition of the tree confused and the 
awareness of it indistinct, even if it otherwise is clear enough to make me aware of the tree as 
distinct from other things. My intuition of the tree will be distinct only insofar the faculty of intuition 
successfully coordinates stem, branch, leaves etc. within the determinate figure of a tree.   
   Thanks to the faculty of intuition, sensibility is itself perfectly competent to provide me with 
intuitions, which are ordered and hence not confused. Contrary to the teachings of Wolff and 
Baumgarten, sensibility is not the faculty of confused or indistinct representations; reversely the 
understanding is not the exclusive faculty of distinct representations. 314 Confusion is the absence 
of order, but order is not the privilege of the understanding, although understanding apprehends and 
brings attention to the characteristic marks of the intuited object.   
   Comparing and reflecting on such given marks, and abstracting from those marks which they do 
not have in common, makes it possible for the understanding to form concepts of common genera 
and species, like birch, little-leaf linden, etc. The peculiar form of the activities of the understanding 
is therefore to subordinate different objects under concepts of common genera and species.315 Kant 
gives expression these thoughts in a note on Meyer’s Vernunftslehre, which Adickes dates back to 
1769, or alternatively to the beginning of the 1770s:   
 
The logical form of the understanding consists in the logical subordination of the conceptuum 
communium; the abstraction is the condition under which conceptus communes can be made [werden 
können].316 (Reflexionen zur Logik, Nr 2871, Ak. 16, p. 553)  
 
     Kant’s critique of Leibniz’s, Wolff’s, and Baumgarten’s account of the difference between the 
sensibility and the understanding has been criticised by scholars like G. H. R. Parkinson and Jean 
École.317 Parkinson correctly notes that a sensation is not a thought, according to Leibniz, but an 
awareness of a (distinctive) perception, which however is confused in the sense that it does not 
makes us aware of the infinity contained in the perception.  Thoughts also involve perceptions, but 
that lead to an awareness of ideas (or concepts in the terminology of Parkinson).   
                                                 
313 My translation, J.J.   
314 As a result of the transcendental turn, Kant introduces a distinction not only between indistinctness and 
confusion but also between sensible clarity/distinctness and intellectual clarity/distinctness. This brings us 
to Kant’s distinction between sensibility and the understanding, mentioned by Erdmann (1884, p. xlv) in his 
account of the transcendental turn. Sensibility is a receptive faculty, which represents objects clearly and 
distinctly, no less than the understanding. Whereas sensible clarity/distinctness belongs to empirical 
intuitions, intellectual clarity/distinctness belongs to concepts. Concepts are distinct, because there is an 
awareness of the partial concepts (marks) they contain, so that the concepts can be defined. To my 
knowledge, Kant never explains what he means by logical clarity, but presumably it involves an awareness 
of the difference between two concepts. For a general overview of Kant’s distinction between intellectual 
and sensible clarity/distinctness, see Laiho (2012, pp. 149-55).       
315 To be exact this form is the logical form of understanding, but as will be seen in Chapter 4 and 5, Kant 
seems to take the form of understanding in a somewhat wider sense, including not only the form of the 
concept and the judgment, but also the so called laws of understanding, including most notably the principle 
of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason.   
316 My translation, J.J.  
317 Parkinson (1981, pp. 305-9), École (1991, pp. 269-70).    
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   École, for his part, underlines that according to Wolff the senses give us ideas, i.e. simple 
apprehensions of notions which, however, are obscurely or confusedly represented. The 
understanding on the other hand represents the notions distinctly. The difference between ideas and 
notions is, however, not merely a quantitative difference between degrees of confusion, but a 
qualitative one, for whereas ideas are singular, notions are universal. According to École, Kant’s 
misrepresentation of the views of Wolff proves that Kant never read Wolff. Instead he got his views 
from Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, § 521 to be exact, where Baumgarten defines the sensitive 
representations as “non-distinct” (non distinctiva).  
    Disregarding the question of whether Kant read Wolff or not, Wolff himself certainly seems to 
invite the interpretation that sensations are thoughts, albeit ones that are grounded in the sense 
organs.318 To say that sensations are grounded in alterations in the sense organs does not mean that 
they are caused by them. The theory of physical influx is at odds with the laws of motion, for the 
representational force of the soul cannot affect the body, for instance the beating of its heart, unless 
it adds something to the forces of motion, which act on the body.319 However, the latter is 
inconsistent with the law of conservation of (living) forces.320  
    In brief, the causal laws, which hold between bodily movements, such as the beating of the heart 
and the movements of the blood, do not apply to the relation between the soul and the body.  The 
correctness of this conclusion is underlined by the implausibility of the thought that forces of motion 
can be transformed, not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively, by being transformed into active 
forces of representation.321   The states of the soul are hence not causally dependent on the forces 
of the body. For instance, my feeling of anger is grounded in forces within my soul, which are 
independent of the bodily forces that cause my heartbeats. Ultimately, it is perfectly possible for 
me to have the same experience as the one I have now, even if the outer world does not exist: 
 
Since the body contributes nothing whatsoever to the sensations of the soul, all of them could occur, even 
if no world were present. This is also recognised by Descartes and long before him by the idealists, who 
recognised nothing but souls and spirits, admitting to the world no other space but in the thoughts.  Thus, 
from what has been argued  it is evident that we would see, hear and in other ways feel all things outside 
us, even if  there were no bodily things outside us.322 (Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der 
Seele des Menschen, § 777)  
 
    In the next chapter, we will see how Kant is going to argue that the concept of space, as a pure, 
a priori concept, makes it impossible to defend Lambert’s view that the axioms of geometry are 
derived from sensations, i.e. from the matter of knowledge. The concept of space is not a concept 
of empirical intuition, and in this sense, Kant is on the same side as Leibniz. However, Kant will 
hold against Leibniz that Leibniz failed to explain how it is possible for us to have a pure concept 
of space, a space which Kant has so far intimated is an absolute space.  
   In brief, what Kant is going to argue is that the pure concept of absolute space is not an empirical 
concept of reflection.  We will also see how this helps Kant takes a more definite stance to the 
question posed in the note above: Is space an a priori condition for the coexistence and relatedness 
of substances, rather than the other way around? To be exact, Kant is going to argue that the 
                                                 
318 Cf. Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele der Menschen § 220 
319 Wolff, Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 762.  
320 Wolff, Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 762. 
321 Wolff, Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 762. 
322 My translation, J.J.   
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substances are merely phenomenal, and that space is nothing but an a priori principle of the 
coexistence and relatedness of these phenomena.    
    In my opinion, what is important here is that Kant’s move opens up a new defence line for the 
theory of physical influx against both Leibniz’s theory of the pre-established harmony and 
Swedenborg’s theory of spiritual influx. For if place is a predicate of our representations, rather 
than the simple substances, it follows that the place of the rational soul in the midst of the world is 
exclusively a property of the appearance of the body. There is no need to assume that the substance 
of the body consists of physical monads, i.e. parts, which fill an extended space. The soul can be 
immaterial and yet interact with, and be influenced by, the substrate of its body, because this 
substrate is not extended, except in its appearance.  
   In particular, Kant opens up the possibility that the sensations of the human, rational soul can be 
explained as an outcome of the influences of its body, in agreement with the theory of physical 
influence. The objects of outer sensation, i.e. the appearances, do not consist of simple substances. 
In this sense, Kant is even more radical than the followers of Leibniz are, at least to the extent that 
they admit that phenomena consist of monads and that monads are located in space, by virtue of 
their bodily point of view.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                   78 
4. Locke, Leibniz, Kant and the Idea of Space    
                             
The previous chapter dealt with Kant’s resolution of the problem of how it is possible for rational 
souls to have place, without being localised in space like a mathematical point or atom. The human 
soul is a spiritual substance, but it is localised in space, insofar as it feels its body, as the centre of 
all direction, from which the soul orients its sensations to outer objects.  We have already seen how 
Kant’s investigations led him to abandon his earlier view of space as a relation or order between 
physical monads. However, so far nothing has been said about the consequences for Kant’s concept 
of space, geometry and the nature of geometric truths, at the end of the 1760s.  
    In the current chapter, I attempt to fill in these gaps. The first section deals with Kant’s attempt 
come to terms with the question of the origin of the concept of space. Given that space is an absolute 
space it follows that the idea of space cannot be received from our senses, contrary to what Locke 
and Lambert thought.  Space is a pure concept of form, which Kant, at this stage of his thinking, 
identifies with a pure concept of understanding. Thus, the concept of space can only be activated, 
not generated, by the touch or sight of extended objects.  Kant’s position is in this sense closer to 
Leibniz who argued that the idea of space is an infinite, continuous whole, which must be innate to 
the understanding. Interestingly some of these points are echoed already in Locke’s own works.     
    The second section therefore takes a somewhat closer look at Locke’s empiricist theory of space. 
According to Locke, the idea of space is a simple sense idea, which we receive by touching and 
seeing extended material bodies. However, Locke also recognises that we have knowledge of space 
that includes properties, which cannot be explained in accordance with the principle of empiricism. 
Whereas the bodies we touch and see are finite and solid with separable and movable parts, space 
is an infinite, empty and continuous whole, with inseparable and immovable parts. The mind must 
therefore have an inner power, which enables it to distinguish the idea of space from the ideas of 
solidity and motion, which means that it cannot be passively received by touch or sight. In all this 
suggests that space is ontologically independent of material bodies, according to Locke.  
   The third section deals with Leibniz’s innatist critique of Locke in the New Essays. The idea of 
space is not a sense idea, but an innate idea of understanding, which abstractly expresses what the 
outer phenomena have in common, regardless of whether they are seen, heard, tasted, etc. The idea 
of space is hence an abstract idea which reduces the phenomenon of extension to a plurality of 
unextended places (mathematical points) rather than points of view. Ultimately, this leads to the 
idea of a continuous and boundless absolute space, which encompasses all places.  
   The fourth section deals with Kant’s late 1760s critique of Leibniz’s explanation of the origin and 
validity of the concept of space. The main point of this critique is based on Euler’s objection to the 
fact that although Leibniz described the idea of space as an innate idea, he actually tried to derive 
it, as an empirical concept of reflection in the same way as the concepts of species and genera. In 
short, the concept of space is not an empirical concept of reflection, abstracted from the extension 
of material bodies and other phenomena. Bodies are extended, only because they occupy spaces, 
which are possible only as parts of the all-encompassing, continuous space. Space is therefore 
originally represented as a unique and singular whole, which means that the concept of space is a 
concept of pure intuition, not an empirical concept of reflection. This gives the key to the 
transcendental ideality of space, for continuity and therefore also extension is exclusively restricted 
to the way bodies appear.  
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4.1 Sensation, Sensibility and Space  
 
We have seen how Kant struggles with the question of the ground of the concepts of direction and 
how this leads him to the dimensions of absolute space. Dimension is a simpler, more fundamental 
concept, which takes us to the concept of direction (the humane, bodily felt dimensions), and 
ultimately to the concept of absolute space. Given that Kant has described his method of conceptual 
analysis as “Newtonian”, this is perhaps not entirely surprising.323 However, it is at this point that 
Kant’s method encounters its greatest resistance.  
    In Directions, Kant observes that absolute space cannot be the object of an “outer sensation” 
(äussere Empfindungen).  Kant’s explanation of this fact is original, for contrary to what one could 
expect, given that one follows the method of the Inquiry, or the method of Lambert’s Architectonic, 
the concept of absolute space is a “fundamental concept” (Grundbegriff), that cannot be retrieved 
from sensation. On the contrary, the representation (“concept”) of the absolute space is a 
representation, which makes outer sensations possible:  
 
Our considerations make it plain that the determinations of space are not consequences of the positions of 
the parts of matter relative to each other. On the contrary, the latter are the consequences of the former. 
Our considerations, therefore, make it clear that differences, and true differences at that, can be found in 
the constitution of bodies; these differences relate exclusively to absolute and original space [absoluten 
und ursprünglichen Raum], for it is only in virtue of absolute and original space that the relation of physical 
things to each other is possible. Finally, our considerations make the following point clear; absolute space 
is not an object of outer sensation; it is rather a fundamental concept [Grundbegriff] which first of all 
makes possible all such outer sensation.  (Directions, p. 371, Ak. 2, p. 383)    
 
This suggests that the concept of absolute space is not abstracted from sensations, like the ideas of 
material bodies, which belong to the matter of knowledge, as Lambert would have it. Could it rather 
be a concept of understanding, which belongs to the form of knowledge?  
   In a note on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, which Adickes dates to 1769, Kant develops these 
observations, by explaining that the concept of space is a pure concept of understanding:  
 
Some concepts are abstracted [abstrahirt] from sensations, others merely from the law of the 
understanding for comparing, combining, or separating abstracted concepts [abstrahirte Begriffe]. The 
origin of the latter is in the understanding; of the former, in the sense. All concepts of the latter sort are 
called pure concepts of the understanding [reine Verstandesbegriffe], conceptus intellectus puri.  We can 
of course set these activities of the understanding in motion only when occasioned to do so by sensible 
impressions and can become aware of certain concepts of the general relations of abstracted ideas 
[abstrahirter ideen] in accordance with the laws of understanding; and thus Locke’s rule that no idea 
becomes clear in us without sensible impression is valid here as well; the notiones rationales, however, 
arise no doubt by means of sensations and can only be thought in application to the ideas abstracted from 
them, but they do not lie in them and are not abstracted from them. Just as in geometry we do not derive 
the idea of space from the sensation of extended beings, although we can clarify this concept only on the 
occasion of the sensation of corporeal things. Hence the idea of space is a notio intellectus puri which can 
                                                 
323 Inquiry, p. 259, Ak. 2, p. 286.  
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be applied to the abstracted idea of mountains and of kegs.324  (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 3930, Ak. 
17, p. 352) 
 
    Kant’s picture of Locke’s theory of space is most likely based on crude and fragmentary second-
hand opinions he received from his reading of Leibniz’s New Essays. However, even with this fact 
carefully kept in mind, it seems correct to say that Kant, consciously or unconsciously, put his finger 
on a weak spot of Locke’s theory of space. Even Locke was aware of the difficulties involved in 
trying to derive the simple idea of pure space from ideas of the qualities of bodies, for pure space 
is something non-solid, immovable, continuous and infinite, which bodies are not. Strongly 
resembling the concept of absolute space, the idea of pure space cannot be given by the senses. 
Hence, not even Locke is able to consistently defend the notion of space as a sense idea, as will be 
seen. 
    Critics of Locke, like Leibniz, suggested that the idea of space is not a simple idea of sensation. 
Rather it derives from the composite idea of extension, an idea which does not originate from one 
sense in particular but which is common to the different senses, like sight and touch. For instance, 
I see the white colour of the table desk and I feel the solidity of its parts. However, the parts of the 
table desk are confusedly perceived, which means that I do not distinguish its ultimate constitutive 
parts, i.e. the monads and their organic bodies. This explains why both the whiteness and the solidity 
are perceived as continuously diffused and therefore as extended, by both sight and touch.     
    The idea of extension, taken in abstraction from the extended matter, which is given by the 
particular senses, is a rather odd, ghostlike idea. Gone are the existing matters and their living 
sensible qualities; left are only their dead, confusedly perceived, continuously diffused situations. 
These situations have lost their last expressive relation to the embodied monads and their mode of 
coexisting with each other, which leaves us with nothing but abstract situations or places. Extension 
is an ideal phenomenal quality but space is even more ideal, even more abstract, inevitably making 
it play all sorts of tricks with our mind, which tries to conceive it as a thing, or even an ontologically 
independent substance.  
    Kant agrees, to repeat, with Leibniz’s diagnosis that the idea of space is not an idea of sensation, 
although sensations play a role in making us aware of it, as we could see in the passage quoted 
above. On the surface, there are other points of agreement between Kant and Leibniz as well, for 
Leibniz also describes the idea of space as a pure idea of the intellect, though innate. The problem 
with Leibniz’s account of the idea of space, according to Kant, is that Leibniz also describes it as 
an abstract idea, which we cannot become aware of except by abstracting it from the extended 
matter of our sensations. Kant denies, however, that the concept of space can be abstracted from 
sensations, as we have seen in the passage quoted above. In the terminology Kant uses in the late 
1760s, the concept of space is not an empirical reflective concept, but a pure concept of form, a 
form which Kant still ascribes to the understanding, at this point of his investigation. To straighten 
out what this might mean it is helpful to take a somewhat closer look at Locke’s and Leibniz’s 
doctrines of space.  
 
 
 
                                                 
324 Translation from Guyer (2008, pp. 81-2).  
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4.2 The Origin and Reality of the Idea Space: Locke  
   
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,325 John Locke (1632-1704) famously makes the 
claim that the idea of space is an idea of sensation, i.e. an idea derived from the seeing and touching 
of extended bodies. This claim is often interpreted against the background of his general contention 
that the understanding has no access to any innate ideas or principles and that all its knowledge is 
“founded” in experience. The original, simple ideas, which the understanding operates with, are all 
received as a result of either sensations or reflections.326 Whereas the ideas of reflection are the 
result of the mind’s consciousness of its own operations,327 the ideas of sensations are produced 
within the mind by objects in the outer world: 
 
Concerning the simple Ideas of Sensation ’tis to be considered, That whatsoever is so constituted in Nature, 
as to be able, by affecting our Senses, to cause any perception in the Mind, doth thereby produce in the 
Understanding a simple Idea; which, whatever be the external cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice 
of, by our discerning Faculty, it is by the Mind looked on and considered there, to be a real positive Idea 
in the Understanding (…).  (E II, viii, 1)   
 
Thus the Perception, which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impression on the Body, made by 
an external Object, being distinct from all other Modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a 
distinct Idea, which we call Sensation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any Idea into the 
Understanding by the Senses. (E II, xix, 1)           
 
    Locke’s way of describing how the understanding receives the ideas of sensation, such as the 
idea of impenetrability, figures, colours, sounds, smells, etc., can therefore be described in 
accordance with some version of the theory of physical influx, or the “causal theory of 
perception”.328 This is to say that sense perceptions should be taken as acts of thought 
(“Modifications of thinking”), which result from impressions of material bodies (“external Object”) 
on the body of the mind. The outcome of these acts of thought is a simple “idea” or a “sensation”, 
which immediately appears as an object to the understanding.  
    From the simplicity of the sense ideas, it follows that they are easily distinguished from one 
another, i.e. the understanding easily distinguishes the idea of red from the idea of green, etc.  In 
Locke’s terminology, the sense ideas are determinate and therefore also clear and distinct. More 
generally, Locke gives the following explanation of what is meant by a clear and distinct idea:  
 
As a clear Idea is that whereof the Mind has such a full and evident perception, as it does receive from an 
outward Object operating duly on a well-disposed Organ, so a distinct Idea is that wherein the Mind 
perceives a difference from all other; and a confused Idea is such an one, as is not sufficiently 
distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different.  (E II, xxix, 4) 
 
As can be seen, Locke’s terminology is somewhat different from that of Leibniz and Kant, because 
according to Locke an idea is clear when it is brought to attention by the mind, but distinct, and 
                                                 
325 Hereafter, E.   
326 That Locke takes sensations as the source of ideas is evident from E II, i.   
327 E II, vi, 1-2. 
328 Bennett (1967, p. 19).    
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therefore also determinate, when the mind observes it as different from other ideas. Thus, when 
Leibniz and Kant speak about clear representations, they mean something closer to what Locke 
refers to as distinct ideas.    
    Let us now turn to the details of his explanation of the origin of the simple idea of space. Locke’s 
general contention here is that the idea of space is a sense idea, which follows from the seeing or 
touching “a distance between Bodies”:   
 
I shall begin with the simple Idea of Space. I have shewed above, c.4. that we get the Idea of Space, both 
by our Sight, and Touch; which, I think, is so evident, that it would be as needless, to go to prove, that men 
perceive by their sight, a distance between Bodies of different Colours, or between the parts of the same 
Body; as that they see Colours themselves: Nor is it less obvious, that they can do so in the Dark by Feeling 
and Touch. (E II, xiii, 2) 
 
In the passage quoted above Locke explains that the simple idea of space has the same origin as the 
ideas of the primary qualities of a body, such as its solidity or motion. However, in the examples 
Locke mentions in support of his statement, it is clear that what he has in mind is not the origin of 
the simple idea of space, but the origin of the idea of distance, which considered in its three 
dimensions, length, breadth and thickness is a quality of bodies, namely their “capacity” or 
extension.329 The idea of a distance is not a simple idea of space, but rather an idea of a 
“Modification of Space”, like the idea of figure and place.330   
   The dimensions and (presumably) also their directions are, in other words, complex ideas of the 
simple modes of space, modes which I see and touch. The distance between my eyes and the 
computer screen for instance is not a condition for its appearance, in front of me, as Kant argues, 
but part of the very content of my sensible knowledge.  
    However, none of this prevents Locke from claiming that the mind can acquire an idea of infinite 
and therefore absolute space, thanks to the mind’s power of “repeating, or doubling any Idea we 
have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to 
come to any stop or stint”.331  The infinite space is also pure, for I can distinguish the idea of space, 
from the idea of body.332 The important implication of this seemingly innocent distinction is that 
the idea of body must be considered as inseparable from the idea of space.333 This relation is 
moreover asymmetric according to Locke: whereas the idea of space can be separated from the 
ideas of body, solidity and motion, the reverse does not hold. The idea of space is, in other words, 
an idea of pure space, which is separable from the idea of body.  
    Locke’s claim that the idea of space is distinct and separable from the idea of body is, more 
exactly, based on an attempt to show that the general properties of space are opposed to those of 
bodies. First, space is not solid like material bodies; whereas solidity is separable from space, 
solidity is inseparable or essential to a material body.334 Solidity is furthermore in its turn dependent 
on space, for it is the resistance a body exerts when it fills a space.335  
                                                 
329 E II, xiii, 3.   
330 E II, xiii, 4-10.    
331 E II, xiii, 4.  To the infinity of pure space, I will return below.  
332 E II, xiii, 11, 13.  
333 E II, xiii, 11, 13. 
334 E II, iv, 1; xiii, 11-12.  
335 E II, iv, 1; xiii, 11-12. 
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   Secondly, whereas space is a continuous whole with inseparable parts, material bodies are 
discrete wholes, with separable parts.336  In order to separate one part of space from another I must, 
Locke claims, cancel the continuity of space, which is not possible; space remains continuous even 
though it is possible to distinguish a plurality of parts within it.337  In Locke’s terminology, we can 
“consider” the parts of space, thanks to the introduction of sensible measures, but this does not 
make its parts less inseparable. Material bodies on the other hand have parts, which are not only 
distinguishable but separable as well, i.e. bodies are discrete.  
   Thirdly, the parts of space are immovable, because of their continuity; the parts of something can 
move only if they can be separated from one another.338 According to Locke, this explains why 
material bodies must have parts which are movable and why the parts of space are in “perpetual 
rest”. Combined with the other two arguments, Locke takes the third argument to be sufficient to 
demonstrate that the idea of space must be separated from the idea of body and from this he proceeds 
to the conclusion that it must be possible for space to exist, without material bodies. The opposite 
is, however, not possible: material bodies cannot exist unless space exists.  The idea of space 
therefore points ahead towards a pure, empty space which can exist independently of the material 
bodies that are filling it. In short, space is not identical to the matter that fills it.     
    Locke develops a number of arguments in favour of the thesis that it is possible for space to exist 
independently of material bodies. The first argument is based on the premise that matter cannot be 
infinite whereas space can: 
 
If Body be not supposed infinite, which, I think, no one will affirm, I would ask, Whether, if God placed a 
Man at the extremity of corporeal Beings, he could not stretch his Hand beyond his Body? If he could, then 
he would put his Arm, where there was before Space without Body; and if there he spread his Fingers, 
there would still be Space between them without Body: If he could not stretch out his Hand, it must be 
because of some external hindrance; (for we suppose him alive, with such a power of moving the parts of 
his Body, that he hath now, which is not in it self impossible, if God so pleased to have it; or at least it is 
not impossible for God so to move him:) and then I ask, Whether that which hinders his Hand from moving 
outwards, be Substance or Accident, Something or Nothing?  (E II, xiii, 21)    
 
Those who want to deny the existence of empty space must face the inconvenience of having to 
explain how something like an infinitely extended body is possible, for if there is no vacuum then 
matter has to extend to each and every part of space. Locke presupposes, in other words, that he has 
established that the absolute, pure space is infinite.  
    The second argument is based on the claim that we must accept the possibility of vacuum and 
therefore also the possibility of an absolute, empty space:339  
 
Farther, those who assert the impossibility of Space existing without Matter, must not only made Body 
infinite, but must also deny a power in God to annihilate any part of Matter. No one, I suppose, will deny, 
                                                 
336 E II, xiii, 13.  
337 E II, xiii, 13. 
338 E II, xiii, 14.    
339 The term “absolute space” is Newton’s; Locke uses the term “pure space” (E II, xiii, 14), as we have 
seen. Locke discusses the idea of vacuum in E II, xiii, 21- 25.  It should be noted that Locke is less 
optimistic than Newton as to the possibility of demonstrating the existence of absolute space: we cannot 
determine whether the idea of space is true, that is, whether it refers something, which has real existence (E 
II, xiii, 26).         
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that God can put an end to all motion that is in Matter, and fix all the Bodies of the Universe in a perfect 
quiet and rest, and continue them so long as he pleases. Whoever then will allow, that God can, during 
such a general rest, annihilate either this Book, or the Body of him that reads it, must necessarily admit the 
possibility of Vacuum. (…) For Vacuum, whether we affirm or deny its existence, signifies Space without 
Body, whose very existence no one can deny to be possible, who will not make Matter infinite, and take 
from God a power to annihilate any Particle of it.  (E II, xiii, 21[bis])    
 
Thus, the deniers of vacuum have to face the trouble that they cannot ascribe to God the power of 
annihilating the material bodies, which is absurd since his powers must be infinite.  These 
arguments prove that vacuum is possible, even if it cannot be affirmed that the vacuum exists. The 
mere difference between the idea of space and the ideas of body and solidity, indicates the 
possibility of vacuum and hence the possible existence of a pure, empty space. 
   The trouble with Locke’s separability claim is that it does not seem to sit perfectly well with the 
rest of Locke’s theory of space. The order of the logical dependence between the concepts of space, 
solidity and material bodies thus seems to extend to the order of the ontological dependence 
between the possibility and existence of space, solidity, and material bodies.  Even if the ideas of 
distance and extension originate from sensations of extended, solid and moving bodies, it turns out 
that these ideas border on another idea, namely the idea of pure infinite space. The result is that 
Locke has to deal with an idea of a pure space that bears strong resemblance to the “absolute space” 
of Newton, in the sense that he considers this pure space as infinite, immovable and empty of 
material bodies.340   
    This impression is substantiated by Locke’s claim that space is infinitely extended independently 
of the finite extension of any material body. 341 Not only does this suggest that space is the subject 
of extension, but it also leaves the alternative open that space might be considered as having a 
reality, separable from the reality of the material bodies. Those who deny this separability and argue 
that space is nothing cannot explain why there are distances between bodies, for if space is nothing 
all bodies must touch each other.342 However, if we admit that space is something, rather than 
nothing, then we are immediately confronted with the question of what this something is.  Locke’s 
attitude to the exact ontological status of space, i.e. whether it exists as a substance in itself or not, 
is, however, cautious and agnostic as always: 
 
If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this Space void of Body, be Substance or Accident, I shall 
readily answer, I know not: nor shall be ashamed to own my Ignorance, till they that ask, shew me a clear 
distinct Idea of Substance. (E II, xiii, 17)   
 
   Locke never leaves a clear-cut answer to this question, but if it is the idea of a substance, or an 
accident, it cannot be maintained that the idea of pure space is a simple idea of sensation, for both 
substances and accidents are complex ideas. Thus, even if we are prepared to describe space as a 
substance endowed with powers, the idea of pure space (as a substance) cannot be produced solely 
by powers located outside the human mind. The suspicion remains that there is something dubious 
about the idea of space.  
   These suspicions are not mitigated by Locke’s efforts to present the idea of pure space as perfectly 
sound and consistent with his general empiricist principles. In conceiving the extension of pure 
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space as infinite, we transgress the limit of that which can be experienced, and pass into the field of 
properties, which are absolute and exist in and for God.343 Thus, in representing space as infinite 
we rely on the power of the mind to “enlarge” the idea of extension in thought, for only in this way 
is it possible to come to the idea of infinity, typical of pure space: 
 
Every one, that has any Idea of any stated lengths of Space as a Foot, finds, that he can repeat that Idea; 
and joining it to the former, make the Idea of two Foot; and by the addition of third, three Foot; and so on, 
without ever coming to an end of his additions, (…) [for] he finds, that after he has continued this doubling 
in his Thoughts, and enlarged his Idea, as much as he pleases, he has no more reason to stop, nor is one 
jot nearer the end of such Addition, than he was at first setting out; the power of enlarging the Idea of 
Space by farther Additions, remaining still the same, he hence takes the Idea of Infinite Space. This, I 
think, is the way, whereby the Mind gets its Idea of infinite Space.  (E II, xvii, 3-4) 
 
The distinction between the finite sensible extension of bodies and the infinite extension of pure, 
geometric space is reflected in Locke’s choice of terminology: he suggests that we should reserve 
the term “extension” for bodies and describe the infinite extension of pure space, by using the term 
“expansion”.344   
    In the context of his discussion of the infinity of space, Locke returns to the question of the 
ontological status of space. The idea of the infinity of space confirms that the idea of space is 
separable from the idea of body, for bodies are always finite. The separability of the idea of space 
does not prove the actual existence of an infinite, empty space, but there is certainly a strong 
propensity or aptitude within our imagination to conceive of space in this way: 
 
’Tis a quite different Consideration to examine, whether the Mind has the Idea of such a boundless Space 
actually existing, since our Ideas are not always Proofs of the Existence of Things; but yet, since this comes 
here in our way, I suppose I may say, that we are apt to think, that Space in itself is actually boundless, to 
which Imagination, the Idea of Space or Expansion of it self naturally leads us.  (E II, xvii, 4) 
    
    That the power of the mind transgresses the boundaries of the sense idea of space not only 
explains how it comes to pass that we have an idea of a pure infinite space but also how Euclidean 
geometry is possible, according to Locke. For the mind has a power to vary not only the idea of the 
extension of space, but also its ideas of the boundaries of the parts of space; as a result it acquires 
ideas of figures other than the figures it sees and touches.345 The truths of Euclidean geometry are 
nothing but propositions about these figures, i.e. propositions about possible modifications of its 
ideas of the boundaries of space.346  
    On Locke’s theory of geometry, the idea of a figure, for instance a circle or a rectangle, is not 
just a chimera of the brain, but an idea in the mind of the mathematician. However, there is nothing 
which grants that the truths extracted from the ideas of these figures are also true of the real things 
outside his or her mind.347 Thus, the truths of Euclidean geometry hold with absolute necessity with 
respect to ideal geometric objects, like rectangles or circles, but only contingently with respect to 
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real things. For short, in Locke’s explanation of Euclidean geometry, as the science of the 
boundaries of the parts of the infinite, pure space, there is nothing, which grants that the spaces of 
real material bodies conform to Euclidean geometry.  Let us now see how Leibniz tackles these and 
other problem, associated with the origin and reality of the idea of pure space.  
 
4.3 The Origin and Reality of the Idea of Space: Leibniz’s Critique of Locke  
 
On a superficial level, it seems as if both Leibniz and Locke argue that the idea of extension 
originates from touching and seeing extended material bodies. However, according to Leibniz the 
perception of extension is not the privilege of any particular sense, like sight or touch, but belongs 
to the sense that is common to them, namely the common sense, the imagination.348 More 
specifically extension is a quality, which is common to the phenomena of colours, the qualities of 
touch, etc. The extension of the paper on my desk for instance, is both in the white colour I see and 
in the smooth surface I touch.   
     Once the perception of extension, in the common sense, is apperceived and hence brought to the 
attention of the understanding, an idea of extension is formed.349 The idea of extension represents 
extension abstractly, apart from the actually infinite simple parts into which it is divided. Gone are 
the qualitatively distinct monads and their active forces; gone are also the passive forces of the 
monads, out of which the extended matter is formed. In the cleansing fire of abstraction, nothing 
remains except their bodily points of view, which are compressed into a plurality of uniform, 
situationally related mathematical points. Gone are also the boundaries, which disappear because 
of the uniformity of the mathematical points, as De Risi observes.350    
    This leaves us with an indeterminate (infinite) place of all places, a whole which is prior to its 
parts, namely because these parts depend on the image of boundaries within the absolutely unbound 
place.  Only the intellect can prevail in the face of this infinity, which it does by forming the idea 
of space, i.e. the idea of a continuously diffused plurality of compossible situations or places.351 
Continuity is what makes a plurality of simultaneous situations or places a continuous quantity, i.e. 
a whole of indeterminate parts, or more formally, a whole such that any two parts which equal the 
whole must have something in common, something which however, is not a part of the whole.352   
    In the New Essays, Leibniz provides his readers with additional information about the ideas of 
common sense in general and the idea of space in particular. The ideas of common sense may be of 
mixed origin, but they are nonetheless from the mind and in this sense innate:   
  
These ideas [idées] which are said to come from [venir de] more than one sense – such as those of space, 
figure, motion, rest – come rather from the common sense, that is, from the mind [de l’esprit] itself; for 
they are ideas of the pure understanding [de l’entendement pur] (though ones which relate to the external 
                                                 
348 On what is Independent of Sense and of Matter, G VI 502, L 549. 
349 Leibniz connects apperception or awareness with attention, for instance in New Essays, pp. 51-3. 
However, awareness is also reflection, and as reflection, it is the source of ideas.   
350 De Risi (2007, p. 178).  
351 Whereas extension can be defined, according to Leibniz, the concept of situation and place cannot. It is 
in this sense a “simple concept”, to phrase it in the terminology of Lambert, albeit relational, contrary to 
what Lambert thought. 
352 Furthermore, the parts of continuous quantities are exterior to each other, i.e. any two parts, which taken 
together do not equal the whole, must have nothing in common.
 For a discussion of Leibniz’s definition of 
continuity, see De Risi (2007, pp. 190-3).    
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world and which the senses make us perceive), and so they admit of definitions and demonstrations. (New 
Essays, p. 128)   
 
Thus, the intellect recognises something of itself in the idea of space, namely the ideas of plurality 
and the order of compossible situations. However, the idea of continuity remains an alien idea of 
imagination.353    
    That space is a continuous whole entails that space is the order of all situations – it is the place 
of all places.354 However, that space is an order of all situations does not entail that it is a continuous 
whole. The uniformity (isotropy) of the situations is insufficient for it to become an extended 
manifold.355 Thus, it is perfectly possible to have places, which are situated, without being extended, 
as is illustrated by the possibility of reducing places to mathematical points.  
     Only the continuation of the situation bridges the gap from situation to extension. Leibniz’s 
unsuccessful attempts to demonstrate that continuity follows from the concept of space as a 
complete order of situations, illustrates this.356 It means that it becomes difficult for Leibniz to 
conceive the idea of space as a pure intelligible idea of a complete order of situations, which does 
not rest on any input from the senses or the common sense.357 Leibniz’s attempt to demonstrate that 
the idea of pure space is an innate idea of pure understanding is from this point of view as failed as 
Locke’s attempt to show that it is a simple idea of sense.   
    Forming the idea of an absolute space, a complete order of situations, easily results in the spurious 
concept of space as actually infinitely extended, or actually infinitely divided. Later, in Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, these two nasty concepts would turn up in the theses of both the first and 
the second mathematical antinomy.  Thus, if the idea of immensity is displaced to the phenomenal 
space of bodies, which we know as an outcome of measurements, we are led to the spurious idea of 
space as a whole of actually infinite parts. This spurious idea suggests that space is absolute, not 
because it is the place of all places, but because it is a whole, made up of an actually infinite 
(greatest) number of parts.  
   Locke’s contention that the mind has a power to take the idea of the extension, which it originally 
has from sight or touch, and enlarge it into an idea of a pure, infinite space just shows that we must 
have an innate ability to form a concept of the infinite:  
 
That shows how our ability to carry through the conception of this idea comes from something within us, 
and could not come from sense experience; just as necessary truths could not be proved by induction or 
through the senses. The idea of the absolute is internal to us, as is that of being: these absolutes are nothing 
but the attributes of God; and they may said to be as much the source of ideas as God himself is the 
principle of beings. The idea of the absolute, with reference to space, is just the idea of the immensity of 
God and thus of other things. But it would be a mistake to try to suppose an absolute space which is an 
infinite whole made up of parts. There is no such thing: it is a notion which implies a contradiction; and 
                                                 
353 Leibniz discusses the pure intellectual ideas in New Essays, p. 81.   
354 C.f. The Controversy between Leibniz and Clarke, Leibniz’s Fifth Paper, Sections 47, G VII 400.   
355 The uniformity of space also makes it isotropic, which means that its geometry is preserved everywhere; 
see De Risi (2007, pp. 179-181).  
356 Unfortunately Leibniz never succeeded to work out a satisfying concept of a continuous manifold, as De 
Risi (2007, pp. 182-91) shows. For the most part Leibniz confused the concept of a continuous quantity 
with the concept of a connected and complete set of mathematical points.       
357 This issue will be dealt with in some closer detail below.   
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these infinite wholes, and their opposites the infinitesimals, have no place except in geometrical 
calculations, just like the use of imaginary roots in algebra. (New Essays, p. 158)    
 
Exercising the innate ability of forming intellectual ideas provides us with an idea of infinity, which 
actually originates from God’s immensity. It puts us in a position to explain what Locke failed to 
explain, according to Leibniz, namely how it is possible for us to have an idea of infinite space. It 
is an idea which puts us in a position to form the idea of an absolute space, for that which is immense 
is absolute as God himself.  
    In this context, Leibniz notes that Locke only describes space as infinite, but never as a completed 
infinite whole. We have an idea of the infinity of space, but not an idea of an infinite space, as 
Locke expresses it.358 The actually infinite is only “in the absolute”, for only in this way is it possible 
for us to have a concept of an infinity, which “precedes all composition and is not formed by the 
addition of parts.”359 Thus, according to Leibniz absolute space is not actually infinite, but only 
syncategorematically infinite, i.e. potentially infinite, in the sense that its parts are without 
boundaries or limits.360  
   The property of being actually infinite is exclusively a property of God. God’s actual infinity is, 
however, not categorematic, i.e. God does not contain an actual infinity of parts. Instead, the infinity 
of God is hypercategorematic, i.e. God is infinite in the sense that he is beyond all determinations.361 
God’s essence hence contains all things and determinations, neither actually nor even potentially, 
but eminently, in the same way as the more perfect comprises and grounds the less perfect. It is also 
in this sense that it is possible for God to be simple and indivisible, and yet a whole, which contains 
all parts, namely eminently. Leibniz explains this in a crossed-out passage of a letter to Des Bosses 
written 1706, i.e. a couple of years after the New Essays:   
 
There is a syncategorematic infinite or passive power having parts, namely, the possibility of further 
progress by dividing, multiplying, subtracting, or adding. In addition, there is a hypercategorematic 
infinite, or potestative infinite, and active power having, as it were, parts eminently but not formally or 
actually. This infinite is God himself. But there is not a categorematic infinite or one [my italics, J.J.] 
actually having infinite parts formally. (The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence, p. 53, G II 314-315) 
 
    In absolute space all directions are dissolved. They can, however, be reintroduced since it is 
possible to imagine any mathematical point as abstractly expressing a point of view, from which 
lines can drawn in a definite direction. Planes bounded by these directed lines, which intersect the 
absolute space into parts, will then be oriented as well, for instance to the right, to the left, etc. 
Figures, which are either congruent or incongruent can thus be constructed on the oriented planes.   
                                                 
358 New Essays, p. 159.  
359 New Essays, p. 157.  
360 De Risi (2007, p. 333) connects the finiteness of any image of space (synthesis) with the “limited 
aesthetic comprehension of each monad.” The perceptual space of the monads has a horizon and no 
microscopical definition of detail. On the other hand, it is exactly the ideality of space, which makes it 
possible to extend any finite image of space in another act of perception; space is always greater than any 
given image of it.   The ideality of the perceptual space of the monad thus explains its potential, 
syncategorematic infinity.     
361 For an interesting discussion of the hypercategorematic infinite in Leibniz, see Maria Antognazza (2015, 
pp. 5-30)    
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   The properties of figures are systematically presented in the propositions of Euclidean 
geometry.362 Typical of figures is that they are limited by boundaries (bornes), such that there is an 
infinity of paths between any pair of points within the extension of the space they limit.363 Figures 
also share some of the properties of the absolute space of which they are parts, namely its uniformity 
and continuity. Thanks to this, there is no curvature in the space within the figure, which makes 
figures completely determined by their boundaries, in accordance with Leibniz’s concept of 
figure.364  Indirectly Euclidean geometry therefore presupposes that the boundaries it describes are 
boundaries of spaces, which share some of the fundamental properties of the global, absolute space, 
in which they are enclosed.    
    From the possibility of determining what belongs to figures, merely by describing their 
boundaries, Leibniz concludes that the absolute space cannot have more than three dimensions.365  
Thus, in a one-dimensional space, boundaries will be points, but points will not determine anything 
other than the ends of lines. Lines can be possible boundaries of plane figures in a two-dimensional 
space and in a three-dimensional space, planes describe possible boundaries of solid shapes, i.e. 
volumes. Volumes are bound, but they are not themselves boundaries of any higher order geometric 
objects which means that figures of higher dimension than three are impossible.  
    Leibniz’s proof of the three-dimensionality of absolute space thus presupposes that figuration 
and hence imagination sets the limits of the number of dimensions that are possible. Leibniz’s 
argument for the three-dimensionality of space is hence not purely geometrical, as De Risi 
observes.366  Rather, the argument is metaphysical, in the sense that it tries to show how the 
properties of absolute space, as they are conceived in thought, can determine what the common 
sense can figure.  Thus, it argues from the possible dimensions of figures to the possible dimensions 
of absolute space. To me it seems as if Leibniz’s argument is metaphysical in another sense also, 
namely because it presupposes that it is possible to argue from the properties of global space to 
local spaces. The latter is typical of ideal structures, as will be seen below, i.e. it presupposes that 
we can reason from the properties of the whole to the properties of the parts.367         
     In a dialogue on the philosophy of Malebranche, Conversation of Philarète and Ariste, 
Following a Conversation of Ariste and Theodore, written 1712, Leibniz summarises his inquiry of 
the roots of the concept of absolute space. The concept of absolute space can be seen as an attempt 
to replace the material body as a subject of extension, which has been dissolved as a result of the 
act of abstraction. Thus, in desiring to recover the unity of the body, our understanding makes an 
attempt to bring the totality of situations (places) under one single concept of an absolute space – 
the place of all places. This space is conceived as a first ground or subject of all common, universal 
                                                 
362 Like propositions of fact these propositions are without exception analytic, according to Leibniz. However, 
contrary to propositions of fact, they are true merely by virtue of the principle of contradiction and hence 
absolutely necessary. The propositions of Euclidean geometry are thus innate truths, propositions true in all 
possible worlds, in spite of the contingency of the fact that there are things in our world which exist in space.
  
363 New Essays, p. 148.  
364 See De Risi (2007, pp. 210-15) for a more detailed discussion of Leibniz’s concept of figure.   
365 De Risi (2007, pp. 210-15).   
366 De Risi (2007, p. 210). 
367 Leibniz does not make the three-dimensionality a premise for the ideality of space, as Kant does in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, when he argues from the three-dimensionality to the synthetic a priori nature of 
Euclidean geometry and from this to the ideality of the space which constitutes the object of this geometry  
(see Chapter 6, appendix).  On the contrary, it can be argued that Leibniz makes the ideality of space an 
implicit premise of his argument for the three-dimensionality of space. 
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places, which are untouched by the moving and relative places of the phenomena, from which it is 
abstracted:  
 
Thus the diffusion of place [Lieu] forms space, which would be the first ground [proton dektikón] or the 
primary subject of extension, and by which it would also apply to other things in space. Thus extension, 
when it is an attribute of space, is the diffusion or continuation of situation [situation] or locality [localité], 
just as the extension of a body is the diffusion of antitypy [resistance] or materiality.  For there is position 
[lieu] in a point as well as in space, and as a result there can be position without extension or diffusion, but 
diffusion in simple length constitutes a localised line endowed with extension.368 (Conversation of 
Philarète and Ariste, Following a Conversation of Ariste and Theodore, G VI 585, L 622) 
 
Leibniz’s contention that space is a ground or subject certainly presupposes that its relation to its 
predicate (extension) is a peculiar one. For generally a subject is thought to contain its predicate, in 
the same way as a universal concept contains a particular concept. In the case of space, however, 
the subject contains its predicate, by being within it, as a plurality of places. Space “comprehends” 
(comprends) all places, as Leibniz expresses it, which means that we can describe space as an 
ordered set of all places.369    
    Russell correctly points out that none of this entails that Leibniz considers space as an 
ontologically independent substance.370 Space cannot be conceived in the same way as a thing, and 
in particular not as a substance.  For if absolute space is a substance it will exist as a thing in its 
own right, and not just as an expression of the order of coexistence of other things, i.e. the monads 
and their organic bodies. Russell does not mention this link, but correctly observes that an absolute 
space would be contrary to principle of individuation.371 For as we have seen space is “absolutely 
uniform”, being indistinguishable at all points. Leibniz does not dismiss the idea of an absolute 
space, a place of all places, but denies that it exists in itself. The idea of an absolute space which 
exists in itself is nothing but an idol, a chimerical notion of an ideal thing, as Leibniz explains in 
his third letter to Clarke: 
 
I call it an idol, not in a theological sense, but in a philosophical one, as Chancellor Bacon says that there 
are idola tribus, idola specus. These gentlemen maintain, therefore, that space is a real absolute being. But 
this involves them in great difficulties, for such a being must needs be eternal and infinite. Hence some 
have believed it to be God himself, or one of his attributes, his immensity. But since space consists parts, 
it is not a thing which can belong to God. (The Controversy between Leibniz and Clarke, G VII 363, L 
682) 
 
    The alternatives for taking space as a substance are to regard it as either an accident of extended 
bodies or of God.372 The problem with the first alternative is that it does not make space any more 
real than the bodies, which occupy the parts of space, which are mere phenomena, according to 
Leibniz. The problem with the second alternative is that it would make it necessary to conceive of 
                                                 
368 Cf. The Controversy between Leibniz and Clarke, Leibniz’s Fifth Paper, Sections 46-7, G VII 399-402, 
L 703-4.  
369 The Controversy between Leibniz and Clarke G VII 400,  L 703;  the view that Leibniz describes space 
as a set, namely the set of all places,  is defended by De Risi (2007, pp. 173-5). 
370 Russell (1964, pp. 119-20).   
371 Russell (1964, pp. 119-20).   
372 Russell (1964, p. 119).   
                                                                                  Locke, Leibniz, Kant and the Idea of Space    
 
 
 
91 
 
God as a composite thing, endowed with parts.373 God is, however, completely simple and has no 
parts, which means that the absolute space must be different from God.374 Russell concludes that 
for Leibniz (absolute) space is purely ideal (“subjective”), for the only things which ultimately are 
real are the monads, and monads cannot be located in space.375 The locations of monads are, as we 
have seen, nothing but points of view, according to Russell, points of view, which result from the 
monads’ confused perceptions.  
    More recently, Glenn A. Hartz and J. A. Cover have defended a somewhat similar position.376 
The absolute space described above is ideal, for reasons closely related to the phenomenalist 
interpretation of Leibniz’s monadology, presented in the previous chapters, according to which 
simple substances and even corporeal substances lack all spatial properties. There are, admittedly, 
no monads in space, according to Leibniz.  However, contrary to Russell, Hartz and Cover argue 
that Leibniz does not consider space as ideal, because space cannot be reduced to the monadic 
attributes of substances.377 Instead, space is ideal because it is abstracted from extended 
phenomena, most notably the material bodies.378 The ideality of space shows itself in its continuity, 
which makes it an analytic whole, which is possible prior to its indeterminate parts.379  Phenomena, 
on the other hand, are real wholes of discrete and determinate parts, which are possible only 
posterior to their parts.380   
    In short, Leibniz’s metaphysics is a building with three floors: monads, phenomena, and abstract 
things (space/time).381 Of these floors only the two first are real, which means that only the 
phenomenon of extension is real, but not space. To me it seems as if this interpretation correctly 
identifies space as an ideal, continuous whole, which is prior to its indeterminate parts. However, 
from this it does not follow that phenomena are unconditioned by space in the way Hartz/Cover 
suggest. According to Hartz/Cover, space is of course conditioned by phenomena, because it is an 
abstraction from extended things. Phenomena on the other hand are unconditioned by space, for it 
is perfectly possible for a thing to be extended even if it does not occupy a space.382  This seems 
entirely inconsistent with Leibniz’s concept of extension, for it suggests that it is possible for a 
phenomenon to be extended even if it is made up of discrete parts which are not diffused.      
   A more promising line of interpretation, which removes these anomalies, is to conceive the 
phenomena as conditioned not only by monads, but also by space.383 On this interpretation space is 
not an idea abstracted from the extension of real bodies, but rather a condition of their extension. 
Thus, the extension of space arises from a synthesis of situations, which is the same synthesis as 
                                                 
373 Leibniz, The Controversy between Leibniz and Clarke, G VII, 399, L 702. 
374 God’s presence to all things is virtual and not local from which it follows that space cannot be the 
sensorium of God, as Clarke and Newton argued. God sees all things in himself, not in absolute space. God 
contains absolute space, only eminently, as its cause. God is therefore the origin of the reality of space and 
of our knowledge of the properties of space, and in this sense also omnipresent:  “He is the source of 
possibilities and of existents alike, the one by his essence and the other by his will. So that space like time 
derives its reality only from him, and he can fill up the void whenever he pleases. It is in this way he is 
omnipresent.” (New Essays, p. 155)   
375 Russell (1964, p. 122).  
376 Hartz/Cover (1988).  
377 Hartz/Cover (1988, pp. 513-5).  
378 Hartz/Cover (1988, pp. 504-5, 510). 
379 Hartz/Cover (1988, pp. 497, 503-10).   
380 Hartz/Cover (1988, pp. 497, 503-10). 
381 Hartz/Cover (1988, pp. 503-7).  
382 To be exact bodies do not occupy space at all, according to Hartz/Cover (1988, pp. 510-11).   
383 For a similar suggestion, but with somewhat different implications, see Adams (1994, pp. 233-4, 253-4). 
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the synthesis involved in the confused perception of an extended body. Thanks to this we can speak 
about Leibnizian space as real, namely as a space of outer phenomena, most notably the organic 
bodies, which give the monads their outer points of view. The ideal complete order of compossible 
situations thus abstractly represents what belongs to any order of coexistence, such as the order of 
coexistence of the phenomena, which in turn is homomorphic to the order of coexistence of the 
noumena (monads). 384 
    To summarise, we can say that Leibniz’s innatism gives him a number of advantages, as 
compared with Locke. First, it is much easier for Leibniz to explain the origin of the phenomenon 
of extension, as distinct from the solid, movable, and discrete extension of bodies.  The original 
phenomenon is both produced and perceived by the imagination, as it synthesises the phenomena 
and their situations.  The perception of extension is hence not originally given to the embodied 
senses.  True, I can see the extended table-top by my sight, or feel it under my fingertips, but the 
extension seen is inseparable from its white colour, and the extension seen is inseparable from its 
solidity.   The original phenomenon of extension is already from the outset something abstract and 
common to the outer senses, like sight or touch.  For short, the phenomenon of extension is 
originally internal to the common sense, i.e. to the imagination.  
    Secondly, it is easier for Leibniz to explain the origin of the idea of extension and pure space, 
than it is for Locke. The phenomenon of extension is, to repeat, internal to common sense, which 
makes it fully uncovered for the attentive and reflective light of understanding.  Imagination is in 
this sense both the womb and the birthplace of the pure idea of extension.  In the idea of extension, 
understanding proudly recognises the idea of space, i.e. the idea of an infinite order of situations, 
an idea internal to itself, which is innate to understanding. Thanks to the innateness of the idea of 
space, it becomes possible for Leibniz to explain why the idea of pure space is conceptually 
independent and separable from the idea of bodily extension. 
    Thirdly, Leibniz is less ambiguous about the reality of space than Locke is. Pure space is neither 
a substance, nor an accident, but an ideal whole of situations or places, which is real only as an 
order of outer phenomena, which conditions the perception of them as extended. Though more is 
needed in order show that space is Euclidean, we can at least imagine an argument for thinking that 
Euclidean geometry is not just contingently true of the figures and spaces of real, material bodies, 
contrary to what Locke thought. 
     Disregarding the question of whether Leibniz’s innatism is convincing or not, Leibniz’s critics 
were not convinced about the correctness of his explanation of the idea of space. Reflection can 
never give us anything except general ideas, like the ideas of species and genera, but not the idea 
of space, which is an individual whole. To Kant this suggested that there is something 
fundamentally wrong about Leibniz’s innatist explanation of the origin of the idea of pure space. 
Let us consider these objections more closely.  
 
4.4 Kant’s Critique of Leibniz and the Ideality of Space 
 
We have already seen how Kant had questioned Leibniz’s philosophy of space in his essay on the 
directions of space from 1768. Kant had found support for this position in Leonard Euler’s 
Reflexions sur l’espace et le temps, printed 1750, in the Memoires de l’academie des sciences et 
                                                 
384 Leibniz even intimates that the ideal, absolute space of possible situations is that which makes it possible 
to situate the bodies of the monads (situables); see Leibniz, The Controversy between Leibniz and Clarke, 
Leibniz’s Fourth Letter, G VII, 376, L 690. 
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belles lettres. In this work, Euler had argued that the mathematical concept of space (l’expression 
matematique) can represent space as it is absolutely and independently of the bodies which are 
placed in it.  Euler contrasted this concept with the metaphysical concept (l’expression 
metaphysique) of space, a concept obviously associated with Leibniz, although Euler never 
mentions Leibniz by name.385  
    The metaphysical concept of space is a concept of a place, abstracted from the places of bodies, 
stones, particles of water, etc. The result is a distorted, abstract concept of an imaginary species or 
genus of place or order: 
 
It is true that the senses are not capable of providing us with ideas of space and position [lieu], and it is 
only through reflection [réflexion] that we form them. From this they [the metaphysicians J.J.] conclude 
that these are merely abstract ideas, similar to the ideas of genus and species, which only exist in our 
understanding and to which no real object corresponds. But it seems to me that this conclusion is hasty 
[précipité], for if we think about it, we will easily apprehend [s’appercevra] that the manner through which 
one arrives at the idea of space and of time is quite different from that through which we form the ideas of 
genus and species.386 (Reflexions sur l’espace et le temps, § 14, p. 329)   
 
     The claim that the idea of space is an idea of an imaginary place in general must be wrong, 
according to Euler. Though it is correct that we can form an idea of place by reflection, this idea is 
the idea of a relative place, which cannot represent the absolute place of an inert body. This means 
that something must be added to the idea of place, which we form by virtue of reflection. In support 
of this claim, Euler pointed out that an inert body must have a real place, which is independent of 
its situation with respect to other bodies, for otherwise it becomes impossible to conceive how it 
can conserve its position and velocity.387  
    For instance, if we consider a stone in still water, its place will depend on its relation to the 
particles of water, which surround it.388 However, if the water starts moving, the stone will remain 
in the same place, or move somewhat, but not as fast as the water, even though the force of the 
water moves it.389 From this it follows that the stone is inert, a property which cannot be explained, 
unless it is assumed that the stone has a place in an ultimately immovable, absolute space.390       
    However, against this Leibniz can argue that Euler misrepresents his position. In reality, Euler’s 
example proves nothing against Leibniz, for Leibniz can always argue that Euler’s example just 
shows that we need a concept of what it is for a thing (say a stone) to be in the same place.  It just 
means that the stone’s mode of coexisting with the particles of water that once surrounded it is the 
same as its mode of coexisting with the particles of water that replaced them, making its order of 
coexistence with respect to the former particles congruent with the order of coexistence of the latter 
particles.  Thus, the concept of sameness of place is perfectly consistent with the “metaphysical 
concept” of space as an order if situations. Moreover, Leibniz can also argue that none of this 
favours one explanation of the inertia of the stone over another explanation, i.e. that Leibniz’s 
concept of sameness of place does not presuppose Newton’s concept of inertial force.  Though it 
                                                 
385 Reflexions sur l’espace et le temps, § 8, p. 327.   
386 My translation, J.J.   
387 Reflexions sur l’espace et le temps, §§ 1-5, pp. 324-6.    
388 Reflexions sur l’espace et le temps, §§ 7- 8, pp. 326-7.  
389 Reflexions sur l’espace et le temps, §§ 8-11, pp. 327-8.  
390 Reflexions sur l’espace et le temps, §§ 11-13, pp. 328-9. 
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remains perfectly correct that none of this tells us whether the stone has preserved its absolute place, 
it remains impossible to determine this place except by the help of a reference body, for instance 
the shore and ultimately the surface of the Earth, which just brings us back to Leibniz’s concept of 
space. 
    Kant also questions that Euler’s proof of the reality of absolute space is correct.391 We have no 
outer sensation of absolute space, which we can refer to in order to determine the places and 
orientations of physical bodies.  Rather, we determine the places of bodies by relating them to some 
reference body. Reference bodies are perceivable, but absolute space is not. Space is absolute, not 
because it is sufficient to determine or specify the orientation of bodies, but because it serves as a 
condition under which such an orientation is possible in the first place, without which we cannot 
explain the phenomenon of incongruent counterparts.  
    Leibniz’s geometry of situation (analysis situs), that is, the geometry which analyses the 
conditions of situational identity (congruency) illustrates this thesis.392 Thus, according to Leibniz’s 
functional definition of congruency, two objects are congruent, because they are qualitatively 
similar and quantitatively equal respectively.393 The left glove and a right glove will for instance be 
congruent, for they are of equal size and similar shape. However, from our bodily point of view, 
we experience that the gloves are incongruent, namely because it is impossible to fit the left glove 
to the right glove, without altering its shape. Incongruent objects, like a pair of gloves, are typically 
both similar and equal, but still distinguishable, because one is oriented to the left and the other to 
the right. This indicates that one object cannot be congruent with another object, unless we take the 
orientation of the objects into consideration.  
    However, Leibniz can argue that Kant’s critique is irrelevant. First, it might be argued that 
Leibniz has taken account of the orientation of space, i.e. the directedness of the order in accordance 
with which the monads coexist with each other. For each monad is endowed with an organic body, 
as we have seen, which means that the order according to which the monads coexist will appear 
differently to each monad. Thus, space must be orientable, at least locally, for places are nothing 
but ideal, abstract expressions of the points of view of the monads and their organic bodies. 
Moreover, space is an all-encompassing whole, according to Leibniz, which is prior to its parts, 
which means that the global properties of space, such as its directedness, are true of its parts as 
well.394  
    Secondly, it might be argued that Kant’s critique is missing its target, since it presupposes a 
definition of situational identity other than the one suggested by Leibniz.  On this definition, the 
left glove and the right glove are incongruent, not because they are functionally incongruent, but 
because a motion which makes the left glove fit the right glove has to be non-rigid. In this context, 
this means that we cannot make the left glove fit the right glove without rearranging the parts of the 
left glove (thumb, fingers, etc.). Thus, in this case the motion that makes the left glove fit the right 
glove is non-rigid, because it distorts the shape of the left glove. What remains left of Kant’s critique 
against Leibniz then is only the charge that the orientation of space compels Leibniz to use a concept 
of congruency, which is based on rigid motions, rather than the concept of functional congruency.395   
                                                 
391 Directions, p. 366, Ak. 2, p. 378.  
392 For an interesting discussion of the evolution of Leibniz’s thoughts about similarity, equality, and 
congruency, see De Risi (2007, pp. 132-52; 283-93).  
393 The functional concept of congruency is discussed in De Risi (2007, p. 282).  
394 For an extremely interesting discussion of the relation between the ideality of absolute space and the 
priority of the whole over its parts, see De Risi (2007, p. 286).    
395 Though De Risi generally defends Leibniz against Kant, he reproaches him for not being able to defend 
his identification of functional congruency and through-motion congruency; see De Risi (2007, p. 286).  
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    On the surface, it even seems as if Kant might have shared Leibniz’s explanation of the concept 
of space, for as we have seen Kant describes the concept of space as a pure concept of 
understanding.  Kant’s marginal notes on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, written around 1769, seem 
to support this interpretation. In one of these notes, Kant outlines four possible alternatives: 
 
Concepts are either intuitive or reflective. The former either sensitive intuition or pure intuition, to the 
extent they are either in the matter or solely in the form of the sensitive representation.  Reflective concepts 
are likewise either empirical or pure. The former are universal concepts containing the matter given to the 
senses; the latter are only containing the form. Space and time are pure intellectual concepts. Metaphysical 
notions are pure rational concepts.396 (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4073, Ak. 17, pp. 404-5) 
  
Thus, the concept of space is a pure concept of understanding, according to Kant. However, from 
this it does not follow that Kant endorsed Leibniz’s explanation of the idea or concept of space.  
Rather he seems to have shared Euler’s view that Leibniz conceived the concept of space as an 
empirical concept of reflection.397 It is a concept which arises from a reflection of what bodies have 
in common, apart from everything that cannot be separated from the nature of the body.  
    Reflection will therefore only give us a concept of place, but not the concept of an extended 
space. Thus, only place is separable from body, not its extension, as Euler pointed out:   
 
But the idea of the position [lieu] that a body occupies is not formed by excising [retranchant] some 
determination [determination]  of the body; it results from removing the entire body, so that position is not 
a determination of the body, as it still remains after removing the entire body with all quantities involved. 
For it must be noted that the position that a body occupies is quite different from its extension; extension 
belongs to the body and is preserved by the body when moving from one position to another, whereas 
position and space are not susceptible to any type of movement.398 (Reflexions sur l’espace et le temps, § 
15, p. 330)   
 
   Locke had tried to avoid this dilemma by describing the infinite pure space as expanded rather 
than extended. To Locke this just underlined that the idea of pure space is separable from the idea 
of body, namely because it is an idea of a whole of penetrable, inseparable, immovable parts, which 
presumably is ontologically independent of the bodies localised in it.  
    To this Leibniz famously responded that the extension of a body is the same as the extension of 
the space it occupies:  
 
Body could have its own extension without that implying that the extension was always determinate or 
equal to the same space. Still, although it is true that in conceiving body one conceives something in 
addition to space, it does not follow that there are two extensions, that of space and that of body. Similarly, 
in conceiving several things at once one conceives something in addition to the number, namely the things 
                                                 
396 My translation, J.J.  
397 This is partly guesswork unfortunately, for Kant does not say anything about how the concept of space is 
formed according to Leibniz. In the Inaugural Dissertation, p. 397, Ak. 2, p. 404, Kant clearly suggests that 
the Leibnizians take the “properties of space” to be “borrowed” from experience. Later, in the 1770s, Kant 
came to describe Leibniz as holding the view that the concept of space is “intellectual, but confused”; see 
Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4851, Ak. 18., p. 9. This seems to suggest that the concept of space is more 
like an intellectual concept, though derived from reflection, like the empirical concepts.    
398 My translation, J.J.   
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numbered; and yet there are not two pluralities, one of them abstract (for the number) an the other concrete 
(for the things numbered).  (New Essays, p. 127)  
 
    Leibniz noted that in conceiving a body in space, we add something to the space it occupies, but 
in doing so, we are not conceiving two different extensions (volumes), one of space and the other 
of the body. 399 The body has a volume only because of the volume of the space it occupies; the 
volume of the stone in Euler’s example is in that respect not any way different from the position of 
the stone. This is also what we can expect, considering that space is ultimately place, namely an 
order of situations. Euler’s distinction between the extension of space and the extension of the body 
is just an unwarranted consequence of the spurious concept of absolute space as an ontologically 
independent thing or substance.               
    However, if this is correct it can no longer be argued that space, or even extension, is originally 
abstracted from an extended thing. If anything, extension must be added to the bodies, for they are 
aggregates and therefore discrete quantities, unlike space and time, which are continuous 
quantities.400 This seems consistent with Leibniz’s contention that the idea of space is innate to the 
understanding, but not entirely, for even if we have the idea of space as an order of simultaneous 
situations, it does not entail that we have an idea of space as an order of continuously diffused 
situations. Continuity is a determination, which only belongs to space, as a condition of the 
synthesis involved in a confused perception. Hence, the confused perception of a body presupposes 
a continuous synthesis of the situations of a plurality of qualitatively indistinguishable, homogenous 
matters, which leads to the representation of an extended space.  From this point of view space is 
not an idea of the intellect, but a form of the sensibility, in the sense that it conditions the synthesis 
of situations into images of extended phenomena.401   
    Kant was most likely not aware of Leibniz’s critique of Locke’s distinction between concrete 
and abstract extension. Instead, he seems to have accepted Euler’s view that the Leibnizians 
misrepresent the concept of space, by presenting it as an empirical concept of reflection, abstracted 
from the finite extension of bodies.  Thus, the Leibnizians fail to explain the original representation 
of space as an infinite continuous whole, which is prior the finite extension of things. Spaces of 
things are hence not possible except as parts of the same all-encompassing space:   
 
One can think of no space, for instance a cubic foot, without an outer space which surrounds it and hence 
no space except as contained in the whole. Similarly no two spaces without a determinate distance and 
place with respect to each other.402  (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4071, Ak. 17, p. 404)  
                                                 
399 According to Hartz/Cover (1988, p. 508) Leibniz develops a distinction between space and the extension 
of bodies.  In particular, they support their reading by referring to a letter to de Volder from 1704, where 
Leibniz seemingly makes a distinction between the space and the extension of a “mathematical body”. 
However, in whatever way this letter should be read, Leibniz’s comment in New Essays, p. 127 precludes 
the reading Harz/Cover suggest.  When Leibniz (Fifth Reply to Clarke, G VII 398) says that a thing (chose) 
“keeps” its extension when it moves from place A to place B, he wants to say that the extension of the thing 
in B is congruent with the extension it had in A, not that the extension of the thing in B is another kind of 
extension than the extension of B.     
400 See Hartz/Cover (1988, pp. 495-510) for a discussion of the development of Leibniz’s distinction 
between the discreteness of bodies and the continuity of space, as well as the distinction between the 
extension and space of bodies, though with an interpretation of their significance, completely different from 
the one defended here. 
401 For a detailed discussion of the arguments for thinking that continuity as an a priori determination of 
sensibility, see De Risi (2007, pp. 405-16).  For a defence of the alternative view that continuity is a 
sensible idea, see McRae (1995, pp. 182-3, 188).    
402 My translation, J.J. Adickes dates this note to 1769.   
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    From this it follows that space is unique and singular, namely because a plurality of spaces is 
possible, only within the same unique, all-encompassing space. The relation to the very same all-
encompassing space is what makes it possible for the body to appear as a centre of reference, from 
which the sensations are oriented in the direction of an object. It is in this sense that space is a law 
of sensibility, namely as a ground or form of the coordination of sensations and appearances, a form 
which cannot be reduced to a form of subordinating them under concepts of species and genera.403  
Without the sensibility, which lets the things appear in space, there would be no situated things and 
therefore also no places.  
   The original concept of space is hence not the concept of place, but the concept of a condition of 
the form of appearances, which Kant now describes as a pure concept of intuition:    
 
The form of the appearances depends merely on space and time, and these concepts arise from no senses 
or sensation, but from the nature of the mind, in accordance with which the different sensations can be 
represented under such relations. Thus, if all sensation of the senses is taken away, space and time is a pure 
concept of intuition [ein reiner Begrif der Anschauung]. And since everything in the experience, which 
can be known by the understanding alone, lies in the pure concept of intuition, it is a concept of 
understanding [Verstandesbegrif]. And although the appearances are empirical, it is still intellectual 
[intellectual].404 (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 3957, Ak. 17, p. 365) 
 
    In Kant’s tentative and somewhat malleable terminology, the concept of space is also described 
as a concept of understanding. In other words, Kant is not making a clear-cut distinction between 
the original representation of space, which is a pure intuition and the concept of the originally 
represented space, a distinction that is more fully worked out in the Transcendental Aesthetic. 
However, in a note which Adickes dates to the same year (1769), Kant indirectly suggests that 
metaphysics only searches for a rational concept of space:  
 
All concepts are either sensible or concepts of reason [Vernunftbegriffe]. The first are either of the 
sensation or of the appearance; these have the form of space and time as their ground. The second cannot 
be found through any analysis [analysin] of  experience, though they coordinate all experience, and are 
pure concepts of reason, if no object of experience is thought through them; but if that is the case, then 
they are empirical concepts. E.g. a genus is a pure concept, but a stone in general or the genus of a stone 
is an empirical concept.  (…) Space is not a concept of reason [Vernunftbegrif], but metaphysics searches 
for the rational concept [Vernunftbegrif] of it.405  (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Ak. 17, Nr. 3974, pp. 371-
2) 
   
    Gone are the previous doubts about whether space should be considered as a condition (ground) 
for things (appearances) and their relations, rather than the other way around. In another note, which 
Erich Adickes dates to 1769 or 1770, Kant argues that the representation of the all-encompassing 
space is prior to the representation of its parts, much as Leibniz had argued. The outcome of this 
subtle change in Kant’s position leads him to make the claim that space is a condition of all possible 
                                                 
403 The form of sensibility and the form (law) of understanding are thus distinguished along lines, which 
reflects Kant’s new division between sensibility and the understanding.   
404 My translation, J.J. Adickes dates this note to 1769.   
405 My translation, J.J.  
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appearances.406 The later also leads him to the conclusion that nothing, except appearances, is 
connected in space:  
 
One can think of spaces, only insofar as one cuts something out of the general space [allgemeinen Raum]. 
The space comes first, before the things; that is the reason why it is no predicate of things, but rather a law 
of the sensibility, which, as the condition of all possible appearances, admittedly comes before all the 
actual appearances.407 (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr.  4315, Ak. 17, pp. 503-4)                                                                                                    
 
   Even more importantly, this suggests that space is not, or does not, represent the order of 
coexistence of simple substances. In a note, which Adickes dates to the same time as the note 
discussed above, Kant expresses this claim in the following way: 
 
The predicate of space and place does not apply to the substance, but rather to the sensible representation. 
Bodily parts are comparative substances, according to the laws of the sensibility and phenomenal 
substances.408 (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4316, Ak. 17, p. 504) 
    
    Innocent as this might seem it actually challenges the doctrine of space Kant had officially 
defended in the 1740s and 1750s, where he had argued that simple substances are localised in space.  
Space is a space of sensible representations, not an abstract representation of the order of 
coexistence of the monads.  So far as I can see there is no way of telling what prompted this shift 
in Kant’s thinking, merely by considering his notes on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, from the late 
1760s. We have to wait until the inaugural dissertation for an official statement of the motives 
behind his novel doctrine of space. However, to me it seems quite likely that the insight that space 
is continuous must have been what definitely settled the issue for Kant.  
    From the continuity of space, it follows that space is an analytic whole, i.e. a whole that is prior 
to its indeterminate parts. In Herder’s lecture notes it was exactly this property which made space 
into a totum ideale, a pure composite of relations which is impossible without the support of a 
subject, namely the simple substances (physical monads), which are related in space.409 This makes 
perfect sense, if the concept of space is a concept of reflection abstracted from the relations of those 
physical monads, which ultimately makes it possible. However, with the investigation into the 
origin of the pure concept of space it became possible for Kant to abandon this view.        
    Space is not an abstractum, but rather originally given through pure intuition as a continuous 
whole. Note that this pure intuition does not just provide us with another, complementary route to 
the concept of space, but rather the only possible one. For even if we assume that we also have a 
concept of space, which is abstracted from the order of coexistence of the physical monads, this 
concept would not take us beyond the concept of an order of situations, which is exactly the point 
Kant tried to make in Directions. It would be the concept of an order of discretely repeated 
situations, but not the concept of a continuous space, such as ours.410 Thus, only the continuity of 
space as a form of sensibility, in which the sensations and their directions are coordinated, explains 
why the phenomenal bodies are continuously extended and infinitely divisible.  Phenomenal bodies 
                                                 
406 In a note dated 1769 or 1770, Kant qualifies this assertion by adding that space is “only” (nur) a 
condition for the appearance of outer things; see Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4191, Ak. 17, p. 451. 
407 My translation, J.J.   
408 My translation, J.J.  
409 Nachträge Herder, Ak. 28, pp. 848-9; see also Chapter 3.  
410 Space as an order of discretely repeated situations would hence be not only qualitatively different, but 
also numerically different from our space, which is unique.  
                                                                                  Locke, Leibniz, Kant and the Idea of Space    
 
 
 
99 
 
are not just confusedly perceived substantial composites of discrete simple substances, which means 
that there is no artificial limit to their divisibility.   
    Here it does not matter if we conceive these phenomena as substantial composites actually 
divided into a finite number of physical monads, as the young Kant did, or as actually divided into 
an infinity of monads as Leibniz does. The point is still that bodies are not actually divided 
substantial composites, which appears as indivisible phenomena in space. The continuity and hence 
the potential indivisibility of the phenomena is not a thin, subjective veneer smeared over them, but 
essential to their very being as phenomena. 
    Later in the critical period, Kant makes the same point, by trying to show that the concept of 
material bodies as substantial composites in space makes it possible to prove that they are both 
finitely and infinitely divided. The only way out of this antinomy is to recognise the phenomenality 
of the material bodies, which makes them continuous and potentially infinitely divisible, on a 
deeper-seated level, like the space which conditions them. Taken together with the solution to the 
antinomy between the finite and infinite extension of the world, this might throw additional light 
on Kant’s re-evaluation of the ontological status of space, as Erdmann argues.411        
    Implicitly, the conclusion about the continuity and ideality of space also opens up the possibility 
that the rational soul might be immaterial, and yet present to a body, localised in the midst of the 
world. For if space is nothing but a condition of the appearance of the body, rather than the 
noumenal substance of the body, it can be argued that the substance of the body can act on the 
rational soul and its sensibility, without having to touch them. Conversely, the rational soul can be 
in contact with the body without having to occupy and fill a place in the body. 
   The notes on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, composed during the end of the 1760s, only intimates 
the contours of this coming doctrine, officially in Kant’s inaugural dissertation in 1770. The main 
components of his doctrine are familiar: God is the infinite cause of the interaction of all simple 
substances, which makes them belong to the same world, one and the same compositum 
substantiale. The world is absolute, in the sense that it cannot be part of another whole: 
 
It exists one world, that is, one whole, which is not a part of any actual (possible) whole. Its parts are not 
bound up with each other out of themselves. Because they are through one cause. Space is the phenomenon 
of the existence of all things through one [cause]. Infinity. The commercium of the substances are possible 
thereby.  (…) The totality of the world and its state. It depends on the ultimate cause, but is not in 
commercio with it.412 (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4086, Ak. 17, p. 409)  
 
     From now on Kant is going to argue that it is possible for the forces of the simple substances to 
interact in agreement with the theory of physical influx without making them localised in space. In 
the opposite case, i.e. if the simple substances are localised in space and God interacts with them, 
they would have to interact on the same plane, i.e. in space. It would then follow that some of God’s 
properties are spatial or that there are two grounds of the coexistence and interaction of the simple 
things, namely both God and space. This is absurd for it entails that there are two necessary 
beings.413  Thus, the concept of space and place applies only to the outer sensations and presumably 
also the appearances, not to God and the substances themselves. The advantage of this move is that 
there is no need for Kant to attribute any spatial properties to God, in order to explain how this 
                                                 
411 Erdmann (1884, p. xxxvi).   
412 My translation, J.J. Adickes dates this note to 1769.   
413 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 6429, Ak. 18, p. 713.  
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interaction comes about. God is not locally present to the things, i.e. he is not a composite thing, 
and space is not the omnipresence of God, but the phenomenon of God’s all-presence.   
   Finally, it follows that we can know the existence (Daseyn) of God only by our intellect, for we 
have no experience and no intellectual intuition of God, i.e. we cannot see how God is for himself.414 
God’s existence must therefore be considered as a hypothesis, which is necessary to assume in order 
to explain the existence and the form of the world of phenomena. 415 This world of phenomena Kant 
now, in the late 1760s and early 1770s, refers to as the sensible world, a world that, however, is 
grounded in the intelligible world of causally interacting monads.416 To follow the details of how 
Kant thinks that space, the intelligible world and God are connected, we have to turn our attention 
to his inaugural dissertation from 1770.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
414 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4254, Ak. 17, p. 483. 
415 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4108, Ak. 17, p. 418 
416 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4254, Ak. 17, p. 483; Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4255, Ak. 17, p. 
484; Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4349, Ak. 17, p. 516. 
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5. World, Space, and God: Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation   
 
 
The previous chapter dealt with Kant’s development in the late 1760s and his attempt to explain the 
origin of the concept of space. In the chapter, I argued that Kant rejected not only Locke’s view that 
space is a sense idea but also Leibniz’s view that space is a concept of reflection abstracted from 
the places of simple substances. Instead, the concept of space originates from a pure intuition. I 
further argued that these considerations led Kant to suggest that space is an analytic whole, which 
is given prior to its parts.  Space is in other words an ideal and continuous whole, and not just a 
whole of situations, abstracted from the situational relations of simple substances.  
    The purpose of this chapter is to show how this leads Kant to the radical, but also problematic 
suggestion that space is a whole in its own right, which is conceptually independent of the material 
bodies which fill it. Whereas bodies are synthetic wholes, which are posterior to their simple 
discrete parts, space is an analytic whole, which is prior to its composite continuous parts.  What 
makes this suggestion problematic is that it seems to alienate space from the real world.  Thus, like 
his predecessors, Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten and Knutzen, Kant conceived the world as a gigantic 
body and hence as a synthetic whole of simple substances, which is absolute, in the sense that it 
does not exist as a part of another whole.  To the embarrassment of Kant, this seems to suggest that 
space is nothing but a figment of the mind, like the phantasms of Hobbes.  
    In the Inaugural Dissertation from 1770, Kant tries to anchor space to the world, by making it a 
condition of the appearance of the world in relation to the sensibility.417 Interestingly the 
phenomenon of the world not only refers to the world, but also preserves some of its mereological 
properties, namely that it is an absolute whole, a whole which is not itself a part of another larger 
whole. However, unlike the world, the phenomenon of the world also shares some of the 
mereological properties of space, namely that it is continuous, prior to its indefinite parts and so on.  
Kant marks this by making a distinction between the sensible world and the intelligible world.418         
    In his inaugural dissertation, Kant also tries to show that the space of the sensible world is the 
same original, subjective space, which he had detected in his investigation of the form of sensibility. 
Space is originally represented in a pure, a priori intuition, for it is presupposed in order to have an 
outer empirical intuition of an object and it does not subordinate them under itself but coordinates 
them within itself. Space is also transcendentally ideal, for the alternatives to this claim are without 
exception absurd.  Space is neither a substance in its own right, as Newton and Clarke argue, nor a 
relation between substances, as Leibniz argues. The former alternative is absurd for it entails that 
space is a whole of relations, which exist without the support of any relata. The latter alternative is 
absurd, for it makes Euclidean geometry contingently true.  
    Though Kant’s arguments fail to refute Leibniz, they highlight that Kant makes a much stronger 
version of the transcendental ideality claim than Leibniz. Thus, for Kant the transcendental ideality 
of space entails that bodies and other phenomena are infinitely divisible, but never actually divided 
to infinity. There is hence no exact correspondence between phenomena and noumena, which grants 
that the situational order between external phenomena faithfully preserves the order of coexistence 
between the simple substances. More technically, if space is transcendentally ideal, the situational 
                                                 
417 Inaugural dissertation, §13, p. 391, Ak. 2, p. 399. 
418 On the interpretation defended here the intelligible world is the world; the noumenal world and the 
phenomenal world are hence not two representations of the same world (“set of objects”), as for instance 
Grier (2001, pp. 52-7) argues. Only the sensible world is a representation, namely of the intelligible world, 
which is ontologically independent of the sensible world.   
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order between external phenomena is not isomorphic with the order of coexistence of the simple 
substances. 
    In the Inaugural Dissertation Kant also takes a step back and considers the methodical errors of 
the thinkers who conceives space as transcendentally real. The spurious concepts of spatially 
located monads is a result of a systematic displacement of concepts from phenomena to noumena. 
Thinkers who displace concepts are victims of an illusion of the understanding, which depends on 
a failure to recognise the demarcation line between the sensibility and the understanding.  However, 
Kant also embeds this claim in a much larger project, intimated already in the inaugural dissertation. 
Thus, in the 1770s Kant starts outlining a new science, a phenomenology, with two fundamental 
objectives: justifying the knowledge of space and time, determining the limits of our knowledge of 
space and time, and systematically exposing and removing all deceptive concepts that results from 
the transgression of these limits. Later, this idea would come to fruition, partly in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, partly in the Transcendental Dialectic.    
    The disposition of the chapter is as follows. The first section introduces the reader to the 
distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal world. The second section follows up this 
discussion, by presenting the official arguments for thinking that the original phenomenon of space 
is given in a pure intuition. The third section tries to reconstruct Kant’s first official statement of 
his arguments for thinking that space is ideal, as he presents them in the Inaugural Dissertation.  
The fourth section connects these arguments with Kant’s distinction between space and God, which 
lead to the more general issue of Kant’s critique of metaphysics and its method, which is the topic 
of the fifth section. The sixth section finally, briefly examines Kant’s development during the silent 
decade that preceded the writing of the Critique of Pure Reason.  
 
5.1 Space and the Concept of the World  
 
The end of the 1760s did not only mark a turning point in Kant’s intellectual development, but also 
in his professional career. In 1770, Kant was appointed ordinary professor of logic and metaphysics 
at the University of Königsberg, which meant that he could leave his post as a librarian at the royal 
castle, a post that he had held since 1766. For his inauguration, as a professor, Kant had to compose 
a special, professorial dissertation, which was defended by his former student and friend Marcus 
Herz (1747-1803), who was invited from Berlin especially for the occasion.   
    The critical spirit of the Inaugural Dissertation comes to expression already in the first section 
(§ 1), which contains a kind of “pilot study” of how to derive the fundamental concepts of 
metaphysics from the cognitive faculties of the soul, in agreement with the plan Lambert had 
outlined in his letters to Kant.419 Kant observes that the mind abstracts the pure concepts of 
understanding from laws (forms), which are inherent to it, by attending to its own acts.420 Kant does 
not present his readers with much detail, but presumably he thinks that the awareness of the act of 
thinking in accordance with a form of judgment provides the mind with certain pure concepts of 
understanding.  
    The awareness of thinking in accordance with, for instance, a categorical form of judgment 
provides the mind with the concepts subject and predicate. It also makes the mind conscious of 
                                                 
419 Inaugural Dissertation § 1, p. 377, Ak. 2, p. 387.   
420 Inaugural Dissertation § 8, pp. 387-8, Ak. 2, p. 395.  The acquisition of the pure concepts of 
understanding corresponds to the “real use” (usus realis) of understanding, Inaugural Dissertation § 5, p. 
385, Ak. 2, p. 393.      
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itself as the subject of all predicates (thoughts), without being the predicate of another subject.421 
However, from this it also follows that it has a concept of itself as a simple substance, for unless 
the mind is simple it cannot bring a plurality of representations to the unity of one thought.422  
    From the concept of the simple substance, the mind can also derive the concept of a composite 
substance, simply as the opposite of a simple substance.423 In thinking of a composite substance, 
the mind can think of it as a part of another composite substance, but ultimately it strives to think 
of a composite, which is not a part of another composite. The understanding hence generates the 
concept of an absolute synthetic whole, which is not a part of another whole – in other words a 
world.424 Conversely, the understanding generates a concept of the parts of the world, by a complete 
analysis in which it thinks away from everything composite in the world. In this way, it is possible 
for the understanding to demonstrate that the world ultimately must consist of a plurality of simple 
substances.425  
    The world is of course not an absolute whole because the mind thinks all simple substances 
together under the same concept, but because they are objectively connected with each other.  The 
simple substances only provides the world with its matter, but in order for there to be a world the 
simple substances need to be coordinated, which is what gives the world its composition or form.426  
Much in the same way as in the New Elucidation, Kant describes this coordination as the outcome 
of forces, which are internal but still transeunt, in the sense that they make the simple substances 
act and interact with each other. Kant also repeats his earlier, pre-critical claim that simple 
substances do not interact merely because they subsist, which means that an interaction does not 
occur unless there is a principle, which makes their mutual influence possible: 
 
But the connection, which constitutes the essential form of a world, is seen as the principle of the possible 
influences of the substances which constitute the world. For actual influences do not belong to the essence 
but to the state, and the transeunt forces themselves, which are the causes of the influences, suppose some 
principle by which it may be possible that the states of the several things, the subsistence of each of which 
is nonetheless independent of that of the others, should be mutually related to one another as states 
determined by a ground. (Inaugural Dissertation § 2, p. 381, Ak. 2, p. 391) 
 
Here Kant gives no details, as to the nature of the principle or cause, which brings the simple 
substances into coexistence. However, somewhat later in the dissertation, Kant repeats his familiar 
thesis that the possibility of an interaction between the simple substances depends on God, as their 
single cause. Only God can bring the simple substances together within the unity of a world, in 
                                                 
421 Kant seems to argue along these lines a couple of years later, according to the lecture notes compiled by 
Pölitz, in Metaphysik L1, Ak. 28, pp. 225-6, 266.  
422 Metaphysik L1, Ak. 28, pp. 226, 266-7. It goes without saying that Kant rejects this “deduction” of the 
concept of substance in the Transcendental Analytic and in the Transcendental Dialectic, since it is based 
on a misplacement of the concept of a substance in time to the thinking I, which results in the illusory 
inference (paralogism) that the thinking I is a simple, permanent substance.  For a discussion of the Pölitz 
lectures, as an authentic account of Kant’s 1770s thoughts about substantiality of the thinking I, see Grier 
(2001, p. 148).          
423 Inaugural Dissertation § 8, p. 388, Ak. 2, p. 395 
424 Inaugural Dissertation § 1, pp. 377-8, Ak. 2, p. 387.   
425 Cf. Physical Monadology, p. 53, Ak. 1, p. 477.   
426 Inaugural Dissertation § 2, pp. 380-1, Ak. 2, pp. 389-90. 
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which the states of the individual simple substances reciprocally depend on each other, in 
accordance with the theory of physical influx.427  
    With this said, Kant also observes that our intellect cannot have an intuition of what it thinks 
under the concept of a composite, without relying on the sensible faculty.428 In representing a 
composite as it appears in relation to our sensibility, our understanding proceeds analytically from 
outer sensations of parts to intuitions of larger composites, by successively adding the parts to each 
other.429 In a similar fashion, our understanding proceeds synthetically from outer sensations of 
given compounds to intuitions of their parts, by successively dividing them.  In both cases, the 
activity takes an unlimited time, Kant argues, making it into an incomplete, mathematically infinite 
process, which the understanding cannot complete.430  Hence, when we represent a composite thing 
by our sensible faculty this thing is not adequate to the pure concept of the intellect, which is nothing 
less than a synthetic composite.431    
    The generation of a concept of a composite, in relation to our sensibility, is therefore different 
from how it is generated in the understanding. In Kant’s terminology, our sensibility cannot “follow 
up” (exsequi) the concept that the understanding has of the world, which means that it fails to 
represent all the simple parts in a “distinct intuition”.432   
    Though Kant has repeatedly been criticised for making the mistake of concluding objective 
impossibility (ignoratio enlenchi) from subjective impossibility, it seems to me as if the order of 
dependency is the exact opposite.433 Thus, the fact that the understanding is unable to finish the 
synthesis/analysis of the composites given to it from the sensibility, originates from objective 
peculiarities of these composites, according to Kant.  The distinction between the representation of 
the world in the intellect and in the sensibility is therefore not just a distinction between two kinds 
of representations – concepts and intuitions –, but at the bottom a distinction between two kinds of 
wholes: one discrete and synthetic, and the other continuous and analytic.    
    From these considerations, Kant concludes that we can make sense of the phenomenon of the 
world, only by conceiving it as a world in its own right.434 Thus, we must make a distinction between 
two worlds: the noumenal world and the phenomenal world, which are numerically different not 
just with respect to their matter, but also with respect to their forms.435  Thus, the matter of the sense 
representations is not the monads, but the sensations, which result from the modification of the 
sensibility by “some object”, presumably the monads.436 The matter of the phenomenal world is 
hence not the matter of the noumenal world, for appearances, like the computer screen in front of 
me, are not composed out of monads, but sensations (or that which corresponds to sensations), 
insofar as they are referred outside me.  
    Likewise, the form of the phenomenal world does not arise from the coordination of simple 
substances, but from the coordination of sensations as either simultaneous or successive.437  Thus, 
                                                 
427 Inaugural Dissertation §§ 17-18, p. 402, Ak. 2, pp. 407-8.  
428 Inaugural Dissertation § 1, p. 377, Ak. 2, p. 387.   
429 Inaugural Dissertation § 1, p. 378, Ak. 2, p. 387.   
430 Inaugural Dissertation § 1, p. 377, Ak. 2, p. 387.   
431 Inaugural Dissertation § 1, p. 377, Ak. 2, p. 387. The use of the pure concepts of understanding must 
therefore also be “elencic”, i.e. used negatively, in such fashion as to keep the noumena distinct from the 
phenomena;  Inaugural Dissertation § 9, p. 388, Ak. 2, pp. 395-6.   
432 Inaugural Dissertation § 1, p. 377, Ak. 2, p. 387.  
433 E.g. Kemp Smith (1999, p. 485); for similar considerations Guyer (1987, pp. 407-11).  
434 Inaugural Dissertation § 13, p. 391, Ak. 2, p. 398. 
435 Inaugural Dissertation § 13, p. 391, Ak. 2, p. 398.  
436 Inaugural Dissertation § 4, p. 384-5, Ak. 2, p. 392-3.   
437 Inaugural Dissertation § 4, p. 384-5, Ak. 2, p. 392-3.   
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whereas understanding subordinates sensations to concepts, the sensibility coordinates the given 
directions of the sensations in space, which is the law of the sensibility.438  Space is therefore, Kant 
is going to argue, not a universal under which the understanding subordinates the objects, as under 
a common genus. Rather, it is the principle of that order (“form”), within which sensations are 
coordinated in the direction of a singular object. Thus, the concept of space is the concept of that 
principle, which is a pure concept, not an empirical concept.439 However, the concept of space is 
still different from the pure concepts of understanding, which the understanding extracts from its 
own laws.  
 
5.2 Geometry and the Exposition of the Concept of Space    
 
Kant’s discussion of the origin and validity of the concept of space is presented in § 15. In many 
ways this “proto-exposition” resembles the Metaphysical and Transcendental Expositions of the 
concept of space, Kant was going to present about ten years later, in the Transcendental Aesthetic. 
In Directions Kant had concluded that space is a “fundamental concept”; now he explains that the 
representation or concept of space “contains” or “is” the form of sensory intuition, namely the 
condition under which it becomes possible to distinguish the appearances (“sensible things”), and 
represent them clearly and distinctly.440  Kant presents a number of arguments for this claim in the 
Inaugural Dissertation.  
    Firstly, the concept of space is a priori, for it is not an empirical concept of reflection, abstracted 
from outer sensations. Kant’s argument here is not just that space cannot be derived by abstracting 
from everything in the bodies I see or touch, except their extension or place, but that the very 
possibility of seeing or touching an outer body depends on the representation of space. Thus, in 
order to represent an outer thing in the first place I need to have an outer sensation of it, which 
presupposes that I represent the thing at a distance from my body. Distances are, however, 
determinations of space as a whole, within which sensations can be oriented at a definite direction 
from our body, for instance to the right, to the left, etc. The very possibility of having an outer 
sensation of a thing outside me therefore presupposes the representation (“concept”) of space:    
 
The concept of space is not abstracted from outer sensations [sensationibus externis]. For I may only 
conceive of something as placed outside me by representing it as in a place which is different from the 
place in which I am myself; and I may only conceive of things outside one another by locating them in 
                                                 
438 Paulsen (1875, p. 104) suggests that the laws of sensibility are the forms of the sensible representations. 
However, to me it seems more correct to say that they are the ground of these forms, for in Inaugural 
Dissertation “form” is generally taken to be a term, which stands for the way matters are related to each 
other, not the condition under which such a relation is possible.  
439 Inaugural Dissertation § 4, pp. 384-5, Ak. 2, p. 392-3.  Kant’s terminology may suggests that the 
principle of sensibility is the ground, in accordance with which outer appearances are actively coordinated, 
rather than given as coordinated. To me it seems as if this ambiguity has its origin in Kant’s not perfectly 
worked out distinction between sensibility as sense, and sensibility as the faculty of intuition, which 
actively orders, or rather, re-orders the sensations, so that they can be taken up by the understanding.  
Falkenstein (2004, pp. 48-50, 91) even argues that space itself becomes a product of sensibility, in the 
inaugural dissertation. Though there is evidence for this “forms-as-mechanism” reading, I think that Kant 
just emphasizes that space is a ground of the active ordering of sensations, in the faculty of intuition 
(imagination). Unfortunately, this makes it easy to overlook that space is the ground of the order, within 
which sensations and outer appearances originally are given to sensibility.      
440 Inaugural Dissertation § 15, p. 396, Ak. 2, p. 403.   
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different places in space. The possibility, therefore, of outer perceptions [perceptionum externarum] as 
such presupposes the concept of space; it does not create it.  Likewise, too, things which are in space affect 
the senses, but space itself cannot be derived from the senses. (Inaugural Dissertation § 15, p. 395, Ak. 2, 
p. 402)   
 
    Secondly, Kant claims that the concept of space is a singular representation, and not a general 
concept of reflection, for in that case particular spaces would be contained in space, which they are 
not: 
 
The concept of space is a singular representation embracing all things within itself; it is not an abstract 
common concept [notio abstracta et communis] containing them under itself. For what you speak of as 
several places are only parts of the same boundless [immensi] space related to one another by a fixed 
position.  (Inaugural Dissertation § 15, p. 396, Ak. 2, p. 402)  
 
Typical of the singular objects is that they are subordinated to universal concepts of species and 
general, by virtue of their marks. The triangle is subordinated to the universal concept of a polygon, 
for three lines cannot form a triangle unless they are enclosing a space.  The same property cannot, 
however, explain why the triangle is related to space, for the property of enclosing a space already 
presupposes that the sides of the triangle are coordinated with each other in one and the same 
mathematically infinite space.441  
    The representation of different geometric objects as well as sensible objects, such as a pencil, a 
desk, etc., thus presupposes the representation of different places, which means that they do not 
obey Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles. This explains why the relation between 
objects and concepts is different from the relation between objects and space, for the objects are 
related to space not because they are subordinated to it, but because they are coordinated with each 
other within space. The representation of space is hence singular and not universal.  
    From the apriority claim and the singularity claim Kant concludes that the original representation 
of space must be a pure intuition, which he still describes as an a priori singular concept: 
 
The concept of space is thus a pure intuition, for it is a singular concept, not one which has been 
compounded from sensations, although it is the fundamental form of all outer sensation. Indeed, this pure 
intuition can easily be seen in the axioms of geometry, and in any mental construction of postulates, even 
of problems.  (Inaugural Dissertation § 15, p. 396, Ak. 2, p. 402) 
 
Kant supports the claim that the representation of space is a pure intuition, by a proto-version of the 
Transcendental Exposition, according to which the postulates of Euclidean geometry (“axioms of 
geometry”) depend on a pure intuition of space.  For instance, the truth of Euclid’s first postulate, 
according to which a straight line can be drawn joining any two points, cannot be demonstrated 
merely from a concept, like the concept of a set of points, or even an ordered set of points. Instead, 
it is immediately apprehended, by drawing a straight line between any two points in space.442 
                                                 
441
 Inaugural Dissertation § 15, p. 396, Ak. 2, pp. 402-3. The unity which space gives to the sensations makes 
them into a whole, but not an absolute whole comprising all parts, but a continuous, mathematically infinite 
whole.
  
The limit of the sensible world can always be transcended and moved, like the phenomenal, perceptual 
space which encloses it. The horizon towards which the sailor gazes is always ahead of him, in perpetual 
motion like the vessel he is sailing.   
442 Inaugural Dissertation § 15, p. 396, Ak. 2, p. 403.   
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According to Euclid’s second postulate, this line can be drawn potentially to infinity, but only 
within the horizon of an all-encompassing space, which means that it is a determination of 
something as a priori and singular, as the constructed line itself. Kant expresses this, by saying that 
the pure intuition of space is “seen in the axioms of geometry”. 443   
    Likewise, it is impossible to determine the direction (plagam) of a place or the difference between 
incongruent counterparts, such as a left hand and a right hand, merely by virtue of the absolutely 
inner marks that can be thought under intellectual concepts.444 We can only apprehend differences, 
such as the difference between the left and the right hand, if we have a (determinate) pure intuition 
of the distance between them. Hence, geometrical demonstrations cannot follow from concepts 
alone:    
 
It is, therefore, clear that in these cases the difference, namely, the incongruity can only be apprehended 
by a certain pure intuition. (…) For, since geometry contemplates relations of space and since the concept 
of space contains within itself the very form of all sensory intuition, nothing can be clear and distinct in 
things perceived by outer sense unless it be by the mediation of the same intuition, the contemplation of 
which is the function of the science of geometry. But geometry does not demonstrate its own universal 
propositions by thinking an object through a universal concept, as happens in the case of what is rational; 
it does so, rather, by placing it before the eyes by means of a singular intuition, as happens in the case of 
what is sensitive. (Inaugural Dissertation § 15, pp. 396-7, Ak. 2, p. 404)      
 
    Space is the ground of the places of the objects, e.g. the left and the right hand, which makes the 
sensory intuitions of the objects sufficiently clear, so that they can be distinguished from each other 
at a distance. Demonstrations in Euclidean geometry do not follow from an analysis of the concept 
of an order of situations or points, abstracted from the order of coexistence of simple substances, a 
view that Kant ascribes to Leibniz. Instead, they follow from constructions within an all-
encompassing and continuous space, which shows that space is an ideal whole, not an order of 
situated simple substances. To this argument I now turn. 
 
5.3 Euclidean Geometry and the Transcendental Ideality of Space   
 
In the remaining sections of § 15 Kant publicly declares, for the first time in his career, that space 
is not objective and real, but subjective and ideal. Thus, in the same way as § 15 presents the readers 
a kind of proto-version of the exposition of the concept of space, it also contains a proto-version of 
the transcendental ideality claim.   
   However, in the Inaugural Dissertation Kant does not let the transcendental ideality claim follow 
as a direct conclusion from the exposition of the concept of space, as in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Rather it follows as an indirect conclusion from a refutation of the competing claim that space is a 
substance, not an accident of substance or a relation between substances:    
 
                                                 
443 That space has three dimensions is also an axiom, according to Kant, which depends on the impossibility 
of constructing more than three lines, which intersect a given point at right angles.  Kant does not develop 
this argument in detail, but a similar version of the argument reconstructed above can be found in 
Prolegomena, Ak. 4, p. 284.    
444 Inaugural Dissertation § 15, p. 396, Ak. 2, p. 403.   
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Space is not something objective and real [obiectivi et realis], nor is it a substance, nor an accident, nor a 
relation; it is, rather, subjective and ideal; it issues from the nature of the mind in accordance with a stable 
law as a scheme, so to speak, for co-ordinating everything which is sensed externally. Those who defend 
the reality of space either conceive it as an absolute and boundless receptacle of possible things – an 
opinion which favour with most geometers, following the English – or they contend that it is the relation 
[relationem] itself which obtains between existing things, and which vanishes entirely when the things are 
taken away, and which can only be thought as being between actual things – an opinion which most of our 
own people, following Leibniz maintain.   (Inaugural Dissertation § 15, p. 397, Ak. 2, pp. 403-4)   
 
    Kant begins his defence of the transcendental ideality claim by attacking the notion of space as 
a substance. This notion is flawed according to Kant, for it makes space into a receptacle or 
container of possible things. It entails that it is possible for space to exist even if it is empty and 
hence consists of nothing but relations between possible things. The latter is absurd, for it makes 
space into a whole of spatial relations, which exists apart from the existence of any spatially related 
things. The ideal space of relations is turned on its head and reified into a substance, which belongs 
to the world of fables.  
    We are in no better position if we make space an accident of God, as Newton and Clarke had 
argued. This concept of space is a subreptic concept, which arises when our understanding 
confusedly takes God’s omnipresence to be local and not virtual.445 It is a concept no less fantastic 
and illusory than the concept of space as a substance. Thinkers who make this mistake are victims 
of the same illusion as Swedenborg, who once thought that God has a place, not just in the sun of 
the intelligible world, but in the sun of the phenomenal world as well.446  In brief, space is not the 
sensorium of God, but the sensorium of man.447 
    Kant continues his defence of the transcendental ideality claim by attacking the notion of space 
as relation between substances – a notion, which he attributes to Leibniz. Here Kant uses an 
argument, which he now presents in public form, for the first time. On this argument, we have to 
reject relationalism, because it endangers the status of Euclidean geometry as a science:  
  
The proponents of the second view, however, are in headlong conflict with the phenomena themselves, 
and with the most faithful interpreter of all phenomena, geometry. For, without mentioning the obvious 
circle in the definition of space in which they are necessarily entangled, they cast geometry down from the 
summit of certainty, and thrust it back into the rank of those sciences of which the principles are empirical. 
For if all the properties [affectiones] of space are merely borrowed by experience from outer relations, then 
there would only be comparative universality such as is obtained by induction, that is to say, such as 
extends no further than observation. Nor would the axioms of geometry possess any necessity apart from 
that which was in accordance with the established laws of nature, nor any precision apart from that which 
was arbitrarily constructed.  (Inaugural Dissertation § 15, pp. 397-8, Ak. 2, p. 404) 
 
                                                 
445 I will discuss the subreptic concepts in some closer detail in section 5.5.   
446 In On the Intercourse between the Soul and the Body, p. 10, Swedenborg metaphorically describes the 
love, which is present everywhere in the intelligible, spiritual world, as a sun, and God’s presence in this 
love as a place in the sun.   However, in an earlier stage of his career Swedenborg even played with the idea 
that God, literary, might have a place in the sun, in the midst of the solar system; see Martin Lamm (1987, 
pp. 32-3).   
447 In Inaugural Dissertation Kant fails to present any details of his views on Newton’s theory of space, but 
it is quite clear that he associated it with the idea that space is a property of God, namely the sensorium of 
the omnipresence of God. See for instance Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4145, Ak. 17, p. 432.    
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    What Kant claims here is that relationalism makes knowledge of the properties of space rely on 
experience of “outer relations”, i.e. the places of material bodies. One way of making sense of this 
claim is to consider it against the background of Euler’s critique of the Leibnizian 
“metaphysicians”, who failed to derive anything but a concept of situation or place when they 
reflected on what bodies have in common, in abstraction from everything that belongs to them 
merely as bodies. The properties, which make space more than just a place but a whole of 
continuously diffused places, is lost in the act of abstraction. In the heads of the metaphysicians, 
geometric space and physical space are torn apart by a gigantic rift, which only physical geometry 
can bridge.   
    The problem with this divorce is that it isolates the postulates of Euclidean geometry not only 
from the physical space but from the land of truth as well. Hence, given that Kant’s understanding 
of Leibniz is correct, there is nothing in an order of coexisting things which necessarily makes it 
into a Euclidean space. Contrary to what Leibniz believes, according to Kant, the postulates of 
Euclidean geometry can make no claims to truth on their own merits, as if they were true by 
themselves.  They are true only because they refer to the existence or real possibility of an object 
outside themselves, a straight line, a circle, a right angle, etc.448 The first postulate for instance, 
refers to the unique, shortest curve between any pair of points, by postulating the possibility of 
drawing a straight line between them.  
     However, curves are nothing but idealised distances in physical space, which means that the first 
postulate ultimately asserts that we can describe the unique shortest distances between any two 
places in physical space as a straight line. But since our knowledge of Euclidean space extends no 
further than the measurement instruments and calculations of the physical geometricians, we cannot 
postulate that it is possible to draw a straight line between any two points, as Euclidean geometry 
demands. Nothing even guarantees that the physical space is everywhere continuous, which 
undermines all demonstrations in Euclidean geometry, which everywhere presuppose the existence 
(real possibility) of points of intersections between, say, circles, or circles and lines, which in turn 
presuppose the continuity of these constructed circles and lines.449 The Leibnizian concept of space, 
as a universal place, abstracts not only from the continuity of space but also from that which makes 
the postulates and demonstrations of Euclidean geometry universal and necessary.      
     On Kant’s interpretation the metaphysicians cannot bridge the gap between their space and the 
space of the geometricians, unless they recognise that the representation of space is a pure intuition, 
which is exactly the purpose of the proto-expositions presented in § 15. That the postulates are 
certain and universally valid follows, because they presuppose the pure intuition of space, which is 
a necessary condition of the external perceptions and phenomena.  The first postulate is true, 
because the external phenomena will not appear except in a space, which is Euclidean.  Moving 
bodies, which follow the shortest path from one place to another, will not appear to us, unless they 
                                                 
448 E.g. Heath (1956, pp. 234-7) commonly uses the term “existence” with respect to postulated points, 
lines, etc., in his commentary on Euclid’s Elementa. Thus on Heath’s interpretation, constructions prove the 
existence of geometric objects, like lines and circles, which the postulates postulate to be possible.  
However, to be exact existence belongs only to something, which has a determinate position in time, 
according to Kant, which mathematical objects do not have. Instead, it is more correct to speak about 
points, lines, etc. as real possibilities, as for instance Brittan (1978, pp. 60-67) argues.  For a critique of this 
view, see Plaass (1994, p. 258), who argues that mathematical objects merely involves possibility, not the 
possibility of existence, i.e. real possibility.         
449 See Heath (1956, pp. 234-7) for a detailed discussion of the “principle of continuity” as a presupposition 
for the demonstrations in Euclidean geometry, for instance the first proposition, which asserts the 
possibility of constructing an equilateral triangle on any given, finite straight line.   
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move along a straight line. Thus, what Kant suggests is that we can recover the universal necessary 
truth of the postulates, once we recognise their truths as transcendental truths.  
    None of these arguments seems decisive for Leibniz, however, simply because there is no major 
disagreement between him and Kant. Space is not objective and real, but rather transcendentally 
ideal, as a form of the monads’ confused perceptions of their bodies as extended and situated with 
respect to the bodies of other monads.  Space is hence real only as the space of external phenomena, 
i.e. the extended organic bodies of the monads. This means that the monads are situated in space, 
but only indirectly, by virtue of their presence to their organic bodies.  
    Leibniz could therefore argue that Kant’s arguments are irrelevant for his philosophy of space 
and geometry. If they are valid, they apply only to the arguments of the physical monadologists, 
like the young Kant. Furthermore, Leibniz could also ask for more detailed information as to the 
reasons why the axioms of Euclidean geometry, like the first postulate, are transcendental truths, 
according to Kant. From Leibniz’s point of view Kant seems to move too quickly from the premise 
that space is an a priori necessary condition for Euclidean geometric constructions, to the conclusion 
that space is Euclidean.  Thus, taken as an abstract order of simultaneous situations it is perfectly 
possible for space to be spherical or hyperbolical, rather than Euclidean.  
    However, what decides the matter in favour of thinking that space is Euclidean, according to 
Leibniz, is that the extension of space arises from the same kind of synthesis, which is involved in 
the confused perception of bodies as extended. The space of extended phenomena is therefore a 
Euclidean space, produced by the imagination in accordance with the postulates of Euclidean 
geometry. For instance, the straight line, which figures in Euclid’s first postulate, is not only the 
shortest curve between two points, but also the simplest and most self-similar curve and hence the 
most determinate way of synthesising a one-dimensional manifold of points.450 The latter is also 
the reason why our imagination follows a Euclidean, rather than non-Euclidean geometry, when it 
synthesises a manifold of situations, within the unity of a curve.451  
    Valid or not, Leibniz’s arguments for the transcendental truth of the postulates of Euclidean 
geometry, certainly point out a weak spot in Kant’s justification of Euclidean geometry. The 
hypothetical necessity, which is granted to geometry if space is considered as a condition of outer 
intuitions, rather than as a relation between things (monads, physical monads etc.), does not 
presuppose that this geometry is Euclidean. However, with this said, it is clear that Kant would still 
have rejected Leibniz’s philosophy of space. For according to Leibniz external phenomena in space 
still consist of an infinity of monads, as their simple parts, making bodies and other external 
phenomena not just potentially, but actually divided to infinity.  Ultimately, the entire phenomenal 
world is actually divided to infinity and of infinite magnitude, according to Leibniz.  
     For Kant on the other hand, the infinite divisibility and infinite extension of the phenomenal 
world is truly potential, not actual. Phenomena are actually divided to infinity only if there is a 
perfect, one-to-one correspondence between phenomena and noumena. However, because of the 
transcendental ideality of space, no such one-to-one correspondence is ever present, not even as the 
ideal limit of a perfectly distinct perception of the noumena.  There is hence no isomorphic 
correspondence between phenomena and noumena, i.e. no perfect one-to-one correspondence 
(mapping) between phenomena and noumena, which grants that the situational order between 
phenomena faithfully preserves the order of coexistence between the noumena. Hence, the 
continuity and potential infinity of the phenomena is not just a subjective perception of an actually 
                                                 
450 See, De Risi (2007, pp. 238-9).   
451 For a detailed discussion of the transcendental truth of Euclidean geometry and how it is connected with 
the transcendental determination of the imagination, see De Risi (2007, pp. 420-28).    
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discrete and infinite (or finite) manifold. Space and the potential infinity of its parts penetrates the 
world of phenomena in its entirety – from its innermost depths to its outmost boundaries. As will 
be seen (Chapter 6), this aspect of Kant’s transcendental ideality claim and his phenomenology is 
going to be decisive for his solution to the mathematical antinomies of Leibnizian cosmology.   
    To summarise, the transcendental ideality claim and hence the demarcation line between the 
phenomenal and the noumenal world, can be established independently of an argument from 
metaphysics.  The universal validity and necessity of Euclidean geometry shows that space is a law 
of sensibility, which conditions the phenomena and makes them belong to the physical space, which 
is the space of the sensible world. Furthermore, without space there would be no phenomena and 
more precisely no world of phenomena, for space is that which brings the phenomena together, 
without which they would not coexist. Thus, space constitutes the principle of the phenomenal 
world because it is essentially a singular, unique (unicum) and absolute whole (totus), which cannot 
be part of another whole.452  
 
5.4 God and the Ideality of Space   
 
In the subsequent sections (§§ 16-22), Kant looks at the question of the transcendental ideality of 
space and time, from a different point of view. The ideality and subjectivity of space and time also 
follows from the knowledge of the principles of the form of the intelligible world.453 Merely from 
the concept of God, as the principle of the coexistence of the substances “in” the intelligible world, 
it follows that God is virtually, not locally present to these substances. Space is, however, locally 
present to its contents, from which it follows that space cannot be identical with the omnipresence 
of God. Space is, in other words, distinct from the transcendental reality of God, which just goes to 
say that space is not the sensorium of God, as Kant argued above.  
   Once again Kant repeats the contention stated in § 13, namely that the principle of the form of the 
intelligible world is the principle according to which the coexistence and connection (“interaction”) 
between ontologically independent simple substances is possible. We cannot answer this question 
by considering the nature of the matter of the world, i.e. the nature of the simple substances: 
 
We are not here contemplating the world in respect of its matter, that is to say, in respect of the natures of 
the substances of which it consists, whether they are material or immaterial. We are contemplating the 
world in respect of its form, that is to say, in respect of how, in general, a connection between a plurality 
of substances comes to be, and how a totality between them is brought about. (Inaugural Dissertation §16, 
p. 401, Ak. 2, p. 407)    
 
    In all, this passage seems to be perfectly consistent with Beiser’s reading of the Inaugural 
Dissertation, according to which the Inaugural Dissertation “does not speculate about distinct kind 
of entities, but simply determines the necessary laws by which our reason can think of any object 
whatsoever.”454 The self-assurance with which Kant presents his transcendental ideality claim in § 
15, but also in § 16, is, however, proof of the opposite, I think.  
                                                 
452 Inaugural Dissertation, pp. 398, Ak. 2, p. 405. 
453 I will discuss the details of this argument somewhat closer below.   
454 Beiser (1999, p. 49).   
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    First of all Kant asserts that the intelligible world consists of substances, which contradicts 
Beiser’s claim that noumena “are not a type of existing thing, but simply the forms or structures to 
which any existing or possible thing must conform.”455 Secondly, although Kant denies that the 
question of the form of the intelligible world needs to take the nature of the interacting substances 
into consideration, it is quite clear that he takes them to be immaterial, for if they were material 
they would have to exist in space.456 However, it is true that this leaves it undetermined whether the 
substances are spiritual or not; the intelligible world might be a spiritual world, proceeding from 
the “pure love”457 of God, in the very midst of the world, as Swedenborg once had claimed, but that 
cannot be known.    
    In the subsequent section (§ 17) Kant explains that the interaction of simple substances, which 
constitute the parts of the composite substances, does not come about merely because they exist.458 
Simple substances do not interact, unless they coexist, but they do not coexist, merely because they 
subsist.459 Kant then explains that although simple substances are ontologically independent of each 
other, their existence is not necessary (§§ 18-20).  
    From this it follows that the noumenal world consists of contingent substances, which depend on 
some other, necessary substance for their existence – namely God (§§ 19-20).460  God is the ultimate 
ground of the reality of the intelligible world, and the principle under which the coexistence and 
interaction between the simple substances is possible. From the latter it also follows that God is the 
ultimate ground under which knowledge of the sensible world is possible, for the substances cannot 
produce the sensations that occur in our minds, unless they interact and are connected in God.  
   The latter contention does not come over as particularly original or controversial against the 
background of Kant’s familiar claim (e.g. New Elucidation), that God alone is the cause of the 
existence of the simple substances and their connectedness.461 The novelty of this claim is that it 
opens up the possibility of explaining our sensations as the outcome of an interaction between our 
soul and a substance, which is not phenomenal. Thus, in the final analysis, it is not the material 
bodies, but only the noumenal substrate of our bodies, which affects the sensibility and makes it 
produce sensations. Making the material bodies into infinite complexes of physical monads isolated 
from the life activities of the mind just forces us to let God enter the equation, in order to bridge the 
gap between the material and the spiritual. 
    Kant’s discussion of God as the principle of the form of the noumenal world is hence not only 
relevant to see how it fits into his earlier attempts to explain the unity of the world but also to 
                                                 
455 Beiser (1999, p. 49).     
456 Cf. Inaugural Dissertation § 13, p. 391,  Ak. 2, p. 398.   
457 Swedenborg, The Intercourse between the Soul and the Body, p.10.  
458 Inaugural Dissertation, § 17, p. 402, Ak. 2, p. 407.   
459 As we have seen, Kant intimates this already in § 2 and § 13, when he speaks about the principle of 
possible influences and the principle of the form of the intelligible world, though without explicitly 
mentioning that this principle is God.  
460 To me it seems quite clear that the order of dependence goes from the  common cause of all simple 
substances (God) to their mutual interaction and connection, not the other way around as Gattermann (1899, 
p. 9) claims.  
461 Paulsen (1875, p. 111) emphasises, correctly, that the concept of interaction leads to the concept of God, 
and thus to the concept of infinite reality, according to Kant.  The latter suggests an analogy between space 
and God, not only because both space and God are omnipresent, but also because both God and space are 
infinite. In this sense, space can be conceived under the concept of infinity, which is a pure intellectual 
concept.  The infinity of space is, however, an idea that cannot originate from anything except a pure 
intuition, i.e. not from the real use of the intellect.  The concept of space, which metaphysics searches for is 
pure, in the sense that there is nothing empirical mixed in it.  However, this does not mean that there is 
something in it, which originates from sources “outside” the intellect, and which is revealed in the 
exposition of the concept, as Kant will going to argue in the Transcendental Aesthetic (see Chapter 6).   
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understand his metaphysical arguments for the transcendental ideality of space. Thus, according to 
Kant God’s existence as a necessary substance makes it impossible for him to interact with 
contingent substances, which means that he exists as a cause detached from the world 
(extramundum), and not “in” the world. God is hence not locally, but virtually present to the 
contingent substances whose existence he upholds. Space is neither a property of God nor a relation 
between monads, and in this sense space is ideal.  
    Space brings, however, testimony to God’s omnipresence and immensity, for God is the principle 
under which relations are possible in the first place; space derives its reality from God, as Leibniz 
would express it.  Hence, though space is not identical with God’s inwardly presence to all things, 
we are still entitled to describe space as the appearance of God’s omnipresence: 
  
Hence, the mind only senses external things in virtue of the presence of the same common sustaining cause. 
Accordingly, space, which is the sensitively cognised universal and necessary condition of the co-presence 
of things, can be called PHENOMENAL OMNIPRESENCE. (For the cause of the universe is not present 
to each and every thing simply in virtue of the fact that that cause is in the places they are.462 It is rather 
the case that places exist, that is to say, that relations of substances are possible, because the cause of the 
universe is inwardly present  [intime praesens] to all things.) (Inaugural Dissertation § 22, Scholium, pp. 
404-5, Ak. 2, pp. 409-10) 
 
We see all things in space, not in God for God is virtually, not locally present to the monads he 
brings together. This is the very opposite of the view that God is present to all the things in the 
universe, because he occupies the same place as them. God is virtually, not locally, present to all 
things in the noumenal world, and this “inner” presence is the foundation of space as a phenomenon. 
Space is not just a phenomenon, but also an appearance of God’s omnipresence.  
    Hence, though Kant firmly rejects Malebranche’s occasionalism, he admits that there is a kind 
of paradoxical affinity between his view and Malebranche’s view, for it is exactly because we see 
all things in space, and not in God  that we cognise all things in the appearance of God’s 
omnipresence: 
 
However, it seems more advisable to keep close to the shore of the cognitions granted to us by the modest 
character of our understanding, rather than put out into the deep sea of such mystical investigations as 
Malebranche did. His view, the view namely that we intuit all things in God, is very close indeed to the 
one which is expounded here.  (Inaugural Dissertation, § 22, Scholium, p. 405, Ak. 2, p. 410) 
 
     From the Scholium of § 22 it follows indirectly that space is only a condition of the interaction 
of phenomenal substances, not the interaction of noumenal substances.  The soul merely interacts 
with the noumenal substrate of the phenomenal body, which gives the soul its point of view, because 
they are brought together in the presence of God. The harmony between the states of the soul, and 
the states of its body, is not pre-established by God from the outset of the creation, as Leibniz 
claims, but is the result of an interaction, which is possible since it does not have to occur in space.  
                                                 
462 Kant does not directly mention God in this sentence, but God is of course what Kant indirectly refers to 
here, namely as the “cause of the universe”.   
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5.5 The Subreptic Axioms and the Method of Metaphysics   
   
In the subsequent sections (§§ 23-30) Kant diagnoses the source of the errors made by the 
philosophers who ignore the demarcation line between sensibility and understanding and fail to 
recognise the transcendental ideality of space and time. Their mistakes are not a mere coincidence 
Kant argues, but an outcome of their flawed method. Their error shows itself in the way they first 
derive (usus realis) and then apply (usus logicus) their concepts and principles.463 The outcome is 
that they often transgress the demarcation line between the principles of sensibility and the 
principles of understanding.464  
     Thus, the principles of sensible cognition, i.e. space and time, spuriously present themselves as 
principles of intellectual cognition.465 Entire clusters of predicate concepts, which originate from 
the principles of sensible cognition, migrate from the world of phenomena to the world of noumena. 
When these predicate concepts (place, continuity, infinity, etc.) merge with the subject concepts of 
intelligible objects (monads, noumenal world, God, etc.) the result is a spurious hybrid principle, a 
so called “subreptic axiom” (axioma subrepticum), which infects the entire research programme of 
metaphysics like a virus in a body or a malware in a computer.466  
    On Kant’s view, these subreptic axioms can be divided into three “classes” (species). Only the 
subreptic axiom of the first class is relevant for the purposes of the present investigation.  This 
subreptic axiom states that everything that exists, is “somewhere” in space and “somewhen” in 
time.467 The illusions caused by this subreptic axiom explain why the followers of Leibniz tried to 
localise the monads in space. The ultimate consequence of this mistake is that even soul-like 
monads are localised in space:        
 
It is on this basis that there come to be bandied on those idle questions about the places in the corporeal 
world [universo corporeo] of immaterial substances (though, just because they are immaterial, there is no 
sensitive intuition of them, nor any representation of them under such a form), about the seat of the soul, 
and about other questions of the same kind.  And since what is sensitive and what belongs to understanding 
are improperly mixed together, like squares or circles, it often happens that one of the parties to the dispute 
presents the appearance of someone milking a billy-goat, and the other of someone holding a sieve 
underneath. But the presence of immaterial things in the corporeal world is a virtual and not a local 
presence (though the latter is improperly but repeatedly asserted to be the case). (Inaugural Dissertation, 
§ 27, p. 410, Ak. 2, p. 414) 
 
The presence of the immaterial monads is virtual and not local.468 This also explains why monads 
are immaterial substances and not atoms in space; the things we see in space are not identical with 
the things which exist in the omnipresence of God.469 Space is solely a condition of the interaction 
                                                 
463 Inaugural Dissertation, § 23, pp. 406-7, Ak. 2, pp. 410-11.  
464 Inaugural Dissertation, § 24, p. 407, Ak. 2, p. 411.   
465 Inaugural Dissertation, § 24, p. 408, Ak. 2, p. 412.  
466 Inaugural Dissertation, § 24, p. 408, Ak. 2, p. 412. 
467 Inaugural Dissertation, § 27, pp. 409-10, Ak. 2, pp. 413-4.  
468 Inaugural Dissertation, § 27, p. 410, Ak. 2, p. 414. Though Kant is cautious on this point, it seems quite 
clear that the interaction must occur between the monads themselves and in particular the monadic parts of 
their bodies, for there is no interaction between the monads and their phenomenal bodies.    
469 Only God can intuit the totality of the parts of the world, as if contained in God, for only God can be 
present to or “comprise” the world without being localised in it. The intuitions of God are, in other words, 
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of material phenomena, not of the things themselves, i.e. the monads; ignoring that restriction leads 
to the subreptic axiom that all things have to have a place somewhere.  
     Ultimately even God’s omnipresence is conceived as local rather than virtual, a mistake which 
Kant attributes to Clarke and Newton, as we have seen. Transgressing the demarcation line between 
sensible cognition and purely intellectual cognition thus leads to the subreptic notion of God as a 
composite being, who is locally rather than virtually present to the monads:  
 
The presence of God is imagined to be local, and God is enfolded in the world as if He were contained all 
at once in infinite space, the intention being to compensate for this limitation, it would seem, by means of 
this local presence conceived absolutely [per eminentiam], so to speak, that is to say, conceived as infinite. 
But it is absolutely impossible to be in several places at the same time, for different places are outside one 
another. It follows that what is in several places is outside itself and present to itself externally, and that is 
a contradiction. (Inaugural Dissertation, § 27, p. 410, Ak. 2, p 414)    
   
Intellectualising places and ascribing a place to God, who is omnipresent, consequently results in 
the absurd notion of God as present in several places at one and the same time.   
    To summarise, the main achievement of the transcendental turn – the real distinction between the 
sensible and the intellectual faculty of the soul – is a presupposition of Kant’s division between the 
principles of sensibility and the principles of understanding, from which the concepts of space, time, 
substance, causality and God can be derived. In the Inaugural Dissertation Kant argues that this 
division is closely related to the distinction between the principles of the sensible and the intelligible 
world; space and time are simply not properties of the real ground of the intelligible world, i.e. 
space and time are transcendentally ideal. The transcendental ideality of space follows, Kant argues, 
from the exposition of the concept of space as the concept of a pure singular intuition and as the 
source of necessary a priori propositions of Euclidean geometry.  
    However, to me it seems as if Kant suggests that the same result can be derived from what he 
says in §§ 8-9 about the concepts of metaphysics as pure and distinct from the concepts of 
sensibility, for instance the concepts of space and time. As Kant argues in these sections, thinking 
that space is transcendentally real, i.e. that all monads have a place is a subreptic proposition, is 
inconsistent with the concept of God as merely virtually present to the monads. Thus, Kant’s 
approach to the subreptitious fallacies of metaphysics is in this sense based on the premises of the 
critical metaphysics established as a result of the critical turn.  
 
5.6 The Path to the Transcendental Aesthetics and the Critique of Pure Reason  
 
Kant scholars often describe the decade following upon Kant’s presentation of the inaugural 
dissertation as the “silent decade”. However, traces of Kant’s thoughts are left in his letters and in 
his notes and lectures on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica and Meier’s Vernuftlehre. In the notes on 
metaphysics, Kant continues his defence of the transcendental ideality claim, as he tries to show 
how this can help us to avoid making the fallacy of using metaphysical concepts in a subreptitious 
way. Recognising the transcendental ideality of space also makes it possible to solve the 
contradictions between the mathematical and the metaphysical accounts of matter and bodies, 
                                                 
divine, rational intuitions, which are active, in the sense that they create the very objects that they represent. 
Cf. Inaugural Dissertation §§ 13, 16, pp. 391, 401, Ak. 2, pp. 398, 407.   
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which had haunted not only Leibniz but also Wolff and Knutzen. The transcendental ideality of 
space and time properly reveals the demarcation line between sensibility and the understanding, 
which separates the phenomenal objects of experience from the noumenal objects of understanding, 
which also are the object of pure metaphysical knowledge.   
    On the one hand, all of this seems to give further support for readings of the inaugural 
dissertation, which emphasise the similarities, rather than the differences, between the Inaugural 
Dissertation and the Critique of Pure Reason. On the other hand, such readings are not convincing 
unless they are able to explain why Kant found it necessary to revise the metaphysics presented in 
the Inaugural Dissertation. In short, they need to explain why Kant found it essential to spend 
another ten years in the provinces of East Prussia, working on the transcendental idealism he would 
come to defend in the Critique of Pure Reason, instead of moving to the more affluent Western 
parts of the kingdom and enjoying the fruits of his fame.470  
    Kant’s letters to his friends and colleagues in Berlin and other places are interesting in this 
context, since they open up a window to what going on in his head. In these letters, Kant reveals 
that he had strong doubts about the completeness of his metaphysics. One of the earliest letters, 
written in September 1770, just shortly after the disputation, was addressed to Lambert. This letter 
is interesting, not only because it suggests that Kant seems to have considered the inaugural 
dissertation as a very long and tardy reply to the ideas presented in Lambert’s letter four years 
earlier, but also because it gives a first indication of the weaknesses Kant had spotted in his 
inaugural dissertation:  
 
The most universal laws of sensibility play a deceptively large role in metaphysics, where, after all, it is 
merely concepts and principles of pure reason that are at issue. A quite special, though purely negative 
science, general phenomenology (phaenomologia [sic] generalis), seems to me to be presupposed by 
metaphysics [vor der Metaphysik vorhergehen zu müssen]. In it the principles of sensibility, their validity 
and their limitations, would be determined, so that these principles could not be confusedly applied to 
objects of pure reason, as has heretofore almost always happened.  For space and time, and the axioms for 
considering all things under conditions, are, with respect to empirical knowledge and all objects of sense, 
very real; they are actually the conditions of all appearances and of all empirical judgments.  But extremely 
mistaken conclusions emerge if we apply the basic concepts of sensibility to something that is not at all an 
object of sense, that is, something thought through a universal or a concept of understanding as a thing or 
substance in general, and so on. (Correspondence, p. 96, Ak. 10, p. 98) 
 
The goal Kant expresses here is not to uproot all transcendent, speculative metaphysics about the 
monads, the intelligible world, the mind and God – but to purify it from those spurious concepts 
that are produced when we transcend the limits of the principles of sensibility. For these principles 
are valid only of the objects of the phenomenal world, like atoms, material bodies, states of motion, 
etc.  
    In all, this suggests that the critical turn was not so much about entirely rejecting speculative 
metaphysics, as to delimit the horizon of the latter, by systematically identifying and eliminating 
all those subreptic axioms, from which atomism, materialism, and ultimately also occasionalism 
and idealism originated. This also gives the clue to the phenomenology he had outlined in his letter 
                                                 
470 1778 Zedlitz offered Kant the prestigious post as professor of philosophy in Halle, a chair that had been 
held by no one less than Wolff. Kant turned the offer down however.  For the details of this story, see 
Cassirer (1981, pp. 119-20).  
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to Lambert.471 Part of the phenomenology was already completed in the inaugural dissertation; in 
§§ 2-3 and § 5 of the Inaugural Dissertation Kant had adumbrated the principles of sensibility, but 
not with the “careful and extensive exposition” needed for a science of the origin, validity, and 
limits of the concepts of space and time, that he later would present in the Transcendental Aesthetic.  
    Fascinatingly, Lambert’s sharp eye spotted that Kant’s investigation promised to bring back the 
“true concept” of continuity to metaphysics, by preventing it from being mixed up with the concept 
of substantial composites (complexus entium simplicium). 472 He also agreed that the noumenal 
world is not localised in space. However, in the end he warned Kant from ignoring that space has a 
counterpart (simulachrum) in the noumenal world: 
 
The whole intelligible world [Gedankenwelt] is non-spatial; it does, however, have a spatial counterpart 
[Simulachrum], which is easily distinguishable from physical space. Perhaps this bears a still closer 
resemblance to it than merely a metaphoric one. (Correspondence, p. 117, Ak. 10, p. 108) 
  
    Kant, however, persistently defended the transcendental ideality claim, even in the face of the 
critique from close friends. For instance, in a letter from December 1770, Moses Mendelssohn 
pointed out to Kant that time might be subjective, but still also objective: 
 
Time is (according to Leibniz) a phenomenon and has, as do all appearances, an objective and a subjective 
aspect. The subjective is the continuity thereby represented; the objective is the succession of alterations 
that are rationata or consequences equidistant [gleichweit] from a common ground. (Correspondence, p. 
124, Ak. 10, pp. 115-6)  
 
However, none of this moved Kant away from his position. For instance, in a note dated 1769-1770 
or 1770-1771, Kant declares that the substances, i.e. the monads, cannot have any locations in space; 
locations can only be ascribed to “sensible representations”.473 Kant links the non-spatiality of the 
monads to the possibility of forming a universe (Weltganze), which he describes as an absolute 
totality (Absolutganze).474 The absoluteness belongs only to the intelligible world, which consists 
of simple parts.  
    Likewise, in a note, which Adickes dates to 1772 or 1776-8, Kant declares that simple substances 
cannot be parts of the sensible world.475 Only composites, like material bodies, can be parts of the 
sensible world, because they can be coordinated next to each other, Kant explains in a note from 
1773-1775.476 This coordination is not just an act of the mind, but also a form, under which they 
are represented.477   
   The condition under which this order is possible is space, which means that it is absolute, in the 
negative sense of not being an order or relation. Space is absolute not because it is something that 
                                                 
471 Most likely, the phenomenology was inspired by Lambert’s phenomenology, which he had presented in 
the second part of Neues Organon and which Kant was familiar with. The purpose of the phenomenology 
was to exhibit the illusions of human knowledge and their influence on the correctness/incorrectness of this 
knowledge; see Neues Organon (2), Phänomenologie, § 1 pp. 117-8.   
472 See, Correspondence, p. 15, Ak. 10, p. 106.  
473 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4316, Ak. 7, p. 504.   
474 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4525, Ak. 17, p. 582.    
475 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4534, Ak. 17, p. 585.   
476 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4673, Ak. 17, p. 639.   
477 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4673, Ak. 17, p. 639.   
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exists in itself as a container of the intelligible world, but because it is the ideal condition under 
which all outer things can be known. Otherwise, it would be impossible to have a priori knowledge 
of space: 
 
The spatium absolutum, this riddle of the philosophers, is something entirely actual [richtiges] (not reale, 
but ideale), otherwise one would not be able to say something a priori about it, and truly, not through 
general concepts, but through properties that let themselves be perceived at it through immediate 
apprehension [Fassung]. It is, however, not something external, but the condition of the form of all external 
representation, which exists in the mind itself. It is nothing imaginary (ens imaginarium), for it is the sole 
actual condition of the representation of actual external things [wirklicher äusserer Dinge]. The order of 
things which are next to each other is not space, but space is that which makes such an order, or better, 
coordination, possible.478  (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4673, Ak. 17, p. 639)    
 
    Space is absolute, but only in the sense that it contains the condition, in accordance with which 
it is possible to represent an order between different coexisting parts of an object, like for instance 
the three sides of a triangle, which originally occur to the imagination in different directions, to the 
left, to the right, etc. Therefore, space is also the condition under which these directions can be 
coordinated and brought to the unity of one whole.  Space cannot “belong” to things in themselves, 
neither as a determination, nor as a condition under which it can be represented, as Kant declares 
in the note quoted above.479 This contention is, Kant humbly remarks, of no great importance in 
mathematics and the special sciences; the significance of the thesis of the transcendental ideality of 
space is restricted to metaphysics: 
 
The question if space is something ideal (not imaginary) or real, does not interest the different sciences. It 
has not been brought to the attention of the mathematics, the mechanics and the general physics; and 
although Leibniz as well as Newton (I mention them above the other great names), assume its adherent 
and subsisting reality respectively, both posit it of things in the world, as if both space and time were two 
for themselves existing containers of the things.  And even if the ideality [of space J.J] is demonstrated by 
us, they [the sciences J.J.] cannot do anything differently with respect to such investigations. However, 
when these answers become transcendent things are different.480  (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4673, 
Ak. 17, p. 641) 
 
Though Kant’s characterisation of Leibniz’s metaphysics of space is rather crude (to put it mildly) 
it is of interest that he takes Leibniz to be an opponent to the transcendental ideality claim, along 
with Newton.481  
   In a note that Adickes dates to the end of the 1770s, or perhaps the beginning of the 1780s, Kant 
repeats, almost verbatim, the contention from the inaugural dissertation, namely that space cannot 
be a determination of objects in themselves.482 Typical of the pure space of geometry is that its unity 
                                                 
478 My translation, J.J.   
479 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4673, Ak. 17, p. 640.  
480 My translation, J.J.   
481 It goes without saying that the metaphysical importance of the transcendental ideality claim extends to 
such principles as Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles; the latter holds only for the noumena, 
not for the appearances in space. 
482 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 5298, Ak. 18, p. 147.   
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anticipates the plurality of its parts, which entails that it is infinitely divisible, which of course is 
not the case with the noumena and the noumenal, intelligible world in general.483  
    Kant returns to the issue of how the transcendental ideality claim is connected with the nature of 
geometry in a note, which Adickes dates to about the same time as the note above. The possibility 
of having geometric knowledge of space which is a priori and necessary is, Kant repeats, not 
consistent with Leibniz’s claim that the concept of space is derived from the objects of knowledge 
(Sachen).484 Had space been a determination of things in themselves, it would become necessary 
for us to intuit the truths about space in God:  
 
Had space been something objective and necessary, from where would we know that?485 We can derive 
no proposition from experience, which simultaneously also could be known as plainly [schlechthin] 
necessary, and a priori is it not known and not knowable. The representation would have to be acquired, 
but then it would also not be necessary. Thus, it must be intuited in God.486 (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik 
Nr 5329, Ak. 18, p. 153) 
 
The necessity of Euclidean geometry supports the contention that we have knowledge of outer 
things not in God, but in space, in accordance with the principles that are internal to the sensible 
world and not in God. The distinction between space as a principle of the form of the sensible world 
and God as a principle of the noumenal world, which Kant introduced in the Inaugural Dissertation, 
is justified by an epistemological argument from geometry, which is independent of metaphysics 
and theology.      
    In the notes on metaphysics from the late 1770s, Kant also makes it clear that the pure intellectual 
concepts, such as the concept of substance, causality, totality, etc., necessarily apply to phenomenal 
objects. The determinations under which pure intellectual concepts apply to the objects in the 
sensible world must, however, not be conferred to noumenal objects. The distinction between 
sensibility and understanding is mirrored not only in the distinction between principles of sensibility 
and understanding but more profoundly in the distinction between immanent and transcendent uses 
of the pure concepts of the intellect.  Only thus can we avoid the antinomies that ensnares 
metaphysics. In the beginning of the 1780s, Kant would present these results in public.  
 
 
                                                 
483 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 5299, Ak. 18, p. 147.   
484 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 5327, Ak. 18, p. 153 
485 Question mark added by me J.J.  
486 My translation, J.J. The dating of this note is unclear, but according to Adickes Kant wrote it no earlier 
than 1773 and perhaps even as late as the 1780s.    
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6. The Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Ideality Claim    
 
 
We should now be in a position to deal with Kant’s answer to the question of the reality of space 
during the mature phase of the critical period. This leads us to the Critique of Pure Reason and 
Kant’s arguments for the transcendental ideality of space, which he presents in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic. The starting-point of this chapter is Kant’s outline of a phenomenology of space and the 
Transcendental Aesthetic as the science of the principles of a priori sensibility. Section two, 
introduces Kant’s method of isolating the determinations, which belong to the principles (forms) of 
sensibility.   
    Section three, discusses how this leaves us with only figure and extension. Contrary to what 
contemporary critics claim, Kant’s method is vital to understand what the Transcendental Aesthetic 
tries to accomplish, in particular with respect to the proof of the transcendental ideality of space. 
Section four, shows that Kant operates with two concepts of space in the Transcendental Aesthetic: 
the concept of geometric spaces and the concept of metaphysical space. The origin and content of 
the metaphysical concept of space is the pure extension, uncovered by the method of abstraction, 
which belongs to the form of (outer) sensibility. The exposition of the metaphysical concept of 
space, which Kant already outlined in the Inaugural Dissertation (Chapter 5), must not be confused 
with the exhibition of how figures and other spaces are determined in agreement with the concepts 
of Euclidean geometry. Instead, the exposition of the metaphysical concept of space exhibits how 
the subjective space is originally given to us, namely as a unique, indivisible, infinite and continuous 
formal ground of all outer appearances and geometric objects. Kant thinks that this shows that space 
is not an empirical concept but must be given to us in a pure intuition.  
    Section five deals with the Leibnizian alternatives to Kant’s transcendental ideality claim. The 
core of the Leibnizian alternatives, suggested by critics like Eberhard and Pistorius, is that Kant 
overlooked the possibility that space might be partly real and partly ideal. The basic conclusion of 
this section is that the exposition of the metaphysical concept of space provides Kant with an 
argument against the Leibnizian alternatives. The exposition of the pure extension, which the 
method of isolation uncovers, shows that space is a continuous whole which cannot be reduced to 
an all-encompassing order or place of all places. Thus, a mere order of spatially localised simple 
substances (noumena) cannot explain what it is that makes the original phenomenon of space 
continuous, and in this sense it is not real, something which even Eberhard admits.  However, as 
will be seen, Kant’s argument still falls short of completely rejecting the Leibnizian alternative, 
because he cannot (and perhaps does not want to) exclude the possibility that there is a 
correspondence between the spatial order of phenomena and the order of coexistence of noumena.  
 
 
6.1 The Idea of the Transcendental Aesthetic  
 
Kant’s idea of a Transcendental Aesthetic, i.e. a science of the principles of a priori sensibility, can 
most likely be traced back to a letter to Lambert. In this letter, written shortly after the presentation 
of his inaugural dissertation, Kant had suggested that metaphysics presupposes a “general 
phenomenology”.487 In the letter, he envisioned this general phenomenology as a “purely negative 
                                                 
487 Correspondence, p. 96, Ak. 10, p. 98. 
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science”, which would determine the validity and limits of the principles of sensibility. In particular, 
Kant envisaged that an investigation into the validity and limits of the principles of sensibility was 
necessary in order to avoid that they were applied to the pure, noumenal objects of thought, most 
notably God and the intelligible world of monads: 
  
A quite special, though purely negative science, general phenomenology (phaenomologia [sic] generalis), 
seems to me to be presupposed by metaphysics. In it the principles of sensibility, their validity and their 
limitations, would be determined, so that these principles could not be confusedly applied to objects of 
pure reason, as has heretofore almost always happened.  For space and time, and the axioms for considering 
all things under conditions, are, with respect to empirical knowledge and all objects of sense, very real; 
they are actually the conditions of all appearances and of all empirical judgments. But extremely mistaken 
conclusions emerge if we apply the basic concepts of sensibility to something that is not at all an object of 
sense, that is, something thought through a universal or a concept of understanding as a thing or substance 
in general, and so on. (Correspondence, p. 108, Ak. 10, p. 98) 
 
    The reason for calling this negative science “transcendental aesthetic” and not “general 
phenomenology” probably goes back to Baumgarten, who used the term “aesthetics” as the name 
of the science of the principles of sensible knowledge.488 The section on the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, in the Critique of Pure Reason was therefore probably worked out in agreement with the 
plan he had outlined in his letter to Lambert.   
    This makes it necessary to dig a little bit deeper into Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic and the 
role it plays in his transcendental philosophy and in particular his metaphysics. Kant divides all 
transcendental philosophy into two branches: critique and metaphysics, which includes the 
metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals.489 Transcendental philosophy as critique 
investigates into the origin, extent and limits (Gränzen) of the pure knowledge, which follows 
merely from the principles of the faculty of reason, in the wider sense.490 It is this pure knowledge 
which metaphysics presents in a systematic form. The systematic part of metaphysics includes both 
general metaphysics and special metaphysics. Whereas the general metaphysics of nature contains 
ontology and critique, 491 special metaphysics contains rational cosmology, rational physics, 
rational psychology and rational theology 492  
   Metaphysics considered so far does not tell us anything about how the objects of pure knowledge 
are given. Kant marks this by adding that metaphysics not only contains the principles of pure 
reason, but also a physiology of reason, which contains the principles in accordance with which an 
                                                 
488 Baumgarten’s use of the term “aesthetic” is discussed by Vaihinger (1895, pp. 113-4). Kant makes an 
explicit reference to Baumgarten’s aesthetic in A21/B35.   
489 A841/B869. Things are complicated by the fact that Kant, occasionally, uses the term “philosophy” to 
denote all metaphysics, including both the metaphysics of morals and the metaphysics of nature.    
490 Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29, pp. 779-81, 786-7; for a similar discussion of the nature of 
transcendental philosophy as critique in the Critique of Pure Reason, see A2-6/B6-10.    
491 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 4851, Ak. 18, p. 9. Kant’s terminology is partly confusing, for general 
metaphysics belongs to the systematic part of transcendental philosophy, and should just contain ontology. 
To me it seems as if this difficulty can be solved if it is kept in mind that Kant sometimes uses the term 
“metaphysics” in a wider sense, namely as another term for transcendental philosophy. (See for instance 
A841/B869.) General metaphysics as transcendental philosophy therefore contains both a critique and a 
systematic part, namely ontology. Accordingly, transcendental philosophy is ontology when it deals with 
the universal predicates of an object in general, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding or categories, but 
critique insofar it investigates the origin, validity and limits of these concepts. 
492 A846-7/B874-5. 
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object is given, either to the sensibility or independently of the sensibility.493 In the former case, the 
physiology is immanent; in the latter case, the physiology is transcendent.494       
    The Transcendental Aesthetic is therefore simply transcendental philosophy, applied to the 
immanent physiology. This means that it is both critique and metaphysics. It is metaphysics insofar 
as it exhibits our knowledge of space and time as they are originally given to the sensibility.  
However, it is a critique, insofar as it isolates the elementary principles or forms, from which pure 
sensible knowledge originates and by virtue of which its extension and limits can be determined.  
It is in the latter sense that the Transcendental Aesthetic can be seen as a continuation of Kant’s 
plan for a general phenomenology. Let us now consider the Transcendental Aesthetic in some closer 
detail.  
 
 
6.2 Sensations, Empirical Intuitions and Thoughts 
 
On the assumption that the Transcendental Aesthetic is a science, which investigates the origin of 
the pure knowledge of space merely from our sensibility, we can expect that Kant is going to isolate 
the principles of this sensibility. In § 1 of the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant explains that this 
method of isolation or abstraction involves two steps.  In the first step, we “isolate” (isolieren) the 
sensibility by “separating off” (abondern) its representations (i.e. the empirical intuitions) from the 
concepts of understanding.495 In the second step, the empirical intuitions are, in their turn, 
“detached” (abgetrennt) from the a posteriori contributions of the sensibility, namely the 
sensations.496 In this way we will be left with the determinations which belong to the pure forms or 
principles of the sensibility from which the pure knowledge of space and time originates.  
    Kant prepares the isolation of the sensibility by introducing his readers to a definition of 
“intuition”, which is immediately followed by a definition of “sensibility”. Sensibility is essentially 
a faculty or capacity (Fähigkeit) for receiving representations “through the mode in which we are 
affected by objects.”497 The immediate result of the sensibility being affected by an object is a 
sensation.498 The intuition of an object, through a sensation, is an empirical intuition.499 Typical of 
an intuition is that it is immediately related to an object, which is given to it without the mediation 
of any universal marks or characters.500  
    In the opposite case, when the mind is related to the object through the mediation of characters 
there is thought, which is a universal representation.501 Implicitly this suggests that intuitions are 
passively given, immediate, and singular representations of objects, whereas thoughts are actively 
produced, mediated, and universal representations of the characters or marks of these objects.502  
                                                 
493 A845/B874.   
494 A845-6/B873-4.  
495 A22/B36.  
496 A22/B36. 
497 A19/B33.  
498 A20/B34.  
499 A20/B34. 
500 A19/B33.  
501 The claim that thoughts are universal representations and that intuitions are singular representations, is 
not made explicitly in the passage quoted above, but can be found for instance in Kant’s Logik, Ak. 9, p. 91.   
502 The singularity of empirical intuitions is not mentioned in the passage quoted above; an explicit 
reference to their singularity occurs first in A320/B376.  
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    The intuitions come with different degrees of clarity.503 However, according to Kant, there is no 
way that empirical intuitions could become representations of the things in themselves, even if we 
could bring them to the highest degree of clarity and distinctness. The intuitions are, in other words, 
not confused representations of things in themselves. However clear (“transparent”) an appearance 
may be, it will not become an object of pure thought, that is, a representation of a thing in itself.504   
    The understanding on the other hand represents objects spontaneously without being affected by 
them. Whereas the sensibility is passive because it receives intuitions of objects, the understanding 
is active because it forms concepts and applies them to objects.505 The difference between the 
sensible and the intelligible faculty of the soul cannot be reduced to a merely logical difference, a 
view that Kant attributes to Leibniz and Wolff.506 The sensibility is different from the 
understanding, not because it represents the objects with less clarity and distinctness, but because 
its representations have a different “origin and content”507 than the representations of the 
understanding.  
 
 
6.3 Appearances: Matter and Form   
 
On the basis of the distinction between sensibility and understanding, Kant concludes that an object 
of sensibility must be an undetermined object of the empirical intuition – an appearance.508  This 
seems to follow from what Kant says about the empirical intuitions, for as objects of representations 
received by the sensibility, appearances are not immediate objects of understanding.  The matter of 
the appearance is that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation, and which is given by the 
sensibility.509 Sensible qualities or realities, such as for instance colours, sounds, etc., correspond 
to sensations, but are not identical with them.510 The sensibility is that which gives matter to our 
representations, as Kant puts it.511 
    Removing sensations from empirical intuitions leaves us with the form of appearances, namely 
space and time. The form of appearances is, Kant explains, the formal ground, which makes (macht) 
                                                 
503 See Reflexionen zur Logik, Nr. 2377, 2383 in Ak. 16, pp. 337-8. The attention, which depends on strong 
impressions, is involuntary according to Kant, and should not be confused with the voluntary attention 
involved in the act by which an appearance is brought under concepts.  This view is in line with 
Baumgarten’s psychology of attention, which Kant seems to have defended at least in some of the earlier 
lecture notes, Metaphysik Herder, Ak. 28, pp. 850, 869.  According to Baumgarten, the sensation is clearer 
the stronger the impression is. Moreover, I attend to that which I clearly represent (perceive). See 
Metaphysica, § 537 and § 529. 
504 A43/B60.    
505 For a critique of Kant’s distinction between intuitions and thought, see Falkenstein (2004, pp. 28-32). 
According to Falkenstein Kant conflated intuitions and singular representations, which made it difficult for 
Kant to explain how the understanding can represent singular objects. 
506  A44/B61-2. For a closer discussion of Kant’s critique of Wolff (and Baumgarten) with respect to the 
distinction between sensibility and understanding, see Chapter 3, section 5.   
507 A44/B62.  
508 Later, in the so called Amphibolies, Kant returns to this theme, where he connects it with the view that 
Leibniz “intellectualised” the phenomena, a charge which echoes his diagnosis of the origins of subreptic 
axioms presented in the Inaugural Dissertation.   
509 A20/B34.  
510 Following the terminology of Vaihinger (1892, pp. 57-8) this amounts to a “real difference” between 
sensations and the matter of the appearances.    
511 Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Nr.  339, Ak. 15, p. 134.  
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it possible to intuit the manifold of appearances as ordered in spatial and temporal relations.512  
Otherwise, appearances will be uncoordinated and confused.  The form of appearances is therefore 
the principle or condition, in accordance with which appearances can be represented outside each 
other, or as succeeding each other.513 From this Kant concludes that the form of appearances must 
“lie ready”514 for the sensations, as an a priori form in the mind.   
    In other words, the form is not the order of appearances, but that which makes the order possible. 
More exactly, the form makes it possible that appearances are given to the sensibility as ordered.  
In other words, the order is not produced by the sensibility, as Kant seems to have argued in the late 
1760s and in the Inaugural Dissertation.515 Orders are produced only insofar as the spatial and 
temporal manifold is combined (or re-combined) in a figurative synthesis in the active part of the 
sensibility, i.e. in the imagination.516 Without a figurative synthesis, it would be impossible have a 
definite, distinct empirical intuition of an appearance of a definite duration, size, and shape, within 
the unity of a perceptual image, which can be recognised under a concept.517   
    In a subsequent passage Kant suggests that we can know what “belongs” (gehört) to this form of 
sensibility by abstraction, in accordance with the method of isolation.  Kant presents the following 
example of how to apply this method: 
 
Thus, if I take away [absondere] from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks in 
regard to it, substance, force, divisibility, etc., and likewise what belongs [gehört] to sensation, 
impenetrability, hardness, colour etc., something still remains over from this empirical intuition, namely 
extension [Audehnung] and figure [Gestalt]. These belong to [gehören] pure intuition, which, even without 
any actual object of the senses or of sensation, exists in the mind a priori as a mere form of sensibility. 
(A20-1/ B35) 
 
The key is to conceive the body from a transcendental point of view, i.e. as a mere representation, 
and not as a real thing. Euler neglected this distinction, and this is the explanation as to why he 
concluded that reflection and abstraction only present us with the idea of place in general. However, 
once the body is conceived as an appearance or representation, we can abstract and isolate an 
entirely new type of determinations, which originates from the form of sensibility, rather than the 
sensations.  
                                                 
512 A20/B34.  
513 The forms which occur in the Transcendental Aesthetic are thus more like the principles of the forms of 
the sensible world, which Kant discussed in the Inaugural Dissertation.  For a critical remark on Kant’s 
terminological shift, see Vaihinger (1894, p. 60).  
514 A20/B34.  
515 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 72-104) gives an ambitious interpretation of Kant’s concept of spatial form in 
terms of an order, which on one hand is a priori and innate, namely with respect to its structural and 
topological properties, and on the other hand as a posteriori and given, namely as the order in which 
sensations and appearances are given. To me this seems acceptable, as long as one keeps in mind that space 
cannot be reduced to an order, according to Kant, namely because it is a continuous whole.   
516 A figurative synthesis (B151) is the product of imagination. Thus, the imagination takes the role, which 
Kant previously ascribed to the faculty of intuition. For a discussion of the faculty of intuition, see Chapter 
3, section 5.  
517 According to Kant, confusion is the cause of the indistinctness of a representation. However, from this it 
does not follow that distinctness arises merely because there is an order; what is ordered needs to be re-
combined and taken up within the unity of consciousness under a concept, for instance the concept of a 
figure, etc. “Distinctness alone makes it possible that an aggregate of representations becomes knowledge, 
in which order is thought in this manifold, because every conscious combination presupposes unity of 
consciousness, and consequently a rule for the combination.” See, Anthropology, p. 26, Ak. 7, p. 138.     
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   In the lecture notes taken by Mrongovius, Kant illustrates his method, by applying it to the 
empirical intuition of a piece of chalk.518 Thus, taking the empirical intuition of the chalk in 
abstraction from the sensation of its impenetrability, dryness and whiteness and the thought of its 
substantiality, divisibility and force, leaves us with nothing but extension and figure. Extension and 
shape therefore originally belong to the contributions of the form of sensibility or pure intuition, 
i.e. the empirical intuition taken in abstraction from the sensible content it contains. Thus, unlike 
the proto-expositions in § 15 of the inaugural dissertation, Kant no longer describes the pure 
intuition as a concept; the concept of space derives from a determination, which belongs to the pure 
intuition, namely extension, but it is not a pure intuition.  
   In the rest of § 1 Kant explains that he no longer reserves the term “form” for the relations of 
coexistence and succession, which are possible in space and time. Instead, he uses “form” to 
designate space and time, considered as conditions of relations of coexistence and succession. The 
forms of appearances, namely space and time, are thus identical with the principles of a priori 
sensible cognition, which are the starting-points of the investigation of the Transcendental 
Aesthetic.519 Isolating the principle or form from which the pure sensible knowledge of space 
originates, would then put us in a position to determine its validity and limits, in accordance with 
the programme Kant outlined for the Transcendental Aesthetic.  
    Many commentators have argued that the situation is much more complicated. They argue that 
there can be no pure knowledge of space unless understanding conceptualises the pure intuition of 
space. Here understanding has to rely on the active part of the sensibility, the imagination, for a 
determinate Euclidean space that can be brought under a concept depends on a figurative synthesis 
of the manifold of the pure intuition of space. Understanding knows space, only by geometric 
constructions of lines, angles, circles, and other spaces of Euclidean geometry. The Transcendental 
Aesthetic is the science of the principles of Euclidean geometry, its origin, validity, and limits.     
    Inasmuch as the figurative synthesis of imagination is determined by the understanding, it seems 
to follow that the unity of space is the product of understanding, rather than immediately given to 
the sensibility. This so called “conceptualist interpretation” of the Transcendental Aesthetic, 
supported by Michael Friedman and Beatrice Longuenesse among others, finds rich support in a 
famous footnote to the B-version of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction (B160-1).520 In this footnote, 
Kant explains that the representation of space as a geometric object, in a formal intuition, i.e. a 
geometric construction, requires more than just a form of sensibility, namely the representation of 
a unity, which can be brought under concepts. Furthermore, this unity “presupposes a synthesis 
which does not belong (angehört) to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time 
first become possible.”521 Thus, even if the unity of the formal intuition of space does not “belong” 
(gehört) to a concept of understanding, Kant still underlines that it presupposes a (figurative) 
synthesis, which makes the sensibility determined by the understanding.522     
    Critics of the conceptualist interpretation, like Michel Fichant,523 Christian Onof, and Dennis 
Schulting524 underline that Kant actually makes a distinction between the concepts of Euclidean 
                                                 
518 Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29, pp. 795-6.  
519 A21-2/B35-6.   
520 For a discussion of the conceptualist interpretation and Friedman’s and Longuenesse’s views in 
particular, see Onof/Schulting (2014, pp. 290-1) and Lydia Patton (2011, pp. 277-81).    
521 B161, footnote.   
522 B161, footnote.   
523 Fichant (2004, pp. 530-550).   
524 Onof/Schulting (2014, pp. 285-304).    
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spaces and the concept of the immediately given space of the sensibility. It is this latter concept 
which Kant refers to as the concept of the “metaphysically, i.e. immediately, but merely subjectively 
given space”, in a reply to the respected mathematician Abraham Gotthelf Kästner (1719-1800).525 
Thus, the conceptualist interpretation confuses the metaphysical concept of space with the concept 
of a Euclidean space, e.g. a straight line, which is a made concept of a formal intuition. The concept 
of the straight line and the Euclidean postulate that a straight line can be drawn between any two 
points, presuppose the construction of a straight line, but this construction presupposes in its turn 
the immediately given, infinite metaphysical space. We must therefore resist the temptation to think 
that the metaphysical concept of space is related to space in the same way that the concepts of 
Euclidean geometry are related to space. 
    Pure knowledge from the metaphysical concept of space is knowledge of what belongs to the 
spatiality of space as a whole, which is originally given to us prior to the Euclidean spaces. It is 
presented in the form of an analysis or exposition of the concept of the metaphysical concept of 
space. Pure knowledge of the metaphysical space originates from the form of outer sensibility and 
extends no further than to the objects conditioned by this form, which also sets the limits of any 
knowledge derived from the metaphysical space. However, with this said, the question still remains 
as to how the metaphysical concept of space is related to the immediately given, subjective space.   
    Here Onof and Schulting argue that imagination and ultimately understanding have a peculiar 
role to play.526 The original, subjectively given space, as a form of outer sensibility, has an absolute, 
inner unity of its own (sui generis), which is different from the unity of a Euclidean space, a line, 
an angle, a circle, etc.527  However, in order for that unity to become a “unity for my cognition”,528 
the manifold of spaces, which are given by the form of outer sensibility, must be apprehended, 
synthesised and brought to the unity of a formal intuition.529 This formal intuition is not a geometric 
construction, but rather something resembling a transcendental schema, whereby the unity of the 
form of outer sensibility is determined under the categories.530    
    Indirectly, this suggests that the exposition of the metaphysical concept of space presents us with 
determinations of the metaphysical space, which stand under the categories. Onof and Schulting 
make no detailed suggestions about how to reread Kant’s exposition of the metaphysical concept 
of space in the light of their interpretation of the pure knowledge of space, but an attempt to fill this 
lacuna has been presented in a relatively recent paper by Henny Blomme.531 On Blomme’s 
interpretation, the metaphysical space is determined in regard to the categories of modality, relation, 
quality and quantity.532  
    For instance, according to Blomme we have an actual representation of space, from which he 
concludes that we have the representation of an actual space, which exists at a determinate time, in 
accordance with the transcendental schema of actuality.533 However, because space is a necessary 
condition of outer experience, Blomme concludes that space necessarily exists at all times, in 
accordance with the transcendental schema of necessity534 and moreover as a permanent, 
                                                 
525 Über Kästners Abhandlungen, Ak. 20, p. 420  
526 Onof/Schulting (2014, pp. 295-6).    
527 Onof/Schulting (2014, p. 295).    
528 Onof/Schulting (2014, p. 296).    
529 Onof/Schulting (2014, pp. 297-8). 
530 Onof/Schulting (2014, pp. 296-7). 
531 Blomme (2012, pp. 152-4).  
532 Blomme (2012, p. 152).   
533 Blomme (2012, p. 153).   
534 Blomme (2012, pp. 155-6). 
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(necessary) ground or substrate of outer intuitions, in accordance with the transcendental schema 
of substance.535    
    The trouble with Blomme’s reconstruction of the exposition, which he partly shares with Onof 
and Schulting, is that he makes the original subjective space into a substratum or substance, which 
moreover necessarily exists, like God.536 However, as we have seen (Chapter 5), Kant quite 
explicitly denies that space is a necessary substance. Space is not God or an accident of God.  
   Space is not even a phenomenal substance, according to Kant, for the category of substance 
applies only to the real permanent substrates in time, in accordance with the transcendental schema 
of the category of substance.537 Space is at most permanent,538 but only if there is time in space, i.e. 
only insofar as it is filled with real, material substances, which move in space.  Taken as a pure 
form, space does not have a determinate existence in time (Dasein), which means that it cannot be 
sensed. As a pure form of sensibility, space does not strictly exist at all, but is the representation of 
the “mere possibility of coexistence”.539  The exposition of the metaphysical concept of space has 
no other datum than the pure extension that belongs to the original phenomenon of space, and which 
the method of isolation reveals.540  Let us consider this point further.  
 
 
6.4 The Metaphysical Expositions and the Third Alternative 
 
We have already seen how Kant, in the end of the 1760s, pointed out that space is not a concept, 
neither an empirical concept of reflection, nor a pure concept of reflection. However, in spite of 
this, Kant also pointed out that metaphysics was still in search of a pure concept of space. Though 
Kant’s observation is ambiguous it seems as if he wants to make a distinction between what space 
is, namely a pure form of the sensibility and our concept of this pure form. The latter concept is the 
concept of the metaphysical, immediately given space, which is the concept of a formal ground, a 
principle of sensibility, which underlies the appearances and their primary qualities 
(Bestimmungen).   
   The ambiguity between space as a form and the concept of space as a pure intellectual concept of 
this form might explain why Kant refers to his investigation of the origin, validity, and limits of the 
pure knowledge of space, as something that evolves from a “Metaphysical Exposition of the 
Concept of Space” (Metaphysische Erörterung dieses Begriffs). 541 In his logic, Kant presents an 
exposition as a way of making the content of a given concept distinct. Thus, an exposition is a 
                                                 
535 Blomme (2012, pp. 157-8).  
536 Blomme (2012, pp. 157-8). In all fairness, it must be noted that Blomme’s interpretation only entails that 
space is a substance, in the limited sense that it is the substratum of all appearances.  Thus, space is not a 
“physical substance”, according to Blomme, which adds further complexity to his interpretation. 
537 A143/B183.  
538 B291.  
539 A274. For a closer discussion of this passage, see Heidegger (1997, pp. 100-1). Kant is ambiguous, 
however, and sometime he speaks about space as something which “exists at all times”; see Brittan (1978, 
pp. 147-8).   
540 Blomme (2012, p. 150) rejects of course Kant’s method of abstraction or isolation, and in this he is on 
the same page as Falkenstein (2004, p. 149).   
541 Logik §§ 102-5, Ak. 9, pp. 141-3. Vaihinger (1892, pp. 155-6) finds Kant’s way of using the term 
“exposition” is “awkward”, but to me it is seems at least consistent with how expositions are presented in 
the Logic.  
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successive synthesis of the marks of a concept, which proceeds from, and immediately takes the 
form of an analysis:  
 
The exposition of a concept consists in the connecting [einander hängenden] (successive) representation 
of its marks [Merkmale], so far these have been found by analysis. (Logik, § 105, Ak. 9, p. 143)  
 
    The exposition of a given concept is different from the construction of an arbitrarily made 
concept, like the triangle on a blackboard. Whereas the exposition of a given concept only result in 
an incomplete analytic definition, the construction of a made concept results in a synthetic 
definition, which is complete. Insofar as the concept, which is analysed, is given a priori, the 
exposition is metaphysical: 
 
By exposition (expositio) I mean the clear, though not necessarily exhaustive, representation of that which 
belongs to a concept: the exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which exhibits the concept as 
given a priori.  (B38)  
 
   The Metaphysical Exposition of the concept of space is consequently different from the 
construction of a concept of Euclidean geometry, but it is also different from the exposition of an 
empirical concept, since it exhibits the concept of space as the concept of an a priori given form of 
sensibility.   
    One obvious problem with this account of the Metaphysical Expositions is that it seems 
inconsistent with Kant’s declaration that the originally given space is a form of sensibility. As for 
instance Falkenstein points out, this view suggests that we cannot have any knowledge of the 
original space, for as a pure intuition it is indeterminate (“blind”).542 The form that has been 
separated and isolated from the sensations and concepts of understanding cannot be known as such. 
Later, in his comments on Kästner, Kant brings attention to this dilemma by pointing out the 
difference between the immediately and subjectively given metaphysical space and the constructed 
and objectively given spaces of geometry.543 Whereas the subjective space cannot be brought under 
geometric concepts, the objective spaces can.   
    Thus, the topic of the Metaphysical Exposition is the concept of the original, subjective space, 
not the concepts of Euclidean spaces. The original space is not given to us in a pure, formal intuition; 
rather it is immediately given to us as a pure form of outer sensibility – a pure intuition of space. 
This may seem troubling for the kind of exposition Kant wants to undertake, for the concept of the 
form does not seem to be any more determinate than the form itself.  The situation seems to be that 
only a figurative synthesis of the imagination can provide the concept of space with a determinate 
content, in agreement with the conceptualist interpretation discussed in the previous section. It is 
only the concept of geometric spaces that can be constructed and therefore exhibited.  
     None of this seems a devastating blow against the possibility of an exposition of the concept of 
an originally given space, if understanding has access to some determination of space, which 
belongs to it originally, prior to the figurative syntheses of imagination, which occurs in the 
construction of the concepts of Euclidean geometry. In the isolation passage quoted above (A20-
1/B35), Kant gives two candidates for such a determination, namely extension (Ausdehnung) and 
figure (Gestalt). Figure it cannot be, for it is the product of a figurative synthesis of the imagination, 
but extension is a possible candidate. This extension is not the extension of the bodies, but the 
                                                 
542 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 55-7). 
543 Über Kästners Abhandlungen, Ak. 20, p. 420. 
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extension of the pure space, which Locke was looking for but could not find, according to 
Leibniz.544   
    If this is true, it follows that the exposition of the concept of extension, which gives access to a 
pure knowledge of the original, metaphysical space, which is different from, and in some sense 
even prior to, the kind of pure knowledge we have in Euclidean geometry. Thus, the Metaphysical 
Exposition exhibits how space is given to us, prior to its geometrical determinations. Kant expresses 
this view in the following way in his comments on Kästner:   
 
Metaphysics must show how one can have the representation of space, geometry however teaches how 
one can describe a space, viz., exhibit one in the representation a priori (not by drawing). In the former, 
space is considered in the way it is given, before all determination of it in conformity with a certain concept 
of object. In the latter, one [i.e. a space] is constructed [gemacht]. 545 (On Kästner’s Treatise, p. 307, Ak. 
20, p. 419) 
 
    The metaphysical originally given space is hence not a space within the boundaries of a geometric 
figure, but a presupposition for the representation of any such space. From this it follows that the 
originally given space is indivisible, for all spaces within boundaries are parts of the same unlimited 
space.546 Space is hence originally given as an actually infinite unity, with potentially infinite parts, 
which means that it is given as a continuous quantity, i.e. as a whole, which contains an 
indeterminate multitude of parts. 
    From this Metaphysical Exposition of the concept of space Kant concludes it is possible to show 
that space is originally presented to us in an a priori intuition.  For as the ground of outer intuitions, 
it must be given to us a priori, and as an indivisible whole of potentially infinite parts it must be 
unique and therefore presented to us in an intuition.547 Taken together, these two points seems to 
cover Kant’s declaration that the Transcendental Aesthetic is about the origin of the knowledge of 
space (and time). However, it could also be argued that the Metaphysical Exposition (at least taken 
together with the Transcendental Exposition) also covers the issue of the validity of the knowledge 
                                                 
544 Thus, Kant’s metaphysical space comes quite close to Locke’s pure space (Chapter 4), i.e. a pure, 
indivisible, infinite unity, without real separable parts. To me it seems as if Kant’s metaphysical space also 
comes quite close to how extension is conceived by Spinoza, in the famous scholion to proposition 15, in 
the second part of the Ethics. Viljanen (2007, p. 119) effectively summarises this scholion in the following 
way: “Spinoza makes there a distinction between two ways of conceiving extended nature. He claims that 
those who are inclined to divide extension attend to it only superficially, as it appears to our senses, and 
consequently find it to be composed of parts. But if the intellect attends to extended nature as a substance, 
Spinoza insists that ‘it will be found to be infinite, unique, and indivisible’ (E1p15s).” However, with this 
said, Kant will of course deny that we attend to metaphysical space as an attribute of a substance, for space 
is not an attribute of God, but the phenomenon of his omnipresence.    
545 Translation by Onof/Schulting.   
546 To be exact Kant reserves the term “unlimited” for the “negative representation of the greatest:  “The 
greatest [maximi] is that beyond which nothing larger is possible. The unlimited [illimitatum]; is the 
negative representation of the largest.” (LM, p. 192, Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29, p. 834)   
547 In the introduction to the Transcendental Aesthetic, § 1,  Kant explains that he is going to take the outer 
intuition apart from that belongs to our sensations, but also what our understanding thinks about it. 
However, it is quite clear that the marks, which the Metaphysical Exposition presents to us, can be thought 
under the pure concepts of understanding, like the concept of ground and whole.  However, in the 
Metaphysical Exposition the pure concepts of an object in general do not serve as concepts under which 
space is possible as an object of experience and hence as concepts under which its existence is 
determinable.  
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of space, namely inasmuch as it shows that space is the condition under which all objects are 
possible as outer appearances.  
    An interesting aspect about the question of what space is, is that Kant thinks that the question has 
another dimension, which we recognise from his discussion of space in the Inaugural Dissertation. 
In this respect, the question of what space is concerns not whether space is a form of sensibility, 
but whether it is also a form of things and not just a form of sensibility. The what-question is not 
only a question about the properties of space, but also a question about the reality of space. 
Surprisingly, Kant thinks that the Metaphysical Exposition can answer this latter question:  
 
What, then, are space and time? Are they real existences [wirkliche Wesen]? Are they only determinations 
or relations of things [Verhältnisse der Dinge], yet such as would belong to things even if they were not 
intuited? Or are space and time such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the 
subjective constitution [Beschaffenheit] of our mind [Gemüts], apart from which they [diese Prädikate] 
could not be ascribed to anything whatsoever? In order to obtain light upon these questions, let us first 
give an exposition of the concept of space. (A23/B37-8)  
 
What seems somewhat perplexing here is that Kant just assumes that the question of the reality of 
space can be answered by an exposition of the concept of space.548 More specifically, it does not 
come out as evident that an exposition of the concept of space could make it possible to decide if 
space is a relation between things, as Leibniz had argued, or a pure form of sensibility, as Kant 
argues.  
    Critics of Kant, like Herman Andreas Pistorius and Johann August Eberhard, who were more or 
less outspoken Leibnizians, were therefore quick to point out that Kant had neglected the alternative 
view that the phenomenon of space is both objective and subjective. 549 In his review, Erläuterungen 
über des Herrn Professor Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft von Joh. Schultze, published in the 
journal Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek in 1786, Pistorius had argued that the concept of space is 
an impure relational concept, which blends elements which are both a posteriori and a priori. 550 On 
Pistorius view, the concept of space is a priori and subjective, because it is grounded in the subject.  
However, it is also empirical and objective, for it is grounded in and represents properties of things 
in themselves, even though these things are not located in space. 551   
    Eberhard argued in a somewhat similar fashion. For instance, in the article Ueber den Ursprung 
der menschlichen Erkenntniss, published in Philosophisches Magazin 1789, Eberhard argued that 
space is a well-founded phenomenon, which is both objective and subjective.552 The phenomenon 
of space thus rests on a ground, which is innate (anerschaffen) to the soul, namely the form of the 
sensibility, a limit (Schranke) of my power of knowledge.553 Likewise, the concept of space contains 
                                                 
548 E.g. Falkenstein (2004, pp. 146-7).    
549 Even friends of Kant, like Moses Mendelssohn, who professed to be on Leibniz’s side, suggested that 
space and time are partly subjective and partly objective phenomena, as we have seen (Chapter 5, section 
6). Time for instance is a phenomenon, according to Mendelssohn, which has both a subjective aspect 
(continuity) and objective aspect (an order of the succession of objective events); see Correspondence, p. 
122, Ak. 10, pp. 115-6. 
550 For an interesting overview of Pistorius’ views, see Specht (2014, pp. 9-10, 67- 75). 
551  Things in themselves do not exist in space however. For a discussion of this point see Specht (2014, pp. 
67-9). One might perhaps say that the representation of space is partly subjective, partly objective. 
Interestingly Eberhard expressed similar views with respect to the sensations; see Ueber den Ursprung der 
menschlichen Erkenntniss, pp. 374-5.   
552 Eberhard, Ueber den Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntniss, pp. 395, 403-4.   
553 Eberhard, Ueber den Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntniss, pp. 400-1. 
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the general and objective marks (Merkmale) of this phenomenon, marks that also are innate to the 
soul.554 However, Eberhard also intimated that the concept of space depends on sensation and 
abstraction, which make the innate content of the concept of space clear.555 Eberhard therefore 
described the clear concept of space as an “empirical concept” (empirischer Begriff), which is 
abstracted from outer experiences.556 
    From Adolf Trendelenburg and onwards it has therefore been argued that there is a “lacuna” 
(Lücke) in Kant’s proof of the transcendental ideality of space.557 Even if Kant is successful in 
proving that space is an object of an a priori intuition it does not follow that space is not also a 
determination of things in themselves. Crudely stated, Kant neglected the alternative that space is 
not just subjective, but also objective. Far from showing that the marks of the concept of space are 
determinations of a purely subjective space, any serious analysis or exposition of the metaphysical 
concept of space will show that these marks are objective, albeit innate concepts of understanding 
(Verstandesbegriffe).558 In short, Kant’s proof of the transcendental ideality of space is invalid, 
because it fails to identify and eliminate this third alternative – which is the alternative most faithful 
to Leibniz’s own theory of space.  In order to see if the Leibnizians were justified in their critique, 
we need to take a closer look at the Metaphysical Exposition.  
 
 
6.4.1 First Metaphysical Exposition   
 
In the first exposition, Kant presents an analysis of the concept of space as the concept of the outer 
form of sensibility, which is the formal ground of the possibility of an outer intuition.  Conceiving 
the originally given space as a ground presents space as the condition of the ordering of the manifold 
of either formal or empirical intuitions. Whereas the manifold of the formal intuition covers an a 
priori manifold of spaces, the manifold of the empirical intuitions also covers an a posteriori 
manifold of sensations. In the former sense, space is a condition of geometrical constructions; in 
the latter sense space is a condition of empirical intuitions of outer objects, i.e. objects located 
outside one another and ourselves in particular.559 The first exposition thus puts us in a position to 
recognise that space is the ground and not a consequence of the ordering of the manifold of the 
intuitions.       
   On the basis of the exposition of the concept of the original space, Kant concludes that the 
representation of space is a priori and not a posteriori. In Kant’s terminology, the original 
representation of space is not an empirical concept:   
 
Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived [abgezogen] from outer experiences. For in order 
that certain sensations be referred [bezogen] to something outside me (that is, to something in another 
                                                 
554 Eberhard, Ueber den Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntniss, p. 389. 
555 Eberhard, Ueber den Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntniss, pp. 400-1. 
556 Eberhard, Ueber den Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntniss, pp. 400-1. 
557 Trendelenburg was in his turn attacked by Kuno Fischer who argued that there is no lacuna in Kant’s 
demonstration; for a review of the debate among Fischer’s contemporaries see Grapengieser (1870) and 
Vaihinger (1892,  pp. 290- 326).   
558 According to Eberhard all concepts presented by Kant in the Metaphysical Expositions are actually 
concepts of understanding (Verstandesbegriffe); see Kurze Widerlegung der transcendentalen Aesthetik in 
der kritischen Philosophie, in Philosophisches Magazin, Volume 4, 1791.     
559 In the latter sense space is the formal ground of the places, which makes it possible to refer my 
sensations to an object outside myself.    
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region [Orte] of space from that in which I find myself [darin ich mich befinde]), and similarly in order 
that I may be able to represent them as outside and alongside [neben] one another, and accordingly as not 
only different [verschieden] but as in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed 
[zum Grunde liegen]. (A23/B38) 
 
Kant’s term “empirical concept” suggests that this passage is directed against the views defended 
by Leibnizians, like Eberhard for instance. In other words, space is not a concept abstracted from 
the order of coexistence of things, but on the contrary the ground of the possibility of their 
coexistence.  
    In the first exposition Kant argues that the Leibnizian view is wrong, since it ignores that the 
representation of space underlies all outer empirical intuitions, because it is the condition for a 
sensation to be “referred to something outside me”, that is, to something which is independent of 
me and my mind. What Kant seems to argue, then, is that sensations (or perhaps more correctly: 
the empirical intuitions received as a result of them) do not represent anything, unless they represent 
an object which can be (i) distinguished from what is merely a state of mind and (ii) distinguished 
from other objects, which are not only qualitatively, but also numerically different from the 
object.560   
   Hence, without space sensations cannot be related or referred to an object outside myself, for 
instance to the embodied sense organs or to an object at a distance from the sense organs. Firstly, 
space is what lets my body appear, in the midst of the world, which also is the place in which I find 
myself located. Secondly, space makes the things appear outside me, at a determinate distance and 
in a particular direction from my embodied sense organs. The distance between my eyes and the 
star above me lets me refer the sensation of light to the star outside me in space, so that I can see 
the star.    
    In particular Kant seems, once again, to take space to be necessary in order to perceive the things 
which appear to the senses, making it into a condition for an empirical intuition, which is clear. For 
as we have seen, if an empirical intuition is clear, then it represents an object which is not only 
distinct from a state of mind, but also distinct from other objects and this presupposes that they are 
represented as objects located in different spaces. The distinction I make between, for instance the 
objects viewed by my eyes, presupposes that the objects can be represented at different locations.  
Finally, Kant’s first argument can also be seen as an argument for taking the representation of space 
as a presupposition for a distinct empirical intuition, for a representation cannot be distinct unless I 
can become aware of the different, spatial parts of the object of the representation, like the different 
parts of a house, e.g. its roof, chimney, walls, etc.561  
 
 
 
                                                 
560 This interpretation of Kant’s first argument is discussed in detail in Allison (1983, pp. 83-4).    
561 Against the first exposition it can, however, be objected that there is a symmetric relation between 
numerical differences in appearances and numerical differences in spaces, i.e. that there is a mutual 
dependence between the possibility of representing a numerical diversity of spaces and the possibility of 
representing a numerical diversity of appearances. As a consequence of this, we cannot argue that the 
representation of space is a priori. However, as various commentators have pointed out, Kant seems to have 
considered this objection in his second argument for taking space as a pure intuition; see Paton (1997a, p. 
112).    
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6.4.2 Second Metaphysical Exposition   
 
Kant’s second exposition states that we can have a representation of a space without the content of 
an appearance, but no representation of an outer appearance without the form of space. 562 The 
immediately given space is a necessary representation, which is presupposed, in order for there to 
be contingent outer intuitions. The necessity of space shows itself in its nature as a permanent 
background, which never disappears in the continual stream of appearing and disappearing objects. 
In Kant’s terminology, space is a representation which underlies all outer intuitions:   
 
Space is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuitions [zum Grunde liegt]. We 
can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects. 
It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination 
[Bestimmung] dependent upon them. It is an a priori representation, which necessarily underlies outer 
appearances [zum Grunde liegt]. (A24/B38-9)      
 
    From the second exposition it follows that there must be an asymmetric relation between the 
representation of different spaces and the representation of numerically different appearances.  
Whereas an empty space without objects is conceivable, an outer appearance without a spatial 
location is not.563  To put it differently, the representation of numerically different spaces does not 
depend on the representation of things which are numerically different because of their inner 
differences. Leibniz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles does not apply to objects in space.  
Hence, the representation of space is a necessary a priori representation, in which nothing can be 
derived from outer senses, or from common sense.   
    The Leibnizian Johann G. Maass (1766-1823) questioned Kant’s conclusion in a polemical 
article printed in the first volume of Eberhard’s Philosophisches Magazin 1788.564 According to 
Maass, representation A may be a necessary ground or condition of the possibility of representation 
B, but from this conceptual dependence, it does not follow that A is a priori. The necessity of A 
does not exclude the possibility that A is originally represented together with B, and that A is 
acquired by being separated and abstracted from B.  The representation of space (A) is a condition 
of the representation of outer appearances (B), but there is no original representation of space apart 
from the appearances, i.e. merely as an order of compossible situations.     
    To this objection Allison has replied that Maass presents space and the outer appearances as 
mutual conditions.565  This ignores that space is a “means or vehicle” of representing them as 
distinct from each other and ourselves, which excludes the possibility of a reverse conditioning 
from outer appearances to space.566  The representation of outer appearances as distinct from each 
other and ourselves is, in other words, not a condition of the representation of space. However, Kant 
could also point out that Maass’ argument entails that the representation of space is an empirical 
concept, which is inconsistent with the apodictic nature of the postulates and propositions of 
Euclidean geometry.  This is also what Kant tries to argue in the Transcendental Exposition. More 
                                                 
562 By the term “outer appearance” is here of course meant an appearance, which is not merely an inner 
appearance, i.e. a state of mind.  
563  Kant does not build his argument on the contention that we have a sense for empty space. We cannot 
sense or experience, empty space. For a similar argument, see Paton (1997a, pp. 112-3). 
564 Maass, Ueber die transcendentale Aesthetik, in Philosophisches Magazin, Volume 1, 1788, pp. 123-9.  
565 Allison (1983, pp. 84-90).  
566 Allison (1983, p. 85). 
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importantly, although an order can be represented apart from the things which are situated in it, this 
only leads to the abstract concept of situation or place, not the concept of the original phenomenon 
of space as a continuous whole.   
 
 
6.4.3 Third Metaphysical Exposition  
 
In the third exposition, Kant presents an analysis of the concept of space, not as the concept of a 
ground, but as the concept of a whole. Once again, the concept which Kant has in mind, is the 
metaphysical concept of space, which gets its content from the form of sensibility.  Taken as a 
whole, space is unique. Kant supports this by underlining that our awareness of space involves the 
consciousness of only one space. Thus, like the pure space of Locke, the metaphysical space does 
not consist of real separable parts, which means that diverse spaces are possible only as ideal 
inseparable parts of the same indivisible and unique space. Space is in other words immediately 
represented as a whole (totum analyticum), which has the peculiar property that it is prior to its 
parts, for the parts of space are the outcome of the limitation of the all-encompassing space.567  
    From this Kant concludes that space is an altogether singular representation. Space is in other 
words not a concept, but an intuition: 
 
Space is not discursive or, as we say, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. 
For, in the first place, we can represent to ourselves only one [einigen] space; and if we speak of diverse 
spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique [alleinigen] space.  (A24/B39)   
 
The concept of space is not, as Eberhard argued, abstracted from the order under which it is possible 
for things to coexist, but a singular idea of outsideness and therefore an intuition. Kant expresses 
this by emphasising that the representation of space is not a general concept of relations of “things 
in general”.   
   In the third exposition, Kant also argues for the same conclusion on the premise that the parts of 
a concept are prior to the whole concept. The parts of space are different in that respect:  
 
(…) these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing [allbefassenden] space, as being, as it were, 
constituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought only in it. Space is 
essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore the concept of spaces, depends solely on the introduction 
of limitations. Hence it follows that an a priori, and not an empirical, intuition underlies all concepts of 
space.  (A25/B39)   
 
Here Kant obviously builds on an exposition of space as a continuous totum analyticum.568 There 
are no largest or smallest (simple) parts in space, as Kant had recognised already in the Physical 
Monadology, and no definite limits within which it is enclosed.  Hence, the all-encompassing and 
unlimited space is always originally represented prior to its parts. 
                                                 
567 Space is, as Kant puts it in the observation to the second antinomy (A438/B466), a totum, not a 
compositum in which the whole is possible only through the parts.  
568 This seems to be what Kant maintains in his fourth argument; Kant also explicitly affirms that this is his 
position in A169/B211 and in some of the lectures on metaphysics. In Metaphysik L2, Ak. 28, p. 561, for 
instance, Kant explains that space and times are continuous quantities, or somewhat misleadingly: 
continuous quanta.   
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    To Kant the latter indicates that space cannot originate from a concept (or at least not an empirical 
concept), since concepts depend on the prior representation of parts. The parts of the concepts are, 
as pointed out by Kemp Smith and Paton, the “attributes”,569 or “common marks”570 thought under 
the concept, and the concept is the result of a combination of these parts. The concept is logically 
prior to the marks thought under it only insofar as it is clarified and made distinct.  In addition to 
this somewhat blunt reconstruction of Kant’s argument Paton adds the point that space, if it were a 
concept, would have to be derived from a reflection upon the common mark of different spaces 
(places), namely that they are “necessarily limited”.571 Such a mark would, however, presuppose 
the representation of an all-including space, which is an intuition.  
 
 
6.4.4 Fourth Metaphysical Exposition  
   
In the fourth exposition, Kant tries to show that space is not a concept, not because it is one unique, 
continuous magnitude, but because it is represented as an infinite given magnitude.572 Since the 
originally given aesthetic space of our sensibility is not a part of another space, it is unlimited and 
greater than any other space.573 Thus, we may make the parts of space as small or great as we want 
without ever encountering any limits or boundaries. The important lesson here is that metaphysical 
space must have an infinite multitude of possible representations contained within it, a claim which 
we recognise from the Inaugural Dissertation (§ 15). Kant contrasts this with the infinity of the 
concept, which typically contains an infinite multitude of possible instances (“representations”) 
under it: 
  
Space is represented as an infinite (unendliche) given magnitude. Now every concept must be thought of 
as a representation which is contained in an infinite number (Menge) of different possible representations 
(as their common character), and which therefore contains these under itself; but no concept, as such, can 
be thought as containing an infinite number (Menge) of representations within itself. It is in this latter way, 
however, that space is thought; for all the parts of space coexist ad infinitum. Consequently, the original 
representation of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept. (B39-40)        
 
Thus, whereas space contains a potential infinity of coordinated parts, a concept contains an infinity 
of possible representations subordinated under it, as its common mark. For instance, the concept of 
a polygon contains all triangles on the blackboard.  The relation between the concept of a polygon 
and the triangles is a logical relation, a relation of containment, based on subordination of concepts. 
Thus, the triangles are included in the sphere of the concept of a polygon. The triangles are, 
however, not in the logical sphere of the concept of polygon, in the same sense as a shoe is in a 
                                                 
569 Kemp Smith (1999, p. 105).  
570 Paton (1997a, p. 119). 
571 Paton (1997a, p. 116). Unnecessarily to point out this reconstruction presupposes that the concept is 
empirical and that the original representation of space must be an intuition, unless it is an empirical concept. 
The alternative that space for instance might be a non-empirical, a discursive pure concept of 
understanding, a category, is then excluded beforehand. 
572 B39-40. 
573 C.f. LM, p. 192, Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29, p. 834.   
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shoebox. If space were a concept, then it would have to be exemplified in the particular spaces, and 
they would not be in it.  Thus, space must be an intuition.574  
    The problem with Kant’s fourth exposition, as pointed out by Kästner in an article published in 
Philosophisches Magazin 1790, is that it seems to presuppose that we have an image of an actually 
infinite space. This is impossible, however, for the only images we have are of potentially infinite 
or unlimited (unbegräntzt) geometric spaces.575 In his reply to Kästner, Kant freely admits that 
geometric spaces are infinite because the possibility of increasing them or decreasing them is 
unlimited.576 This makes them different from the original, metaphysical space, which is infinite, 
because it encompasses all spaces, making all other spaces are thinkable, only as parts of it. 577 The 
originally given space within which I can draw a line, for instance, is larger than any other line 
which I may draw in it.  
    More recently, Onof and Schulting have pointed out that Kant defended the view that the 
metaphysical space must be given as an actually infinite magnitude.578 In this respect, Kant supports 
                                                 
574 As Paton points out, Kant makes his arguments even more difficult by often saying that space is a pure 
intuition.  See Paton (1997a, pp. 104-05, 115, footnote 2).    
575 Kästner, Ueber den Matematischen Begriffs des Raums, § 13, p. 407. To be more exact a geometric 
space, like a line, is indeterminate only quantitatively but not qualitatively. 
576 On Kästner’s Treatise, pp. 309-10, Ak. 20, pp. 420-1. 
577On Kästner’s Treatise, p. 309, Ak. 20, pp. 419-20. 
578 Onof/Schulting (2014, pp. 287-90). See also Fichant (2004, pp. 537) for an overview of the opposite 
properties of metaphysical and geometric space. Lydia Patton (2011) summarises the contemporary debate 
on the a priori givenness of actually infinite space in a recent paper. Broadly, this debate can be divided 
along the same lines as the phenomenalist and conceptualist (“epistemic”) accounts of metaphysical space 
mentioned above. In Patton’s (2011, pp. 275-87) summary Charles Parsons figures as one of the main 
proponents of the phenomenalist accounts, whereas Michael Friedman is selected as the main representative 
of the conceptualist accounts. Parsons (1998), quoted in Patton (2011, pp. 276-7), recognises that subjective 
space shows itself in the continuity of geometric constructions, such as a line for instance. However, 
Parsons claims that the continuity of space is incompatible with its actual infinity, since it would force us to 
represent an infinity of parts, e.g. the infinite parts of a line. Instead, Parsons suggests that the continuity 
can be described in terms of continuability, i.e. the possibility of continuously moving our attention from 
foreground to background and from background to foreground, as we outline a figure against its horizon.  
Against Parsons, Friedman (2000), discussed and quoted in Patton (2011, pp. 275-79), firmly relocates the 
infinite in the geometric construction, e.g. the construction of a line. Infinite space is given in the continuity 
of the construction of the line, in particular the possibility of constructing it in many and opposite directions 
and viewing it from many and opposite points of view.  However, as Patton (2011, pp. 277-8) points out, 
according to critics like Emily Carson (1997), Friedman does not make a proper distinction between 
metaphysical space and constructed spaces. Thus, Friedman ignores that the unique and boundless 
metaphysical space grounds and is given prior to and independently of the spaces that are constructed in 
Euclidean geometry. In his turn Friedman (2000), quoted in Patton (2011, p. 278), has replied that we have 
no direct “perceptual” access to infinity and in particular not to the actual infinity of metaphysical space, 
which seems to undermine the legitimacy of Carson’s critique. Patton partly agrees with Friedman, even 
though she denies that Friedman successfully explains the origin of the oneness of metaphysical space. On 
Patton’s (2011, pp. 279-80) reading we have to presuppose metaphysical space in order to represent the 
possibility of rigid motions by the means of rotations and translations. Patton does not explicitly mention it, 
but rotations and translations are presupposed in order to determine if a figure is congruent with another 
figure. Thus, perspective alterations make it possible to view directed geometric spaces, e.g. lines, not as 
fluxion magnitudes, i.e. vectors, but as magnitudes without direction, i.e. scalars. On Patton’s (2011, pp. 
283-7) reading metaphysical space is revealed to us as an outcome of perspective alterations with respect to 
vector constructions. From this she concludes that the infinity of metaphysical space consists in the fact that 
the scalars exhaust all vectors, i.e. all temporal vector constructions. In my opinion, Patton’s observation on 
scalars creates difficulties of their own. One of them is to explain how metaphysical space is a priori given. 
Congruent spatial orders, i.e. scalars, are not immediately given, but constructed. Furthermore, though a 
scalar is different from a vector, it is still strongly similar to an objective geometric space. True, Patton 
(2011, p. 288) does not reduce metaphysical space to a scalar, but considers metaphysical space as a set of 
scalars or “relations that are neutral in orientation”. However, with that said we have still not answered in 
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himself on a distinction between the infinito potentiali and the actu infinitum, which can be found 
in the works of the English mathematician Joseph Raphson (1648-1715).579 Whereas the infinito 
potentiali exclusively holds for the mathematically constructed spaces, the actu infinitu is “in the 
mind”, as Onof and Schulting put it. From this Kant also seems to argue that we can conclude the 
“subjective ground of the possibility of space”, and hence also the ideality of space.580     
   On this interpretation, a number of things can be said. First, it should be noted that Kant’s 
argument is somewhat difficult to follow, namely because it is difficult to know if Kant reads “actu 
infinitu” as “infinite in actuality” or “infinite in act”.  The reply to Kästner does not give any clue 
as far as I can see, but on the basis of what Kant says on other occasions about the infinity of space, 
I cannot come up with any example where Kant explicitly speaks about space as actually infinite – 
unless one reads “infinite given magnitude” (B39-40) as immediately referring to an actual infinite 
magnitude.581  Secondly, it seems as if this reading puts Kant in the rather ungrateful position of 
having to defend the concept of a categorematic whole, in other words the concept of a greatest 
number, which Kant rejected, along with Leibniz.   
    To avoid this conclusion, I suggest that Kant takes the metaphysical space to be actually infinite, 
not because it is a whole which contains an actual infinity of parts (a categorematic whole), but 
because it is absolute. Thus metaphysical space is never a region of a greater, more all-
encompassing space. This makes the metaphysical space different from its parts, which are 
constructible under geometric concepts and therefore merely potentially infinite.  Kant expresses 
his position in the following way in his reply to Kästner’s criticisms:     
 
Now that the geometrically and objectively given space is always finite agrees completely with this; for it 
is only given through its being constructed (gemacht). That, however, the metaphysically, i.e. originally, 
nonetheless merely subjectively given space, which (because there is no plurality thereof) cannot be 
brought under any concept which would be constructible, but to be sure contains the ground of the 
construction of all possible geometrical concepts, is infinite only indicates that it consists in the pure form 
of the sensible mode of representation of the subject, as a priori intuition; hence in this, as singular 
representation, the possibility of all spaces, which goes to infinity, is given. (On Kästner’s Treatise, p. 309, 
Ak. 20, pp. 420-1)   
 
      To add some detail to this argument it is helpful to consider it against the background of the 
model the hypercategorematic infinite of Leibniz’s God.582 In this model, God is infinite because 
he is the most perfect being which contains all things. Thus all things are contained in God either 
eminently, as perfections in his essence, or ideally, as imperfections in his mind.583 Furthermore, 
all things which are contained in God eminently may be contained in God either actually or 
potentially.584 For instance, power is in God eminently, but the power to move is only potentially 
in God, insofar as God is the ground or cause of the power to move. However, none of this makes 
                                                 
what sense this set is immediately given to us. Finally, it is far from clear if metaphysical space is actually 
infinite, i.e. that it is infinite in any other sense than that it contains a potentially infinite number of vector 
spaces.        
579 Onof/Schulting (2014, pp. 288-9).   
580 On Kästner’s Treatise, pp. 309-10, Ak. 20, pp. 421-2. 
581 Such an interpretation is, as far as I can see, defended by Vaihinger (1892, p. 254).   
582 See Chapter 4, section 4.3. For an overview of this topic, see Antognazza (2015).   
583 Antognazza (2015, pp. 14-17).  
584 Antognazza (2015, pp. 16-18).  
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God into a whole of actually or potentially infinite parts. Potential infinity belongs to God only 
eminently as the virtually present ground and cause of the perfections and divisions of all finite 
things. Furthermore, actual infinity belongs to God only eminently as an absolute unity considered 
above and apart from all divisions.    
    Now, metaphysical space is not infinite in the same way as God, i.e. space is not 
hypercategorematically infinite.  Unlike God, metaphysical space is an analytic whole of potentially 
infinite parts. But like God, metaphysical space is infinite in another way, namely because it is 
unlimited in the sense that it is an absolute whole, a whole which is not a part of another whole.  
Thus, metaphysical space is a subjective form of sensibility, which grounds all spaces in a way 
similar to how God contains the perfections of finite things eminently, namely potentially. 
    In many ways this seems to licence no other view than the one most often repeated in this work, 
namely that space is a whole of potentially infinite parts. However, with this said metaphysical 
space does not contain its parts merely in the same distant way as a ground contains its 
consequences. Thus, metaphysical space contains its parts more intimately, within the bosom of its 
own unity, though without dividing it, which means that it preserves its undivided oneness, its unity 
sui generis, without which space would become a synthetic whole rather than a continuous, analytic 
whole.585 Space is “essentially one” as Kant puts it.586 In the same way as God is actually infinite 
insofar as he contains all perfections eminently within the undivided unity of his essence, 
metaphysical space is actually infinite insofar as it contains every space within the unlimited and 
undivided unity of its oneness.  It is in this sense we might say that the actual infinity of 
metaphysical space is given immediately in pure intuition, for infinity is contained within its 
original unity, a unity which is not constructed and mediated by any concepts.  
 
 
6.5 Kant’s Conclusions from the Metaphysical Expositions  
 
Kant presents the conclusions from the expositions of the concept of space in a summary, divided 
into five paragraphs. The title of the summary is quite modest: “Conclusions from the above 
Concepts” (Schlüsse aus obigen Begriffen). The “concepts” Kant has in mind here are most likely 
the concepts that he presented in his exposition of space as a necessary, singular (unique), and 
continuous whole, which is prior to its progressively and regressively indefinite parts.  Thus, 
Vaihinger seems to be on the right track when he takes the “above concepts” to involve the 
“determinations of the essence of space” (Bestimmungen über das Wesen des Raumes), which have 
been “discovered” (aufgefunden) and “established” (festgestellt) as a result of the expositions. 587 
                                                 
585 As Onof/Schulting (2014, p. 295) correctly points out the sui generis unity of metaphysical space is 
internal to it as a form of sensibility. More specifically, it does not originate from the forms of 
understanding: “It is not a conceptual unity because it is not a unity of a multiplicity of representations that 
are contained under a higher one (A69/B94; A78/ B104) and there are no grounds for viewing the 
understanding as involved in defining this unity. Rather, it is the internal unity of the space in which 
manifolds in intuition are first represented. The pure receptivity of our faculty of sensibility defines a unity 
which Kant describes at A25/B39 as the ‘single all-encompassing space’ whose parts are ‘only thought in 
it’. This characterizes the metaphysical space of On Kästner’s Treatises in its original givenness. (…) The 
unity of this unitary space is the unity that Kant refers to when he claims that a single representation is 
always a unity (A99): i.e. a single representation is always an ‘absolute unity’, which is different from the 
unity that the understanding brings to the manifold.” 
586 A25/B39 
587 Here Vaihinger (1894, p. 286)  
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    In the first paragraph (A26a/B42a) Kant presents his core claim, namely that the expositions 
make it possible to conclude that space does not represent any properties or relations588 of “things 
in themselves”:  
 
Space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relations 
to one another. That is to say, space does not represent any determination [Bestimmung] that attaches to 
the objects themselves, and which remains even when abstraction has been made of all the subjective 
conditions of intuition. For no determinations, whether absolute or relative, can be intuited prior to the 
existence of the things to which they belong, and none, therefore, can be intuited a priori. Space is nothing 
but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility, under which 
alone outer intuition is possible for us. (A26/B42)   
  
Kant’s premise here seems to be that the exposition of the concept of space already has shown that 
the original representation of space is an a priori intuition. From this premise we are entitled to 
conclude not only that the representation of space is not an empirical concept, as Leibnizians like 
Eberhard argued, but also that space cannot be anything but a purely subjective form of 
sensibility.589 For if space is an absolute or relative property of things in themselves, then there is 
no a priori representation of space, which is prior to the empirical representations of the spatial 
properties of things in themselves. However, as the Metaphysical Exposition shows, there is an a 
priori intuition of space.590 Hence, space is not an absolute or relational property of things in 
themselves, but merely a form of sensibility.   
   The subsequent second paragraph (A26b/B42b) contains the positive conclusions from the 
expositions of the concept of space:  
 
Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility 
[subjective Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit], under which alone outer intuition is possible for us. Since, then, 
the receptivity of the subject, its capacity to be affected by objects, must necessarily precede all intuitions 
of these objects [vor allen Anschauungen dieser Objekte vorhergeht], it can readily be understood how the 
form of all appearances can be given prior to all actual perceptions [Wahrnehmungen], and so exist in the 
mind a priori, and how, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, it can contain, prior 
to all experience, principles which determine the relations of these objects. (A26/B42)  
 
Here Kant does three things. First, he repeats what he thinks is the main accomplishment of the 
expositions of the subjective concept of space, i.e. the concept of the necessary form of outer 
sensibility, namely that space is the content of a pure intuition.591  Secondly, on the basis of the 
transcendental ideality claim presented in the previous paragraph, he concludes that space is nothing 
                                                 
588 Kant’s critique of More’s, Clarke’s and Newton’s concepts of space is more explicitly presented in 
A39/B56, as well as in B70-1.    
589 Eberhard, Ueber den Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntniss, p. 400.  As Vaihinger (1892, pp. 287- 90) 
puts it, Kant suggests that we can infer from the apriority of space to its subjectivity. 
590 As we recall, Kant had suggested this argument for the transcendental ideality of space already in the 
late 1770s.  
591 On the reading defended here, Kant’s sole concern is the exposition of the original, metaphysical 
concept of space, i.e. the concept of the form of outer sensibility.  Thus, on my reading the claim that space 
is the “subjective condition of sensibility” it is not smuggled into paragraph (b) from nowhere, as Kemp 
Smith (1999, pp. 114-5) and Vaihinger (1894, pp. 326-7) argue.    
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but the form, which makes outer appearances become related outside each other. Thirdly, he 
concludes that space is a form given prior to all outer intuitions, which as a pure intuition contains 
the (geometric) principles according to which the relations of these objects are determinable. It is 
as a form by which appearances become related to each other that space is real. This explains how 
Euclidean geometry, which is synthetic and a priori, can apply to the things we perceive and 
experience. 
    Kant’s conclusion in the first and second paragraphs brings us back to the debate about a third 
alternative. Does the Metaphysical Exposition demonstrate that the transcendental ideality of space 
follows merely from the Metaphysical Exposition of space, in a way which excludes the third 
alternative?  In other words, does the Metaphysical Exposition demonstrate that the transcendental 
ideality of space follows merely from an exposition of it as a singular, continuous, all-encompassing 
whole, which is prior to its potentially infinite parts? 
    To gain greater understanding about Kant’s demonstration of the transcendental ideality claim, 
it is helpful to consider it against the background of the alternative to it, which was suggested by 
Kant’s Leibnizian critics. This alternative is mostly forgotten today and did not play any significant 
role even for Trendelenburg, who was the progenitor of the contemporary debate about the third 
alternative. The interesting thing about the Leibnizian alternative is of course that it was actually 
suggested to Kant, more or less personally. This means that we have first-hand information about 
Kant’s attitude to the Leibnizian version of the third alternative, and whether Kant neglected it or 
not.  To get a grip on the alternative suggested by the Leibnizians, it is helpful to give a brief 
overview of its main components.  
   First, the Leibnizian alternative has to say something about how space is represented. Here the 
Leibnizians considered two options: the representation of space is (a) an a priori intuition, or (b) an 
empirical concept. Secondly, the Leibnizian alternative has to say something about the ontological 
status of space. Here the Leibnizians considered three options: space is (c) transcendentally ideal, 
(d) transcendentally real, and (e) in part transcendentally real and in part transcendentally ideal.  
From what we know about the views defended by Pistorius and Eberhard, we can now describe the 
Leibnizian alternative as a combination of option (b) and (e). Finally, we can contrast the Leibnizian 
alternative with Kant’s alternative, which can be described as a combination of option (a) and (c). 
Let us now discuss the Leibnizian alternative and the arguments for it somewhat closer.  
 
 
6.5.1 Arguments for Option (b) 
 
In order to inform ourselves about the arguments for thinking that the representation of space is an 
empirical concept, we need to consider Pistorius’ and Eberhard’s critiques of Kant’s Metaphysical 
Exposition in some closer detail. To emphasise the specificities of Eberhard’s critique it is helpful 
to qualify option (b) somewhat.  First, we can speak about the concept of space as an empirical 
concept in a weak way, which more or less coincides with Eberhard’s version of (b).  Typical of 
the weak version of (b) is that the concept of space only contains predicates which are originally 
innate, a priori concepts of understanding. The concept of space is, to repeat, empirical only in the 
sense that sensation and abstraction is needed in order to make us aware of these predicates.592    
                                                 
592 Eberhard, Ueber den Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntniss, pp. 400-1. One historically important 
side-aspect of Eberhard’s claim is that all predicates presented in the Metaphysical Exposition of the 
concept of space actually are concepts of understanding. Eberhard makes this claim in the paper Kurze 
Wiederlegung der transcendentalen Aesthetik in der Kritischen Philosophie, pp. 188-9, which was 
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    The justification of the weak version of (b) therefore takes the form of a refutation of the 
Metaphysical Expositions. According to Eberhard, the Metaphysical Exposition tries to 
demonstrate that space is an a priori intuition, but this is self-contradictory.  Only the concept of 
space is a priori, but the concept of space is not a sensible intuition. Implicitly, the thesis of the 
Metaphysical Exposition is contradictory for it suggests that an a priori, intelligible, general, and 
superior thing is an a posteriori, sensible, singular, and inferior thing.593 Furthermore, the predicates, 
which collectively can be ascribed to space in general, cannot be ascribed to an allegedly a priori, 
pure intuition without contradiction. Space in general is necessarily possible, “uniform” 
(gleichförmig), all-encompassing (one) and infinite (indeterminate), which singular spaces cannot 
be since they are possible but bounded and finite.594        
    Secondly, we can speak about the concept of space as an empirical concept in a stronger way, 
which is more or less identical with Pistorius’ version of (b). On the stronger version of (b), some, 
but not all, predicates are a priori and innate. Some predicates, thought under the concept of space, 
are genuinely and originally a posteriori and empirical in a sense, which the weak version does not 
allow. Insofar as this is the case the concept of space is (or resembles) an empirical concept.595 For 
instance, the concept of the infinity/immeasurability of space is the concept of a finite, perceived 
space, insofar as it is indefinitely extended in our imagination.596 It is not an innate concept of the 
indeterminateness of space as a place of all places, as Leibniz would have it, but rather an empirical 
concept, formed more or less in the same way as Locke’s idea of infinite space (see Chapter 4). 
 
  
6.5.2 Arguments for Option (e) 
 
To sort out the details of (e) a little bit more carefully it is helpful to repeat that Leibnizians, like 
Pistorius and Eberhard, interpreted Kant’s Metaphysical Exposition as an attempt to exhibit the 
                                                 
published in Philosophisches Magazin, Volume 4 1791. Using Kant’s 1760s taxonomy, we can perhaps say 
that Eberhard describes the concept of space as a pure concept of reflection, although we acquire it in the 
same way as an empirical concept of reflection.                
593 Eberhard, Kurze Wiederlegung der transcendentalen Aesthetik in der Kritischen Philosophie, pp. 188-
191.  
594 Eberhard, Kurze Wiederlegung der transcendentalen Aesthetik in der Kritischen Philosophie, pp. 191-3.  
On my interpretation Eberhard’s argument is meant to show that none of the predicates, which allegedly are 
derived from an original, pure intuition, could have been derived from anything except the concept of space 
in general.  For example, different instances of space in general cannot be distinguished by any inner, 
quantitative or qualitative marks, which means that they are perfectly congruent with each other. From this 
it follows that space in general is uniform.  Intuition could only present us to the spaces of different singular 
things, which presumably are subject to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which means that 
they necessarily are internally different from each other.  Only abstraction from these inner differences, 
which leads to the concept of space in general, can take us to the concept of uniformity and congruency. On 
the other hand, it seems perfectly possible that these spaces are congruent with themselves, which Eberhard 
seemingly ignores. What Eberhard perhaps has in mind is that spaces of singular things cannot combine 
congruency (with themselves) with the property of being all-encompassing and infinite, which belongs to 
space in general only, according to Eberhard. For space in general is all-encompassing insofar it contains all 
spaces as instances of itself and it is infinite insofar it is indeterminate, which is impossible for singular 
spaces.        
595 Pistorius, Erläuterungen über des Herrn Professor Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft von Joh. Schultze, 
pp. 100-1. 
596 Pistorius, Erläuterungen über des Herrn Professor Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft von Joh. Schultze, 
pp. 105-6. 
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subjectively grounded marks, which cannot belong to space except as a purely ideal phenomenon. 
In the terminology of Pistorius and Eberhard such marks are a priori, subjective predicates of the 
phenomenon of space. The Leibnizians will therefore have to show that Kant is mistaken in either 
of the following ways: (i) the a priori predicates are in reality both subjectively and objectively 
grounded, namely subjectively grounded in the limits of the force of representation and objectively 
grounded in the things in themselves; (ii) the a priori predicates are subjectively grounded, but the 
concept of space includes some a posteriori marks, which are objectively grounded and which 
Kant’s Metaphysical Exposition fails to identify. In both cases, it follows that space is a well-
founded phenomenon, in agreement with (e). 
    The first line of attack (i) comes quite close to Eberhard’s position. On Eberhard’s view, the 
concept of space includes predicates which are altogether a priori, even though we become aware 
of them as a result of sensation and abstraction. None of these concepts are abstracted from pure 
intuition, as we have seen, but are innate to the understanding. They are a priori predicates, but still 
objectively grounded. To these predicates Eberhard counts the concept of space in general.  Space 
in general is an abstract, “intelligible space” (der intelligible Raum), i.e. a mere order or 
“combination” (Verknüpfung) of coexisting things.597 Space in general is therefore grounded in the 
combination of coexisting simple substances, which is the objective and actual space according to 
Eberhard.598   
    Thus, on Eberhard’s arguments, Kant’s transcendental ideality claim is invalid, since it ignores 
that the phenomenon of space must have an objective ground in the actual space. In the opposite 
case, if the phenomenal space is merely subjectively grounded, space becomes a qualitas occulta, 
i.e. something which lacks sufficient reason for its existence other than as a mere state of mind or 
perhaps illusion.599 Hence, the concept of a combination or order of coexisting, ultimately simple 
things must have an objective ground, which makes the concept valid, contrary to what Kant claims.  
    Eberhard also recognises that the concept of space contains other predicates, which are a priori, 
such as the concept of continuous coexistence. In the article Von den Begriffen des Raums und der 
Zeit in Beziehung auf die Gewissheit der menschlichen Erkenntniss, from 1789, Eberhard makes a 
somewhat half-hearted attempt to argue that the continuity is objectively grounded in the order of 
coexistence of simple substances.600 However, ultimately, Eberhard concedes that the continuity 
cannot be derived from the order of coexistence of simple substances.601 Continuity is “peculiar” 
(Eigentümlich) to the image or phenomenon of space and not, as Eberhard admits, grounded in the 
                                                 
597 Eberhard Von den Begriffen des Raums und der Zeit in Beziehung auf die Gewissheit der menschlichen 
Erkenntniss, pp. 66-7.   
598 Eberhard Von den Begriffen des Raums und der Zeit in Beziehung auf die Gewissheit der menschlichen 
Erkenntniss, pp. 58-9, 66-7.  It must be noted that Eberhard’s analysis of the relation between simple 
substances and actual space is not perfectly clear cut. For instance, in Ueber die logische Wahrheit oder die 
transcendentalen Gültigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniss, in Philosophisches Magazin, Volume 1 1788, 
pp. 169-70, Eberhard describes the elementary representations as the ground of the concrete time, the 
succession of representations, and not as the actual time itself. If this analysis is applied to space it would 
follow that the coexistence of simple substances is the ground of the concrete, phenomenal space, rather 
than the actual space itself.       
599 Eberhard, Ueber den Ursprung des menschlichen Erkenntniss, pp. 403-4.  
600 Eberhard Von den Begriffen des Raums und der Zeit in Beziehung auf die Gewissheit der menschlichen 
Erkenntniss, pp. 59-60. The concept of space as an order does not entail that this order is continuous, as 
already Leibniz noted (Chapter 4), but lies within our way of perceiving it.  
601 Eberhard Von den Begriffen des Raums und der Zeit in Beziehung auf die Gewissheit der menschlichen 
Erkenntniss, pp. 59-60.    
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actual space.602 Continuous diffusion and combination are hence irreducible marks of 
confused/indistinct perceptions, grounded in the limit (form) of the force of representation.603 Space 
in this sense is a form of perception, which makes it not only transcendentally real, but ideal or 
rather transcendentally ideal, as perhaps even Leibniz would admit, namely because it is 
constitutive of the original phenomenon of extension.    
    The second line of attack (ii) comes closer to Pistorius’ critique of Kant’s transcendental ideality 
claim.  Like Eberhard, Pistorius argues that space is a well-founded phenomenon, which is not just 
subjectively grounded.604 However, contrary to Eberhard, Pistorius is not committed to the kind of 
objective validity Eberhard ascribes to the a priori predicates of space. According to Pistorius, a 
priori predicates are merely subjectively valid concepts, grounded in the limitation of the force of 
representation.605 Only a posteriori concepts are objectively valid predicates. The concept of space 
as a multiplicity (presumably of places) for instance, is grounded in the actual multiplicity 
(wirklichen Mehrheit) of things in themselves.606 The phenomenon of space is objectively 
grounded, insofar as the multiplicity of places corresponds to and is grounded in the multiplicity of 
the things in themselves. The latter does not presuppose that the things in themselves, the simple 
substances, are localised in space, which means that Pistorius distances himself from the kind of 
physical monadology, which is implicit in Eberhard’s critique.  
 
 
6.5.3 Kant’s Response to the Leibnizians 
 
Let us now reconstruct how Kant might respond to the criticisms of the Leibnizians. Such a 
reconstruction is facilitated by the fact that Kant actually responded to the critique of Eberhard, 
Kästner and other contributors to Philosophisches Magazin.607 In my reconstruction of Kant’s 
counterargument to the Leibnizian alternative, I will therefore use Kant’s reply to Kästner in 
addition to the arguments already presented in the Metaphysical Exposition. Let us start with (b), 
i.e. the claim that the concept of space is an empirical concept.  
   Kant’s response here is mainly concerned with the claim that the predicates of space are innate or 
some mixture of innate and empirical predicates. Implicitly this claim suggests that the concept of 
the original metaphysical space coincides with the concept of space in general (or spatiality), which 
is either innate or partly innate and partly empirical.  The strong version of this claim is rejected by 
                                                 
602 Eberhard Von den Begriffen des Raums und der Zeit in Beziehung auf die Gewissheit der menschlichen 
Erkenntniss, pp. 59-60.   If phenomenal space is grounded in simple substances, but also continuous, it 
seems difficult for Eberhard to hold this position, and at the same time say that simple substances are in 
space, perhaps even as parts of space, for that would mean that they are in the continuous, which now has 
turned out to be an ideal property of space.    
603 Eberhard Von den Begriffen des Raums und der Zeit in Beziehung auf die Gewissheit der menschlichen 
Erkenntniss, pp. 58-60. 
604 Pistorius discusses the objective and subjective grounds of phenomena in Erläuterungen über des Herrn 
Professor Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft von Joh. Schultze, pp. 98-101. 
605 Pistorius, Erläuterungen über des Herrn Professor Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft von Joh. Schultze, 
pp. 100-1. 
606 Pistorius, Erläuterungen über des Herrn Professor Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft von Joh. Schultze, 
p. 101. 
607 Kant’s critique of Eberhard was presented 1790, in the essay Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll, in Ak. 8, pp. 185-271, from 
now on Discovery.  For a detailed historical background to Kant’s Discovery the reader is referred to 
Allison (1973).   
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Kant in the Discovery. The concept of space is acquired, not innate. Unfortunately, what Kant seems 
to suggest in the Discovery is that the concept of the original, metaphysical space is acquired in the 
same fashion as we acquire the concepts of geometric spaces, i.e. by virtue of constructions.608  
    This ambiguity is reflected in Kemp Smith’s commentary, according to which Kant’s Discovery 
contradicts the account presented in the Metaphysical Expositions, which assumes that the 
representation of space is innate.609 However, to me it seems that Kant’s statement in the Discovery 
is largely consistent with what he says in the Metaphysical Exposition and in his response to Kästner 
(see section 6.4.4). The determinate pure intuitions of geometric spaces, which Kant describes in 
the Discovery, still presuppose an indeterminate pure intuition of the originally given, metaphysical 
space.610 
    Kant does not discuss any of the details of Eberhard’s criticism in the 1791 essay, since 
Eberhard’s essay was published one year after the Discovery. Nonetheless, it seems as if Kant could 
argue that the distinction between metaphysical space and geometric space is at the heart of Kant’s 
critique of Eberhard. From Kant’s point of view, Eberhard makes the mistake of assuming that only 
local, geometric spaces are singular, which ignores that they are embedded in a global, all-
encompassing space, which is singular. The relation between the local, objective spaces and the 
global space is not a relation between a superior thing and an inferior thing, but rather a relation 
between a superset and a subset.    
    Let us now turn to Kant’s response to the Leibnizian thesis that space might be partly real and 
partly ideal (e).  On this thesis, space is ideal inasmuch as it is subjectively grounded in the limit of 
the human faculty of representation. It is the latter, which makes us confusedly perceive space as a 
continuous order of coexisting phenomena. Continuity cannot be abstracted from a discrete order 
of simple substances, like those empirical concepts of reflection Kant discussed in the late 1760s.  
Continuity is a subjectively grounded, a priori predicate of space. For if space is an all-
encompassing continuous whole, it also follows that space is prior its parts. According to the 
Leibnizians, space is possible only as a totum analyticum, and as already Leibniz recognised 
(Chapter 4), such wholes are ideal and consist of parts that are indeterminate and hence potentially 
infinite. Both Kant and the Leibnizians can thus agree that space is a continuous whole. It is only 
when we consider the conclusions from this result that disagreement begins.   
   For Leibnizians, like Eberhard, the phenomenal space is grounded in something real, namely in 
the actual space of simple substances. So far, we have seen few details of the nature of this 
grounding relation. However, for Kant it is clear from the outset that for Leibnizians, like Eberhard, 
simples cannot be thought of as the ground of space, unless it is thought of as the place of a world 
of simple substances. For them space is real only as the space of a totum syntheticum, i.e. as the 
space of a substantial composite of determinate and finite simple substances. As we have seen, Kant 
thinks this conclusion is absurd, for it makes something, which is ultimately simple, invisible, and 
non-sensible, a part of that which is infinitely divisible, visible, and sensible.611 Eberhard’s defence 
of (e) is inconsistent with the continuity of space, which means that it must be rejected.  
    Recently, Falkenstein has argued that Kant’s critique of Eberhard presents us to an argument for 
the transcendental ideality of space, which he takes to be quite independent of the Metaphysical 
                                                 
608 Discovery, Ak. 8, pp. 221-2.  
609 Kemp Smith (1999, pp. 88-98).  
610 As Allison (1983, p. 95) points out “every determinate space is represented as a part or determination of 
the one unbounded space. This one unbounded space can be said to be ‘preintuited’, in the sense that it is 
given together with every determinate intuition as its original ground or condition. It is not, however, itself 
actually intuited as an object.”     
611 Discovery, Ak. 8, pp. 201-6.   
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Expositions, which Falkenstein labels the “decomposition argument”.612 On Falkenstein’s reading, 
the decomposition argument is designed to show that space cannot be real as the space of a 
substantial composite, which consists of simple parts, for space is an indefinitely divisible totum. 
The decomposition argument provides, in other words, an argument against the view that the reality 
of space is grounded in the reality of spatially located monads.613 This version of the decomposition 
argument is, however, inadequate according to Falkenstein, since it does not exclude the possibility 
that space is real as an order of physical monads, which fill space by the sphere of activity of their 
repulsive forces.614 The possibility of dividing the sphere of activity of the repulsive forces, and 
hence also the matter which fills space, does not threaten the indivisibility of the physical monads.  
Ironically, the young Kant’s arguments for physical monads are here turned against the mature, 
critical Kant.   
    To me it seems that Falkenstein identifies a weak spot in the very premise of Kant’s argument 
against the Leibnizian alternative (e). The possibility of physical monads endowed with repulsive 
forces suggests that simple substances can be localised in space without distorting the continuity 
and infinite divisibility of space. The mature Kant’s arguments against this possibility are also weak 
and inconsistent. 615 On the other hand, we should note that Kant presents other arguments for 
thinking that monads cannot be physical. First, physical monads make it difficult to explain the 
mind-body union (Chapter 3), and second, physical monads entail that monads are localised in 
space.  
    Effectively the second point brings us back to the quandaries of Leibniz (Chapter 2), namely if, 
and in that case how, it is possible for monads to be literally localised in space.  Monads have a 
mode of coexisting with other monads by virtue of their bodies, which give them a point of view in 
space, but this does not immediately entail that places are real properties of the monads. Places are 
limits of the space continuum and hence as ideal as the continuum itself. Simple substances are not 
elements of appearances/phenomena, but their ground, a position which Kant now attributes to 
Leibniz, and which Eberhard later argued was the correct version of his own position.616                         
    However, these arguments do not rule out that there is some sort of correspondence between 
space and the order of coexistence of simple substances.  In the “Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science” (Metaphysische Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaften), written a couple of 
years before Discovery, Kant seems to confirm that he was fully aware of this alternative and that 
he did not rule it out:   
 
Now, the composite of things in themselves must certainly consist of the simple; for the parts must here 
be given before all composition. But the composite in the appearance does not consist of the simple, 
because in the appearance, which can never be given otherwise than as composite (extended), the parts can 
be given only through division and thus not before the composite but only in it. Therefore, it was not 
Leibniz’s intention, as far as I comprehend, to explicate space by the order of simple entities side by side, 
                                                 
612 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 293-301). 
613 Falkenstein (2004, p. 300).  
614 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 300-1). 
615 Falkenstein (2004, pp. 300-1). For a more detailed critique of Kant’s arguments against physical 
monads, which Kant presents in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, see Falkenstein (2004, 
pp. 371-2), footnote 32.   
616 Discovery, Ak. 8, pp. 202-3; examples of Eberhard’s response to the Kantian critique can be found in the 
article Bemerkungen über eine Recension des zweyten Stücks dieses phil. Mag. in der Allg. Litt. Zeit.  N. 90 
dieses Jahres, published in Philosophisches Magazin 1789, p. 52.  
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but rather to juxtapose this order as corresponding to space [my italics, J.J.] while yet belonging to a 
merely intelligible (for us unknown) world. And this is to assert nothing other than what was pointed out 
elsewhere, namely, that space, along with the matter whose form space is, comprises not the world of 
things in themselves but only the appearance of such world, and is itself only the form of our external 
sensible intuition. (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, pp. 55-6, Ak. 4, pp. 507-8)    
 
The lesson then would be that the expositions of the concept of space only show that there exists a 
numerical difference between space as a form of sensibility and space as a form of things in 
themselves (monads). When Kant declares that space does not represent any relation of things in 
themselves (A26a/B42a) he denies that there is a homomorphy between the spatial order of 
coexistence of appearances and the unknown order of coexistence of the things in themselves, but 
not there is a correspondence between them.617    
    Allison has observed that a correspondence between space and the order of coexistence of simple 
substances commits us to the existence of a qualitative identity or similarity between them.618  
However, speaking about a qualitative identity or similarity between space as a form of sensibility 
and space as form of things in themselves is meaningless and perhaps logically inconsistent, 
something Allison thinks the proponents of the third alternative ignore.619 Following Charles 
Parsons, one might say that Allison’s argument builds on what Parsons calls the “Subjectivist 
view”.620 According to this view appearances are not distorted pictures of things in themselves, but 
ontologically different from them, in the sense that they do not exist as mind-independent objects, 
but only as representations. Since space and time are forms or determinations of these 
representations, one cannot ascribe them to things in themselves, without making a “category 
mistake”.621 
   To me this argument does not appear to be entirely convincing: it seems to build on the assumption 
that it is logically impossible for two numerically different things that are essentially different to 
have some properties that are identical. For instance, the line I draw on a blackboard is essentially 
different from the line a draw in my imagination, in the sense that the first is objectively real 
(material) and the other is not. But from this it does follow that the lines cannot share certain 
properties, for instance the property of representing what universally belongs to a line, etc.  To say 
that it is meaningless to talk about shared properties or similarities seems relevant only in the sense 
that we cannot determine whether it is true.  
   Although things in themselves are not localised in space and not parts of the phenomenal world 
they are in a sense “localised” in the presence of God (as Malebranche would express it). The 
numerical difference between space and God does not exclude that there is a certain similarity or 
analogy between the former and the latter. For the local omnipresence and the mathematical infinity 
of space certainly resembles the virtual omnipresence and metaphysical infinity of God. Moreover, 
there is a correspondence between the order of the monads in the presence of God and the order of 
                                                 
617 Perhaps it is more accurate to say that there is a correspondence between phenomena and noumena, 
rather than between their orders of coexistence.  On De Risi’s (2007, pp. 326-7) interpretation both Leibniz 
and Kant assume that there a mapping from noumena to phenomena, but contrary to Leibniz Kant denies 
that this mapping is structure preserving, that is, according to Kant there is not even a partial isomorphism 
(homomorphism) between the spatial order between phenomena and the order of coexistence between the 
noumena.       
618 Allison (1983, pp. 111-113).   
619 Allison (1983, pp. 111-113).   
620 Parsons (1999, p. 85).   
621 Parsons (1999, p. 85).   
                                          The Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Ideality Claim    
 
 
 
147 
 
the appearances (some of which are bodies of monads) in space, as Kant admitted in the beginning 
of the 1790s. It is thus not meaningless to speak of a similarity between space and God, in terms of 
an analogy.  Some of the knowledge we have in transcendent speculative metaphysics is therefore 
synthetic, namely insofar as it depends on analogies rather than analyses of concepts or definitions.       
    Given that this assessment of the situation is correct, it seems to leave much Pistorius’ version of 
alternative (e) intact. But what about Pistorius’ version of (b)?  We have seen (Chapter 5) that Kant 
presents an argument against (b) already in Inaugural Dissertation. The original representation of 
space cannot be an empirical concept, since that would entail that the postulates of Euclidean 
geometry are more or less probable inductive generalisations, not universal truths in the strictest 
sense. That is not the case, however, for according to Kant the postulates of Euclidean geometry 
are necessary, a priori and synthetic truths. This also goes to show that space cannot be a property 
of things in themselves. For according to Kant Euclidean geometry cannot say anything about the 
spatial properties of objects, which is universally and necessary true, unless these properties are 
produced in agreement with Euclidean geometry. Kant’s argument from Euclidean geometry does 
not strictly belong to the Metaphysical Exposition, however, but to the Transcendental Exposition, 
which will be discussed in some detail in the appendix below.  
 
 
Appendix. Guyer and the Transcendental Ideality Claim  
 
In his book Kant and the Claims of Knowledge Guyer presents an alternative interpretation of the 
transcendental ideality claim, in which the non-spatiality of things in themselves (A26a/B42a) 
figure as a premise and not a conclusion of Kant’s arguments for this claim.622 According to Guyer 
it is the non-spatiality of the things in themselves, which entails the subjectivity of the form of 
sensibility, and not the other way around:  
 
(…) that Kant’s inference is from the nonspatiality of things in themselves to the subjectivity of the 
necessary forms of representation, rather than vice versa, is evident from prominent passages in Kant’s 
published work as well as from several key passages in his unpublished remains.623    
   
     Guyer’s interpretation is based on Paul F. Strawson’s contention that “the transcendental 
subjectivity of space rests on no other discernible support that [sic] that provided by the argument 
from geometry.”624 In summary, Guyer’s so-called epistemological argument says that the 
possibility of a priori, necessary knowledge of space, entails that space cannot be a property of 
things in themselves. The thesis that space is an a priori representation and that we have a priori 
knowledge of space does not immediately underwrite the conclusions from the Metaphysical 
Expositions (A26a/B42a), namely that space is not a property of things in themselves and merely 
subjective – unless we insert an additional, minor premise.625  More specifically, Guyer argues, this 
involves an argument from the nature of Euclidean geometry to the ideality of space. 
    In order to follow Guyer’s reconstruction of Kant’s conclusion we have to consider how Kant 
thinks that Euclidean geometry might demonstrate that space is a pure intuition, and how this might 
                                                 
622 Guyer (1987, p. 342).  
623 Guyer (1987, p. 355).  
624 Strawson (1966, p. 277).   
625 Guyer (1987, pp. 348-9, 355).    
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provide an argument for the transcendental ideality of space. Kant discusses the connection between 
Euclidean geometry and the pure intuition of space in a section with the title “The Transcendental 
Exposition of the Concept of Space” (Tranzendentale Erörterung des Begriffs vom Raume). In the 
Transcendental Exposition, Kant proceeds regressively from the synthetic expositions of Euclidean 
geometry to the pure intuition of space. Thus, in the Transcendental Exposition Kant argues that 
space is a necessary condition for the validity of all propositions of Euclidean geometry, such as 
for instance the proposition that space has three dimensions, that a sum of every two sides of a 
triangle is greater than the third side, etc.626  
   Space is not just the ground, which underlies the empirical intuitions and appearances, but also a 
universal condition of the constructions of Euclidean geometry, without which there would be no 
synthetic knowledge a priori in mathematics. The Metaphysical Exposition, which proceeds 
progressively from an analytic exposition of the concept of space, can be completed by an argument, 
which more literally rests on a synthetic exposition. 627    
  The argument of Kant’s Transcendental Exposition goes from the validity of Euclidean geometry 
to the conclusion that space must be a pure intuition:  
 
Geometry is a science which determines the properties [Eigenschaften] of space synthetically, and yet a 
priori. What, then, must be our representation of space, in order that such knowledge of it may be possible? 
It must in its origin be intuition; for from a mere concept no propositions can be obtained which go beyond 
the concept – as happens in geometry. Further, this intuition must be a priori, that is, it must be found in 
us prior to any perception of an object, and must therefore be pure, not empirical, intuition. For geometrical 
propositions are one and all apodeictic, that is, are bound up with the consciousness of their necessity; for 
instance, that space has only three dimensions. Such propositions cannot be empirical or, in other words, 
judgments of experience, nor can they be derived from any such judgments.  (B40-1)     
 
Thus, geometric knowledge has to be synthetic, a priori and apodictic. It must be knowledge from 
an intuition, for we have no synthetic knowledge solely from concepts; I cannot have a clear and 
distinct concept of a straight line, unless I represent what belongs to the possibility of such an object, 
which depends on the construction of the shortest line between two points. And these constructions 
are a priori formal intuitions, from which it follows that they precede and are independent of any 
empirical intuitions and cannot be reduced to such intuitions.628 Thus, there are no geometrical 
propositions unless it is possible to visualise the spaces, which they describe in a formal intuition a 
priori. If space could not be visualised in a determinate pure intuition, no axioms of Euclidian 
geometry would be possible, according to Kant.629  
                                                 
626 A25/B39, B41. As a further example of a geometrical axiom Kant mentions the axiom that there is only 
one straight line between a pair of points, etc.     
627 As Paton (1997a, p. 130) expresses it, the Transcendental Exposition moves regressively and analytically 
from the conditioned to the condition. The Metaphysical Exposition on the other hand is progressive and 
passes from the condition to the conditioned. More exactly, the Transcendental Exposition involves the 
“explanation of a concept, as a principle from which the possibility of other a priori synthetic knowledge 
can be understood”, or in other words the explanation of how we can have axiomatic geometrical 
knowledge from the pure intuitions of space.     
628 Pure intuitions can never be derived from experience; a pure intuition is always an original 
representation (ursprüngliche Darstellung). Anthropologie §28, Ak. 7, p. 167. 
629 The claim that the original space is Euclidean is perhaps not Kant’s most interesting or convincing 
claim. More important and less time bound is his claim that space, constitutes some kind of Euclidean 
reference system, a presupposition without which there would be no perception of experience of things and 
their properties or states.   
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    According to Guyer, the peculiar nature of the truths of Euclidean geometry – there are no other 
geometries to be reckoned with according to Kant – is thus the sole basis of Kant’s challenging 
conclusion that space does not exist independently of our minds. The premise of this claim is that 
the truths of Euclidean geometry are necessary and not contingent, as we have seen.630 Guyer argues 
that this means that Kant takes Euclidean geometry to be true of an object if and only if it is 
necessarily true of the object, i.e. if and only if it necessarily exemplifies the spatial properties 
ascribed to it. The latter does not follow, Guyer continues, except on the supposition that the mind 
“imposes” the spatial form on the objects. Presumably, this makes the necessity of Euclidean 
geometry “absolute”, in the sense that it is not conditioned by the restriction our sensibility puts on 
the objects we perceive.631   
   Guyer summarises Kant’s view by formulating the following two alternative versions of the 
necessity that belongs to the spatial properties of an object:632   
 
(1) Necessarily, if we are to perceive an object x then x is spatial and Euclidean. 
 
(2) If we perceive an object x, then necessarily, x is spatial and Euclidean.  
 
     On the first alternative, our sensibility necessarily filters out objects which are not spatial, but it 
does not filter out objects which are contingently spatial, including contingently spatial things in 
themselves. Only the second alternative can therefore satisfy Kant’s demands of absolutely 
necessary truths in Euclidean geometry, according to Guyer.  From this Kant infers that things in 
themselves cannot be ascribed any spatial properties, for in that case our knowledge of these 
properties would be contingent and based on experience.633 The propositions of Euclidean geometry 
would then have to be synthetic and a posteriori, which they are not.634  There is no third alternative: 
to say that we know the spatial properties of objects, both contingently and necessarily is absurd 
according to Kant: 
 
On Kant’s conception, spatiality cannot be necessarily true of some objects (representations) and 
contingently true of some others (things in themselves), for then it is not necessarily true of any objects at 
all; if it is to be necessarily true of any objects at all, it must be necessarily true of all objects of which it 
is true. Since we cannot assert that spatiality is necessarily true of things in themselves – but can assert 
that it is necessarily true of some objects – it thus follows that it is not true of things in themselves at all.635  
 
Hence, it must be impossible for things in themselves to be in space.  
   The epistemological argument Guyer presents thus makes the transcendental ideality of space into 
an implication of the a priori and necessary nature of our knowledge of space and the spatiality of 
the objects we experience. The argument makes a case for Kant’s transcendental ideality claim, but 
in all it fails to do its job. Thus, Kant has no sound argument for the claim that the truths of Euclidean 
                                                 
630 Guyer (1987, p. 359).   
631 Guyer (1987, p. 361).  
632 Guyer (1987, p. 364).   
633 Had space been a property of things in themselves, there would have been no intuition of space prior to 
the empirical intuition of space as a property of things in themselves, as Kant argues in the first paragraph 
of the conclusions.    
634 Guyer (1987, p. 364).   
635 Guyer (1987, pp. 366-7).  
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geometry are absolutely true, as against the alternative view that the truths of Euclidean geometry 
are hypothetical necessities, i.e. the view that Euclidean geometry is true of all external objects we 
perceive, just because our sensibility filters out any object for which Euclidean geometry is not 
true.636  
   The trouble with Guyer’s interpretation, as even those who defend it admit, is that it is extremely 
difficult to determine what it would be to “impose” a spatial form on an object in the context of 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy. 637 For implicitly this notion presupposes that Kant assumes that 
the mind imposes its spatial form on some sort of readymade object. It is significant that the 
examples invoked by Guyer, in support of his reading, are drawn mainly from passages where Kant 
discusses geometric objects, i.e. objects of our own making, in which nothing is given to us by the 
senses. However, this ignores the possibility that Euclidean geometry is necessarily true of the 
objects we experience, because it describes the properties of the order in which these objects are 
given.638     
    Furthermore, it is difficult to see in what sense it would be correct to say that the truths of 
geometry are absolutely necessary according to Kant, for that would make the truths of geometry 
into analytic truths, which is exactly what Leibniz claims and Kant denies. Perhaps we could make 
more sense out of Guyer’s reading if we take him to say that Kant considers the properties of 
Euclidean space to be necessarily exemplified in the objects we experience and that this de re 
necessity is the foundation of the de dicto necessity of the propositions of Euclidean geometry.639  
    However, none of this entails that the truths of Euclidean geometry are absolutely necessary, for 
their truth would still be restricted to the subset of all worlds, which are like ours, in the sense that 
they have a spatial form imposed on them. To me it seems more convincing to say that Kant 
considers geometric propositions to be true in all worlds we can experience; they are, as Brittan 
puts it, true in all really possible worlds.640 This would restrict the truth of Euclidean geometry to 
worlds in which spatial properties of objects are conditioned by sensibility such as ours, namely a 
sensibility which perceives (intuits) an object only if it can orient them in the directions that are 
possible along the three dimensions of an Euclidean space. 
    Guyer also argues that Kant suggested another argument for the transcendental ideality claim, 
which is independent of the epistemological argument. Guyer refers to this argument as the 
“metaphysical argument”. According to Guyer, Kant based this argument on the “philosophical 
prejudice” that a relation cannot be an inner property, which belongs to the thing in itself.641   
    Given that the metaphysical argument is correct, it follows that the claim about the necessary and 
synthetic a priori nature of Euclidean geometry becomes something that is grounded in the claim 
                                                 
636 Guyer (1987, pp. 368-9).   
637 See for instance Parsons (1999, pp. 86-7).   
638 On this interpretation, the form of sensibility is not a form imposed on outer appearances, but rather a 
form in which appearances are given to the sensibility. We can then think of the form as an order, and the 
appearances as being given to sensibility, as mapped in a spatial order.  Without sensibility and its form or 
order, the mapping would not be possible. However, sensibility does not determine the place of each 
appearance in the order. Using the analogy/metaphor of the form of sensibility as the order of a mapping 
also makes it possible to conceive how sensibility selects certain objects (noumena) and filters out certain of 
their relations. For a closer discussion of sensibility and its form, in terms of mappings, orders, selections, 
and filters, see Falkenstein (2004, pp. 424-5), footnote 4.    
639 Guyer invites to this interpretation on a number of occasions; see Guyer (1987, p.  363). 
640 Brittan (1978, pp. 81-2).  
641 Guyer (1987, pp. 350-2).   
                                          The Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Ideality Claim    
 
 
 
151 
 
that things in themselves are non-spatial, rather than the other way around.642 Indirectly the 
metaphysical argument also becomes an argument for Kant’s claim that Euclidean geometry is 
necessary and a priori, which of course is linked to his a priori thesis.  
    In my opinion, metaphysical considerations behind the transcendental ideality claim deserve 
more serious attention.  Moreover, Kant’s metaphysical arguments should not be taken as based on 
the premise that no relations are real. Relations between things in themselves or noumena are real, 
according to Kant, but they do not make them spatially located. Implicitly the transcendental 
ideality claim is the claim that the relations between noumena must be distinguished from the 
relations between phenomena. The metaphysical arguments are hence the arguments Kant presents 
in favour of keeping this distinction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
642 As Guyer (1987, p. 356) observes Kant’s presentation of the transcendental ideality claim in the Critique 
of Pure Reason (A26/B42) suggests that he argued from the premise that “space is not a feature of things in 
themselves, [to] the conclusion that space can only be a subjective form of representation”. 
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7.  The Limits of Sensibility and the Errors of Metaphysics    
 
 
The discussion so far has dealt with Kant’s attempt to demonstrate the transcendental ideality of 
space from the conclusions of the expositions of the concept of space. Space is valid with respect 
to outer appearances only. This conclusion also accords with the ambitions of the plan Kant 
presented in his letter to Lambert where he declared that the Transcendental Aesthetic 
(“phenomenology”) must determine the limit of the use of the principles of space and time with the 
purpose of preventing them from being “confusedly applied to objects of pure reason, as has 
heretofore almost always happened.”643  
    In this chapter, I will try to link this part of Kant’s critique with his discussion of transcendental 
reflection. Kant conceives transcendental reflection as a reflection on the origin of representations 
in either sensibility or the understanding.  Transcendental reflection on the origin of representations, 
in either sensibility or understanding, makes it possible to isolate and analyse the pure form of 
sensibility, which is exactly what the Transcendental Aesthetic tries to accomplish. Transcendental 
reflection keeps the contribution from the pure forms of sensibility apart from the contributions 
which originate from the forms of the understanding. Without this fundamental distinction, sensible 
forms are easily taken for logical forms, which leads to a migration of spatial and temporal 
predicates to the noumena. The concepts of phenomena end up becoming confusedly applied to 
noumena, which distorts them and endows them with spatial and temporal predicates that do not 
belong to them.  
    For instance, if the piece of chalk is confusedly taken as a noumenon, rather than as a 
phenomenon, understanding will misrepresent its sensible form, and mistakenly conceive it as a 
logical form.  As a result, the space of the chalk is misconceived as a relation between things (place), 
or as a mode, or an attribute of things (bodily extension). The very same mistake will also affect 
the use of categories and other metaphysical concepts.  Instead of applying the concept of substance 
to what is comparatively inner in the piece of chalk, namely the repulsive force – by virtue of which 
it is permanent and impenetrable – understanding will try to apply the concept of substance to that 
which is absolutely inner in the piece of chalk. The result is that Kant’s piece of chalk is 
misconceived as a composite of absolutely inner, simple substances.    
    The spurious concept of substantial composites is the fertile ground upon which rational 
cosmology grows. Ultimately, it tries to conceive the entire world as a gigantic composite 
substance, which only rational cosmology can handle. The same error, which reifies the original 
phenomenon of space and turns it into a property of things, now spreads to the world. Rational 
cosmology only lets understanding deal with the world as a thing, namely as an absolute whole of 
simple substances. Understanding concludes that the world is finite, but this inference is 
immediately contradicted by sensibility, which tells it that space is immense and inexhaustible. 
Infinity becomes a problem on which understanding has to brood, in a series of endless syllogisms. 
Rational cosmology promises everything, but only in return for understanding giving up its 
ambition to grasp the original phenomenon of the world in its original infinity.     
    The only way to overcome these errors is to make a proper distinction between sensible form and 
logical form, etc., so that the use of the categories can be restricted to their empirical use, with 
respect to phenomena, i.e. with respect to appearances in space and time, which are determinate 
under the transcendental schemata.  Removing the metaphysical errors also restricts space and time 
                                                 
643 Correspondence, p. 96, Ak. 10, p. 98. 
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to appearances and limits them from the objects of understanding, which gives an indirect argument 
for the transcendental ideality of space and time. Not only does this remove the antinomies of 
rational cosmology, but it also helps to conceive the noumena purely, without any subreptic 
admixtures from spatial and temporal predicates.  
   For instance, conceiving the noumenal substrate of the body apart from any spatial or temporal 
predicates makes it possible to conceive the union between the body and the mind in accordance 
with the theory of physical influx, without having to assume that the soul is spatially located.  For 
similar reasons it becomes possible to deal with the concept of God purely as the concept of a 
necessary being, who is virtually rather than locally present to the noumenal substances, which he 
continuously recreates and keeps together within the unity of the noumenal world. The theory of 
physical influx is merely a speculative hypothesis, but we are entitled to use it, for polemical 
purposes.   
   The disposition of the rest of this chapter is as follows. The first section deals with Kant’s critique 
of the errors of Leibnizian metaphysics, which are the result of transcendental amphibolies, i.e. 
confusions of phenomena and noumena. Section two tries to connect Kant’s critique of Leibnizian 
metaphysics with his discussion of the errors of rational cosmology and the mathematical 
antinomies. Section three deals with the subreptic concept of an extended bodily substrate and the 
difficulties which are generated in rational psychology because of this subreptic concept. In this 
way, it becomes possible to defend the theory of physical influx as a legitimate hypothesis in 
rational psychology. Finally, section four deals with how Kant applies these considerations to 
rational theology and the concept of God.  
 
 
7.1 Transcendental Reflection and the Transcendental Amphibolies 
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that the Transcendental Aesthetic is an investigation 
not just of the origin and validity of our pure knowledge of space, but also the limits of this 
knowledge and hence also the limit of our sensibility: 
  
Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge from which bodies of a priori synthetic 
knowledge can be derived. (…) But these a priori sources of knowledge being mere conditions of our 
sensibility, just by this fact determine their own limits, namely, that they apply to objects only insofar as 
objects are viewed as appearances, and do not present things as they are in themselves. This is the sole 
field of their validity; should we pass beyond it, no objective use can be made of them.  (A39/B56) 
 
    Knowing the limits of the forms of sensibility, and the pure knowledge which follows from these 
forms, makes it possible to demarcate the concepts which apply phenomena from the concepts 
which apply to noumena. From this it is easy to conclude that the Transcendental Aesthetic puts an 
end to all speculative metaphysics about noumena. However, as Freuler correctly points out, 
knowledge of what noumena are not is, indirectly, knowledge of the limitation (limes, Limitation, 
Schranke) of our knowledge of the noumena.644 We limit (einschränken) our speculative knowledge 
                                                 
644 Freuler (1992, pp. 330-1); cf. Metaphysik Dohna, Ak. 28, p. 644.  
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of noumena, by purifying it from all determinations which exclusively belong to phenomena, like 
their spatial and temporal determinations.645 
    Interestingly it is this very same act of abstraction, which indirectly opens up the possibility to 
limit (beschränken) our knowledge of noumena, by concretising it to the outer limit (terminus, 
Grenze), where it meets the empirical knowledge of phenomena.646 However, this deepening is 
merely problematic, in the sense that it only exhibits analytical predicates, i.e. determinations 
already contained in the concept of the noumenon.647 The knowledge of noumena and the limit of 
this knowledge is synthetic only insofar as it thinks the noumena under predicates, which are 
analogous to predicates, which otherwise apply exclusively to phenomena.648 
    For instance, from the analogy between the relation of coexistence of phenomenal substances 
(bodies) and the coexistence of noumenal substances (monads), we can conclude that noumena are 
situated with respect to each other. However, from this we are not entitled to conclude that they are 
localised in space. It is exactly this mistake which leads to the spurious concept of physical monads.     
    Kant gives further details to these thoughts, in an appendix called “The Amphiboly of Concepts 
of Reflection”.649 In this appendix, Kant discusses the concepts of identity and difference, 
agreement and opposition, inner and the outer, and matter and form.650 These so called “concepts 
of reflection” (Reflexionsbegriffe) are easy to recognise from his correspondence with Lambert. 
However, contrary to Lambert, Kant denies that the use of the concepts of reflection can be justified 
in the same way as the ontological concepts, i.e. categories like the concepts of substance, causality 
etc. Thus, according to Kant, the use of the concepts of reflection cannot be justified without a prior 
act of “transcendental reflection”.651  
    Typical of the act of transcendental reflection is that it makes it possible to determine if given 
representations (concepts) “belong” to one and the same faculty (sensibility/understanding) or not. 
The difference between sensibility and understanding is not just logical, but transcendental, which 
means that it extends to the content and origin of the representations of sensibility and 
understanding, respectively.652 Without a prior act of reflection the concepts of reflection end up 
becoming misapplied, i.e. illegitimately extended from noumena to phenomena, and vice versa. As 
a result there will be a “transcendental amphiboly”, i.e. “a confounding of an object of pure 
understanding with appearance.”653 In the appendix on the transcendental amphibolies Kant argues 
that Leibniz misapplied the concept of the absolutely inner, and that this explains why he conceived 
the substances as monads, for monads are the only things, which are perfectly distinguishable by 
their absolutely inner, perceptual states.654  
    According to Kant, not only the concepts of the inner and the outer, but also the concepts of 
matter and form, belong to the concepts of reflection. In his discussion of the concepts of matter 
and form, Kant accuses Leibniz of having mistakenly applied the concepts of noumenal matter and 
form to phenomena.655 The pure understanding identifies the matter with the essential elements 
                                                 
645 Freuler (1992, pp. 330-1).  
646 Freuler (1992, pp. 330-4); Metaphysik Dohna, Ak. 28, p. 644; Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Ak. 28, pp. 
505-6.  
647 Freuler (1992, p. 354).   
648 Freuler (1992, pp. 340-5); Prolegomena, §58, pp. 357-8.  
649 A261-92/B316-49.  
650 A261-2/B317-8.  
651 A261/B317.    
652 B61-2.   
653 A270/B326.  
654 A265-6 /B321-2 
655 A266-7/B322-3. 
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(essentialia) of a concept, which it takes to be prior to its form, the attributes and modes, which are 
sufficiently grounded in the essential elements.656 For instance, if the essential elements of the 
equilateral triangle are its three equal sides, it follows that it is possible to prove that it has three 
equal angles.657 The equal angles therefore belong to the form (attributes) of the equilateral triangle.  
    It was this alleged misapplication of the order of dependence between form and matter, which 
led Leibniz to conceive space, not as a formal ground of outer appearances, but as an order of 
coexistence, which depends on the prior existence of the monads and their perceptual states.658 
Thus, if the appearances are confusedly taken as real composites of monads, it follows that their 
matter must be given prior to the form, i.e. prior to the spatial order in which appearances coexist 
with each other.  
    In Kant’s terminology Leibniz made the mistake of having “intellectualised” both the phenomena 
and the forms of sensibility, i.e. space and time.659 Had he made a proper distinction between 
sensibility and the intellect, and therefore also between the phenomena and noumena, he could have 
avoided this mistake, but that was not possible for Leibniz, since he denied that sensibility has an 
intuition of its own, which cannot be reduced to a confused intellectual representation of a 
noumenon.660 
   The interesting aspect about Leibniz’s misapplication of the concept of the absolutely inner and 
the concept of matter and form, is that it explains why he came to form a concept of spatially 
localised monads and a concept of material bodies/phenomena as aggregates of monads (Chapter 
2). Kant’s discussion of the amphibolies is hardly an accurate description of Leibniz’s ontology of 
monads, however, since it largely ignores that Leibniz actually conceived monads as endowed with 
points of view rather than places in a literal sense. However, it is still possible to appreciate Kant’s 
discussion as an attempt to explain the origin of the concept of spatially localised monads as a 
concept, which belongs to the same kind of subreptic concepts, Kant discussed in the Inaugural 
Dissertation (see Chapter 5). Ultimately then, the fallacy which results in the spurious concept of 
localised monads turns out to be a special case of the transcendental amphibolies.   
    The failure to recognise the limits of sensibility makes the understanding misuse concepts spatial 
and temporal concepts, by predicating them of things in themselves, like the noumenal world, the 
rational soul and God. According to Kant this mistake explains the prevalence of so called 
dialectical or transcendental illusions in the metaphysics of Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten. These 
transcendental illusions are basically the result of transcendental amphibolies, and come to 
expression in judgments which falsely attribute a phenomenal predicate to a noumenon or 
alternatively a noumenal predicate to a phenomenon.  
    The discussion of these illusions properly belongs to the Transcendental Dialectic, not to the 
Transcendental Aesthetic.661 The purpose of the Transcendental Dialectic is not to expose (or 
demonstrate) the transcendental ideality of space directly. However, the Transcendental Dialectic 
                                                 
656 A266/B322. 
657 See Wolff, Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, § 146.   
658 A266-8 /B322-4.  
659 A275/B331.  
660 A276/B332. The outcome is of this mistake is, as that space is described as an intellectual predicate which 
strictly only belongs to monads, namely the order of their coexistence.   
661 For a discussion of the origin of the transcendental illusions, see Grier (2001, pp. 108-39). On Grier’s 
reading transcendental illusions originate in reason, quite independently of the transcendental amphibolies. 
To me it seems as if the transcendental illusions are intimately connected with and conditioned by the 
transcendental amphibolies. See also Grier (2001, pp. 177-9) for a discussion closer to the interpretation I 
defend.  
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gives an indirect argument for the transcendental ideality claim, namely by exhibiting the illusions 
which are produced when we consider space as transcendentally real.  More exactly, this argument 
occurs in the part of the Transcendental Dialectic, which deals with the mathematical antinomies 
of rational cosmology. To these antinomies I turn now.  
 
 
7.2 The World and the Transcendental Ideality of Space   
 
Interestingly, the misapplication of the concept of the absolutely inner has implications, which take 
us beyond the ontology of monads and phenomena, to rational cosmology.  Like a domino-effect, 
the misapplication of the concept of the absolutely inner also leads to a misapplication of the 
concept of the noumenal world. The core of Kant’s discussion of this misapplication is, I think, 
quite obvious. It deals with the subreptic concept of the world, which occurs in Wolff’s and 
Baumgarten’s rational cosmologies, because of their confusion of the noumenal world with the 
phenomenal world.   
    To get started it is helpful to consider Kant’s discussion against the background of Leibniz’s 
cosmology. Let us recall that for Leibniz, space is potentially infinitely extended and divisible. 
However, there are no infinite (greatest) numbers, according to Leibniz, and hence no actually 
infinite wholes. We have already seen (Chapter 4) that this makes it impossible to conceive absolute 
space as an actual (categorematic) infinite whole.  
    The ontological status of the world is different. The world is an absolute whole, like space, but 
unlike space the world is a real whole, not an ideal potentially (syncategorematically) infinite, ideal 
whole. Thus, if the world is an absolute whole and real, then it must be finite. However, on the 
subreptic assumption that the world is located in a potentially infinite space, it seems to follow that 
the world is surrounded by an empty space.662   
    Though there is evidence that Leibniz might have played with the idea that vacuums are 
metaphysically possible, there is strong evidence against thinking that he accepted the actual 
existence of such vacuums.663 This suggests that Leibniz considered the potentially infinite to be 
real with respect to the extension of the matter of the world. Here Leibniz could argue that a limit 
to the extension of the matter of the world would be arbitrary, and that God perpetually creates and 
adds new matter of the world, which means that the world is as unlimited as space.664  
    Moreover, contrary to what one might think given Leibniz’s rejection of actual, categorematic 
infinite wholes (see Chapter 4), Leibniz fully embraced the possibility of actual infinites.665 The 
matter of the world for instance is not just infinitely divisible, but consists of an actual infinity of 
                                                 
662 For a discussion of the arguments in favour of thinking that Leibniz recognised the possibility of 
vacuums, see Vailati (1997, pp. 117-120).   
663 For a discussion of the arguments against the possibility of vacuums and a critique of Vailati’s position 
see Futch (2008, pp. 52-6).  
664 This interpretation is defended by Futch (2008, pp. 97-8).   
665 Leibniz’s concept of infinity, is discussed in Futch (2008, pp. 81-98).   
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things.666 Thus, we cannot conceive of the world as a whole, but only as an aggregate.667  However, 
this was not a conclusion that Leibniz’s followers were prepared to make, which explains their 
efforts to preserve the finiteness of the world, at the expense of a proper understanding of its infinity. 
To see how Leibniz’s followers dealt with this problem, it is helpful to outline what Baumgarten 
has to say about the finiteness of the world.668 
    Positively stated, the world is a composite, namely a series, which contains a manifold of parts 
and states, according to Baumgarten.669 But the world is also one, that is, a whole (totum), namely 
an absolute whole, that is, a whole which is not part of another whole.670 There is no part that is not 
a part of the world, which means that all parts are connected with each other in an identical 
fashion.671 The coexistence of the parts and the succession of their states is therefore ordered.672 
From this Baumgarten concludes that the parts coexist in space and that their states succeed each 
other in time.673   
    Negatively stated, the world is not an indefinite series in space and time, within which we can 
regress or progress without ever encountering any limits. Thus, Baumgarten typically argues that 
the world is finite, and that we can demonstrate the finiteness of the world from the principle of 
sufficient reason.  For, according to the principle of sufficient reason, an infinite series of causally 
related things and states cannot exist without a ground or cause. The cause cannot be a member of 
the series, for in that case it will be the effect of another cause. On the other hand, the cause cannot 
exist outside the series, for in that case it would be an absolutely necessary first cause, which sets a 
boundary to the series. The world is hence not an indefinite series, in space and time: 
 
An indefinite progression [Progressus in infinitum], however great it would be posited, is a contingent 
being. Thus, it has an efficient cause posited outside it. This [cause] cannot be a contingent being, for in 
that case it would once again be a being caused by another being, [and] not posited outside the progression 
itself, but [as] a part of it. Hence the efficient cause of the indefinite progression must be a necessary being, 
and independent. In whichever mode this being can exist, it exists in that mode. But it can exist, although 
it is not caused by another being posited outside it. Hence, it is not caused by another being posited outside 
it; indeed it is its first effective cause as such. Thus, the indefinite progression, which must be without first 
cause as such, and yet have one, is impossible and is not assumable neither in this, nor in any other world 
[nec in hoc, nec in ullo mundo ponendus].674 (Metaphysica, § 381) 
 
                                                 
666 Space is a whole so it cannot contain an actual infinity of parts, i.e. it is merely infinitely divisible 
(though not separable of course). The material content in space is nonetheless actually divided to infinity, 
according Leibniz, for it is an aggregate, not a whole.  The young Kant thought that the latter is impossible, 
since he assumed that the world is a substantial composite and hence a whole, from which he concluded 
that the world cannot contain an infinity of parts. The world contains a finite number of parts, namely the 
physical monads, which are conceivable independently all composition and therefore simple. This left Kant 
with no other infinity except the potential infinity of space and (presumably) time.     
667 Cf. Essai de Theodicée §195, G VI 232.  
668 To simplify the discussion somewhat I have used Baumgarten’s Metaphysica as a source of reference, 
since it occurs in Kant’s discussions of rationalist cosmology.  
669 Baumgarten, Metaphysica, § 354.   
670 Baumgarten, Metaphysica, § 354.   
671 Baumgarten, Metaphysica, § 357. 
672 Baumgarten, Metaphysica, § 359.  
673 Baumgarten, Metaphysica, § 374. 
674 My translation, J.J.  
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    The problem with this conclusion is that it is contradicted by not only the geometer, but also the 
layman, who finds nothing but infinitely divisible composites in the visible world (mundus 
adpectabilis), in which he lives. For instance, the continuous lines, which can be constructed in the 
imaginary space of geometry, seem to be indefinitely divisible (contrary to space); likewise there 
seems to be no end to temporal progression. However, in reality the mathematical infinity of space 
and time is merely an imaginary property. Baumgarten summarises this aspect of rational 
cosmology by pointing out that the mathematically infinite is an ideal, imaginary property, which 
only signifies that the magnitude of the world is immensurable for us: 
 
Thus the thing which has a maximum degree of reality, or the most real, is infinite, [and] everything else 
is finite. The finite, whose limits we neither can, nor want to determine is indefinite (that is to say, the 
imaginary, mathematically infinite).675 (Metaphysica, § 248) 
 
    Kant’s discussion of the fallacies of the rationalist concept of the world is intimately connected 
with the amphibolies of the concept of the absolutely inner, which was discussed above. Once we 
have “intellectualised” the phenomena, as Leibniz did, it becomes easy to “intellectualise” the 
phenomenal world, by conceiving it as an absolute whole of simple parts (monads), as Baumgarten 
did.  The problem with this is that the phenomenon of the potential infinity of the world is lost. The 
phenomenal world succumbs to the noumenal world of monads. In particular, it becomes difficult 
to conceive the world as a unity of causally interacting substances, for the forces of the monads do 
not act outside themselves, on their own bodies and on the bodies of other monads.676 The perceptual 
states of the monads are correlated in accordance with the theory of the pre-established harmony, 
but not causally connected. The unity of the world is idealised so to speak – the world is one only 
in thought.  
    We can gather further information about how Kant conceived of the fallacies of rational 
cosmology from his discussion of the two mathematical antinomies in the Critique of Pure 
Reason.677 This discussion is based on the observation that rational cosmology fails to distinguish 
between the world as an absolute whole of simple substances (the noumenal world) and the world 
as a given whole of appearances (the phenomenal world). This leads to a misapplication of the 
concept of the noumenal world to the phenomenal world, which makes us distortedly conceive of 
the phenomenal world not as a potentially infinite whole, but as an actually finite or actually infinite 
whole.  Since we can conceive of the world as finite/infinite both regressively and progressively, 
the outcome is that rational cosmology becomes entangled in two mathematical antinomies, namely 
the antinomy between the world as finitely and infinitely extended in space, and the antinomy 
between the world as finitely and infinity divided in space.      
    In the thesis of the First Antinomy, Kant explores the possibility of conceiving of the world as 
finitely extended.678 Kant assumes that an infinite whole in space could be “given” only through an 
infinite successive synthesis (addition) of its parts in time, which is impossible.679 The world must 
                                                 
675 My translation, J.J. Like all composites the world is extended, i.e. it has a magnitude in space, but since 
the world is real and all real magnitudes are finite, it follows that the magnitude of the world and its space 
must be finite. For Kant this passage must have suggested that there is something suspicious, either about 
the notion of space as something real, namely the order of coexistence, or about the world as a totum reale.               
676 A274-5 /B330-1.  
677 A426-44 /B454-72. 
678 A426/B454. 
679 A426/B454; A428/B456. 
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therefore be finitely extended, which grants the preservation of the world as an absolute whole in 
space.  
    The antithesis of the First Antinomy, on the other hand, conceives of the world as infinitely 
extended in space.680 Given that we accept the assumption that space is actually infinite together 
with the thesis, that the world is finite and limited, it follows that the world must be limited in 
space.681 Thus, the world cannot be limited in space, unless it is related to space, that is, unless it is 
surrounded by empty space. In other words, the world becomes engulfed by an absolute space, but 
since absolute space is nothing but a form of outer intuition, it would have to be related to nothing, 
which is absurd.    
    The thesis of the Second Antinomy describes the world as a substantial composite, which 
everywhere consists of simple parts.682 This grants that the world is finitely divisible, since it is a 
whole, which consists of a finite number of parts. In the proof of the thesis Kant rehearses an 
argument familiar from the Physical Monadology (Chapter 2), namely that composite substances 
consist of simple parts, for otherwise there would be nothing left of the substances when everything 
composite is taken away from them.683   
    In the antithesis of the Second Antinomy, it is stated that there are no simple parts, neither in the 
bodies nor in the world.684 Indirectly, the antithesis entails that the world is infinitely divisible, 
because it is a whole which consists of potentially infinite parts. In the proof of the antithesis, Kant 
argues that space contains nothing but complex parts, and that there is an equality between the parts 
of space and the parts of the world. From this, it follows that the parts of the world cannot be simple, 
unless they are complex, which is self-contradictory.685  
    On a closer examination, however, it turns out that none of these incompatible predicates are true 
of the phenomenal world. Thus, once we recognise that the concepts of an actually finite or infinite 
magnitude can be true only of the noumenal world, we have a key to the solution to the mathematical 
antinomies.686 Hence, both the concepts of finite and actually infinite extension are false when 
predicated of the phenomenal world. The same observation also holds for the concepts of actually 
finite and infinite division, which are true only of the noumenal world.687 The phenomenal world is 
divided neither into a finite number of simple parts nor into an infinite number of simple parts, but 
it is only infinite in the syncategorematic sense, i.e. indefinite or potentially infinite, as to the 
number of its parts.  
                                                 
680 A427/B455. 
681 A427/B455.  
682 A434/B462. 
683 A434-6/B462-4.  
684 A435/B463. 
685 A436/B464.  
686 A503-7/B531-5. 
687 A503-7/B531-5; A523-7/B551-5. To be exact it should be noted that the antithesis to the second 
antinomy does not say that the bodies and the world are actually divided to infinity.  Thus, in the solution to 
the Second Antinomy, A524/B552, it is suggested that the world is infinitely divisible, but not because it is 
“made up of infinitely many parts.” However, because of the misapplication of the concept of substantial 
composites to appearances, the inevitable consequence of the antithesis is that the things must be conceived 
as actually divided to infinity, which of course is false of the appearances and the phenomenal world. 
Kant’s discussion of the solution to the dialectical opposition between finite and infinite numbers of parts in 
A505-6/B533-4 seems to confirm this. Once the antithesis is conceived in this way, it loses, ironically, its 
edge against the thesis, for it is perfectly possible for a body (substantial composite) to be actually divided 
to infinity, and yet consist of an infinity of simple substances.   
Seeing All Things in Space 
160 
 
    To Kant this suggests the possibility of an indirect proof of the transcendental ideality of the 
phenomenal world.688 Given the assumption that the phenomenal world is neither finite nor infinite 
(which we need in order to solve the mathematical antinomies), it follows that the phenomenal 
world is nothing in itself. Space has no more reality than the phenomena spread out in it, for an 
empty absolute space cannot be real. The indirect proof of the transcendental ideality of the 
phenomenal world also provides us with an argument for the transcendental ideality of space.         
    Kant’s indirect argument for the transcendental ideality claim has not been positively evaluated 
by Kant’s commentators, like Norman Kemp Smith, to take just one example. According to Kemp 
Smith, Kant’s proof of the thesis of the First Antinomy is flawed, because it infers that the world is 
finite from the subjective impossibility of representing an infinite whole, by an infinite synthesis 
(addition) in time.689 The subjective impossibility of an infinite world thus coincides with the 
impossibility of an infinite number.690    
    The proof of the antithesis of the First Antinomy fares no better in the eyes of Kemp Smith. In 
the proof of the antithesis Kant fails to proceed from a purely “dogmatic standpoint”, implicitly 
presupposing the correctness of the main theses of the Transcendental Aesthetic, according to which 
absolute space is “nothing”.691 For unless one accepts that space is nothing but a form of outer 
intuition, as Kant does in his proof of the antithesis,692 nothing compels us to conclude that a finite 
world in empty space is related to nothing.693    
    Kemp Smith also criticises the arguments which Kant presents in support of the thesis and 
antithesis of the Second Antinomy. In the proof of the thesis of the Second Antinomy, Kant just 
assumes the “Leibnizian standpoint” that the bodies and ultimately the world are real composites 
of simple substances, which is exactly what he attempts to prove. For if the world consists of 
ontologically independent parts and therefore as subjects of properties which are absolutely internal 
to them, it easily follows that these parts must be simple substances.694  
    In the antithesis, on the other hand Kant just assumes the exact opposite of the Leibnizian 
standpoint he presupposes in the proof of the thesis.695 Kemp Smith thus notes that Kant is basing 
his proof on an illicit conclusion from the continuity and infinite divisibility of space to the infinite 
divisibility of matter, which fills space, an argument which he had tried to overthrow in the Physical 
Monadology, and which he largely attributed to the “geometers”, such as Leonard Euler.696 For 
short, Kemp Smith’s arguments against the proof of the antithesis of the Second Antinomy are 
basically identical with Falkenstein’s arguments against the decomposition argument.     
    To me it seems that commentators like Kemp Smith are justified in their critique, with some 
minor qualifications perhaps, particularly with respect to the Second Antinomy. However, in my 
opinion this does not make Kant’s transcendental ideality claim less relevant as an assumption, 
                                                 
688 A506-7/B534-5. 
689 According to Kemp Smith (1999, pp. 485-6) Kant commits the error of ignoratio enlenchi: “Deferring 
for a moment the further objections to which such procedure lies open, we may observe that Kant, in 
arguing from a subjective to an objective impossibility, commits the fallacy of ignoratio enlenchi. For when 
the conditions of objective existence are recognised in their distinction from those of mental apprehension, 
the supposed contradiction vanishes, and the argument ceases to have any cogency.” 
690 The concept of infinite numbers is an impossible concept according to Kant. To ascribe an infinite 
number of parts to the world would be the same thing as describing the world as an infinite whole, which is 
an impossible concept, as already Leibniz had argued in the New Essays.    
691 Kemp Smith (1999, p. 488).   
692 B457, footnote b.   
693 Kemp Smith (1999, p. 488).   
694 Kemp Smith (1999, pp. 489-90).   
695 Kemp Smith (1999, pp. 490-1).   
696 Kemp Smith (1999, p. 491). 
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which provides “critical and doctrinal advantage” in cosmology. In other words, transcendental 
philosophy still has the advantage that it provides us with an alternative solution to the contradiction 
inherent within the dogmatic, rationalistic concept of the world – without having to reduce the 
mathematically infinite to the true infinity of God, as Wolff and Baumgarten argued. 
   The concept of an absolute whole still applies to the noumenal world, which is a real composite 
substance – if it exists.  Likewise, the mathematical infinite is an empirically valid concept, which 
applies to the phenomenal world, and which we cannot reduce to the concept of a finite magnitude 
immensurable for us. The mathematically infinite does not have to be excluded from cosmology 
(and ontology), but claims its place as a notion which applies to the phenomenal world. In seeing 
all things in the mathematical infinity of space, we see them not in the immensity of God, but in 
something which is analogous to God’s immensity. 
 
  
7.3 The Soul and the Transcendental Ideality of Space 
 
Kant’s discussion of the subreptic fallacies and transcendental illusions of rational psychology also 
provides material for an indirect argument for the transcendental ideality claim. This discussion 
occurs partly in his 1780s lectures on Descartes’ concept of the soul, and partly in the Paralogisms 
of Pure Reason. Kant’s discussion here is based on a rejection of the thesis that the noumenal 
substrate of the body is known to us and that we can conclude that the substrate of the body has the 
same properties as the phenomenon of the body, i.e. extension, motion, figure, etc.697   
    The result of this error is that the noumenal substrate of the body is conceived as a substance, 
which is heterogeneous from and unable to act immediately on the soul, much like the corporeal 
substance we encounter in Descartes’ metaphysics.698  Alterations in the corporeal substances are 
only occasions for alterations in the states of the souls, not their causes. For instance, my desire to 
scratch my back is just an occasion for my arm to move, but not its cause. Descartes therefore had 
to assume that God acts as an intermediate cause between the soul and the body. Thus, the 
immediate cause of the motion of my arm is God, not my desire to scratch my back.699      
     More generally, both occasionalism and the theory of the pre-established harmony seem to make 
the body superfluous for our representations of outer things. From the point of view of 
occasionalism and the doctrine of the pre-established harmony, it is as if we see all things in God, 
and not by our eyes: 
 
The body as phenomenon is not in community with the soul, but rather the substance distinct from the 
soul, whose appearance is called body. This substrate of the body is an outer determining ground of the 
soul, but how this interaction is constituted, we do not know. (...) Descartes says: God produces 
representations immediately, e.g., when my eye moves. The third, namely the eye, e.g., is then wholly 
dispensable, because without an eye God could also produce the representations. Leibniz assumes these 
representations preestablished by God, that is not much better. (LM, pp. 399-400, K2, Ak. 28,  p. 758)  
 
                                                 
697 Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29, pp. 907-8.   
698 This was, as we recollect, exactly the problem, which Kant had to face during the 1760s, see Chapter 3.  
See also Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29, pp. 907-8 and Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29, pp. 866-7. 
699 Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29, pp. 866-7. 
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    Kant recognises that the substance of the thinking mind and the substance of the body can be 
heterogeneous (rather than identical), but denies that this makes the interaction between them 
impossible, once we realise that they are heterogeneous, not because one is thinking and the other 
is extended and moving.  For if place, extension, figure, motion, and impenetrability are mere 
phenomena, it follows that they provide no basis for making a distinction between thinking and 
corporeal substance, considered as noumena: 
 
The primary difficulty that one runs up against in the explanation of the interaction with the body is that 
motion and thinking are so different that one cannot comprehend how the one is supposed to have an effect 
on the other; but the body is a phenomenon and consequently its properties are as well. We are not 
acquainted with its substrate. Now how this could be in interaction with the soul amounts to how 
substances in general can be in interaction, and the difficulty due to heterogeneity now falls away. (LM, 
pp. 273-4, Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29, p. 908) 
  
   This might seem to be a promising argument for establishing a connection between the 
transcendental ideality claim and the immateriality of the mind, if it had not been for the fact that 
Kant strongly criticises the very possibility of knowing with certainty that the mind is an 
incorporeal, spiritual substance. Indeed, in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason Kant denies that there 
is a way of proving ”I am an incorporeal substance”. The fact that I am aware of nothing composite 
and extended in the apperception of myself as a thinking subject does not prove that I exist as a 
simple incorporeal thinking substance. The latter conclusion is wrong, for once we realise that 
extension merely belongs to the appearance of the body, and not to the (noumenal) substrate of the 
body, there is nothing which excludes the possibility that this substrate is the subject which thinks: 
 
But although extension, impenetrability, cohesion, and motion – in short, everything which outer senses 
can give us – neither are nor contain thoughts, feeling, desire, or resolution, these never being objects of 
outer intuition, nevertheless the something which so affects our sense that it obtains the representations of 
space, matter, shape, etc., may yet, when viewed as noumenon (or better, as transcendental object), be at 
the same time the subject of our thoughts. (…) For this something is not extended, nor is it impenetrable 
or composite, since all these predicates concern only sensibility and its intuition, in so far as we are affected 
by certain (to us otherwise unknown) objects. (A358) 
                                                            
    The certainty that I am a thing that thinks, and therefore a thing with a faculty of thinking, does 
not entail that I have just one original, primitive power, namely the power of thinking. Likewise, it 
does not entail that I have just one primitive power, which produces just one effect, namely thinking. 
I may be an exclusively thinking substance, like the monads of Leibniz, but I may also be a 
substance endowed with corporeal powers.  However, even if it is true that the thinking substance 
and the substrate of its body are identical, it does not follow that it is material. Thus, on the premise 
that space is transcendentally ideal, so that phenomena can be distinguished from noumena, it 
follows that the extension and other spatial properties only belong to the appearance of the body, 
not to the substrate of the body.   
     The dissolution of the spurious concept of the noumenal substrate of the body does not prove 
that the soul acts on its body in accordance with the hypothesis of a physical influx. However, it 
removes the heterogeneity between the body and the soul, which once gave the occasionalist 
hypothesis its advantage over the hypothesis of physical influx.  The hypothesis of physical influx 
is also easiest to square with the common-sense belief in an outer world, and our experience of 
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seeing things in space. We see all things in space and not in God, because our thinking minds are 
causally (not occasionally) connected with the noumenal substrate of a body, which appears as the 
centre from which we direct ourselves to the things, which we see in the phenomenal world. Thus, 
the hypothesis of physical influx turns out to be most consistent with the experience of perceiving 
things from a point of view in space.  
 
 
7.4 God and the Transcendental Ideality of Space    
 
We have already seen how Kant, shortly after the transcendental turn, introduced a distinction 
between God and space, on the basis of a distinction between two different grounds or principles 
of coexistence. Whereas God is the principle of the coexistence of noumena, i.e. the simple 
substances, space is the principle of the coexistence of phenomena. Thus, space is not the condition 
under which monads and other simple substances are possible; in particular, it is not the cause of 
their existence. For in that case it would follow that space is the ground or condition also of the 
existence of God, in agreement with the first postulate of subreptic axioms in the Inaugural 
Dissertation.700  
   In Kant’s notes on Baumgarten’s textbook on metaphysics and Eberhard’s textbook on theology, 
written in the 1780s and 1790s, after the publication of Critique of Pure Reason, there are numerous 
remarks on rational theology, which confirm that Kant remained faithful to these views also during 
the period of transcendental philosophy. Space and time are nothing in themselves, for if they were 
they would become necessary beings, which condition all things, God included. As a result, God 
would lose his causal independence, as his actions would then be determined in time:   
  
Would space and time be viewed as conditions of the existence of the world in itself, and the noumenal 
world not distinguished from the phenomenon, the causality of God with respect to the world would be 
determined in time, thus making God belong to the world. His causality would, through time, belong to a 
series of causes and effects. God [would] thus be contingent, together with all that which, with the world, 
belongs to a whole.701  (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 5962, Ak. 18, p. 401) 
 
   The core of this mistake is that it conflates space with the omnipresence of God, which is exactly 
the charge Kant brought up against Newton and Clarke in the inaugural dissertation (Chapter 5). 
This view entails that the metaphysical concept of space is a pure intellectual idea, a concept of 
reason, which it is not.  The necessity of space is conditioned by the omnipresence of God, not the 
other way around.  There are no necessary beings other than God, and God is the condition not only 
of all contingent noumenal beings but also of the idea of space:   
 
The things in space are all tied a priori to the condition of space. Were this something in itself, it would 
also be necessary and God [would] also [be] tied to the existence in it. God must be present to the things 
in themselves and thus also to the thinking beings and thereby make the idea of space to a necessary 
condition of their outer intuitions.702 (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 6285, Ak. 18, pp. 552-3) 
 
                                                 
700 B71-2.  
701 My translation, J.J. Adickes dates this note to 1794-1795 or 1796-1798.   
702 My translation, J.J.  
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   More importantly, the subreptic concept of God as an omnipresent being in space is contradictory, 
as Kant had argued already in the inaugural dissertation. God is conceived  either as a composite 
substance or a simple substance which is present in more than one place at one and the same time.703 
The former does not only make God material but it also has the consequence that the concept of the 
mathematically infinite is displaced from space and time to God. God’s presence to the world is, 
however, virtual rather than local. God is immense because he is the most real (maximum), not 
because his presence is mathematically infinite – in space and time.   
    In a note on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, which Adickes dates to the end of the 1780s, Kant 
develops his thoughts about God’s virtual presence, in the context of a reflection on Leibniz’s theory 
of the pre-established harmony. In the note, Kant suggests that the pre-established harmony perhaps 
should be taken as the idea of an intelligible, noumenal world without space and time, in which the 
divine omnipresence is the principle of any real connection.704 Space is not God’s omnipresence, 
but God’s omnipresence as the form of a phenomenon, as Kant explains to his students in the 
beginning of the 1790s:    
  
Space itself is the form of the divine omnipresence, i.e. the omnipresence of God is expressed in the form 
of a phenomenon, and through this omnipresence of God all substances are in harmony. But here our 
reason can comprehend nothing more. - Those who assume space as a matter in itself or as a constitution 
of things in themselves, are required to be Spinozists, i.e., they assume the world to be a summation of the 
determinations of a united necessary substance, thus only one substance. Space as something necessary 
would then also be a property of God, and all things exist in space, thus in God. (LM, p. 478, Metaphysik 
Vigilantius, Ak. 29, pp. 1000-9)  
 
In sum, God is not present in space; all we are entitled to say is that God’s omnipresence takes the 
form of a phenomenon – the phenomenon of space.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
703 Cf. Inaugural Dissertation, p. 410, Ak. 2, p. 414. 
704 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 5962, Ak. 18, p. 405.   
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8. Conclusions 
 
The year of the transcendental turn 1769 saw a number of important ideas being brought together in 
Kant’s mind: the idea that sensibility and the understanding must be distinguished along with 
phenomena and noumena, and the idea that space and time are nothing but forms of sensibility. In this 
study, I have tried to interpret the transcendental turn in the same tradition as Erdmann, Watkins, 
Jauernig, and others, who emphasize the importance of Leibnizian themes for Kant’s intellectual 
development. Thus, I have argued that much of the deliberations behind the transcendental turn 
originated from problems of Leibnizian metaphysics.  
    Leibniz’s concept of material bodies as on the one hand continuous phenomena in space, but on the 
other hand discrete aggregates of causally independent, embodied soul-like monads, stirred much 
perplexity among Leibniz’s contemporaries. How is it possible for something discrete to ground 
something continuous, and what prevents the possibility that each monad lives in the presence of God, 
apart from their bodily point of view, in a world of their own?  In response to these difficulties, the 
successors of Leibniz tried to conceive how the monads can be localised in space (Wolff) and how it is 
possible for them to interact with each other (Knutzen).  
    I have tried to argue that these considerations explain much of Kant’s interest in the theory of physical 
influx, and his transformation of monads into physical monads. Following the suggestions of Schönfeld, 
I have argued that the notion of physical monads contains the seed of Kant’s intellectual crisis, which 
found its culmination and solution in the transcendental turn.  How is it possible to explain that the soul 
perceives everything from the point of view of its body, rather than from a particular place within the 
body, if it is a physical monad, rather than an immaterial, spiritual monad?  On the other hand, if the 
soul is an immaterial, spiritual monad, which has no other place than the place of its body, how is it 
possible for the body to influence it?  
    I think that this study provides ample evidence that these questions were important in stimulating 
Kant’s investigations during the sceptical period. Though it would be ridiculous to reduce Kant’s entire 
1760s discussion of metaphysics and its method to just this single question, it is important for any 
interpretation of Kant’s early intellectual development which emphasizes the role of Leibnizian themes.  
From this point of view, my reading has a slight advantage over the interpretations of Kant’s intellectual 
crisis, suggested for instance by Erdmann and Watkins.  
     Further support in favour of my reading is provided by Kant’s interest for the distinction between 
sensibility and understanding, which is visible in his notes on metaphysics from the late 1760s. This 
interest becomes perfectly reasonable, on the assumption that Kant aimed at explaining how it is possible 
for the soul to be influenced by the forces of the body, without having to assume that it is localised in a 
separate place, apart from the place of the body.  Sensibility is a passive faculty, which has a power to 
produce representations, insofar as it is causally influenced by the body. Otherwise, we are compelled 
to conclude that the bodily point of view just reflects the virtual presence and one-sided causal influence 
of the soul on its body, as for instance Swedenborg had argued.  
    In this study, I have argued that something made Kant change his mind about the possibility of 
sensibility, as a passive and receptive power of representation, which made him convinced that it was 
more than a merely speculative hypothesis. I have argued that Kant’s acquaintance with Locke and 
Leibniz, both directly and indirectly through his correspondence with Lambert, might have been decisive 
for his change of attitude. There are no data which let us know the faculty of sensibility directly, but we 
can know this faculty indirectly, by its effects, namely our sensations. Kant had already recognised that 
sensations provide us with simple concepts, which are the data or matter of those indemonstrable 
Seeing All Things in Space 
 
166 
 
propositions, from which all knowledge originates. However, thanks to Kant’s correspondence with 
Lambert, he was reminded that knowledge also has a form.  
     I have tried to show that Kant contributed to the tradition he assumed from Lambert, namely by 
arguing that the form of knowledge is not dead and passive, but itself the source of data of knowledge. 
There are simple concepts of form, which do not originate from sensations. The concept of space is a 
concept of form, contrary to what Locke and Lambert argued. One of the most important contributions 
of Kant in this context, was his claim that sensibility produces something more than just sensations, 
namely a relation to an outer object, which makes the sensations into appearances.   
    In the late 1760s, Kant came to argue that the orientation of the sensations contains the key to the 
relation between the sensations and the outer objects. Relating involves orienting the sensations in a 
definite direction (right/left, etc.), from a place, which coincides with the bodily point of view of the 
soul, which just goes to confirm that the soul has no other place than its body. Sensations are not just 
placed, but oriented in a direction, which makes them related to an absolute space, which cannot be 
reduced to a mere order of situations. In absolute space sensations are coordinated, not subordinated, 
which proves the point that space is a form of sensibility, not a logical form of understanding.      
     Space is that which lets the body appear in a place in the midst of the world, as the point of view of 
the soul. The point of view is a condensed point of unity between the soul and the body, but it is not 
their real point of contact.  Space is nothing but a form of sensibility, which means that the substrate of 
the body is not localised in space.  The latter explains how it is possible for the soul to have a sensibility, 
which makes it truly receptive to its body. The point of view of the soul is an expression of a unity, 
which depends on a causal interaction between the soul and the body, in agreement with the theory of 
physical influx. The soul lives in the presence of God, but sees nothing in the world, apart from its bodily 
point of view and the real unity it expresses, which makes it impossible for the soul-monad to live in a 
world of its own. 
    In this study, I have tried to defend Kant against École’s accusation that he just misunderstood Wolff’s 
notion of the faculty of sensibility, by reducing it to a faculty of non-distinct representations.  In fact, 
Wolff recognised that the representations of sensibility are singular and grounded in the sense organs, 
and not just obscure and confused, which Kant largely ignored. Though École’s assessment contains a 
grain of truth, it should not overshadow the bigger picture, which is that Wolff never found a way of 
coming to terms with the faculty of sensibility, as a receptive faculty, which ties the soul to its bodily 
point of view.  
   With this said, it must be recognised that Kant’s earliest account of sensibility and the form of 
sensibility, suggests an uneasy balance between sensibility as a passive and as an active power of 
representation.  On one hand, sensibility is a passive faculty and power, which produces sensations, 
insofar it is causally affected by alterations in the sense organs of its body; on the other hand, it is an 
active faculty, a faculty of intuition, which produces determinate empirical intuitions by coordinating 
the places and directions of the sensations, within the unity of a definite figure. 
     In this study I have argued that Kant’s late 1760s notes on space, as well his inaugural dissertation, 
gives an idea of a kind of new science of space, which later would maturate into the Transcendental 
Aesthetic. I have tried to argue that this science partly resembles Leibniz’s analysis situs, a kind of 
progenitor to later geometries of space.  De Risi has pointed out that Kant adds little to Leibniz’s 
accomplishments in this field, and leaves few leads to students who want to find suggestions which point 
ahead towards later discoveries of global spaces, with non-Euclidean structures, topologies and metrics. 
However, in my opinion this does not mean that Kant does not deal with global space, and from this 
point of view, he is on the same page as Leibniz.         
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   Kant’s science of space also has merits of its own.  More than anyone before him, Kant consciously 
explored the possibility that the postulates of Euclidean geometry are true, not because they describe the 
structural, topological, and metric properties of any global space, but because they describe those very 
same properties of the global space, within which any outer objects of our sensibility have to be ordered.  
The postulates of Euclidean geometry are in other words transcendental truths, something that already 
was on the cards of Leibniz’s philosophy of space.  
    In this study, I have tried to emphasize that there is another aspect of Kant’s science of space, which 
merits attention, namely the critical question of the origin and validity of the concept of global space, 
taken as a separate theme of study. Global space cannot be gazed upon by our eye, in an empirical 
intuition, something even Locke and Lambert had to admit. In that respect Kant was in perfect 
attunement with Euler and the entire camp of the Newtonian oriented mathematicians.  Euler taught that 
Leibnizian metaphysics had no idea of space, other than the idea of place. It is an abstract idea of a 
property of the body, which remains when a body is abstractly conceived, apart from everything which 
belongs to its nature. Conceiving a body concretely, as a body placed in relation to other bodies, which 
exert force on it, shows that the body is inert. Inert bodies are placed in relation to reference frames, 
which ultimately points towards a global space, which is absolute.   
    Euler concluded that the abstract idea of place, cannot be reduced to the concrete idea of place, and 
that the idea of space, involves the idea of an absolute space. The idea of space is not just derived by 
induction but depends on a deduction as well. However, neither his deduction of the idea of absolute 
space nor Kant’s attempt to improve it, by showing that the idea of space cannot be reduced to Leibniz’s 
idea of a situational order, are of great interest. I have tried to argue that Kant’s arguments only show 
that the idea of space is an idea of a situational order, oriented with respect to the bodily point of view 
of the soul, which is attached to an observational framework.  
    What is interesting about Euler though is that he provides a framework, against which Kant’s own 
late 1760s taxonomy of concepts can be viewed. It throws light on why he chose to reject, the alternative 
that the concept of space derives from an empirical intuition. However, it also shows why he rejected 
the alternative that the concept of space is an empirical concept of reflection, for such a concept can 
only lead to the concept of place, or more broadly, the concept of a situational order. I have tried to 
argue that this concept fails to capture what specifically belongs to an order of continuously diffused 
situations, which makes space an extended whole. Bodily extension is of no help here, because it can 
only represent extended wholes of separable, moving and impenetrable parts, which space is not.                   
    I have argued that Kant’s 1760s taxonomy only left him with two remaining options, namely that the 
concept of space is a pure concept of reflection, or a concept of pure intuition. Kant played with the idea 
that the concept of space is a pure concept of reflection, but finally rejected this alternative. Pure 
concepts of reflection extracted from the logical forms of understanding, like the concepts of subject, 
predicate, ground, etc., are the basis of the ontological concepts of substance, accident, etc. They cannot 
capture what belongs to a potentially infinite, continuous whole of indefinite parts, such as the global 
space. This left Kant with only one option, namely that the concept of space is the concept of a pure 
intuition.      
    Embracing the global space as a continuous whole, a totum analyticum immediately goes to show that 
space is an ideal whole, a totum ideale, which is one of the most important lessons of this study.  Space 
is fundamentally different from the real substantial composites, which were cherished in the Leibnizian 
ontology and cosmology of Wolff or Baumgarten. The distinction between ideal wholes and real wholes 
is long forgotten but belonged to the basic education of any capable student in metaphysics, like the 
students that attended Kant’s lectures, in the early 1770s. For former students and friends, like Herz, it 
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was an easy thing to see what place Kant’s new science was coming from, and the reasons why this 
science had to be the science of an ideal thing and not a real thing.   
     Kant’s new science never did develop into a geometry of space, but it morphed into a science of the 
origin, validity and limits of the pure knowledge of space. In a letter to Lambert, Kant initially described 
this science as a phenomenology, which determines the limits of the principles of sensibility, and hence 
prevents the application of space and time to composites of simple substances and other noumena. Space 
is a continuous whole, which must not be confused with a substantial composite, a point, which Lambert 
wholeheartedly supported.  Even if the simple parts of these composites were situated with respect to 
each other, it would be impossible to form a concept of the order of these situations, other than one 
which is discrete, given the premises and conclusions from Kant’s 1760s taxonomy.  Instead we would 
have to demonstrate that continuity belongs to an order of situations, for instance in the same way as we 
have to demonstrate that completeness belongs to a set. 
    In this study, I have made the claim that the phenomenal world is a representation of the noumenal 
world, which ultimately is that substantial composite which Lambert had pointed out must be carefully 
distinguished from space. Space is the ground of all places, which lets our body appear as the point of 
view and centre of reference, from which all sensations appear as oriented in the direction of an outer 
object. It is the ground of all appearances, which brings them together within the unity of one world – 
the phenomenal world. Space is hence not just an ideal whole, but also a transcendentally ideal ground 
of outer appearances.  
    Hopefully, this study has made it somewhat clearer that the continuity of space was a matter of 
outmost importance for Kant, not just to convince him of the transcendental ideality of space, and seek 
out the arguments for it, but also to establish the sovereignty and entitlements of Euclidean geometry, 
once and for all.  Kant’s science of space, which found its mature form in the Transcendental Aesthetic, 
partly in accordance with Kant’s plan for a phenomenology, hailed Euclid’s geometry as the highest 
form of science. Euclid’s postulates were immediately certain and necessarily true. Kant did not wrestle 
with Euclid’s definitions and postulates, trying to improve or prove them, as Leibniz or Lambert did.  
What he tried, however, was to justify them, by showing that there has to exist something such as a 
continuous and mathematically infinite space. Exists, not in the same way as a thing, but as something 
which everywhere penetrates our experience of outer things.     
    To appreciate the relevance of what Kant tried to accomplish, it is helpful to recall that Euclid’s 
geometry is a geometry of constructions and not just a geometry of definitions.  For instance, Euclid did 
not just define what belongs to a straight line but postulated that a straight line can be constructed 
between any two lines.  Likewise, he did not just define a circle, but postulated that a circle with any 
centre and radius can be constructed. However, as Heath underscores, it is not possible to construct and 
prove something further by the help of these lines and circles, unless it is possible for them to intersect 
each other.705  
    Indirectly, the proofs of Euclid’s propositions follow only if the existence of the points of intersection 
has been demonstrated from an independent principle, which needs to be postulated.706 This principle is 
the principle of continuity, which intuitively says that the line segments and circle arcs, which are used 
as arguments in the demonstrations, have to be complete, in the sense that they must be free of gaps or 
holes.707 The point of intersection, which divides a segment into two parts, has to exist and belong to 
either of the two parts.    
                                                 
705 Heath (1956, pp. 234-7). 
706 Heath (1956, pp. 235-6). 
707 Heath (1956, pp. 235-6). 
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    For instance, in order to construct an equilateral triangle on a given straight line from A to B, it must 
be shown that this line describes both the radius of a circle with centre A, and the radius of another circle 
with centre B. The point C, in which the circles intersect, is the apex of the triangle ABC. The length of 
the radius AB describes of course the lengths between the respective centres and the boundaries of both 
circles.  Hence, the length of AB equals both the length from A to C and the length from B to C, which 
entails that ABC is equilateral.  However, this proof goes down the drain if there is a gap in C. To 
prevent this unhappy outcome, the proof must rely on an independent demonstration of the existence of 
the point C, which is exactly what the principle of continuity allows us to do.    
     Kant knew of course nothing of this principle of continuity – a brainchild of Dedekind and 19th 
century mathematics.  However, he was most likely assured that he had done more than anyone before 
him to safeguard Euclidean geometry from those devilish, metaphysical holes and gaps in the fabric of 
the world, which otherwise threatened to swallow it.  He had granted continuity to it, because it was a 
phenomenal world, grounded in the inner unity of the immediate subjective space of our outer 
sensibility.  
    Transcendental ideality is inseparable from it, for it is solely as a form of outer sensibility, that 
Euclidean geometry can pretend to say something a priori and necessarily of the phenomenal world, and 
yet independently of any measurements of it.  The truths of Euclidean geometry follow neither from 
definitions, nor from inductions.  Euclid’s first postulate is true, because the shortest distance between 
any outer phenomena, which appear from the bodily point of view of our sensibility, is conditioned by 
the form of that sensibility. 
    In this study, I have argued that Kant fails to muster a decisive argument against Leibniz’s philosophy 
of space. As De Risi shows, Leibniz did not have to borrow evidence for the continuity of space and the 
truth of the postulates of Euclidean geometry from experience.   Leibniz never conceived space, merely 
as an order of simultaneous situations, but as a form in accordance with which situations are synthesised 
in our imagination. Without a synthesis of situations, there can be no perceptions of outer phenomena. 
Transcendental truth thus belongs to the postulates of Euclidean geometry, insofar as they describe the 
principles, in accordance with which situations are synthesised in outer perceptions.  
    However, although Kant’s arguments against Leibniz fail, they point ahead towards the deeper seated 
reasons behind Kant’s defence of the transcendental ideality claim. The transcendental ideality claim 
grants that simple substances cannot have a place in space, which means that they cannot become parts 
of the phenomena. There is nothing that limits the continuity and potentially infinite divisibility of the 
phenomena, according to Kant. More narrowly, the transcendental ideality claim grants that the spatial 
order between phenomena is not isomorphic with the order of coexistence between the noumena, i.e. 
the simple substances. Hence, there is no perfect one-to-one correspondence or mapping between 
phenomena and noumena, which guarantees that the spatial order between the phenomena faithfully 
preserves the order of coexistence between the noumena. Phenomena are at no point actually finitely or 
infinitely divided, in a way which perfectly mirrors how the noumenal substances are divided.      
    In Kant’s late 1760s taxonomy there was still a tension between describing space, or the representation 
of space as a pure intuition and as a concept of understanding. Kant did not work out the distinction 
between the pure intuition of space and the concept of space, until the late 1770s and early 1780s. In 
this study, I have followed the suggestions of Fichant, Onof, Schulting, Patton and others, who 
emphasise that Kant made a distinction between two concepts of space: the metaphysical concept of 
space and the geometric concepts of space.  Whereas the former concept is the concept of the immediate, 
originally given subjective space of our sensibility, the latter concepts are the concepts of points, curves 
and figures, which occur in the definitions and constructions of Euclidean geometry.          
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    Pure knowledge of the global space, as a phenomenon originally given to sensibility, is what the 
Transcendental Aesthetic promises. Knowledge, which proceeds from an exposition or analysis of the 
metaphysical concept of space, with the purpose of showing that the original representation of space is 
a pure intuition. The trouble for any student of Kant, is to figure out how the metaphysical concept of 
space acquires its content and hence how it is linked to the pure intuition of space.  In this study I have 
made the, perhaps, somewhat unconventional claim that Kant’s method of abstraction should not be 
dismissed in the way generally done.  
     The metaphysical concept of space is the concept of form, which can be isolated only if we conceive 
the body, from a transcendental point of view, i.e. not as a thing in itself, but as a representation of body. 
From the point of view of transcendental reflection, a piece of chalk is just a representation, with a form 
and a matter.  Its matter, dryness, whiteness, etc., which originates from sensation, can then be isolated 
from those elements of its form, which originate from the understanding, like substance, force, etc. This 
will leave us with nothing but extension and figure, which presuppose the form of sensibility, and hence 
the pure intuition of space, a form not originally given to the understanding.  
    The expositions of the metaphysical concept of space are nothing but an analysis of the extension 
uncovered by the method of abstraction. Contrary to commentators like Onof, Schulting, Blomme, and 
others, the purpose of the Metaphysical Expositions is not to exhibit those categorical determinations 
under which understanding thinks a thing. True, it makes sense to say that space is a quantity, a ground, 
a substrate, but none of this makes a discrete quantity of a real substance, like the things we experience.  
We know things in space, but we do not know space, in the same way as a thing.      
     I hope that this study has added somewhat to the understanding of the considerations behind Kant’s 
transcendental ideality claim, from a historical point of view.  However, before closing this study I think 
it is fitting to say just a few words about this claim, from a more contemporary point of view. For us 
there is little which seems to support Kant’s claim. Space exists: it is the space of our physical universe. 
Mathematical geometry deals with ideal spaces and physical geometry decides which geometry applies 
to the space of the physical universe. 
   Historically geometry simply arose from the practical need to measure the Earth, like the area of a plot 
of land, or things on the Earth, like the height of a building or the distance traversed by a ship. The 
division between geometry and physical geometry was just an expression of the development of 
productive forces and private property rights, which stimulated the need for measurements in the first 
place. Mathematical geometry started with the need to measure real lengths, areas, volumes, etc., but 
soon left these rather dull issues to geographers, surveyors, etc. 
    Thanks to this, the specialised mathematical geometers could concentrate their efforts on points, 
curves, figures, etc. These spaces were constructed spaces, in the imagination and thought of the 
geometers. They obeyed rules of construction, codified in often inadequate definitions, as well as in 
postulates and axioms, borrowed from the practical experiences of measuring real spaces.  For the 
mathematical geometers the ideal spaces in their heads were more true and real than the real spaces that 
were measured by surveyors, peasants, artisans, workers, engineers, etc. However, this social 
psychological and ideological illusion was not an ordinary illusion, or self-delusion.   
   Rather it was an illusion originating from the forgetfulness that is typical of societies based on a 
developed division of labour. Geometers simply forgot, and forget, that their ideal points are nothing 
but idealisations of real places. Points arise in the original act of determining the places on the Earth, 
the place of a statue for instance. Place de la Sorbonne is not just the place of Sorbonne, but also a 
reference frame, a place, which indicates the place of any object on Place de la Sorbonne, for instance 
the place of the statue of Auguste Comte. However, by using Place de la Sorbonne to point out the place 
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of the statue of Auguste Comte, Place de la Sorbonne represents the place of the statue abstractly, apart 
from its extension and figure, and hence in the same way as a mathematical point.     
    Malebranche had a fine sense for these delicate issues, when he invited his readers to imagine the 
measurement of a cloth, an everyday labour activity, which could be observed in any tailor shop in 
Paris.708 The cloth is real, and so is the ellwand, but their relation, which makes the cloth three ells, is 
not real. However, it is a truth and this truth we see in God.709 Developing this example somewhat, it is 
not difficult to see how the ellwand could represent the length of the cloth abstractly, and purely, as just 
a mathematical line. The truths of the mathematical line derive from the reality of the ellwand, not as a 
natural object of wood, but as an instrument of measurement, a fact which Malebranche only could make 
sense of by suggesting that we see the mathematical line, in God.   
   I think that Kant understood the depth of what Malebranche was looking for. Geometric truths are not 
truths from experience, but transcendental truths, universally valid for the things we experience and 
measure.  Geometric truths resemble the transcendent truths of God, but they are not truths in God or 
truths about God. Space is not God or a property of God, but a source of transcendental truths, which 
makes it possible to see all things from the point of view of our body, which is exactly what this study 
has been about. 
 
 
 
                                                 
708 The Search after Truth III, ii, 6, p. 234.  
709 The Search after Truth III, ii, 6, p. 234.  
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